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FOREWORD
The world urgently needs to change the way it pro-
duces and consumes food. In the coming decades, 
the global agricultural system must find ways to 
meet pressing but sometimes competing needs. 
Farmers must provide enough food for a population 
that is expected to reach nearly 10 billion people 
by 2050. Employing around 2 billion people today, 
agriculture must continue to be an engine of inclu-
sive economic and social development that con-
tributes to poverty reduction, even as many small 
farmers transition into other forms of employment. 
At the same time, agriculture must lighten its 
environmental footprint. The impacts of agriculture 
are large and growing, to the point where they are 
already undermining food production through land 
degradation, water scarcity, and adverse impacts of 
climate change. 
As the global population grows and incomes rise 
across the developing world, overall food demand 
is on course to increase by more than 50 percent by 
mid-century, and demand for animal-based foods 
by nearly 70 percent. Yet even today, hundreds of 
millions of people remain undernourished as local 
agricultural systems fail to provide enough nutri-
tious food, and economic factors prevent equitable 
distribution of available food.
This World Resources Report is the product of a 
multiyear collaboration between World Resources 
Institute, the World Bank Group, the United 
Nations Environment Programme, the United 
Nations Development Programme, the Cen-
tre de coopération internationale en recherche 
agronomique pour le développement, and the 
Institut national de la recherche agronomique. 
Creating a Sustainable Food Future defines and 
quantifies three specific challenges facing the global 
food system: 
 ▪ Food supply. If consumption trends continue 
as projected, the world will need to increase 
food production by more than 50 percent  
to feed nearly 10 billion people adequately  
in 2050.
 ▪ Land use. To protect natural ecosystems criti-
cal to biodiversity and climate change mitiga-
tion, the additional food must be produced with 
no net expansion in the area of agricultural 
land. Without action, cropland and pastureland 
are projected to increase by nearly 600 million 
hectares by 2050.
 ▪ Greenhouse gas emissions. Agriculture 
has not been a major focus of emissions mitiga-
tion, other than as a potential source of carbon 
sequestration in soils. Yet farming is a signifi-
cant and growing source of emissions. To limit 
agriculture to its “fair share” of total allowable 
emissions in a world where global temperatures 
have risen by 2 degrees Celsius, the sector must 
address the demand for 50 percent more food 
while reducing emissions by two-thirds from 
2010 levels. And to stay under a 1.5-degrees 
Celsius rise in temperature, these emissions 
will need to be further reduced by reforesting at 
least 585 million hectares of agricultural land 
freed up by productivity gains and reductions  
in demand.
Meeting these challenges will be an immense task, 
but this report proposes a 22-item “menu of solu-
tions” that, together, could deliver a sustainable 
food future. The solutions target both supply- and 
demand-side measures: We must produce more 
food, but we must also slow the rate of growth in 
demand—especially demand for resource-intensive 
foods such as beef. 
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A new model, developed specifically for this report, 
allows us to quantify the potential contribution of 
each “menu item” to the goals of raising production, 
limiting demand, and/or reducing GHG emissions. 
The report analyzes specific obstacles that must be 
overcome and identifies the most promising solu-
tions that are currently available or show promise 
in the near term. It also identifies the policies, 
practices, and incentives necessary to implement 
the solutions at the necessary scale. 
A common thread in many of the solutions is the 
urgent need to “produce, protect, and prosper.” 
The world must act decisively to intensify produc-
tion on agricultural land. The world must also act 
decisively to protect natural ecosystems that store 
carbon, support biodiversity, and provide the many 
ecosystem services on which humanity depends. 
Food production and ecosystem protection must 
be linked at every level—policy, finance, and farm 
practice—to avoid destructive competition for pre-
Achim Steiner
Administrator of United Nations 
Development Programme 
Andrew Steer
President 
World Resources Institute
cious land and water. And this combination must—
and can—result in greater prosperity to lift people 
out of poverty and sustain political will.
We do not argue for full implementation of all 22 
menu items in every country, as some solutions will 
not be relevant or feasible everywhere. Interested 
governments, businesses, and stakeholders across 
food supply chains will need to decide which menu 
items are relevant for them.
The report demonstrates that big changes are pos-
sible and that a sustainable food future is achiev-
able. The menu proposed in this report can create a 
world with sufficient, nutritious food for everyone. 
It also offers the chance to generate the broader 
social, environmental, and economic cobenefits that 
are the foundation of sustainable development. But 
such a future will only be achieved if governments, 
the private sector, and civil society act upon the 
entire menu quickly and with conviction. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As the global population grows from 7 billion in 2010 
to a projected 9.8 billion in 2050, and incomes grow 
across the developing world, overall food demand 
is projected to increase by more than 50 percent. 
Demand for more resource-intensive foods like meat 
and dairy products is projected to rise even faster, 
by nearly 70 percent. Yet even today, more than 800 
million people are hungry or malnourished. Increas-
ing food production in ways that respect human 
well-being and the environment presents enormous 
challenges. Agriculture already uses almost half 
of the world’s vegetated land, and agriculture and 
related land-use change generate one-quarter of 
annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
This World Resources Report proposes a menu of 
options that could allow the world to achieve a sus-
tainable food future by meeting growing demands 
for food, avoiding deforestation, and reforesting or 
restoring abandoned and unproductive land—and 
in ways that help stabilize the climate, promote 
economic development, and reduce poverty.  
Achieving these goals requires closing three great 
“gaps” by 2050:
 ▪ The food gap—the difference between the 
amount of food produced in 2010 and the 
amount necessary to meet likely demand in 
2050. We estimate this gap to be 56 percent 
more crop calories than were produced in 2010. 
 ▪ The land gap—the difference between global 
agricultural land area in 2010 and the area that 
will be required in 2050—even if crop and pas-
ture yields continue to grow at rates achieved in 
the past. We estimate this gap to be 593 million 
hectares, an area nearly twice the size of India.
 ▪  The GHG mitigation gap—the difference 
between the level of annual GHG emissions from 
agriculture and land-use change in 2050, which 
we estimate to be 15 gigatons (Gt), and a target 
of 4 Gt that represents agriculture’s proportional 
contribution to holding global warming below 
2°C above pre-industrial temperatures. Holding 
warming below a 1.5°C increase would require 
meeting this 4 Gt target plus freeing up hun-
dreds of millions of hectares for reforestation.  
This report explores a 22-item “menu for a sus-
tainable food future,” which is divided into five 
“courses” that together could close these gaps: (1) 
reduce growth in demand for food and agricultural 
products; (2) increase food production without 
expanding agricultural land; (3) protect and 
restore natural ecosystems; (4) increase fish supply 
(through improved wild fisheries management and 
aquaculture); and (5) reduce GHG emissions from 
agricultural production.  
On the one hand, the challenge of simultaneously 
closing these three gaps is harder than often recog-
nized. Some prior analyses overestimate potential 
crop yield growth, underestimate or even ignore the 
challenge of pastureland expansion, and “double 
count” land by assuming that land is available for 
reforestation or bioenergy without accounting for 
the world’s growing need to produce more food, 
protect biodiversity, and sequester more carbon. 
Significant progress in all 22 menu items is neces-
sary to close the three gaps, requiring action by 
many millions of farmers, businesses, consumers, 
and all governments.  
On the other hand, the scope of potential solutions 
is often underestimated. Prior analyses have gener-
ally not focused on the promising opportunities for 
technological innovation and have often underesti-
mated the large social or economic cobenefits. Our 
menu is detailed but several themes stand out:
 ▪ Raise productivity. Increased efficiency 
of natural resource use is the single most 
important step toward meeting both food 
production and environmental goals. This 
means increasing crop yields at higher than 
historical (linear) rates, and dramatically 
increasing output of milk and meat per hectare 
of pasture, per animal—particularly cattle—and 
per kilogram of fertilizer. If today’s levels of 
production efficiency were to remain constant 
through 2050, then feeding the planet would 
entail clearing most of the world’s remaining 
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forests, wiping out thousands more species, and 
releasing enough GHG emissions to exceed the 
1.5°C and 2°C warming targets enshrined in the 
Paris Agreement—even if emissions from all 
other human activities were entirely eliminated. 
 ▪ Manage demand. Closing the food gap will 
be far more difficult if we cannot slow the rate 
of growth in demand. Slowing demand growth 
requires reducing food loss and waste, shifting 
the diets of high meat consumers toward plant-
based foods, avoiding any further expansion 
of biofuel production, and improving women’s 
access to education and healthcare in Africa to 
accelerate voluntary reductions in fertility levels. 
 ▪ Link agricultural intensification with natural ecosystems protection. 
Agricultural land area is not only expanding; 
the location of agricultural land is also 
shifting from one region to another (e.g., from 
temperate areas to the tropics). The resulting 
land-use changes increase GHG emissions 
and loss of biodiversity. To ensure that food 
production is increased through yield growth 
(intensification) not through expansion, and 
that productivity gains do not encourage more 
shifting, governments must explicitly link 
efforts to boost crop and pasture yields with 
legal measures to protect forests, savannas, and 
peatlands from conversion to agriculture.
 ▪ Moderate ruminant meat consumption. 
Ruminant livestock (cattle, sheep, and goats) 
use two-thirds of global agricultural land and 
contribute roughly half of agriculture’s produc-
tion-related emissions. Demand for ruminant 
meat is projected to grow by 88 percent be-
tween 2010 and 2050. Yet, even in the United 
States, ruminant meats (mostly beef) provide 
only 3 percent of calories and 12 percent of 
protein. Closing the land and GHG mitigation 
gaps requires that, by 2050, the 20 percent of 
the world’s population who would otherwise be 
high ruminant-meat consumers reduce their 
average consumption by 40 percent relative to 
their consumption in 2010. 
 ▪ Target reforestation and peatland restoration. Rewetting lightly farmed, 
drained peatlands that occupy only around 0.5 
percent of global agricultural lands provides 
a necessary and cost-effective step toward 
climate change mitigation, as does reforesting 
some marginal and hard-to-improve grazing 
land. Reforestation at a scale necessary to hold 
temperature rise below 1.5 degrees Celsius (i.e., 
hundreds of millions of hectares) is potentially 
achievable but only if the world succeeds in 
reducing projected growth in demand for 
resource-intensive agricultural products and 
boosting crop and livestock yields.  
 ▪ Require production-related climate mitigation. Management measures exist 
to significantly reduce GHG emissions from 
agricultural production sources, particularly 
enteric fermentation by ruminants, and from 
manure, nitrogen fertilizers, and energy use. 
These measures require a variety of incentives 
and regulations, deployed at scale. Implemen-
tation will require far more detailed analysis 
and tracking of agricultural production systems 
within countries.   
 ▪ Spur technological innovation. Fully clos-
ing our gaps requires many innovations. For-
tunately, researchers have demonstrated good 
potential in every necessary area. Opportunities 
include crop traits or additives that reduce meth-
ane emissions from rice and cattle, improved 
fertilizer forms and crop properties that reduce 
nitrogen runoff, solar-based processes for mak-
ing fertilizers, organic sprays that preserve fresh 
food for longer periods, and plant-based beef 
substitutes. A revolution in molecular biology 
opens up new opportunities for crop breeding. 
Progress at the necessary scale requires large 
increases in R&D funding, and flexible regula-
tions that encourage private industry to develop 
and market new technologies.
Using a new model called GlobAgri-WRR, we 
estimate how three scenarios we call Coordinated 
Effort, Highly Ambitious, and Breakthrough Tech-
nologies can narrow and ultimately fully close our 
three gaps. As one example, Figure ES-1 illustrates 
how our five courses of action could feed the world 
and help hold down global temperature rise. 
We believe that a sustainable food future is achievable 
although the challenges are formidable. The world 
must act swiftly to define goals and scale up the mul-
tiple efforts that will be necessary to achieve them.
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Figure ES-1 |    Ambitious efforts across all menu items will be necessary to feed 10 billion people and help keep 
global temperature rise well below 2 degrees Celsius
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Note: These charts show the most ambitious “Breakthrough Technologies” scenario. “Restore forests and peatlands” item includes full reforestation of at least 80 million hectares 
of liberated agricultural land, in order to reach the 4 Gt CO2e/year target by 2050 for limiting global temperature rise to 2°C. As an even more ambitious option, in order to limit 
warming to 1.5°C, full reforestation of at least 585 million hectares of liberated agricultural land could offset global agricultural production emissions for many years.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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Scope of the Challenge 
and Menu of Potential 
Solutions
This World Resources Report addresses a fundamental question: How 
can the world adequately feed nearly 10 billion people by the year 2050 
in ways that help combat poverty, allow the world to meet climate goals, 
and reduce pressures on the broader environment? Chapters 1–4 of 
this report assess the scope of the challenge and outline the menu of 
possible solutions for a sustainable food future. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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A RECIPE FOR CHANGE
The challenge of creating a sustainable food future involves 
balancing several competing needs. By 2050, the world must feed 
many more people, more nutritiously, and ensure that agriculture 
contributes to poverty reduction through inclusive economic and 
social development, all while reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, loss of habitat, freshwater depletion and pollution, and 
other environmental impacts of farming. Pursuing any one of these 
goals to the exclusion of the others will likely result in failure to 
achieve any of them. 
CHAPTER 1
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First, the world needs to meet growing food 
demand. Food demand will grow in part because 
the world’s population will grow. The United 
Nations projects a 40 percent population growth 
in just 40 years, from nearly 7 billion in 2010—the 
base year for many of the calculations in this 
report—to 9.8 billion by 2050.1 In addition, at least 
3 billion people are likely to enter the global middle 
class by 2030.2 History shows that more affluent 
consumers demand more resource-intensive food, 
such as meat, vegetables, and vegetable oils.3 Yet 
at the same time, approximately 820 million of 
the world’s poorest people remain undernourished 
even today because they cannot afford or do not 
have access to an adequate diet.4 
Strategies can attempt to reduce the demand for 
food by the affluent in socially beneficial ways, 
but failing to produce enough food to meet overall 
global demand is not an acceptable option because, 
when food availability falls short, the world’s rich 
outcompete the poor and hunger increases.5 Based 
on current trends, both crop and livestock produc-
tion will need to increase at substantially faster 
rates than they have increased over the past 50 
years to fully meet projected food demand.6 
Second, the world needs agriculture to contribute 
to inclusive economic and social development to 
help reduce poverty. More than 70 percent of the 
world’s poor live in rural areas, where most depend 
on agriculture for their principal livelihood.7 Growth 
originating in the agricultural sector can often 
reduce poverty more effectively than growth origi-
nating in other economic sectors, in part by provid-
ing employment and in part by lowering the cost 
of food.8 Although agriculture directly accounts for 
only about 3.5 percent of gross world product, that 
figure is approximately 30 percent in low-income 
countries.9 Agriculture is at least a part-time source 
of livelihoods for more than 2 billion people.10 
Women make up an estimated 43 percent of the 
agricultural workforce worldwide, and they consti-
tute an even higher share of agricultural workers in 
East Asia, Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.11 
Because increasing women’s income has dispropor-
tionate benefits for alleviating hunger,12 assisting 
women farmers is a particularly effective way to 
reduce poverty and enhance food security. 
Third, the world needs to reduce agriculture’s 
impact on the environment and natural resources. 
Agriculture’s impacts are especially large in three 
environmental areas:
Land-based Ecosystems 
Since the invention of agriculture 8,000–10,000 
years ago, growing crops and raising livestock have 
been the primary causes of ecosystem loss and 
degradation.13 Today, more than one-third of the 
planet’s landmass, and almost half of the world’s 
vegetated land, is used to produce food (Figure 
1-1).14 By one estimate, “worldwide agriculture has 
already cleared or converted 70 percent of grass-
land, 50 percent of the savanna, 45 percent of the 
temperate deciduous forest, and 27 percent of tropi-
cal forests.”15 Yet agriculture continues to expand 
and is the dominant driver of deforestation and 
associated impacts on biodiversity.16
Figure 1-1 |  Thirty-seven percent of Earth’s  
landmass (excluding Antarctica) is  
used for food production
Note: Numbers may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
a Permanent ice cover, desert, etc. When excluding deserts, ice, and inland water 
bodies, nearly 50 percent of land is used to produce food.
Source: FAO (2011b).
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Climate 
Agriculture and associated land-use change such 
as deforestation accounted for nearly one-quarter 
of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2010 
(Figure 1-2). Of these, agricultural production 
contributed more than one-half.17 
Agriculture’s role in the challenge of climate 
change is also intimately connected to its impacts 
on ecosystems. Native vegetation and soils contain 
vast quantities of carbon, and conversion to agri-
culture causes the loss of nearly all the carbon in 
the vegetation and, in the case of cropland, roughly 
one-quarter of the carbon in the top meter of 
soils.18 By 2000, conversion of natural ecosystems 
accounted for roughly one-third of the increased 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere since preindus-
trial times.19 Agriculture-related emissions, includ-
ing those from loss of carbon in cleared and drained 
peatlands, now amount to roughly five gigatons (Gt) 
of CO2e per year. Total emissions from loss of land-
based carbon are equivalent to about 10 percent of 
human-caused emissions from all sources.20 If we 
estimate on the basis of gross conversion, which 
ignores the carbon impact of forest regrowth, the 
estimates of emissions from land-use change would 
be substantially higher.21 
Water 
Agriculture accounts for 70 percent of all fresh 
water withdrawn from rivers, lakes, and aquifers, 
and for 80 to 90 percent of fresh water consump-
tion by human activities (Figure 1-3).22 Agriculture 
is also the primary source of nutrient runoff, which 
creates “dead zones” and toxic algal blooms in 
coastal waters and aquatic ecosystems.23
Figure 1-2 | Agriculture accounts for about one-quarter of global GHG emissions (~2010)
Note: Numbers may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
a Excludes emissions from agricultural energy sources described above. 
b Includes emissions from on-farm energy consumption as well as from manufacturing of farm tractors, irrigation pumps, other machinery, and key inputs such as fertilizer. It 
excludes emissions from the transport of food.
Sources: GlobAgri-WRR model (agricultural production emissions); WRI analysis based on UNEP (2012); FAO (2012a); EIA (2012); IEA (2012); and Houghton (2008) with adjustments.
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Figure 1-3 | Agriculture accounts for the vast majority of global freshwater withdrawals and consumption
Note: Figures measure only “blue water” demand and do not consider rainfed agriculture (“green water”). Consumption figures are averaged for the years 1996–2005; withdrawal 
figures are for the year 2000.
Sources: Hoekstra and Mekonnen (2012) (consumption); OECD (2012) output from IMAGE model (withdrawals).
Addressing Food Supply, Development 
and Poverty Reduction, and 
Environmental Protection
Because of feedback effects, addressing any one of 
these needs in isolation would probably undermine 
the chances of meeting all three. For example, the 
world could focus on raising food production by 
converting forests and savannas to croplands and 
grazing lands, but this approach would increase 
agriculture-related GHG emissions from the loss 
of carbon in plants and soils. The climate effects of 
such an approach would likely have large adverse 
effects on agricultural output due to higher average 
temperatures, extended heat waves, flooding, shift-
ing precipitation patterns, and saltwater inundation 
or intrusion of coastal fields (Figures 1-4 and 1-5).24 
Reducing agriculture’s impact on climate and the 
broader environment in a manner that fails to meet 
food needs or provide economic opportunities 
would probably undermine the political support for 
that environmental protection. Trying to increase 
food production in ways that boost prices or 
displace smallholders without alternative opportu-
nities could undermine the economic development 
necessary to support improved agriculture. 
Agriculture’s past performance is evidence of 
the enormity of the challenge. Between 1962 and 
2006, the Green Revolution25 drove increased 
yields with scientifically bred varieties of grains, 
synthetic fertilizers, and a doubling of irrigated 
area.26 A “livestock revolution” increased meat and 
dairy yields per animal and per hectare through 
improved feeding, breeding, and health care.27 
Even these vast yield increases were not enough to 
prevent net cropland and pastureland expansion of 
roughly 500 million hectares (Mha), according to 
data from the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO).28 And although this 
period witnessed reductions in global poverty rates, 
roughly 820 million people remained chronically 
undernourished in 2017.29 
To balance by midcentury the three great needs—
meeting food demand, supporting development, 
and protecting the earth’s natural resources—the 
world’s food system must exceed previous achieve-
ments in increasing food production while reducing 
poverty, avoiding land conversion, and mitigating 
agriculture-related GHG emissions. 
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Figure 1-4 | Climate change is projected to have net adverse impacts on crop yields (3°C warmer world)
Figure 1-5 |  Water stress will increase in many agricultural areas by 2040 due to growing water use and higher temperatures
Note: Maps are for illustrative purposes and do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of WRI concerning the legal status of any country or territory, or concerning 
the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries.
Source: World Bank (2010).
Note: Areas in white do not contain cropland or pasture. Based on a business-as-usual scenario using shared socioeconomic pathway SSP2 and climate scenario RCP8.5.  
Maps are for illustrative purposes and do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of WRI concerning the legal status of any country or territory, or concerning the 
delimitation of frontiers or boundaries.
Sources: Gassert et al. (2015); cropland and pasture from Ramankutty et al. (2008). 
Percentage change in yield-50%No data +100%
Projected changes in water stress, 2010–40
 > 2.8x  increase2x increase2x decrease> 2.8x decrease 1.4x increaseNear baseline level1.4x decrease
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A TALE OF THREE GAPS
We quantify the challenge of creating a sustainable food future 
in terms of the need to close three “gaps”: in food production, 
agricultural land area, and greenhouse gas mitigation. To measure 
the size of these gaps, we use a new model, GlobAgri-WRR, 
developed in a partnership between WRI, CIRAD, INRA, and 
Princeton University.
CHAPTER 2
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Creating a sustainable food future requires closing 
three interrelated “gaps” by 2050:
The Food Gap
The food gap, as we define it, is the difference 
between the crop calories produced in 2010 and 
those that the world will likely require in 2050 
based on projected demand. This gap can be closed 
both through measures that decrease the rate of 
growth in demand and measures that increase 
supply. The more the gap can be closed through 
demand-reduction measures, the smaller will be the 
challenge of increasing food production. And as that 
challenge decreases, so does the risk that the world 
will fail to meet food needs, which would most 
harshly affect the poor. In this report, we explore 
both demand-reduction measures and the potential 
to boost food supply to fill the remaining gap.
The Land Gap
The land gap is the difference between the projected 
area of land needed to produce all the food the 
world will need in 2050 and the amount of land 
in existing agricultural use in 2010. The food gap 
could be closed by expanding agricultural land—but 
at the cost of increased harm to ecosystems and 
further releases of their stored carbon. To avoid 
huge additional land clearing, the target is to hold 
agricultural land area—both cropland and grazing 
land—to the area used in 2010, the base year for  
our analysis. 
The Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Mitigation Gap
The GHG mitigation gap is the difference between 
agriculture-related GHG emissions projected in 
2050 and an emissions target for agriculture and 
related land-use change in 2050 necessary to sta-
bilize the climate at acceptable temperatures. The 
emissions include both emissions from agricultural 
production and from land-use change. The GHG 
mitigation gap can be closed by demand measures, 
by measures to increase production on existing 
land, and by changes in production processes. 
To measure the size of each gap, we use a new 
model, GlobAgri-WRR (Box 2-1 and Appendix 
A). Although the food gap is simply the difference 
between demand in 2050 and demand in 2010, 
the land and GHG mitigation gaps can usefully 
be understood in different ways, which leads us 
to develop a few versions of the gap. Primarily, 
we use the GlobAgri-WRR model to project what 
land-use demands and emissions are likely to be 
in 2050 under a “business-as-usual” or “baseline” 
trajectory. In general, crop and pasture yields 
grow, farmers increase their efficiency in the use 
of many inputs, and these gains hold down the 
growth in agricultural land area and emissions. 
Using different ways of estimating historical yield 
trends, GlobAgri-WRR also projects an “alterna-
tive” baseline, and the land or GHG mitigation gaps 
represent the difference between these baselines 
and the land-use and emissions targets that must 
be achieved for a sustainable food future. 
Our definition of the baseline projection, and 
therefore of the land and mitigation gaps, already 
assumes great progress and effort by farmers, 
governments, businesses, and individuals. Their 
efforts contributed to the historical rates of prog-
ress, and so this future baseline implicitly assumes 
similar efforts. It is easy to overlook how much 
work is necessary to achieve even this baseline.
To help keep in mind the level of ambition required 
in the baseline projection, we also create a “no 
productivity gains after 2010” projection, which 
assumes no improvement in the efficiency of pro-
duction systems and no increase in average yields 
after 2010. We estimate how much agricultural land 
would expand and GHG emissions would rise by 
2050 if all expected food demands were met under 
this “no gains” assumption. Using this projection, 
the land-use and GHG mitigation gaps in 2050 are 
much larger. 
In effect, the gap quantified by this “no produc-
tivity gains after 2010” projection measures the 
total progress required between 2010 and 2050 to 
achieve a sustainable food future. By contrast, the 
gap using the business-as-usual baseline, which is 
largely based on past trends in productivity gains, 
indicates how much higher rates of progress must 
be than those achieved in the past. 
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BOX 2-1 | Overview of the GlobAgri-WRR Model (see Appendix A for a longer description)
GlobAgri-WRR is a version of the GlobAgri 
model developed jointly by the Centre de 
coopération internationale en recherche 
agronomique pour le développement 
(CIRAD) and Institut national de la recherche 
agronomique (INRA), WRI, and Princeton 
University. This global accounting and 
biophysical model quantifies food production 
and consumption from national diets and 
population, as well as land-use demands. 
The model also estimates GHG emissions 
from agriculture, including emissions from 
production (primarily methane and nitrous 
oxide), carbon dioxide emissions from the 
energy used to produce fertilizers and 
pesticides or to run farm machinery, and 
emissions from land-use change. Emissions 
modeled include everything up to the farm gate 
but do not include those from food processing, 
transportation, retail, or cooking.
GlobAgri links food consumption decisions in 
each country or region (see Appendix A for a 
list of countries and regions) to the production 
of the crops, meat, milk, and fish necessary to 
meet food demands after accounting for food 
loss and waste at each stage of the value chain 
from farm to fork. Its core data for production, 
consumption, and yields for base year 2010 are 
based on data from FAO (2019a). The model 
accounts for the multiple food, feed, and energy 
products that can be generated by each crop 
and reflects the estimates of both crop and 
food product calorie contents by region as 
estimated in FAO (2019a). It estimates land-use 
and GHG emissions related to agricultural 
production in each of the world’s countries 
in light of crop yields, population, diets, 
production methods, and levels of food loss 
and waste—factors that can all be modified 
to examine future scenarios of agricultural 
production and food consumption. Much of 
the complexity of the model resulted from 
automated ways in which it reconciles different 
FAOSTAT data.
To analyze the alternative food production and 
consumption scenarios and the “menu items” 
presented in Courses 1–5, GlobAgri-WRR altered 
the relevant attribute while holding all other 
consumption and production factors constant. 
For example, to examine the consequences 
of shifting diets, the model assumes any 
additional or less food consumption per food 
category would be supplied at the same 
national crop yields, and using the same 
national livestock production systems, along 
with the same rates of food loss and waste 
as in the 2050 baseline. Thus, in Courses 1–5, 
GlobAgri-WRR calculates the impact of each 
menu item in isolation. With limited exceptions, 
the model also assumes that the role of 
imports and exports would remain the same. 
For example, if 20 percent of a crop in Country 
A is imported, then the same percentage 
would remain true under scenarios of altered 
demand for that crop, and countries also 
contribute the same share of the crop to global 
exports. The combined scenarios presented 
in the penultimate section of this report, The 
Complete Menu, alter several attributes at 
once (for instance, all demand-side attributes). 
Because the combined effects are not merely 
the sum of each individual menu item, we then 
allocate the total combined effect to individual 
menu items in combined mitigation scenarios. 
Assumptions underlying the 2050 baseline are 
presented in this chapter.
GlobAgri-WRR is designed to estimate land 
use and GHG emissions with specified levels 
of population, diets and other crop demands, 
specific trade patterns, and specified 
agricultural production systems in different 
countries. The model by itself does not attempt 
to analyze what policies and practices will 
achieve those systems, which are the focus of 
this broader report. For this reason, GlobAgri-
WRR does not need to attempt to analyze 
economic feedback effects. 
Other models attempt to estimate these 
kinds of economic effects and feedbacks. 
For example, if people in one country were 
to become richer and increase their food 
consumption, the prices of food would 
generally increase globally, which might result 
in some reductions in food consumption in 
other countries, and changes in production 
systems globally. Such models can in 
theory help us understand how to design 
policies to achieve specific consumption 
or production practices, but they are not 
necessary to analyze the land-use and 
emissions consequences of any specific set 
of consumption or production practices. One 
downside of such models is that they must 
make a large series of assumptions to operate 
because economists have not econometrically 
estimated many of the relationships 
programmed into these models. They include 
some of the most basic demand and supply 
responses of individual crops around the world 
to prices and almost no estimates of the extent 
to which a reduction in consumption of one 
food item simply shifts consumption to another. 
Future projections of economics are even more 
uncertain than modeling current behavior. 
Perhaps most important, the need to assign 
prices and supply and demand relationships 
among parameters requires a high level of 
biophysical simplification. By focusing only 
on noneconomic relationships, GlobAgri-WRR 
can incorporate a substantially higher level of 
biophysical detail. 
Patrice Dumas (CIRAD) is the principal 
architect of the GlobAgri-WRR model, 
working in partnership with Tim Searchinger 
(Princeton University and WRI). Other 
researchers contributing to the core model 
include Stéphane Manceron and Chantal Le 
Mouël (INRA), and Richard Waite and Tim 
Beringer (WRI). A number of researchers 
from INRA and CIRAD provided important 
analyses that underpin the GlobAgri-WRR 
modeling in this report. They include 
Maryline Boval, Philippe Chemineau, Hervé 
Guyomard, Sadasivam Kaushik, David 
Makowsky, and Tamara Ben Ari.
A strength of the GlobAgri-WRR model is that it 
incorporates other biophysical submodels that 
estimate GHG emissions or land-use demands 
in specific agricultural sectors. GlobAgri-WRR 
therefore benefits from other researchers’ 
work, incorporating the highest levels of 
detail available. Major contributions include a 
representation of the global livestock industry 
developed primarily by Mario Herrero (CSIRO) 
and Petr Havlík (IIASA), with extra contributions 
from Stefan Wirsenius (Chalmers University); 
a land-use model with lead developer Fabien 
Ramos, formerly of the European Commission 
Joint Research Centre (JRC); a nitrogen use 
model developed by Xin Zhang (originally of 
Princeton University and now of the University 
of Maryland); a global rice model with lead 
developer Xiaoyuan Yan of the Chinese Institute 
for Soil Science; and an aquaculture model 
with lead developers Mike Phillips of WorldFish 
and Rattanawan Mungkung of Kasetsart 
University. Each of these submodels had 
several contributors. For more on the GlobAgri-
WRR model, see Appendix A.
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Understanding the Food Gap
The food gap is the difference between the amount 
of food that must be produced in 2050 to ensure 
that everyone in the world obtains sufficient food 
and nutrition and the amount that was produced 
in 2010. We establish this target not because we 
believe that increasing food consumption by every-
one will be appropriate. In fact, our report explores 
ways to cut excess food consumption by many. But 
underproducing food is not an acceptable option 
because those who overconsume will likely out-
compete those who are hungry if food availability is 
insufficient and prices rise. The food gap identifies 
by how much food demand must be decreased and 
food production increased to avoid that result. 
How much more food will the world demand by 
2050 under business-as-usual trends? 
To project food demands in 2050, we start with a 
2012 FAO projection of the diets that the average 
person in each country will consume in that year.30 
FAO based its projections on economic growth and 
income trends and culture in different countries. 
We adjust these projections per person moderately, 
adding fish consumption and including enough 
additional calories in sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia to ensure sufficient nutrition for everyone, 
after accounting for waste and unequal distribu-
tion.31 Additionally, the United Nations has added 
more than half a billion people to its medium-level 
estimate of the global population in 2050 compared 
to the scenario used by FAO,32 so we further adjust 
2050 food demands to reflect this new estimate of 
9.8 billion people.
By this method, we project that world food demand 
(measured in total calories) will rise by 55 percent 
between 2010 and 2050. This figure counts the caloric 
content (Box 2-2) of all food categories, including not 
just crops but also dairy, fish, and meat. 
Another way to calculate the food gap is to look at 
the necessary increase in crop production alone to 
meet projected food demands in 2050. This crop 
gap excludes milk, meat, and fish but includes the 
growth in crops needed for animal feed to produce 
this milk, meat, and fish, as well as crop growth 
needed for direct human consumption. We also 
assume that the same share of crops must continue 
to meet industrial demands and must continue to 
supply biofuels at their 2010 share of global trans-
portation fuel of 2.5 percent.33 This growth in crop 
demand means that crop production (measured in 
total calories) would be 56 percent higher in 2050 
than in 2010, almost the same size as the growth in 
total food demand. Overall, crop production would 
need to increase from 13,100 trillion kilocalories 
(kcal) per year in 2010 to 20,500 trillion kcal in 
2050—a 7,400 trillion kcal per year crop calorie 
“gap”34 (Figure 2-1).
To put the challenge in perspective, without mea-
sures to limit demand, the projected increase in 
crop calorie demand in the 44-year period between 
2006 and 2050 is 11 percent higher than the 
increase achieved between 1962 and 2006, a period 
that encompassed the Green Revolution.35 
BOX 2-2 |  Why and how we use calories as our 
measure of the food gap 
Food comes from a wide variety of crops and animal products, and 
provides not only calories but also proteins, vitamins, minerals, fiber, 
and other nutritional benefits to people. There is no one perfect way to 
measure quantities of food or a “food gap.” For instance, FAO’s estimate 
in 2012 of a 70 percent food gap between 2006 and 2050, which 
many authors have cited, measured food by its “economic value.” But 
because prices change over time, economic value does not provide a 
consistent unit of measure. Likewise, food “volume” is a weak measure 
because it includes water, which does not provide energy, and different 
foods have widely varying quantities of water. Moreover, “nutrients” are 
not amenable to a single uniform unit of measure because people need 
many different types of nutrients. 
Although far from perfect, “calories” are consistent over time, avoid 
embedded water, and have a uniform unit of measure. Production and 
consumption data on calories are also globally available. Of course, 
the use of calories to measure the food gap might lead to distorted 
solutions if we considered solutions that increased calories at the 
expense of nutrients. For example, it might reward in our analysis the 
production of cereals with high yields and calorie content (or worse, 
food with added sugars) in place of fruits and vegetables, beans, and 
animal-based foods. To prevent this distortion, our “shifting diets” 
scenarios in Chapter 6 ensure not only adequate calories but also 
adequate protein for all populations, and include two scenarios that 
increase fruit and vegetable consumption and limit added sugars and 
red meat consumption in line with nutritional recommendations. We 
therefore use calories to provide a practical means of measuring the 
food gap only among nutritionally balanced alternatives. 
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Figure 2-1 | The world needs to close a food gap of 56 percent by 2050
Note: Includes all crops intended for direct human consumption, animal feed, industrial uses, seeds, and biofuels.
Sources: WRI analysis based on FAO (2019a); UNDESA (2017); and Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012).
Is there really a “food gap”?
A common refrain in popular writings is that the 
world does not actually need more food because it 
already produces 1.5 times the quantity of calories 
needed to feed everyone on the planet today and 
therefore enough to feed 40 percent more people if 
food were evenly distributed (Figure 2-2).36 Could 
we just redistribute the food?
It is true that the world’s distribution of food is 
highly unequal. Approximately 820 million people 
worldwide are undernourished, even as more than 
2 billion people are overweight or obese.37 But the 
claim that the world already has enough food if 
evenly distributed must make a number of major 
assumptions. It assumes no food losses or waste. 
It also counts as available for food the one-third of 
all crop calories that are now used for animal feed, 
for seed, and in industrial uses such as biofuels. In 
effect, this claim assumes that the world becomes 
predominately vegan (except for milk and meat 
from grazing animals). It also assumes that people 
who switch away from meat and milk substitute the 
same maize, soybeans, and feed wheat that today 
are eaten by animals rather than the more likely 
combination of foods, including fruits, vegetables, 
and beans. This more realistic combination requires 
more land and tends to use more fertilizer and 
water per calorie than animal feed.38 
Realistically, we should focus on actual food con-
sumption patterns, including meat and milk, and 
account for food losses and waste. Doing so yields 
a very different result. The amount of food con-
sumed in 2010 (nearly 2,500 kcal per person per 
day), spread over the projected population in 2050, 
would provide only 1,771 kcal per person per day—
nearly 600 kcal below FAO’s recommended average 
daily energy requirement (ADER) (Figure 2-3).39 
Even if we assume away all postconsumer food 
waste, “available food” (see Box 2-3 for definitions) 
would still fall short of the target by 300 calories 
per person per day.40
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Figure 2-2 |  Claims that the world already produces more than enough food assume that people will eat animal feed and 
biofuel crops and that food loss and waste are eliminated
Note: Numbers may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
Source: Kummu et al. (2012) using FAO data.
Figure 2-3 |  The amount of food consumed (or available) in 2010 would be insufficient to feed the world  
population in 2050
Note: Data reflect food for direct human consumption. They exclude food crops grown for animal feed, seeds, and biofuels. Consumption and availability figures shown are global 
averages.
Sources: WRI analysis based on GlobAgri-WRR model with source data from FAO (2019a); FAO (2011c); and UNDESA (2017) (medium fertility scenario).
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Equally, planning needs to focus on the reality of 
food distribution. Assuming food to be equally 
distributed does not make it so, any more than 
assuming equal distribution of housing, cars, health 
care, or income. More equitable distribution of food 
without increased production would mean that the 
poor eat more but the wealthy must eat less, which 
explains why the goal is challenging. Failure to pro-
duce enough food to meet all demands in the hope 
that the rich would then volunteer to eat less would 
be irresponsible because the more likely result is 
that the rich would outcompete the poor for the 
available food.41 
The only viable way to distribute food more equally 
is to explore realistic strategies that would persuade 
overconsumers and inefficient consumers to con-
sume less. This report identifies some promising, 
if challenging, strategies. These strategies are not 
denials of the food gap but ways of closing the food 
gap—although even they would not eliminate the 
need to produce substantially more food. 
Understanding the Land Gap 
Our target for land is to avoid a net expansion of 
agricultural land beyond the area used in 2010. 
This target is necessary to protect the natural 
ecosystems that provide the critical services under-
pinning agriculture, including climate and water 
regulation, soil stabilization, and pest control, 
among others. It is necessary also to protect biodi-
versity. Rates of species extinction have accelerated 
and have now reached 0.4–0.6 percent per year.42 
Agriculture has long been understood to be the 
single largest cause of biodiversity loss and is likely 
to remain so in the future absent major change.43 
Agricultural expansion is occurring in critical 
hotspots of biodiversity in Brazil, Indonesia, parts 
of Africa, and even parts of the United States and 
Canada occupied by rare grassland bird species.44 
Agricultural expansion also has frequent adverse 
social consequences such as displacing or compro-
mising native peoples who depend on local ecolo-
gies for ecosystem services such as water filtration, 
soil integrity, flood protection, and cultural identi-
ty.45 And for reasons we elaborate below, this target 
is also necessary to close the GHG mitigation gap 
and stabilize the climate.
Using this target, how big is the land gap? 
How much more agricultural land would the world 
need in 2050 using today’s production systems 
and yields?
To measure the full effort needed to avoid agri-
cultural land expansion, we use GlobAgri-WRR to 
estimate the amount of land the world would need 
in 2050 to produce enough food to meet projected 
demand if today’s production systems and efficien-
cies were to remain unchanged. Under this projec-
tion, which we term “no productivity gains after 
2010,” agricultural area would grow by 3.2 billion 
hectares beyond the roughly 5 billion hectares in 
use in 2010. 
This report uses several terms to describe the status of food along 
the food supply chain:
 ▪ Food production. Food at the point when crops are ready for 
harvest, livestock ready for slaughter, and fish caught. This is 
food at the start of the production stage of the food supply chain.
 ▪ Food availability. Food at the point when it is ready to eat but 
not yet ingested. This includes food available for retail purchase 
and in restaurants. 
 ▪ Food consumption. Food ingested by people. This number is 
lower than “food availability” because it subtracts consumer 
waste, that is, food that is not ultimately eaten.
 ▪ Food supply chain. The movement of food from farm, ranch, 
or boat to the consumer. The food supply chain consists of five 
stages: production—during or immediately after harvest or 
slaughter; handling and storage—after leaving the farm for han-
dling, storage, and transport; processing and packaging—during 
industrial or domestic processing and/or packaging; distribution 
and market—during distribution to wholesale and retail markets; 
and consumption—in the home or business of the consumer, in 
restaurants, or through caterers.
 ▪ Food loss. The food lost from human consumption in the pro-
duction, handling and storage, and processing part of the chain. 
Some of this food may be diverted to animal feed.
 ▪ Food waste. The food that does not get consumed by people 
after it reaches the retail or consumption stage.
BOX 2-3 |  Definitions
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That level of expansion would eliminate the major-
ity of the world’s remaining forests and woody 
savannas. This figure thus represents the total 
amount of forest and savanna the world must save 
through improvements in food production systems 
and reductions in the rate of food demand growth. 
How much more cropland would the world need 
based on business-as-usual trends? 
Fortunately, by increasing yields from cropland, 
agriculture has consistently become more land-effi-
cient over the past 50 years and is likely to continue 
to do so in the future. The area of cropland required 
will depend on yield gains. How much yields will 
grow is impossible to predict with certainty, in part 
because previous rates of yield growth reflected not 
just private initiative but also extensive govern-
ment efforts and scientific advances, and these are 
uncertain in the coming decades. We rely on two 
alternative projection methods. 
The main 2050 business-as-usual baseline we use 
relies on yield projections for 2050 by FAO. These 
projections are based on the professional judgment 
of FAO experts and external experts, who consider 
not only trend lines but also their knowledge of the 
technical potential of different regions.46 Over-
all, although FAO projects very different rates of 
growth for individual crops compared to the past, 
on average, FAO projects that yields will grow 
between 2010 and 2050 at roughly the same linear 
rate as they did from 1961 to 2010. This projection 
means that the amount of land required to produce 
crops in 2050 will be roughly the same as if the 
global yield of each crop grew at the same rate it 
grew from 1962 to 2006.47 We therefore consider 
this baseline consistent overall with trend lines 
since 1961. Based on these estimates, we project an 
average rate of crop yield growth across all crops of 
48 percent between 2010 and 2050.48 
Annual yields per hectare can also rise if farmers 
plant and harvest crops more frequently on each 
hectare of land each year, an increase in “cropping 
intensity”—or the ratio of harvested area divided 
by total cultivated area.49 Farmers can either leave 
land fallow less often or plant more hectares with 
multiple crops each year. FAO projects a smaller 
rate of growth in cropping intensity in the next 
several decades compared to the past. The reason  
is that growing multiple crops per year often relies 
on irrigation, and farmers have less opportunity 
now to expand irrigation, given that the easier 
places to irrigate have already been exploited. We 
again rely on FAO’s projection of cropping intensity 
in our baseline; globally, we project cropping inten-
sity to rise from 85 percent in 2010 to 89 percent 
in 2050. In this projection we therefore do not 
increase cropping intensity in the future baseline as 
much as predicted by past trends. 
Using these FAO estimates of growth in yield and 
cropping intensity, GlobAgri-WRR projects a net 
increase in global cropland between 2010 and 
2050 of 171 Mha. Using an analysis of aquaculture 
systems described more in Course 4, we also project 
an additional 20 Mha of aquaculture ponds, bring-
ing the total land-use expansion to 191 Mha  
(Figure 2-4).
We also develop a less optimistic “alternative 
baseline” because FAO’s projected yield gains are 
more optimistic than suggested by recent trend 
lines. During the second half of this historical time 
period—that is, from 1989 to 2008—crop yields 
grew at a slower linear rate than they did from 
1962 to 1988 (i.e., fewer additional kilograms were 
produced per hectare each year).50 Our “alterna-
tive baseline” projects future cropland needs based 
on yields we project ourselves using these more 
recent (i.e., 1989–2008) growth rates. Using this 
alternative baseline, we estimate that global area of 
cropland and aquaculture ponds would expand by 
332 Mha between 2010 and 2050 (Figure 2-4).51 
How much more pastureland would the world 
need under business-as-usual trends?
Although cropland expansion tends to receive more 
attention, expanding pastureland by clearing forests 
and woody savannas presents a potentially greater 
challenge. Globally, pasture occupies two or three 
times as much land as crops, depending on the cri-
teria used to identify grazing land.52 Between 1962 
and 2009, according to FAO statistics, pasture-
land area expanded by 270 Mha—a slightly larger 
amount than cropland expansion during this period 
(220 Mha).53 And in Latin America, pasture expan-
sion has been the dominant cause of forest loss over 
the past several decades.54
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Pasture area is projected to expand even more 
than cropland because of high projected growth 
in demand for milk and ruminant meat, whose 
production relies heavily on grasses and other 
forages. In the GlobAgri-WRR model, grasses 
provided one-half of all animal feed used by rumi-
nants in 2010. In a separate analysis by Wirsenius 
et al. (2010), grasses provided more than half of 
all the feed of all livestock when including grass-
based forages produced on cropland (Figure 2-5). 
Although we project that the share of global food 
crops used in ruminant animal feed will grow from 
7 percent to 9 percent between 2010 and 2050,55 
the share of pasture and forage crops will probably 
expand because they are more nutritious than the 
next biggest category of ruminant feeds—food crop 
residues—which will decline. 
Projecting the expansion of pastureland under 
business-as-usual trends, however, is even more 
difficult than cropland. Three factors determine 
the output per hectare of grazing land: increases 
in the efficiency of converting feed into meat and 
milk, increases in the quantity of grass grown and 
consumed by animals per hectare, and increases in 
the share of feeds that do not derive from pasture. 
Each of these factors contributes to more output per 
hectare of grazing land between 2010 and 2050 in 
our main business-as-usual scenario—dairy produc-
tivity per hectare rises by 53 percent, beef pro-
ductivity by 62 percent, and sheep and goat meat 
productivity by 71 percent. Our 2050 pastureland 
baseline projects livestock efficiency improvements 
based on the recent trend lines in each of these 
three factors.56 
Even with these productivity increases, we project 
a global increase in pasture area of 401 Mha in 
our baseline scenario (Figure 2-4). Our alterna-
tive baseline scenario assumes slower crop pasture 
yield growth and reduces the growth of ruminant 
livestock feed efficiency by 25 percent relative to 
the business-as-usual baseline. In this less optimis-
tic projection, pasture area expands by 523 Mha. 
Because farmers already graze animals on virtually 
all native grasslands suitable for grazing, the addi-
tional pasture area comes at the expense of forests 
and woody savannas.
Figure 2-4  |  The world needs to close a land gap of 593 million hectares to avoid further agricultural expansion 
Note: “Cropland” increase includes a 20 Mha increase in aquaculture ponds under the two projected baselines and a 24 Mha increase in the “no productivity gains after 2010” 
projection.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model. 
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Additional land-use challenges 
Even closing these land gaps will not by itself solve 
the problem of land expansion into natural ecosys-
tems for two main reasons. First, other nonagricul-
tural land uses such as human settlements, planta-
tion forestry, and mining are projected to expand. 
For example, Seto et al. (2012) estimate that urban 
areas will expand by 120 Mha between 2000 and 
2030, based on current land-use and population 
trends.57 Urban expansion often claims good agri-
cultural land because many cities took root where 
agriculture was productive and land relatively flat.58 
Accommodating these nonagricultural land-use 
demands implies that an actual decline in agricul-
tural area would be a valuable goal. Some of the 
scenarios in this report can free up land enough to 
accommodate this growth.
Second, agriculture continually shifts from one 
region to another, and even within regions, result-
ing in the encroachment of agriculture into natural 
ecosystems.59 Addressing these shifts—conversion 
to agriculture in one place, reversion to a natural 
ecosystem in another place—is a part of the agricul-
tural land-use challenge with respect to both bio-
diversity and GHG emissions, and we also address 
this challenge in this report.
Understanding the Greenhouse Gas 
Mitigation Gap
Agriculture contributes to GHG emissions in two 
principal ways: land-use change and the food pro-
duction process itself (Figure 1-2).60 The GHG miti-
gation gap is the difference between the expected 
level of emissions in 2050 and the level necessary 
to stabilize the climate at acceptable temperatures. 
Quantifying the gap requires, first, projecting those 
emissions in 2050 and, second, establishing an 
emissions target.
How high will agricultural emissions be in 2050?
Agricultural production emissions occur primarily 
in the form of methane and nitrous oxide—trace 
but powerful GHGs—generated by microorganisms 
in ruminant stomachs, soils, and manure slurries. 
Ruminant livestock—cows, buffalo, sheep, and 
Figure 2-5  |  Grasses provide more than half of all livestock feed
Note: Soybean and other oil meals are included in “Food industry by-products” while whole soybeans are included in “Soybeans, starchy roots, and other edible crops.” Data for 
2010 represent mean values between two scenarios (1992–94 and 2030). 
Source: Wirsenius et al. (2010).
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goats—generate nearly half of all production-related 
emissions. Roughly 80 percent of these agricultural 
production emissions occur in emerging economies 
and the developing world, a percentage that is likely 
to be similar in 2050.61 
As when analyzing the land-use gap, we develop 
a “no productivity gains” projection, which ana-
lyzes what emissions would be in 2050 if expected 
demand were met and if today’s yields and produc-
tion systems do not change. Using GlobAgri-WRR, 
we estimate that total emissions would rise from 
12 Gt CO2e per year in 2010 to roughly 33 Gt CO2e 
per year, with about two-thirds of emissions com-
ing from land-use change and one-third from the 
agricultural production process.
Fortunately, yields will probably continue to grow, 
and the use of chemicals, animals, and other inputs 
to the production process that lead to emissions will 
probably become more efficient as well. (We describe 
these assumptions in more detail in Course 5.)
Using GlobAgri-WRR, in our business-as-usual 
baseline, we project that CO2e emissions from 
agricultural production will rise from 6.8 Gt per 
year in 2010 to 9.0 Gt per year in 2050. To estimate 
land-use-change emissions out to 2050, GlobAgri-
WRR uses the global estimates for land-use expan-
sion discussed in the previous section. These global 
projected changes represent the sum of estimated 
changes in each of nine major world regions. 
Including ongoing peat emissions between 2010 
and 2050, we estimate total cumulative land-use 
emissions of 242 Gt CO2e.62
These emissions will occur over 40 years. To pres-
ent annual emissions in 2050, we divide these emis-
sions by 40, which may or may not truly estimate 
the proportion of these total emissions that will 
occur in 2050 but is a way to convey the cumula-
tive significance of these emissions. As a result, we 
estimate emissions from land-use change in 2050 
at 6 Gt per year—1 Gt higher than recent levels.
Total agricultural emissions from land-use change 
and production under our business-as-usual base-
line would thus rise from roughly 12 Gt per year in 
2010 to 15 Gt per year by 2050 (Figure 2-6). 
Figure 2-6  |  Agricultural emissions are projected to grow by at least 28 percent between 2010 and 2050
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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As with our land-use projections, we again develop 
a less optimistic alternative baseline using recent 
yield growth trends.63 In this scenario, emissions 
from agricultural production would grow to 9.3 Gt 
CO2e per year in 2050 and total emissions, includ-
ing those from land-use change, would rise to 17.1 
Gt CO2e per year (Figure 2-6).64
Agricultural emissions and the  
Paris Agreement climate goals
How significant are agricultural GHG emissions? 
One way to view the answer is to focus on total 
emissions of all GHGs in 2050 relative to climate 
goals. In the Paris Agreement, countries agreed to 
set a target of stabilizing the average global temper-
ature at no more than 2°C above preindustrial lev-
els, and to explore a goal of 1.5°C. Although setting 
a 2050 target for all kinds of emissions to achieve 
these goals is complicated (for reasons we describe 
below), we believe the most plausible target is 
around 21 Gt CO2e per year.65 Based on this num-
ber, and using the annual production emissions and 
annualized emissions from land-use change in our 
business-as-usual baseline projection, we estimate 
that agriculture would generate about 70 percent of 
allowable emissions from all human sources, leav-
ing little room for emissions from nonagricultural 
sectors (Figure 2-7). Under the alternative baseline, 
agriculture would generate more than 80 percent of 
allowable emissions.66
Another useful analysis is the contribution agricul-
ture would make in our baseline toward allowable 
cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide alone. 
Because carbon dioxide persists in the atmosphere 
so long, some models now try to estimate the maxi-
mum cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide (from 
all sectors) that are consistent with a good chance 
of holding climate warming to the 2°C goal agreed 
in Paris. One of the first such studies estimated that 
maximum cumulative emissions of 670 Gt between 
2010 and 2050 would give the world a 75 percent 
chance of meeting the target.67 United Nations 
Environment uses average estimates of 1,000 Gt for 
a two-thirds chance of meeting the target. Another 
recent study estimates that cumulative emissions 
of 600 Gt between 2010 and 2050 would enable 
the world to hold temperature rise to somewhere 
between 1.5° and 2°C.68 
Figure 2-7  |   Agricultural GHG emissions are likely to be at least 70 percent of total allowable emissions from all sectors by 
2050, creating an 11 gigaton mitigation gap 
Sources: GlobAgri-WRR model, WRI analysis based on IEA (2012); EIA (2012); Houghton (2008); OECD (2012); and UNEP (2013).
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Given these global maximum allowable emissions, 
our baseline estimate of cumulative agricultural and 
land-use-change CO2 emissions of roughly 300 Gt 
(242 Gt from land-use change and peatlands, and 
60 Gt from agricultural energy use) would use up 
30–50 percent of the allowable CO2 emissions from 
all human sources. Using the cumulative emissions 
approach, this scenario also would leave too little 
room for the bulk of GHG emissions from other 
human activities and prevent the world from reach-
ing acceptable climate goals. 
Agriculture’s GHG mitigation target and  
climate goals 
How high could agricultural GHG emissions be in 
2050 if the world is to limit global warming either 
to 1.5 or 2°C? Choosing a target is not straightfor-
ward for many reasons, and these reasons apply not 
only to the agricultural and land-use-change target 
but also to the target for all emissions sources. 
First, standard approaches to target-setting 
employed by researchers and international institu-
tions involve the use of models to estimate the path 
of emissions levels each year over time that would 
meet a climate goal at the “least cost.” Unfortu-
nately, many of these future costs of mitigation 
are highly uncertain. The method also means that 
the mitigation goal assigned to agriculture will be 
informed by the estimated costs of agricultural miti-
gation as well as estimates of the costs of mitigation 
in other sectors. That gives the setting of climate 
targets a circular quality. Any assumed difficulty 
or expense with agricultural mitigation leads the 
models to impose higher mitigation requirements 
on other sectors, even if these requirements are 
expensive and uncertain. By assigning more mitiga-
tion requirements elsewhere, the models then sug-
gest that the lower mitigation target for agricultural 
emissions is acceptable. We are reluctant to rely on 
such estimates when setting an agricultural target, 
in part because models may use simpler and now 
out-of-date estimates of agricultural mitigation,69 
in part because all estimates of future mitigation 
costs are highly uncertain, and in part because the 
more mitigation requirements are shifted to other 
sectors, the less realistic it is that those sectors  
can deliver. 
Second, many modeling analyses now select paths 
for mitigation emissions that allow emissions to 
exceed the levels necessary to hold climate change 
to below 1.5 or 2°C and rely on “negative emissions” 
after 2050. Negative emissions remove carbon from 
the air. But the economic and technical potential 
for negative emissions approaches is highly uncer-
tain.70 The discussion of bioenergy later in this 
report explains why we believe one of the largest 
sources many models use for future negative emis-
sions—bioenergy with carbon capture and storage 
(BECCS)—is based on incorrect premises. We are 
therefore reluctant to rely on modeling estimates 
that themselves rely heavily on negative emissions.
Third, other uncertainties in picking relatively 
simple 2050 targets include the uncertainties 
concerning how the climate responds to different 
emissions, the variable effects of the different GHGs 
over different time periods, and the uncertainty of 
post-2050 emissions.
Recognizing these challenges, to limit global 
warming below 2°C we select a target of zero net 
emissions from land-use change (and peatlands) 
between 2010 and 2050 and a target of 4 Gt CO2e 
for emissions from agricultural production sources 
in 2050 (Figures 2-6 and 2-7). Our 4 Gt target is 
based on the concept of equal sharing. According 
to a projection by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), emissions 
from all human sources are on a course to reach 
70 Gt of CO2e per year by 2050.71 Reaching 21 Gt 
in 2050 therefore requires a 75 percent reduction 
compared to projected 2050 levels. If the agricul-
ture sector (including land-use change) also reduces 
its projected emissions under our principal busi-
ness-as-usual scenario by 75 percent, agricultural 
emissions must decline to 4 Gt.72
Our target of zero net emissions from land-use 
change reflects both our own and others’ analysis 
that it would be impossible to reach a 4 Gt target 
for total agricultural emissions without eliminating 
emissions from land-use change altogether. That is 
because it is even harder to reduce emissions from 
agricultural production than from land-use change. 
Reflecting this challenge, nearly all other research-
ers’ scenarios for a stable climate with 2°C of 
warming assume that net emissions from land-use 
change have stopped by 2050, and many require 
net carbon sequestration on land.73 
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To limit warming to 1.5°C, typical scenarios con-
template similar levels of emissions from agricul-
tural production but require extensive reforestation 
to offset other emissions.74 In this report, we there-
fore also explore options for liberating agricultural 
land to provide such offsets. 
This agricultural emissions target of 4 Gt per year 
in 2050 allows quantification of three possible 
GHG mitigation gaps. As shown in Figure 2-6, 
in our 2050 “no productivity gains after 2010” 
projection, the gap would be 34 Gt CO2e. That gap 
represents the total reduction in emissions that 
must be achieved by improvements in food produc-
tion or sustainable reductions in food consumption 
between 2010 and 2050. Compared with the 4 Gt 
target, our business-as-usual baseline results in a 
gap of 11 Gt, while our alternative (less optimistic) 
yield growth rate baseline results in a gap of 13 Gt. 
The 11 Gt gap is still large; it is the primary gap we 
use in this report and represents a measure of the 
additional efforts the world must make beyond the 
effort it has made in the past to improve agriculture 
if the world is to achieve climate goals. 
Summary of the three gaps
The food, land, and GHG mitigation gaps will vary 
from region to region. In general, developing coun-
tries face the largest growth in food demand and the 
greatest challenges. Sub-Saharan Africa faces the 
biggest challenges of all (Box 2-4).
Globally, using our business-as-usual 2050 base-
line, the three gaps make it possible to express the 
challenge of a sustainable food future in a quan-
titative form. Between 2010 and 2050, the world 
needs to close a food gap equal to more than half of 
present production, while avoiding projected land 
expansion even greater than that of the past 50 
years, and while reducing agricultural GHG emis-
sions by two-thirds. 
BOX 2-4 | Sub-Saharan Africa: A hotspot for the challenge of a sustainable food future
The challenges outlined in this chapter are 
particularly acute in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Food
Sub-Saharan Africa is already the world’s 
hungriest region. FAO estimates that 23 
percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s people 
were undernourished in 2016.a The region 
contained 30 percent of the world’s 
chronically hungry people that year, even 
while holding only 16 percent of the world’s 
population.b The region is also the most 
dependent in the world on imports for its 
staple foods: in 2010, the region relied on 
imports for one-quarter of its cereals, two-
thirds of its vegetable oil, and 14 percent 
of its meat and dairy.c Because the region 
is relatively poor, this reliance on imports 
makes the availability of and access to 
food unstable. 
At the same time, sub-Saharan Africa 
currently has the world’s highest fertility 
rates (discussed in Chapter 8), and the 
population is expected to grow from 880 
million in 2010 to 2.2 billion in 2050. As 
poverty declines and incomes rise, people 
will rightly consume a better and more 
varied diet—including an increase in per 
capita demand for meat and dairy. As a 
result, a large portion of the global growth 
in food demand will occur in this region. 
Although sub-Saharan Africa consumed 
only 12 percent of the world’s food calories 
annually in 2010, the region will account 
for 43 percent of global growth in demand 
for food calories between 2010 and 2050.d 
And although globally the demand for food 
calories is projected to grow by 55 percent 
between 2010 and 2050, food demand is 
projected to grow by 216 percent (i.e., more 
than triple) in sub-Saharan Africa during that 
period.e
Land
Many opportunities exist to boost food 
production in sub-Saharan Africa, but fully 
meeting needs on existing agricultural land 
will be difficult. Given projected growth in 
population and food demand, sub-Saharan 
Africa would need to more than triple its 
cereal yields by 2050 relative to 2010 to 
avoid expanding cereal cropland area.f 
Doing so would require an increase in 
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BOX 2-4 |  Sub-Saharan Africa: A hotspot for the challenge of a sustainable food future 
(Cont’d)
Notes:
a. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, et al. (2017).
b. Authors’ calculations from FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, et al. (2017) and UNDESA (2017).
c.  The precise figures, measured by weight, were 24.5 percent of cereals, 65.7 percent of vegetable oils, and 13.7 percent of animal products. Authors’ calculations based on 
FAO (2019a).
d.  Authors’ calculations from GlobAgri-WRR model, using the measure of food availability. These food calories consist of the food people actually eat, both crops eaten 
directly and animal products. Crop calories exclude animal products but include feed. Growth of food demand in sub-Saharan Africa is a larger percentage of the world’s 
increase in food consumption because FAO projects that the region will consume only modest amounts of crops as animal feed.
e. GlobAgri-WRR model, using data from Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012), with upward adjustments for more up-to-date population projections and elimination of hunger.
f.  Authors’ calculations based on average cereal yields of 1.2 metric tons per hectare in 2010 and yields of 3.8 metric tons needed in 2050 to avoid land-use change while 
meeting cereal demand. Demand calculations are based on the assumption that the proportion of imports and exports of food and feed does not change. These increases 
are independent of any other increases in cropland area that might occur because of investments focused on agricultural exports.
g. Authors’ calculations from FAO (2019a).
h. GlobAgri-WRR model.
i. GlobAgri-WRR model.
j. GlobAgri-WRR model.
k. World Bank (2017d).
l. IFAD (2010).
m. Breman et al. (2007).
n. Henao and Baanante (2006), as cited in Noble (2012).
o. Rockström and Falkenmark (2000).
p. Rockström et al. (2003). 
q. World Bank (2008).
r. Authors’ calculations from FAO (2019a).
s. Gassert et al. (2015).
production of 61 kilograms (kg) per hectare 
relative to the previous year—almost 50 
percent higher than the global average 
annual cereal yield growth from 1962 to 
2006.g FAO has predicted healthy growth 
in yield per hectare for the region from 
2006 to 2050 at rates that would more 
than double yields for most important 
crops. Even with this growth, and while 
maintaining the same rate of imports, 
the region would likely have to expand 
cropland by roughly 100 Mha between 2010 
and 2050.h Pastureland would expand by 
nearly 160 Mha.i This expansion would lead 
to extensive loss of forests and savannas, 
impacting people who currently rely on or 
live in those areas, releasing more than 2 
Gt of CO2e per year,
j harming biodiversity, 
and degrading other ecosystem services. 
Economic development 
Approximately 62 percent of sub-Saharan 
Africa’s population lives in rural areas, 
where economies are dominated by 
small-scale agriculture.k It is in these 
regions that poverty rates and hunger are 
highest.l Limited social welfare programs 
make subsistence agriculture an economic 
activity of last resort. Although healthy 
growth in other economic sectors is 
needed to provide more job opportunities, 
the welfare of hundreds of millions 
of people will be tied to small-scale 
agricultural production for the foreseeable 
future.
Water and soils 
Ninety percent of the soils in sub-Saharan 
Africa are geologically old and nutrient-
poor.m Nutrient depletion continues as 
farmers remove more nutrients from the 
soil than they add. For example, one study 
estimated during the period 2002–4, 85 
percent of African farmland suffered a net 
annual loss of at least 30 kg of nutrients 
such as nitrogen, phosphorus, and 
potassium (NPK) per hectare.n In eastern 
and southern Africa, more than 95 percent 
of the food-producing sector is based on 
rainfed agriculture,o and over most of the 
continent, high rainfall variability poses 
practical challenges to farming. Rainfall 
can occur in distinct seasons, much in 
brief periods with high intensity and high 
rates of runoff, and farmers must contend 
with periodic droughts.p 
These physical factors, along with much 
neglect of agriculture in postcolonial 
decades,q have contributed to low yields. 
For example, the region had cereal yields of 
1.5 metric tons per hectare in 2011―roughly 
half the world average.r Until around 2006, 
the region had experienced no growth in 
yields of most staple crops for decades.
The soil and water challenges make it 
difficult for Africa to close its food gap and 
leverage agriculture for economic growth. 
Moreover, these challenges increase the 
difficulty of successful intensification 
of agriculture on existing farmland and 
grazing land, which puts pressure to clear 
more natural forests and savannas to gain 
new agricultural land.
Climate 
Although different climate models project 
different changes in rainfall patterns, there 
is general agreement that climate change 
poses high risks to much of the continent, 
from both rising temperatures and 
increased rainfall variability. (We discuss 
these challenges more in Chapter 15 on 
adapting to climate change.) The growing 
season is often short, and a relatively small 
percentage of rainfall is actually used by 
growing crops. Climate change will only 
increase this challenge, as sub-Saharan 
Africa is expected to experience higher 
levels of water stress than today under 
most climate change scenarios.s
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ADDITIONAL 
SUSTAINABILITY 
CRITERIA
Although this report presents a menu of solutions that could help 
close the food, land, and GHG mitigation gaps, even closing these 
three gaps will not fully achieve a sustainable food future. Each 
menu item must also contribute to—or at least be compatible 
with—three other important criteria. 
CHAPTER 3
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Promoting Economic Development and 
Alleviating Poverty
Agriculture’s potential to reduce poverty is primar-
ily related to making food affordable. The world’s 
poor spend on average more than half of their 
incomes on food.75 In South Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa, food accounts for 40–70 percent of house-
hold spending. Even in rural areas, a majority of the 
poor are net purchasers of food.76 Food prices there-
fore remain a critical variable—influencing not only 
how many people are in formal poverty but also the 
depths of their deprivation.77 According to numer-
ous studies, lower food prices account for much of 
the economic benefit from agricultural develop-
ment to Asian and Latin American economies in 
general, and to the poor in particular. One study of 
the Green Revolution found that without improved 
crop yields, the proportion of malnourished chil-
dren would have been 6 to 8 percent higher because 
of higher food prices, and overall calorie intake  
in the developing world have been roughly 14 
percent lower.78 
From 1962 through 2006, as poverty rates declined, 
food prices declined on average by 4 percent per 
year, which played a significant role in decreasing 
the number of the world’s hungry.79 This rela-
tively consistent decline in food prices fostered a 
global complacency, which three successive global 
food crises interrupted in 2007–8, 2010–11, and 
2012—especially in 2008, when global cereal prices 
doubled in just a few months.80 During these peri-
ods, hardship led to major food riots.81 
The future of global food prices is uncertain. 
A detailed comparison of 10 major long-term 
global economic model groups that forecast out 
to 2050 showed six projecting sustained food 
price increases of various magnitudes, one show-
ing essentially no change in real terms, and three 
showing sustained price declines.82 Regardless, 
studies typically find that productivity gains can 
greatly reduce food prices and the number of mal-
nourished children.83 
Overall, the most basic need is to meet growing 
demand for food for the simple reason that when 
food runs short, the world’s wealthiest are affected 
marginally but continue to eat, while the poor 
become poorer and eat fewer and lower-quality 
nutrients. Extensive economic literature has found 
that stable or declining food prices also play a 
valuable role in the macroeconomics of developing 
countries both because they account for such a large 
share of the economy and consumer expenditures, 
and because they help household incomes  
go farther.84
A second role of agriculture is to support economic 
development through its direct contribution to 
national income. According to World Bank esti-
mates, in 2016, value added by agriculture on 
the farm still accounted for 30 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in the world’s low-income 
countries, many of them in Africa, and 9 percent 
of GDP in the middle-income countries, mostly in 
Latin America and East Asia.85 An important contri-
bution to China’s industrial-based economic boom 
over the past several decades was a boost in crop 
yields spurred by major institutional changes in 
rural governance and massive agricultural research 
investments in the 1970s and 1980s to adapt Green 
Revolution food production technologies to Chinese 
conditions.86 Along with other drivers, the expan-
sion of food production and domestic food sales 
permitted a large migration of people to the cities 
without a decline in overall food production, and 
higher agricultural profits that were subsequently 
invested by industry.87 
A third role for agriculture is to help lift people 
out of poverty through employment. At least 70 
percent of the world’s poorest people live in rural 
areas, mostly in the tropics.88 In sub-Saharan Africa 
(outside of South Africa), 47 percent of people lived 
on less than $1.25 a day in 2011.89 Agriculture serves 
as a source of livelihood for well over 80 percent 
of these and other rural people. It provides at least 
part-time jobs for 1.3 billion smallholder farmers 
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and landless laborers. In much of Africa, large parts 
of South Asia, and significant pockets elsewhere, 
smallholder farmers living at the economic margin 
comprise most of the population. 
As economies develop and agricultural productiv-
ity increases, more of the poor prefer to look for 
job opportunities in cities, and the number of farm 
workers can decline. This migration has happened 
on a huge scale in China and can be observed in 
other Asian countries where rural populations have 
recently begun to decline. In the past two decades, 
this pattern has become apparent in Africa as well; 
the share of farm employment is declining across 
the continent, and in several countries—includ-
ing Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia—the share of 
medium-scale farms is on the rise.90 Boosting the 
productivity and income opportunities of small 
farms is an important part of ensuring that this 
transition is humane.
Empowering Women Farmers
Around the world, women play a crucial role in 
household food security. Women represent an esti-
mated 43 percent of the world’s agricultural labor 
force, and half or more in many African and Asian 
countries.91 However, on average, farms operated 
by women have lower yields than those operated 
by men, even when men and women come from the 
same household and cultivate the same crops. For 
example, the World Bank found that in parts  
of Burkina Faso women had an 18 percent lower 
crop yield than their male counterparts in the  
same household.92 
Inequitable access to inputs and property explains 
much of this gap. Women typically have less 
access than men to fertilizer, to improved seeds, to 
technical assistance, and to market information. 
They have less ability to command labor, both from 
unremunerated family members and from other 
members of the community.93 In some developing 
countries, women also may have lower levels of 
education, constraints on mobility, and high addi-
tional time commitments for child-rearing, gather-
ing firewood and water, and cooking.94
Women farmers often have reduced property 
rights, which reinforces their limited access to 
inputs and credit because credit often requires 
collateral such as land. Women control very little 
land relative to their participation in agriculture. 
In Kenya, for example, women account for only 5 
percent of the nation’s registered landholders.95 
Studies project that rectifying these imbalances 
can increase yields. For example, the World Bank 
has estimated that if women farmers were to have 
the same access as men to fertilizers and other 
inputs, maize yields would increase by 11–16 
percent in Malawi, by 17 percent in Ghana,96 and by 
20 percent in Kenya.97 Overall, ensuring women’s 
equal access to productive resources could raise 
total agricultural output in developing countries by 
2.5 to 4 percent.98 
These gains in turn could have disproportion-
ate benefits for food security because women are 
more likely than men to devote their income to 
food and children’s needs.99 IFPRI estimates that 
improvements in women’s status explain as much 
as 55 percent of the reduction in hunger in the 
developing world from 1970 to 1995. Progress in 
women’s education can explain 43 percent of gains 
in food security, 26 percent of gains in increased 
food availability, and 19 percent of gains in health 
advances.100 In the same vein, FAO estimates that 
providing women with equal access to resources 
could reduce world hunger by 12–17 percent.101 
Empowering women can both help boost produc-
tion of crops and livestock and sustainably reduce 
demand, for example, by achieving replacement 
fertility rates. Empowering women is therefore 
not a single solution but rather a strategy that cuts 
across multiple menu items. We adopt a criterion 
that all menu items should either contribute to or at 
least not undermine this strategy. 
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Protecting Freshwater Resources
Although croplands that rely solely on rain account 
for 80 percent of cultivated land, the 20 percent 
of land that is irrigated probably accounts for 40 
percent of global crop production, estimated very 
roughly.102 In emerging and developing countries, 
irrigated agriculture plays an even more prominent 
role, accounting for nearly half of all crop produc-
tion and nearly 60 percent of cereal production 
according to FAO.103 Globally, irrigated crop yields 
are more than two-and-a-half times greater than 
those of rainfed agriculture.104 A major driver of 
yield growth from 1962 and 2006 was an increase 
of 160 Mha in irrigated area105 and an estimated 
doubling of water consumption by irrigation.106 
This experience might suggest a strategy of expand-
ing irrigation wherever feasible both to increase 
production and provide greater resilience for farm-
ers. But the world’s freshwater supplies are already 
greatly stressed, and agriculture is the principal 
reason. Globally, irrigation accounts for nearly 
70 percent of total freshwater withdrawals107 from 
rivers, lakes, and aquifers. Domestic and industrial 
users account for the remaining 30 percent. How-
ever, the agriculture sector accounts for more than 
90 percent of water consumed.108 This is because 
much of the water withdrawn for agriculture ends 
up in the atmosphere as a result of evaporation 
and plant transpiration.109 By contrast, much of the 
water used by industry and households is returned 
to terrestrial water systems and may be reused. 
Agriculture will increasingly compete with ris-
ing demands from these other water uses. Urban 
expansion has led to conflicts between urban and 
agricultural uses in the western United States. As 
populations expand and become more able to afford 
modern plumbing amenities, conflicts are likely 
to increase. In 2015, the World Economic Forum 
listed water disputes between both different users 
and different countries as the number one global 
risk over the coming decade.110 
In many of the world’s major agricultural areas, 
there is little additional water to provide. Roughly 
60 percent of global irrigation comes from surface 
waters,111 and this irrigation has already dewatered 
not only many small, local rivers but even some 
of the world’s most massive rivers.112 The other 40 
percent of irrigation is supplied by groundwater, 
withdrawals of which have at least tripled over the 
past 50 years and continue to increase.113 Aquifers 
are being depleted in key agricultural areas. Accord-
ing to one index of water availability calculated by 
WRI, more than half of the world’s irrigated crop-
lands are already in areas of high water stress.114
Increasing irrigation levels would also exacerbate 
serious environmental harms to aquatic life, wet-
land ecosystems, river deltas,115 and even the global 
climate.116 Fish die or move elsewhere when sections 
of rivers run dry, but even reduced water flows tend 
to raise water temperatures and deny access to 
much river habitat, reducing aquatic life.117 Irriga-
tion, whether from rivers or groundwater, often 
dries up wetlands.118 The dams that create irriga-
tion reservoirs also tend to block fish migrations, 
change water temperatures, and block sediment 
and fresh water from replenishing river deltas.119 
One recent study estimated that the world’s reser-
voirs are responsible for between 1 and 2.4 percent 
of the global GHG emissions each year, mostly 
through the methane created by the decay of trees 
and other inundated vegetation.120 Large irrigation 
demands, and dams in particular, cut off the regular 
overflow of rivers into floodplains, which typically 
provide critical habitat for fish to spawn and grow. 
Floodplains provide much of the food supply for the 
main stem of rivers and nourish trees, wetlands, 
and other vegetation critical to birds and other 
animal life.121 Not surprisingly, irrigation projects, 
associated dam building, and water withdrawals 
for irrigation have shaped some of the world’s most 
acute social and environmental conflicts.122 
The global water challenge is complex and large 
scale, and an entire report could appropriately 
focus on it. Shrinking aquifers and overdrawn rivers 
present major challenges to agriculture at existing 
irrigation levels. Higher yields will increase pres-
sure on freshwater resources as crops use and tran-
spire more water. Left unchecked, pollution from 
agriculture and other sectors will further degrade 
water quality, increasing the competition for 
clean fresh water.123 Moreover, climate change will 
place additional pressure on fresh water through 
changes in precipitation patterns and because 
hotter temperatures lead to more evaporation and 
transpiration.124 
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Accounting for these various limitations, FAO 
projects that irrigation will expand by only 20 
Mha from 2006 through 2050—around 1 percent 
of global cropland.125 By adopting FAO’s yield 
projections, we implicitly accept this level of 
expansion. Yet given the scope and complexity 
of the water challenge, we exclude large-scale 
expansion of irrigation from our menu for a 
sustainable food future and identify wherever 
possible agricultural improvements that can 
conserve or make more efficient use of water. 
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MENU FOR A 
SUSTAINABLE FOOD 
FUTURE
To explore how to close the three gaps while meeting our 
additional sustainability criteria, this report develops a “menu for 
a sustainable food future”—a menu of actions that can meet the 
challenge if implemented in time, at scale, and with sufficient 
public and private sector dedication.
CHAPTER 4
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We analyze the potential of 22 menu items to sus-
tainably close the food, land, and GHG mitigation 
gaps by 2050 (Table 4-1). They are organized into 
five “courses”:
1. Reduce growth in demand for food and other 
agricultural products
2. Increase food production without expanding 
agricultural land
3. Protect and restore natural ecosystems and 
limit agricultural land-shifting
4. Increase fish supply 
5. Reduce GHG emissions from agricultural 
production
MENU ITEM DESCRIPTION 
DEMAND-SIDE SOLUTIONS
Course 1: Reduce growth in demand for food and other agricultural products 
Reduce food loss and waste Reduce the loss and waste of food intended for human consumption between the farm and the fork.
Shift to healthier and more 
sustainable diets
Change diets particularly by reducing ruminant meat consumption to reduce the three gaps in ways that 
contribute to better nutrition.
Avoid competition from bioenergy for 
food crops and land Avoid the diversion of both edible crops and land into bioenergy production.
Achieve replacement-level fertility 
rates
Encourage voluntary reductions in fertility levels by educating girls, reducing child mortality, and 
providing access to reproductive health services. 
SUPPLY-SIDE SOLUTIONS
Course 2: Increase food production without expanding agricultural land 
Increase livestock and pasture 
productivity 
Increase yields of meat and milk per hectare and per animal through improved feed quality, grazing 
management, and related practices.
Improve crop breeding to boost yields Accelerate crop yield improvements through improved breeding.
Improve soil and water management Boost yields on drylands through improved soil and water management practices such as agroforestry and water harvesting.
Plant existing cropland more 
frequently
Boost crop production by getting more than one crop harvest per year from existing croplands or by 
leaving cropland fallow less often where conditions are suitable.
Adapt to climate change Employ all menu items and additional targeted interventions to avoid adverse effects of climate change on crop yields and farming viability.
The report addresses each of the five courses in 
turn. Because many policies to advance the menu 
cut across the different courses, policy issues are 
addressed separately in “Cross-Cutting Policies for 
a Sustainable Food Future.” 
The menu items focus on an overall goal of achiev-
ing a sustainable level of food supply to meet food 
demands in 2050. Although expansive, the menu 
does not directly address all dimensions of food 
security, whose universal achievement also requires 
additional measures to reduce poverty and improve 
access to food (Box 4-1). 
Table 4-1  |   Menu for a sustainable food future: five courses
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Table 4-1  |   Menu for a sustainable food future: five courses (continued)
MENU ITEM DESCRIPTION 
Course 3: Protect and restore natural ecosystems and limit agricultural land-shifting 
Link productivity gains with 
protection of natural ecosystems
Protect ecosystems by legally and programmatically linking productivity gains in agriculture to 
governance that avoids agricultural expansion.
Limit inevitable agricultural expansion 
to lands with low environmental 
opportunity costs
Where expansion seems inevitable—such as for local food production in Africa—limit expansion to lands 
with the lowest carbon and other environmental costs per ton of crop.
Reforest abandoned, unproductive, 
and liberated agricultural lands 
Protect the world’s remaining native landscapes; reforest abandoned, unproductive, and unimprovable 
agricultural lands as well as lands potentially “liberated” by highly successful reductions in food demand 
or increases in agricultural productivity.
Conserve and restore peatlands Avoid any further conversion of peatlands to agriculture and restore little-used, drained peatlands by rewetting them.
Course 4: Increase fish supply 
Improve wild fisheries management Stabilize the annual size of the wild fish catch over the long term by reducing overfishing.
Improve productivity and 
environmental performance of 
aquaculture 
Increase aquaculture production through improvements in breeding, feeds, health care, disease control, 
and changes in production systems.
Course 5: Reduce GHG emissions from agricultural production 
Reduce enteric fermentation through 
new technologies Develop and deploy feed additives to reduce methane releases from ruminant animals.
Reduce emissions through improved 
manure management
Use and advance different technologies to reduce emissions from the management of manure in 
concentrated animal production systems.
Reduce emissions from manure left 
on pasture
Develop and deploy nitrification inhibitors (spread on pastures and/or fed to animals) and/or breed 
biological nitrogen inhibition traits into pasture grasses.
Reduce emissions from fertilizers by 
increasing nitrogen use efficiency
Reduce overapplication of fertilizer and increase plant absorption of fertilizer through management 
changes and changes in fertilizer compounds, or breeding biological nitrification inhibition into crops.
Adopt emissions-reducing rice 
management and varieties
Reduce methane emissions from rice paddies via variety selection and improved water and straw 
management.
Increase agricultural energy efficiency 
and shift to nonfossil energy sources
Reduce energy-generated emissions by increasing efficiency measures and shifting energy sources to 
solar and wind.
Focus on realistic options to 
sequester carbon in agricultural soils
Concentrate efforts to sequester carbon in agricultural soils on practices that have the primary benefit of 
higher crop and/or pasture productivity and do not sacrifice carbon storage elsewhere. 
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According to FAO, “Food security exists when all people, at all times, 
have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious 
food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy life.”a The Committee on World Food Security identified 
four main “pillars of food security”:b 
 ▪ Availability is ensured if adequate amounts of food are 
produced and are at people’s disposal. 
 ▪ Access is ensured when all households and all individuals 
within those households have sufficient resources to obtain 
appropriate foods for a nutritious diet (through production, 
purchase, or donation).
 ▪ Utilization is ensured when the human body is able to ingest 
and metabolize food because of adequate health and social 
environment. 
 ▪ Stability is ensured when the three other pillars are maintained 
over time. 
Some experts have argued for a fifth pillar on environmental 
sustainability, which is ensured only if food production and 
consumption patterns do not deplete natural resources or the 
ability of the agricultural system to provide sufficient food for future 
generations.c
The sustainability dimension is a frequently overlooked but 
important pillar because food availability depends on the state of 
the environment and the natural resource base. The current global 
food production system―what is grown where, how, and when―
has evolved within a climate that has been relatively stable over the 
past 8,000–10,000 years. Production of rainfed and irrigated crops 
depends on the supply of fresh water at appropriate levels at the 
appropriate time during the growing season. Natural ecosystems 
located in or around farmland underpin agricultural productivity by 
providing soil formation, erosion control, nutrient cycling, pollination, 
wild foods, and regulation of the timing and flow of water.d 
In turn, access relates to availability because access depends on 
the cost of food both on average and in times of poor production. In 
regions with many poor people, food price increases can present 
acute issues of food security. In addition, if food production is not 
sustainable from an environmental perspective, then it will not be 
stable over time.
This report focuses on the interplay of food availability and 
sustainability. Both touch on the pillars of stability and access by 
influencing prices. Although assuring availability and sustainability 
is critical to food security, we do not address all issues related to 
income, distribution, nutrient balance, and disaster interventions.
Notes:
a. FAO (2006a).
b. The following definitions are paraphrased from Gross et al. (2000).
c. Richardson (2010); Daily et al. (1998).
d. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005).
BOX 4-1 |  Food security and sustainability
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We also wish to do more than simply compile a 
broad list of options. We therefore carefully review 
the available quantitative and qualitative infor-
mation and identify the most promising and yet 
realistic paths forward. We then use the GlobAgri-
WRR model to evaluate the potential of different 
measures or levels of achievement to close the 
overall food, land, and GHG mitigation gaps. As 
conceptually illustrated in Figures 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3, 
each course and its component menu items serve as 
a “step” toward closing the gaps. 
For each menu item, we also offer policy recom-
mendations for moving forward. Policy recommen-
dations can be broad or detailed. Our standard is 
one of “usefulness.” Where issues remain contro-
versial, even broad recommendations can be useful, 
but we try to make detailed recommendations 
wherever feasible to identify immediate  
steps forward. 
In evaluating each menu item, our approach differs 
from an economic modeling approach, which is 
commonly employed to estimate mitigation costs, 
but which we believe often conveys a false sense 
of both precision and confidence. A broad range 
of changes in production and yields have effects 
on emissions, and researchers have too little real 
knowledge of the broad range of costs across vast 
agricultural areas even today to inspire much 
confidence in estimates of current mitigation costs, 
let alone to make confident projections about those 
costs in the future. Economic models also cannot 
focus on the potential of promising measures and 
potential innovations that are critical to a sustain-
able food future but that are still too uncertain to 
model. But we do not ignore economics. Instead,  
we use available information to evaluate menu 
items for their potential to provide economically 
desirable solutions. 
Figure 4-1  |  Can a menu of solutions sustainably close the food gap?
Note: Includes all crops intended for direct human consumption, animal feed, industrial uses, seeds, and biofuels. Bar sizes to close gap are illustrative only. 
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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Figure 4-2  |  Can a menu of solutions close the agricultural land gap? 
Note: Bar sizes to close gap are illustrative only. 
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
Figure 4-3  |  Can a menu of solutions close the agricultural GHG mitigation gap? 
Note: Bar sizes to close gap are illustrative only. 
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
Ne
t a
gr
icu
ltu
ra
l la
nd
 ex
pa
ns
ion
(M
ha
) (
20
10
–5
0)
2050
(baseline)
2050
(target)
593
0
Reduce growth in demand 
for food and other 
agricultural products
Increase food production 
without expanding 
agricultural land
Ag
ric
ult
ur
al 
GH
G 
em
iss
ion
s (
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
+ 
lan
d-
us
e c
ha
ng
e)
 
 G
t C
O2
e/
ye
ar
 (2
05
0)
2050
(baseline)
2050
(target)
Reduce growth in 
demand for food and 
other agricultural 
products Increase food 
production 
without expanding 
agricultural land Reduce GHG 
emissions from 
agricultural 
production
Protect and restore 
natural ecosystems
15
4
        41Creating a Sustainable Food Future
Combining Menu Items for a 
Sustainable Food Future
Our analysis of individual menu items in Courses 
1–5 estimates how much each item could help 
the world close the three gaps and meet targets to 
increase food production, minimize expansion of 
agricultural land area, and reduce GHG emissions. 
In the penultimate section of this report, “The Com-
plete Menu: Creating a Sustainable Food Future,” 
we use the GlobAgri-WRR model to aggregate 
menu items into three plausible (or at least pos-
sible) combined scenarios. Each combined scenario 
represents a different level of ambition in terms of 
the political will, technological developments, and 
financial resources that will need to be applied to 
achieve a sustainable food future.
The “Coordinated Effort” scenario represents the 
lowest level of ambition—but it still involves a 
dramatic increase in global effort. Success depends 
more on strong, coordinated, global commitment 
to actions that are already well understood, rather 
than significant advances in technology. The 
“Highly Ambitious” scenario, as its name suggests, 
represents a greater level of effort. It incorporates 
all the efforts of the Coordinated Effort scenario but 
pushes further in terms of implementing improved 
technologies, even where they involve higher 
costs or appear somewhat impractical today. The 
“Breakthrough Technologies” scenario combines 
the efforts of the previous two scenarios but builds 
in levels of achievement that could be realized 
only with innovations that dramatically improve 
the performance and/or costs of technologies. The 
scenario includes only technologies where there are 
genuine grounds for optimism in that the science is 
demonstrating progress.
We refer to these combined scenarios throughout 
the report in our discussions of the potential of 
various menu items. 
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ENDNOTES
1. UNDESA (2017). The figure of 9.8 billion people in 2050 reflects 
the “medium fertility variant” or medium population growth 
scenario (as opposed to the low-growth and high-growth 
scenarios published by the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs).
2. “Middle class” is defined by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) as having per capita 
income of $3,650 to $36,500 per year or $10 to $100 per day 
in purchasing power parity terms. “Middle-class” data from 
Kharas (2010).
3. Foresight (2011a).
4. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, et al. (2018).
5. FAO, WFP, and IFAD (2012).
6. Authors’ calculations from GlobAgri-WRR model and 
Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012).
7. IFAD (2010). In 2010, about 1 billion of the 1.4 billion people 
living on less than $1.25 per day lived in rural areas. A more 
recent analysis by Castañeda et al. (2016) estimated that in 
2013, about 80% of people living on less than $1.90 per day in 
developing countries lived in rural areas.
8. World Bank (2008).
9. World Bank (2018). The World Bank number is based on 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing value added.
10. World Bank (2012a).
11. SOFA Team and Doss (2011).
12. FAO (2011a).
13. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005).
14. Figures exclude Antarctica. FAO (2011b).
15. Foley et al. (2011).
16. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005). In this report, we 
treat the negative impacts on ecosystems to imply a negative 
impact on biodiversity as well.
17. This estimate is based on the GlobAgri-WRR model. Previous 
analyses in this series used a figure of 13% for agricultural 
production using an analysis based on UNEP (2012); FAO 
(2012a); EIA (2012); IEA (2012); and Houghton (2008) with 
adjustments. This figure excludes downstream emissions from 
the food system in processing, retailing, and cooking, which 
are overwhelmingly from energy use, and which must be 
addressed primarily by a broader transformation of the energy 
sector.
18. The variability is high, and there are even differences from 
meta-analyses, but a summary of recent evidence confirming 
that this estimate is still the most reasonable is included in the 
supplement to Searchinger et al. (2018a).
19. Houghton (2008); Malhi et al. (2002).
20. This figure is based on an estimate of 5 Gt of CO2e emissions 
per year from land-use change in recent years. It attempts 
to count carbon losses from the conversion of other lands 
to agriculture, or conversion of grasslands to cropland, the 
carbon gains from reversion of agricultural land to forest 
or other uses, and the ongoing losses of carbon due to 
degradation of peat. Because it is impossible to estimate 
land-use-change emissions with data from a single year, we 
do not choose to pinpoint a specific year for these emissions 
but instead treat them as a typical rate from recent years. 
In reality, it is not possible to generate a precise estimate 
of these numbers because it is not possible to track each 
hectare of land globally and its carbon changes from year to 
year. There is a large difference between gross and net losses, 
and assumptions must be made about rates of carbon gain 
and loss from land-use change. In addition, much of these 
data are based on national reporting of net changes in forest 
area, which therefore assume carbon losses only on the net 
difference in each country where it occurs and carbon gains 
from net gains in forest where that occurs. This calculation 
cannot capture the real net losses because the losses in areas 
losing forest are unlikely to be different (and are often higher) 
than the gains from regenerating forests.  
 
In earlier reports in this series, we estimated emissions 
from land-use change at 5.5 Gt CO2e based on an average 
from other estimates found in UNEP (2012), FAO (2012a), and 
Houghton (2008). These estimates included losses from 
2000 to 2005, in which FAO’s Forest Resources Assessment 
(FRA)  estimated heavy declines in forest. Several more 
recent papers have reduced estimates of deforestation and 
therefore emissions. Smith et al. (2014) estimates 3.2 Gt CO2e/
yr in 2001–10 including deforestation (3.8 Gt CO2e/yr), forest 
degradation and forest management (-1.8 Gt CO2e/yr), biomass 
fires including peatland fires (0.3 Gt CO2e/yr), and drained 
peatlands (0.9 Gt CO2e/yr). Another paper estimates 3.3 Gt 
of CO2 equivalent from land-use change in 2011 but does not 
include drained peatland (Le Quéré et al. 2012). Federici et al. 
(2015), which based its estimates on FAO’s 2015 FRA, estimated 
emissions from net deforestation at 2.904 Gt CO2e/year from 
2011 to 2015 but also suggested that this figure was likely 30% 
too low due to failure to count carbon in some forest pools, 
which would increase the figure to 3.78 Gt/year. FAO also 
estimated peatland emissions separately of 0.9 Gt CO2eq/year 
to the IPCC, leading to a recent FAO estimate of 4.7 Gt/year 
(Federici et al. [2015]). Our peatland emissions estimate of 1.1 Gt 
CO2e/year includes fire and is further explained in Chapter 20. 
Federici et al. (2015) also reported a large increase in “forest 
degradation,” which is due principally to logging and other 
nonagricultural activities, and which we do not discuss here. 
        43Creating a Sustainable Food Future
21. Using the FRA, Federici et al. (2015) estimated gross land 
conversion to be more than 1 Gt of CO2 higher than the net 
conversion, but this definition of gross represented only the 
“net” conversion in countries that had net deforestation. 
In other words, it excluded countries that had net gains in 
forest, but if a country lost 1 million hectares of forest while 
500,000 hectares reforested, this method counts only the 
500,000 hectares lost in that country as a “gross” loss. As 
we discuss elsewhere in this report, there are large shifts in 
locations of agricultural land within countries, which suggests 
much higher carbon losses on a gross basis. Seymour and 
Busch (2016) reviewed a series of studies estimating gross 
pan-tropical land use-change emissions during the 2000s 
and found a median estimate of 5 Gt CO2e/year with a high 
estimate of 10 Gt CO2e/year.
22. Foley et al. (2005).
23. Selman and Greenhalgh (2009).
24. Porter et al. (2014). See discussion in Chapter 13 on adaptation.
25. The Green Revolution was a concerted, multidecade effort 
to modernize farming in the developing world. High-yield 
varieties of rice, wheat, and maize were developed and widely 
distributed, and the use of agricultural inputs (e.g., irrigation 
water, fertilizers) sharply increased. Across Asia, for instance, 
average rice yields nearly doubled, and wheat yields nearly 
tripled (Conway 2016). 
26. Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012); WWAP (2012). 
27. Delgado et al. (1999). 
28. Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012), Table 4.8. FAO data estimate 
an increase in arable land in use of 220 million hectares from 
1962 to 2006. According to FAO (2019a), pasture area has 
increased by 270 million hectares since 1962. 
29. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, et al. (2018).
30.  Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012).
31. We adjusted diets to assure food availability of 3,000 kcal 
per person per day in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
by proportionately scaling up all food items in the FAO 2050 
projections until this level of calories would be available. Food 
availability defines food available to consumers but excludes 
postconsumer waste. The total quantity of calories available 
must be adequate to feed all individuals after accounting first 
for this food waste and second for the unequal distribution of 
food, which means that many individuals will consume less 
than the regional average. We based the 3,000 kcal/person/
day on a recognition that once regions obtain this level of food 
availability, they have low levels of food insecurity.
32. UNDESA (2017).
33. Biofuels contributed 2.5% of world transportation energy in 
2010. EIA (2013). For this comparison with FAO projections, 
we used data provided by FAO for the crops used for biofuels 
in 2050 and back-calculated the quantity of ethanol and 
biodiesel.
34. There is no one perfect measure of the production increase 
challenge. This figure does include the rise in crops fed to 
livestock measured in calories, rather than the calories in 
the livestock products themselves. Doing so recognizes that 
animal products only return a small percentage of the calories 
in crops fed to them. However, this calculation does not 
reflect the additional calories from grasses that livestock also 
consume to provide people with milk and meat. The number 
reported in the text has the advantage of fully estimating the 
total increase in crop production, including that for feed and 
biofuels. But it leaves out the increase in pasture and other 
feeds that must be generated to produce the additional animal 
products.  
 
Careful readers of this series of reports will also notice that we 
earlier expressed the crop gap as 6,500 trillion kcal between 
2006 and 2050 (Searchinger, Hanson, Ranganathan, et al. 2013) 
rather than 7,400 trillion kcal between 2010 and 2050. The 
reason for the larger gap in the current report is that GlobAgri-
WRR counts calories in a ton of many crops differently and 
higher than those used for primary crops in Alexandratos and 
Bruinsma (2012), which did not include many crop calories 
that go into certain separate products. Those products 
include the bran in cereals and surprisingly the protein cakes 
from oilseeds. One advantage of GlobAgri-WRR is its careful 
mapping of all eventual food and feed outputs to primary 
crops. However, this adjustment affects estimates both in 2010 
and 2050. On a percentage basis, the earlier gap estimates are 
close to those estimated by GlobAgri-WRR after adjustment for 
further updates to population growth and the change in the 
base year from 2006 to 2010, so that our gap now covers 40 
years rather than 44. 
35. Authors’ calculations from GlobAgri-WRR model and 
Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012). 
36. See, e.g., Holt-Gimenez (2012); Bittman (2013); and Berners-Lee 
et al. (2018). 
37. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, et al. (2018); Ng, Fleming, et al. (2014). The 
World Health Organization (WHO) defines “overweight” as 
having a body mass index (BMI) greater than or equal to 25 
and “obese” as having a BMI greater than or equal to 30. BMI is 
an index of weight-for-height that is commonly used to classify 
overweight and obesity in adults. It is defined as a person’s 
weight in kilograms divided by the square of his height in 
meters (kg/m2) (WHO 2012). 
38. See Chapter 6 for discussion of the relative resource use 
requirements for different foods.
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39. In this report, we use the term “per capita [calorie or protein] 
availability” to mean the quantity of food reaching the 
consumer, as defined in the FAO Food Balance Sheets (FAO 
2019a). We use the term “per capita consumption” to mean 
the quantity of food actually consumed, when accounting 
for food waste at the consumption stage of the value chain. 
“Consumption” quantities (which exclude all food loss and 
waste) are therefore lower than “availability” quantities. Data 
on “per capita consumption” are from the GlobAgri-WRR 
model, using source data from FAO (2019a) on “per capita 
availability” and FAO (2011c) on food loss and waste. 
 
In 2010, global average daily calorie consumption from 
both plant- and animal-based foods was 2,487 kcal/person. 
Multiplying this figure by the 2010 global population of 
6,958,126,000 yields a total daily global calorie availability of 
17,304,859,362,000 kcal. Spreading this amount of calories 
evenly among the projected 2050 global population of 
9,771,589,000 people results in a daily calorie consumption 
of 1,771 kcal/person. For daily calorie availability, which was 
2,871 kcal/person in 2010, the same calculation yields 2,044 
kcal/person available in 2050. As a point of comparison, FAO’s 
suggested average daily energy requirement (ADER)―the 
recommended amount of caloric consumption for a healthy 
person weighted globally by age and gender―for the world in 
2010–12 was 2,353 kcal/person/day (FAO 2014a).
40. Figure 2-1 implies a global average of 13.3% of “available” food 
(measured in calories) wasted at the consumption stage of the 
food supply chain. It is smaller than the global average of 24% 
of all food lost or wasted across the food supply chain that is 
quoted in Chapter 5 (authors’ calculations from FAO 2011c).
41. The evidence for this out-competition comes from 
measurements of “elasticities” of demand for food, which are 
much higher for people in poorer countries than in wealthier 
countries (Regmi and Meade [2013]).
42. Kolbert (2014).
43. Sala et al. (2000).
44. Shackelford et al. (2014).
45. Chaplin-Kramer et al. (2015).
46. These assumptions are reflected in Alexandratos and 
Bruinsma (2012).
47. “Rate” refers to linear not compound growth rates; that is, 
an additional number of kilograms per hectare per year, 
because that is the historical pattern of yield growth as 
discussed elsewhere in this report. This projection is not 
obvious, however, because FAO projects that yields of cereals, 
which receive most attention, will grow at only 57% of their 
historical rates, and soybeans at 88%. But FAO projects that 
yields of most other major crops will grow much faster than 
their historical rates, including pulses (dry beans and lentils) 
(397%), potatoes (200%), cassava (209%), and sugarcane 
(192%). Using the method described below, the higher and 
lower growth rates of different crops roughly balance out 
future projections from the past. 
 
There is no perfect way to calculate an average growth rate 
of different crops. For example, calculating the total growth 
of all crops by weight would be misleading because it would 
greatly overvalue growth rates for high-yielding crops and 
undervalue the importance of growth rates for lower-yielding 
crops. “Effective yields” also depend not merely on how 
much yields grow but also on how much increase there is in 
“cropping intensity,” the ratio of crops harvested each year to 
the quantity of cropland. To determine an overall growth rate 
relative to the past, we instead do a calculation that compares 
future crop area using FAO projected yields and future crop 
area if yields of each crop grew at their prior (linear) rates. This 
method not only averages out the effects of different crops but 
weights each crop by both its yield and its level of demand in 
2050.  
 
We do these calculations in two ways. If we use one global 
growth rate for each crop from 1961 to 2010 to project the trend 
line, 20% less cropland would be required in 2050 according to 
FAO, which means by this method that FAO is projecting 20% 
lower growth in yields than historical trends. But if we use 
historical, regional growth rates for each crop to project trend 
lines, roughly 20% more cropland would be required, which 
means that FAO projected yields in 2050 are 20% greater 
than historical trends would suggest. In both cases, we use 
FAO projected increases in cropping intensity. As there is no 
obvious reason to use one growth rate rather than another, we 
think it is appropriate to treat FAO projected growth in yields 
as roughly matching historical rates.  
 
In the Interim Findings, we did the same kind of analysis 
using FAO’s projection of total crop production in 2050 from 
Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012), rather than our modeled 
estimates of crop production using FAO projected yields, and 
we came to the same conclusion.
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48. We use the same method to calculate an average rate of yield 
growth across multiple crops as described in note 47. 
49. Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012). Globally, cropping intensity 
is below 100% (i.e., there is more cultivated area than 
harvested area). Cropping intensity can exceed 100% in areas 
where more than one crop cycle occurs on a given cultivated 
area, as in India.
50. Ray et al. (2013).
51. Ray et al. (2013) used local data to estimate rates of yield 
growth for five major crop categories. For the remainder, we 
calculated and used regional, linear rates of yield growth for 
each other major crop category from 1989 to 2008.
52. Estimates vary and appear to be based on the number of 
livestock that researchers assume must be present before 
they call an area a pasture. FAO data place cropland at 1,530 
Mha in 2011, and permanent meadows and pastures at 3,374 
Mha in 2011 (Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012, 107). But 
estimates for permanent meadows and pastures can be as 
high as 4.7 billion hectares (Erb et al. 2007). 
53. FAO (2019a). 
54. By one estimate, cattle ranching accounted for 75% of the 74 
Mha of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon during the first 
decade of the 21st century (Barreto and Silva 2010). Aide et al. 
(2012) shows the pattern continuing across Latin America. See 
also Murgueitio et al. (2011). 
55. GlobAgri-WRR model.
56. For beef and meat from sheep and goats, we project 
20% increases between 2010 and 2050 in the efficiency 
of converting feed to food (i.e., the same quantity of feed 
produces 20% more meat), and 15% increases in efficiency for 
milk. We developed this projection first by using two different 
sets of estimates of the relationship between output per 
animal and feed per kilogram of milk or meat in contemporary 
livestock systems globally (data underlying Herrero et al. 2013; 
and Wirsenius et al. 2010). We also used FAOSTAT estimates of 
milk and meat production globally and numbers of livestock 
to establish a trend line of changes in output per animal. 
Putting the two together, we could translate the trend line of 
output per animal into a trend line of output per kilogram of 
feed. Although the two data sets yield different estimates from 
each other of milk and meat per kilogram of feed, they actually 
resulted in similar projections of changes in this ratio over 
time and therefore between 2010 and 2050. We also project a 
23% increase in the quantity of forage consumed per hectare 
(measured in dry weight), which could result either from better 
production or better grazing methods.  
 
Finally, using GlobAgri-WRR, we project changes in the 
quantity of feeds other than grass-based forages. This change 
is implemented by the model to achieve the gains in feed 
efficiency (milk and meat output per kilogram of feed) using 
different production systems and possible, plausible improved 
production systems over time in each major livestock-
producing country or region. We established a series of 
decision rules to guide which systems would be adopted.  
 
Ultimately, GlobAgri-WRR calculated increases in output per 
hectare, which reflect the global increases in feed efficiency, 
the increases in forage consumption per hectare of forage 
area (pasture), and the shift in the percentage of feeds other 
than forage. 
57. Seto et al. (2012).
58. Seto et al. (2012).
59. See discussion in Chapter 16 on shifting agricultural lands.
60. GlobAgri-WRR’s estimates of agricultural production emissions 
in 2050 employ a variety of calculations and assumptions 
based on our best estimates of trend factors wherever 
possible, which we describe more fully in Course 5. Some 
studies include emissions from regular human burning of 
savannas and grasslands, but we do not because these 
systems burn naturally on occasion and we consider any 
increase in emissions due to human efforts too uncertain. 
GlobAgri-WRR does, however, consider a smaller set of 
emissions from the burning of crop residues.
61. Authors’ calculations from GlobAgri-WRR model (counting 
emissions outside North America, the European Union, and 
other OECD countries as “developing and emerging.” Smith et 
al. (2007) and Popp et al. (2010) came to a similar conclusion 
but put the percentage of current emissions from developing 
and emerging economies at closer to 70%, rising above 80% 
by 2050. 
62. GlobAgri-WRR model.
63. Recent crop yields are given in Ray et al. (2013). In our less 
optimistic baseline scenario, the growth in beef output per 
hectare between 2010 and 2050 falls from 64% (in our 2050 
baseline) to 51%, and the growth in milk output per hectare 
falls from 59% (in our 2050 baseline) to 52%.
64. GlobAgri-WRR model.
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65. The 2°C scenario roughly corresponds with the scenario RCP 
2.6, which is the lowest climate change scenario analyzed 
by global modeling teams for the 2014 Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment. That ambitious 
scenario, which actually relies on negative emissions in the 
later part of the century, also assumes that emissions of 
carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane fall to roughly 21 
Gt of CO2 equivalent by 2050, which includes reductions of 
methane by roughly 50%. Authors’ calculations come from 
data presented in van Vuuren (2011), Figure 6. UNEP (2013) 
puts the figure for stabilization at 22 Gt. Newer modeling 
has roughly the same levels as summarized in Sanderson et 
al. (2016) and UNEP (2017). In this modeling, the emissions 
target is that required to have a greater than two-thirds 
chance of holding temperatures to the 2° goal, reflecting the 
uncertainties of climate sensitivity to higher GHGs. There are 
scenarios presented in both papers, particularly UNEP (2017), 
that allow higher emissions in 2050, but they rely even more 
on negative emissions later in the century. As we consider any 
large negative emissions to be questionable at best, we focus 
only on the scenarios allowing emissions of 21–22 Gt CO2e 
in 2050. This use of a single emissions target ignores many 
possible patterns of emissions that would each have the same 
emissions in 2050 based on 100-year global warming potential 
but which involve different levels of emissions between 2010 
and 2050 that might involve different balances of gases (i.e., 
different shares of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane). 
Under different variations of such scenarios, the emissions 
allowable in 2050 would vary greatly. This target for total 
emissions in 2050, then, merely provides a useful benchmark. 
66. GlobAgri-WRR model.
67. For example, Meinshausen et al. (2009), estimated that 
cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide would need to be 
limited to 1,000 Gt between 2000 and 2050 to provide a 
75% chance of holding warming to 2°C. As carbon dioxide 
emissions were roughly 330 Gt from 2000 to 2010, that leaves 
670 Gt. For a 50% chance of holding climate to 2°C, this paper 
calculated the 2000–2050 CO2 budget of 1,440, which leaves 
1,310 from 2010 to 2050.
68. UNEP (2017); Figueres et al. (2017).
69. For example, in Wollenburg et al. (2016), the authors select 
agricultural mitigation targets for methane and nitrous oxide 
that are based on three models, each of which the paper 
indicates relies for its agricultural mitigation on agricultural 
mitigation analyses performed for the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency sometime between 2006 and 2008. Our 
report uses more recent data, explores a wider range of 
mitigation options than those EPA reports, and we believe 
does so at a far more sophisticated level.
70. Smith et al. (2016).
71. OECD (2011).
72. Going from a 2050 baseline of 85 Gt of total global emissions 
(15 Gt from agriculture and land-use change, and 70 Gt from 
other sources) to a target of 21 Gt implies an emissions 
reduction of 75%. Twenty-five percent of 15 Gt (from agriculture 
and land-use change) is 3.8 Gt, which we rounded to 4 Gt.
73. Rogelj et al. (2018). 
74. Although some modeling analyses call for much steeper 
overall reductions in emissions by 2050, to around 8 Gt CO2e 
per year, it appears that strategies to meet that goal have not 
relied on lower agricultural emissions of nitrous oxide and 
methane (Rogelj et al. 2018; Sanderson et al. 2016). Instead, 
they typically rely on faster mitigation of emissions from the 
energy sector and often large negative emissions after 2050.
75. Von Braun et al. (2009).
76. See Hazell (2009) for a perspective on the Green Revolution. 
Aksoy and Hoekman (2010) provide copious evidence from 
around the developing world of the same phenomenon. An in-
depth empirical investigation that supports this view for four 
African countries is found in Christiaensen and Demery (2007). 
77. World Bank (2012b).
78. Evenson and Gollin (2003a).
79. FAO (2011d). The decline in inflation-adjusted prices over the 
period averaged more than 4% per annum.
80. World Bank (2012b).
81. Bush (2009).
82. Von Lampe et al. (2014). The range of average annual changes 
forecast between 2005 and 2050 was -0.4% to +0.7% per year.
83. For example, Nelson et al. (2010) estimates that productivity 
gains of 40% greater than baseline estimates would reduce 
the annual number of future malnourished children by 19 
million people and hold down otherwise expected food price 
increases dramatically. 
84. A comprehensive survey of the literature and discussion of the 
issues is in Timmer (2002).
85. World Bank (2018). This does not include backward- and 
forward-linked activities such as input supply or food 
processing and retailing.
86. Huang et al. (2007). For more detail, see the historical material 
in Sonntag et al. (2005). 
87. Also see Christiaensen (2012).
88. World Bank (2017a).
89. World Bank (2017b); World Bank (2008).
        47Creating a Sustainable Food Future
90. Jayne et al. (2016a).
91. SOFA Team and Doss (2011).
92. World Bank (2011).
93. UN (2012).
94. World Bank, FAO, and IFAD (2009).
95. World Bank (2011a).
96. World Bank (2011a).
97. World Bank, FAO, and IFAD (2009).
98. UN (2012).
99. World Bank, FAO, and IFAD (2009).
100. IFPRI (2000).
101. FAO (2011a).
102. FAO (2011b).
103. Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012).
104. WWAP (2012). 
105. Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012); WWAP (2012). 
106. Shiklomanov (2000).
107. “Water withdrawal” refers to the total amount of water 
abstracted from freshwater sources for human use. See  
Gassert et al. (2013) and WWAP (2012). 
108. Hoekstra and Mekonnen (2012). 
109. “Water consumption” is the portion of all water withdrawn 
that is consumed through evaporation or incorporation into a 
product, such that it is no longer available for reuse (Gassert 
et al. 2013).
110. WEF (2015). 
111. Siebert and Doll (2010).
112. For a good pictorial presentation, see National Geographic 
(2017).
113. WWAP (2012). Two-thirds of groundwater withdrawals are for 
agriculture (Margat and van der Gun 2013).
114. “Water stress” is the ratio of total water withdrawals to 
available renewable supply in an area. In high-risk areas, 
40% or more of the available supply is withdrawn every year. 
In extremely high-risk areas, that number goes up to 80% 
or higher. A higher percentage means more water users 
competing for limited supplies (WRI Aqueduct 2013). 
115. Scanlon et al. (2007).
116. Deemer et al. (2016).
117. Malherbe et al. (2016).
118. Lemly (1994).
119. Ziv et al. (2012).
120. Deemer et al. (2016).
121. Frenken and Faurès (1997); Junk et al. (1989); Baldock et al. 
(2000).
122. Reisner (1993) provides a great history of irrigation in the 
United States and the conflicts resulting from it.
123. Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2011). Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2011) 
have also developed a measure of gray water consumption, 
defined as the volume of fresh water that is required to 
assimilate the load of pollutants based on existing ambient 
water quality standards. However, the estimates of agricultural 
water consumption in this report refer to only green and blue 
water.
124. IPCC (2014); Comprehensive Assessment of Water 
Management in Agriculture (2007). 
125. Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012). 
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COURSE 1  
Reduce Growth in Demand 
for Food and Other 
Agricultural Products
The size of the food challenge—and the associated environmental and 
economic challenges—depends on the scale of the increase in demand 
for crops and animal-based foods by midcentury. The food, land, and GHG 
mitigation gaps are derived from reasonable estimates of business-as-
usual growth in demand for food crops and livestock. Yet such levels of 
growth are not inevitable. Course 1 menu items explore ways to reduce this 
projected growth in socially and economically beneficial ways. 
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CHAPTER 5
MENU ITEM: REDUCE 
FOOD LOSS AND WASTE
A significant share of the food produced for consumption is never 
consumed by people. Reducing present rates of food loss and 
waste could, in principle, reduce the three gaps significantly. 
We believe such a reduction is possible in practice, given the 
economic costs of food loss and waste, some recent success 
stories, and the emergence of promising new technologies.
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Figure 5-1  |  Approximately 24 percent of all food produced (by caloric content) is lost or wasted from farm to fork
Source: WRI analysis based on FAO (2011c).
The Challenge
Efforts to reduce food loss and waste (FLW) must 
overcome the challenge posed by the fact that 
losses occur mostly in relatively small percentages 
at different stages as different handlers move food 
from farm to fork. To reduce these losses requires 
broadly shared commitments to strong quantita-
tive goals, careful measurement, and persistent 
action. This menu item explores the challenges and 
opportunities.
According to the best available estimates by FAO, 
approximately one-third of all food produced in 
the world in 2009, measured by weight, was lost or 
wasted.1 Food loss and waste refers to food intended 
to be eaten by people that leaves the food supply 
chain somewhere between being ready for harvest 
and being consumed, and thus is not consumed 
by people (Box 5-1). Converted into calories, this 
amount is equivalent to 24 percent of the world’s 
food supply lost somewhere between farm and fork 
(Figure 5-1).2
Globally, this inefficiency in the food system results 
in losses of almost $1 trillion per year.3 In sub-
Saharan Africa, postharvest grain losses total up 
to $4 billion per year.4 In the United States, the 
average family of four wastes roughly $1,500 worth 
of food annually,5 while in the United Kingdom, the 
average household with children discards approxi-
mately £700 of edible food each year.6 
In some regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia, food losses are concentrated during 
harvesting and storage and therefore reduce farm-
ers’ income and, at times, even their ability to feed 
their families. In other places—including Europe 
and North America—food wasted near the fork can 
affect local people who are food-insecure when the 
food is not donated or redistributed. 
Gross food available = 6 QUADRILLION KCAL (2009)
Production
Handling and storage
Processing
Distribution and market
Consumption
Net food available
-6%
-6%
-1%
-3%
-8%
76%
100%
PERCENT
LOST OR
WASTED
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BOX 5-1 |  Defining food loss and waste
In this report, “food loss and waste” refers to food intended to be 
eaten by people that leaves the food supply chain somewhere 
between being ready for harvest or slaughter and being consumed. 
Some definitions also include the associated inedible parts of food. 
“Food” refers to any substance—whether processed, 
semiprocessed, or raw—that is intended for human consumption or, 
more specifically, ingestion. “Inedible parts” refers to components 
associated with a food that, in a particular food supply chain, are 
not intended to be consumed by people; inedible parts include 
bones, rinds, and pits. What is considered inedible depends 
strongly on the cultural context. In this report and its calculations, 
we include only food and exclude the associated inedible parts, 
following FAO (2019a).
The distinction between food loss and food waste is not always 
sharply defined but, where used, is primarily based on the 
underlying reasons for material leaving the food supply chain. “Food 
loss” typically refers to what occurs between the farm and the retail 
store, and is typically considered  to be unintended and caused by 
poor functioning of the food production and supply system or by 
poor institutional and legal frameworks. Examples include food that 
rots in storage because of inadequate technology or refrigeration, 
or food that cannot make it to market because of poor infrastructure 
and goes unconsumed. “Food waste” typically refers to what occurs 
from the retail store through to the point of intended consumption. It 
occurs due to intended behaviors—choice, poor stock management, 
or neglect. Examples include food that has spoiled, expired, or been 
left uneaten after preparation. 
Given this definition, food loss and waste calculations do not include 
surplus food that is redirected to food banks and subsequently 
eaten by people; food grown intentionally for feed, seed, or industrial 
use; or overconsumption beyond recommended caloric needs.
Sources: Food Loss and Waste Protocol (2016); Global Initiative on Food Loss and 
Waste Reduction (2016). 
FLW also wastes natural resources. It consumes 
about one-quarter of all water used by agriculture 
each year.7 It requires an area of agricultural land 
greater than the size of China.8 And it generates 
about 8 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions annually.9 If food loss and waste were a 
country, it would be the third-largest GHG emitter 
on the planet (Figure 5-2).
FLW can occur at each stage of the food supply 
chain: 
 ▪ During production or harvest in the form of 
grain left behind by poor harvesting equip-
ment, discarded fish, and fruit not harvested 
or discarded because they fail to meet quality 
standards or are uneconomical to harvest. 
 ▪ During handling and storage in the form of food 
degraded by pests, fungus, and disease. 
 ▪ During processing and packaging in the form of 
spilled milk, damaged fish, and fruit unsuitable 
for processing. Processed foods may be lost or 
wasted because of poor order forecasting and 
inefficient factory processes.
 ▪ During distribution and marketing in the form 
of edible food discarded because it is noncom-
pliant with aesthetic quality standards or is not 
sold before “best before” and “use-by” dates.
 ▪ During consumption in the form of food pur-
chased by consumers, restaurants, and caterers 
but not eaten.10 
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Figure 5-2  |  If food loss and waste were a country, it would be the third-largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world
The distribution of food loss and waste along 
stages of the food supply chain varies significantly 
between developed and developing regions. More 
than half of the food loss and waste in North 
America, Oceania (which includes Australia and 
New Zealand), and Europe occurs at the consump-
tion stage. In contrast, the two stages closest to the 
farm―production and storage―account for more 
than two-thirds of food loss and waste in South and 
Southeast Asia and in sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 
5-3). As more countries develop, we can therefore 
anticipate that food losses and waste will shift from 
the farm toward consumers. 
The total share of available food that becomes lost 
or wasted ranges from 15 percent to 25 percent 
across most regions. As Figure 5-3 indicates, the 
outlier is North America and Oceania, where loss 
and waste is approximately 42 percent of all avail-
able food.
On a per capita basis, North America and Oceania11 
stand out, with about 1,500 kcal per person per 
day lost or wasted from farm to fork, while Europe 
and industrialized Asia hover around 750 kcal per 
person per day and all other regions lose or waste 
under 600 kcal per person per day.12
Regionally, about 56 percent of total food loss 
and waste occurs in the developed world―North 
America, Oceania, Europe, and the industrialized 
Asian nations of China, Japan, and South Korea. 
The developing world accounts for 44 percent 
(Figure 5-4). 
The choice of whether to measure food loss and 
waste in terms of calories or weight alters the rela-
tive contribution of different food categories. While 
cereals comprise the most FLW relative to other 
food categories on a caloric basis, fruits and vege-
tables are the largest source by weight (Figure 5-5). 
This difference results primarily from the high-
water content of fruits and vegetables. Yet because 
fruits and vegetables have high nutritional values 
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Figure 5-3  |  Where food loss and waste occurs along the food supply chain varies among regions
Figure 5-4  |   About 56 percent of food loss and waste 
occurs in developed regions and 44 
percent in developing regions
Note: Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding. Data are for the year 2009.
Source: WRI analysis based on FAO (2011c).
Source: WRI analysis based on FAO (2011c).
relative to their calories and require more natural 
resources to produce than cereals, the significance 
of their waste is greater than just their calories.13 
A significant challenge in reducing FLW results 
from the fact that most of the total FLW is caused in 
small quantities by different handlers. If one person 
or a single process in the food supply chain had a 25 
percent rate of FLW, progress would be relatively 
easy. But for most individual farmers, companies, 
or consumers, the rates are less, which means each 
may have limited incentive to improve. Figure 5-6 
illustrates the multiple causes of loss and waste 
estimated by a Nigerian study of gari, a traditional 
product made from cassava.14 Total gari losses are 
more than 50 percent. Causes of losses vary from 
some of the tubers being too small or too woody to 
meet consumer preferences, to losses during stor-
age. The largest cause of loss of edible gari occurs 
during the peeling stage. On the one hand, this 
example shows a hotspot of waste, which therefore 
should have large potential for improvement. On 
the other hand, even this hotspot causes less than 
half of the FLW. 
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Figure 5-5  |   Cereals comprise half of food loss and waste in terms of caloric content, while fruits and vegetables 
comprise just under half in terms of weight
Figure 5-6  |   Food loss and waste occurs along the food supply chain: Example of gari (cassava) in Nigeria
Source: WRI analysis based on FAO (2011c).
Source: Oguntade (2013). Graphic from Yossi Qunt. 
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BOX 5-2 |  How the United Kingdom reduced 
household FLW by 21 percent 
Between 2007 and 2012, the United Kingdom achieved a 21 percent 
reduction in household FLW (equivalent to an estimated 14 percent 
total reduction in food loss and waste for the country), mostly 
through a variety of labeling and public relations efforts. For 
example, supermarket chains started printing tips for improving 
food storage and for lengthening shelf-life for fruits and vegetables 
directly onto the plastic produce bags in which customers place 
their purchases. Some chains shifted away from “Buy-One-Get-
One-Free” promotions for perishable goods toward using price 
promotions on such goods instead. The government revised its 
guidance on food date labels, suggesting that retailers remove “sell 
by” dates—which many consumers mistakenly interpret as meaning 
that food was unfit to eat after that date—and instead display “use 
by” dates which more clearly communicate when food is no longer 
fit for consumption. In addition, many food manufacturers, food 
retailers, and local government authorities participated in the “Love 
Food Hate Waste” campaign that raised public awareness about 
food loss and waste and provided practical waste reduction tips 
through in-store displays, pamphlets, and the media.
Source: Lipinski et al. (2013).
The Opportunity
From a purely technical perspective, potential 
reductions in FLW must be large because developed 
countries have managed to achieve relatively low 
loss rates at the harvest and storage stages of the 
food supply chain, while developing countries waste 
relatively little food during the consumption stage. 
But present levels of FLW represent the decisions 
of literally billions of farmers, processors, retailers, 
and consumers, and every one of them makes at 
least some effort not to lose or waste food or they 
would sell or consume nothing at all. 
What is the evidence that public and private initia-
tives could reduce FLW? Although limited, evidence 
comes in three forms: experience with recent 
efforts, estimates of economic savings, and a variety 
of technical and management opportunities. 
Recent experience
The United Kingdom launched a nationwide initia-
tive to reduce food waste in 2007 and has probably 
put more effort into reducing food waste than any 
other country (Box 5-2). By 2012, the United King-
dom achieved a 21 percent reduction in household 
food waste relative to 2007 levels, and a 14 percent 
reduction in total FLW.
Economic savings
The potential for economic savings, documented 
by several studies, also indicates the potential 
for change, and again the United Kingdom pro-
vides some of the most compelling evidence. For 
example, the United Kingdom’s nationwide initia-
tive saved households approximately £6.5 billion.15 
One study found that each £1 invested generated 
savings of £250 (although costs did not include any 
additional time or convenience costs to consum-
ers).16 In one specific urban effort in 2012–13, six 
West London boroughs implemented an initiative 
to reduce household food waste primarily through 
communications. The initiative resulted in a 15 
percent reduction, with a benefit-cost ratio of 8 
to 1 when considering the financial savings to the 
borough councils alone and 92 to 1 when factoring 
in the financial benefits to households.17
To gain a wider perspective, along with the orga-
nization Waste and Resources Action Programme 
(WRAP), we surveyed efforts to reduce food loss 
and waste at nearly 1,200 business sites across 
17 countries and more than 700 companies. They 
represented a range of sectors, including food 
manufacturing, food retail (e.g., grocery stores), 
hospitality (e.g., hotels, leisure), and food service 
(e.g., canteens, restaurants). We found that the 
median benefit-cost ratio was 14 to 1 across all types 
of companies, while hotels, food manufacturers, 
and food retailers tended to have ratios between 5 
to 1 and 10 to 1.18 
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Figure 5-7  |   A wide range of approaches could reduce food loss and waste (not exhaustive)
Source: Hanson and Mitchell (2017).
Technical and management approaches to 
reducing FLW
The last piece of evidence comes from the variety of 
practical, technical, and management approaches 
to reduce FLW. Figure 5-7 lists some of these 
approaches that show the most promise for near-
term gains.19 We highlight examples of opportuni-
ties at each major step in the chain. 
Production stage
FLW in the production stage often occurs because 
of poor harvesting equipment, because of uneven 
ripening, or because bad weather prevents crops 
from being harvested in time. In Senegal in the 
early 1990s, hand threshing processes led to losses 
of 35 percent of harvested rice. Researchers worked 
with farmers to modify a mechanized threshing 
tool for local conditions that proved able to harvest 
six tons of rice per day and capture 99 percent of 
grains. Despite a cost of $5,000, the benefits were 
sufficiently high that the technology is today used in 
half of rice production in Senegal.20 Similar harvest-
ing technology improvements are needed across a 
wide array of crops.
Handling and storage stage
In developing countries, limited refrigeration and 
food processing lead to large storage losses, yet 
innovative, cheap alternative storage systems pro-
vide powerful technical options to reduce handling 
and storage losses.
Evaporative coolers. Evaporative cooling is a 
relatively low-cost method of preserving fruits, 
vegetables, roots, and tubers, especially in regions 
where electric refrigeration is either prohibitively 
expensive or unavailable.21 Evaporative coolers are 
based on the principle that when air passes over a 
wet surface, water evaporates and withdraws heat 
from the surface, creating a cooling effect upon that 
surface. One vessel, holding the food being stored, 
is placed inside another vessel filled with water. As 
the water evaporates, the inner vessel stays cool and 
water is refilled as needed.22
During or immediately after 
harvesting on the farm
After leaving the farm for 
handling, storage, and 
transportation
During industrial or 
domestic processing and/or 
packaging
During distribution to 
markets, including at 
wholesale and retail markets
In the home or business 
of the consumer, including 
restaurants and caterers
• Convert unmarketable 
crops into value-added 
products
• Improve agriculture 
extension services
• Improve harvesting 
techniques 
• Improve access to 
infrastructure and 
markets
• Improve storage 
technologies
• Introduce energy-
efficient, low-carbon 
cold chains
• Improve handling to 
reduce damage
• Improve infrastructure 
(e.g., roads, electricity 
access)
• Reengineer 
manufacturing 
processes
• Improve supply chain 
management
• Improve packaging to 
keep food fresher for 
longer, optimize portion 
size, and gauge safety
• Reprocess or repackage 
food not meeting 
specifications
• Provide guidance 
on food storage and 
preparation
• Change food date 
labeling practices
• Make cosmetic 
standards more 
amenable to selling 
imperfect food (e.g., 
produce with irregular 
shapes or blemishes)
• Review promotions 
policy
• Reduce portion sizes
• Improve consumer 
cooking skills  
• Conduct consumer 
education campaigns 
(e.g., general public, 
schools, restaurants)
• Consume imperfect 
produce
HANDLING & 
STORAGE
PROCESSING & 
PACKAGING
DISTRIBUTION & 
MARKETPRODUCTION CONSUMPTION
• Improve forecasting and ordering
• Facilitate increased donation of unsold food
•  Increase financing for innovation and scaling of promising technologies
• Create partnerships to manage seasonal variability (e.g., bumper crops)
• Increase capacity building to accelerate transfer of best practices 
= Approach profiled in report
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Table 5-1  |   Increases in shelf life via zero-energy cool chamber
CROP
SHELF LIFE (IN DAYS)
ADDED SHELF LIFE (PERCENT)ROOM 
TEMPERATURE
ZERO-ENERGY 
COOL CHAMBER
Banana 14 20   43%
Carrot 5 12   140%
Cauliflower 7 12   71%
Guava 10 15   50%
Lime 11 25   127%
Mango 6 9   50%
Mint 1 3   200%
Peas 5 10   100%
Potato 46 97   111%
Source: Adapted from Roy (n.d.).
Evaporative coolers are constructed from locally 
available materials and do not require elaborate 
training. Extension agencies could help spread 
awareness of their potential to preserve food (Table 
5-1), and agencies could also create demonstration 
sites showing how to construct a zero-energy cool 
chamber.23 
PICS bags. To reduce pest damage, research-
ers at Purdue University have developed a simple 
reusable plastic storage bag, the Purdue Improved 
Cowpea Storage (PICS) bag. PICS uses three bags 
nested within each other, with the innermost bag 
holding the crop being stored. After filling, each bag 
is tied tightly to form an airtight seal.24 Although 
designed originally for cowpeas, the bags may be 
useful for other crops as well.25 
The main obstacle to more widespread use is the 
limited availability of PICS bags in many coun-
tries, due to the low density of agricultural input 
retailers.26 In some parts of Niger, for example, 
the average distance to a PICS retailer is nearly 13 
kilometers.27 Low levels of awareness about PICS 
bags can also be a constraint.28 High import tariffs 
on raw materials for manufacturing the bags add to 
the cost, as do high transportation costs for vendors 
who sell the bags. These kinds of constraints can be 
overcome through education by extension services, 
increased support by donors, and reduction of 
tariffs on key material imports.
Processing and packaging stage
Causes of FLW during this stage include discard-
ing of damaged food, losses by inefficient factory 
machinery, and food never processed because of 
poor order forecasting. Potential improvements 
include changes in production processes, and 
improvements in forecasting and responses to 
changes in orders.29 
This stage is also where opportunities exist to 
improve the long-term resistance of products to 
spoilage. Traditional approaches include canning, 
pickling, and drying, but opportunities exist for 
some “next-generation” approaches.
The Apeel Science company, for example, has 
illustrated the potential for innovation by develop-
ing sprays of thin lipids to coat fruits and vegetables 
from organic sources. The sprays have extended 
shelf life by 30 days or more. The lipid, extracted 
from plant material such as banana leaves and 
peels, is designed separately for each fruit or 
vegetable. It helps hold in water, which prevents 
fruits and vegetable from shriveling. It also controls 
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the exchange of gases between the interior of the 
fruit or vegetable and the atmosphere, particularly 
oxygen and ethylene, to slow decay. Finally, it 
blocks the ability of bacteria on the surface of foods 
to sense that they are near a food source, and thus 
the bacteria multiply much slower.30 Because this 
method works without refrigeration, it offers great 
potential benefits in developing countries with 
limited refrigeration. 
Distribution and marketing stage
The United Kingdom group WRAP studied loss and 
waste that occurs in the retail sector in the United 
Kingdom and found that although loss and waste 
levels were fairly low, one-seventh could be avoided 
through improved packaging and handling, stock 
ordering, and inventory control.31 It also found that 
another two-sevenths could be donated to charities 
for distribution and consumption. 
The leading obstacles to food donations are  
related to transportation and legal or economic  
factors. Farmers and stores with surplus food  
might not be physically close enough to food  
banks or food rescue groups to deliver unused food 
economically. Prospective food donors might be 
concerned about legal repercussions should the 
food somehow be unsafe and the recipients of the 
food suffer health consequences.32 
Although the transportation obstacles can be dif-
ficult to address, establishing additional food banks 
could lessen travel distances and make redistri-
bution easier for many farmers and retailers. An 
adequately funded nonprofit organization could run 
scheduled retrieval services, driving to farms and 
retail stores, picking up donated goods, and deliv-
ering to food banks. Internet apps are now being 
rolled out that inform food banks when unsold food 
is available at retail stores in near-real time.33
To address the legal obstacle, governments can 
pass “Good Samaritan” laws that limit the liability 
of donors in case redistributed food unexpectedly 
turns out to be somehow harmful to the consum-
er.34 These laws generally do not protect against 
gross negligence or intentional misconduct but 
instead assure food donors that they will not be 
penalized for redistributions made in good faith.35 
In addition to granting legal protection to donors, 
these laws may also be seen as an endorsement of 
food redistribution, bringing it to the attention of 
those who might not have considered the practice.36
To help address the economic obstacles, govern-
ments could introduce tax incentives for food dona-
tions. In the United States, the states of California, 
Arizona, Oregon, and Colorado have passed state 
laws providing tax credits for food redistribution to 
state food banks.37
Consumption stage
One obvious reason for food waste by consumers 
in restaurants and other food service providers is 
excessive portion sizes.38 Restaurants use larger por-
tion sizes as selling points to suggest to consumers 
that they are receiving good value for their money.39 
However, this trend toward larger sizes causes more 
food waste when customers are unable to finish a 
meal, and also contributes to obesity and overcon-
sumption of food. On average, U.S. diners do not 
finish 17 percent of the food they buy at restaurants 
and leave 55 percent of these leftovers behind.40 
Reducing portion sizes is one straightforward 
approach to reducing this food waste. Another 
option is offering smaller portion sizes at a lower 
price while still offering larger portion sizes at a 
higher price. This approach would allow customers 
with smaller appetites to order a smaller meal and 
presumably leave less of it behind, while also lower-
ing preparation costs for the restaurant.41 
In a buffet or cafeteria-style food service environ-
ment, however, the customer generally determines 
the portion size of food purchased—but food service 
operators can eliminate cafeteria-style trays and 
make customers carry the food they purchase on 
plates, which prevents “hoarding.” One study of 
dining halls in 25 U.S. universities found that elimi-
nating trays reduced food waste by 25–30 percent.42 
Some of the FLW in homes occurs because of 
confusion about spoilage dates. Dates provided on 
the packaging of food and drinks are intended to 
provide consumers with information regarding the 
freshness and safety of foods. However, these seem-
ingly simple dates can confuse consumers about 
how long food may be safely stored. One study, for 
instance, found that one-fifth of food thrown away 
by households in the United Kingdom is disposed 
of because the food is perceived to be “out of date” 
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due to labeling, when in fact some of the food is still 
suitable for human consumption.43 
Part of the confusion surrounding product dating 
results from multiple dates that might appear on 
the packages. For example, three commonly seen 
terms in the United States are “use by,” “sell by,” 
and “best before,” none of which are required by the 
federal government.44 “Sell by” informs the store 
how long to display the food product. “Best by” rec-
ommends the date before which a product should 
be consumed in order to experience peak flavor 
and quality. Only “use by” concerns product safety, 
indicating the last date recommended for safely 
consuming the food product. However, consumers 
often view each of these dates as being a measure of 
food safety.45
Manufacturers of food products could also move to 
a “closed date” system, which would replace a “sell 
by” date with a code that can be scanned or read 
by the manufacturer and retailer, but not by the 
consumer. To reduce confusion, retailers can post 
in-store displays, provide leaflets and online guid-
ance, or print messages on grocery bags that define 
the various food date labels and explain the differ-
ences between them. A sign of progress is that in 
2017 the Consumer Goods Forum organized a “call 
to action” to streamline food date labels by 2020 in 
accordance with these recommendations.
Model Results
Because coordinated efforts to reduce FLW are 
relatively new, we cannot know how much reduc-
tion of what kind of food loss or waste, and in which 
regions, is truly economical or practicable. We 
therefore chose to model in GlobAgri-WRR only 
“across the board” estimates of reduction in rates of 
FLW for each food in each region by 2050 compared 
to present FLW rates. For our three levels of ambi-
tion (Coordinated Effort, Highly Ambitious, and 
Breakthrough Technologies), we model FLW reduc-
tions of 10, 25, and 50 percent to estimate how much 
each would close the food, land, and GHG mitigation 
gaps. The 50 percent reduction reflects the FLW 
reduction target in the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), but we believe this level of reduction 
will require major new technologies, such as the 
Apeel coatings that dramatically change how easy it 
is to use and keep food without spoilage.
Not surprisingly, each of the scenarios would 
significantly contribute to meeting our food, land, 
and GHG targets (Table 5-2). To illustrate, a 25 
percent reduction in FLW would make more food 
available and reduce the size of the food gap from a 
56 percent shortfall in crop calories to 50 percent. It 
would close the land gap by 27 percent (163 million 
hectares [Mha]) and the GHG mitigation gap by 15 
percent. 
Recommended Strategies
To reduce food loss and waste, we recommend that 
public and private sector decision-makers follow a 
three-step approach: target, measure, and act.
1. Target
Targets set ambition, and ambition motivates 
action. In September 2015, a historic window of 
opportunity opened to elevate the issue of food loss 
and waste reduction on the global agenda as the 
UN General Assembly formally adopted a set of 
17 SDGs—global goals to end poverty, protect the 
planet, and ensure prosperity. These goals include 
SDG Target 12.3, which calls for cutting in half per 
capita global food waste at the retail and consumer 
levels and reducing food losses along production 
and supply chains (including postharvest losses) by 
2030. Implicitly, governments have accepted this 
goal. But because it is only one of 169 targets, it may 
not be garnering sufficient attention. To create the 
needed focus, governments and companies should 
adopt explicit food loss and waste reduction targets 
aligned with SDG Target 12.3.
How much progress has been achieved to date? 
The United States, the European Union, Australia, 
Japan, Norway, and the African Union46 have now 
adopted specific FLW reduction targets consistent 
with Target 12.3. Courtauld 2025, a voluntary com-
mitment on the part of more than 100 businesses 
and government agencies in the United Kingdom, 
has set a target for FLW reduction that will put 
the country on a trajectory to deliver Target 12.3.47 
Several groups of companies have also set reduc-
tion targets, including the Consumer Goods Forum 
(CGF), the Global Agri-business Alliance, and 2030 
Champions (a U.S. business partnership).48 
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Going forward, notable gaps in explicit adoption of 
a food loss and waste reduction target need to be 
closed, including the following:
 ▪ Targets by developing and middle-income 
countries outside of Africa
 ▪ Targets set as part of implementing a country’s 
nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change (only Rwan-
da’s NDC currently includes a quantified food loss 
and waste reduction target as part of its strategy)49 
 ▪ Targets at the subnational level, including cities
2. Measure
The adage that “what gets measured gets managed” 
has particular significance for FLW because data 
are still relatively weak. For instance, existing glob-
ally consistent estimates are at the near-continental 
scale and rely on extrapolations from a limited set 
of target studies. Moreover, different analyses even 
of one commodity within one country can produce 
a wide range of estimates. To prioritize reduction 
strategies and track progress, decision-makers need 
not just better overall estimates but also estimates 
of where and why FLW occurs in the food chain. 
How much progress has been achieved to date? 
Some governments and companies have started 
quantifying their food loss and waste and are 
publishing the results. Country and region leaders 
include the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and the European Union. City leaders include 
Denver, Jeddah, London, Nashville, and New York. 
Although many companies measure and report on 
overall material waste levels, only a handful specifi-
cally measure food loss and waste and report on it 
separately. Among those that do, Tesco—one of the 
world’s largest food retailers—has conducted an 
annual food loss and waste inventory for its opera-
tions since 2013 and publicly reported the results.50 
Table 5-2  |   Global effects of 2050 food loss and waste reduction scenarios on the food gap, agricultural land use, and 
greenhouse gas emissions 
SCENARIO
FOOD 
GAP, 
2010–50 
(%)
CHANGE IN AGRICULTURAL 
AREA, 2010–50 (MHA) 
ANNUAL GHG EMISSIONS, 2050  
(GT CO2E) 
GHG 
MITIGATION 
GAP  
(GT CO2E)Pastureland
Crop-
land Total
Agricultural 
production
Land-use 
change Total
2050 BASELINE 56 401 192 593 9.0 6.0 15.1 11.1
10% reduction 
in rate of food 
loss and waste 
(Coordinated 
Effort)
54 367 (-34)
159
(-33)
526
(-67) 8.9 5.5 14.4 
10.4 
(-0.7)
25% reduction in 
rate of food loss 
and waste (Highly 
Ambitious)
50 318(-84)
112
(-79)
430 
(-163) 8.7 4.7 13.4
9.4 
(-1.6)
50% reduction in 
rate of food loss 
and waste
(Breakthrough 
Technologies) 
44 240(-162)
39
(-152)
279
(-314) 8.3 3.6 11.9
7.9
(-3.1)
 
Notes: “Cropland” includes cropland plus aquaculture ponds. Numbers not summed correctly are due to rounding. Numbers shown in parentheses are changes relative to 2050 
baseline.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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Going forward, more governments at the national 
and subnational levels and companies need to 
start quantifying and reporting on their food loss 
and waste. The release of the Food Loss & Waste 
Protocol’s51 Food Loss and Waste Accounting 
and Reporting Standard in 2016 can help with 
this quantification. The FLW Standard provides 
global requirements and guidance for quantifying 
and reporting on the weight of food and/or associ-
ated inedible parts removed from the food supply 
chain.52 The FLW Standard empowers countries 
and companies to create base-year food loss and 
waste inventories and quantify progress over time 
toward meeting Target 12.3 or any other goals they 
may have. Measurement does not need to be a com-
plex and resource-intensive exercise. Quantification 
and periodic monitoring can be integrated with 
other resource monitoring programs that govern-
ments and companies have in place.
3. Act
How much progress has been achieved to date? 
Efforts to address food loss and waste are not new, 
and activity in many places has been ongoing for 
some time. But since the launch of the SDGs in 
2015, many governments and businesses have 
started to tackle high rates of FLW. For instance, 
some food retailers now are selling imperfectly 
shaped but perfectly nutritious produce that in pre-
vious years would have been discarded at the farm 
because it did not meet cosmetic standards. Inter-
net-based apps are now being used by food retailers 
and restaurants to quickly transport unsold—yet 
still safe—food to charities, feeding those in need 
and avoiding food waste. Coalitions involving food 
service companies such as Sodexo are now working 
collaboratively to reduce food waste in schools and 
elsewhere.53 Innovations in crop storage continue to 
gain popularity in Africa.54 
What is needed going forward? Given the scale of 
the food loss and waste challenge, there is a need for 
more action by more entities across more regions. 
Exactly what should be done varies between entities 
and by stage in the food supply chain; no simple, 
single recommendation can adequately capture 
the actions needed. In many developing regions, a 
majority of food loss occurs between the point of 
harvest and when the food reaches the market. Thus 
pursuing actions during the production, storage, 
and processing stages of the food supply chain 
are important. In developed regions, as well as in 
rapidly growing urban areas just about everywhere, 
a significant share of food waste occurs closer to the 
fork. Thus pursuing actions during the market and 
consumption stages is vital. 
Figure 5-7 lists some of the approaches that the 
authors, literature, and interviews suggest could 
be particularly practical and cost-effective, could 
be implemented relatively quickly, and could 
achieve near-term gains once put into place at the 
appropriate stage in the food supply chain.55 Some 
involve large-scale infrastructure development. For 
instance, building roads and introducing electric-
powered refrigeration in low-income countries 
would contribute to reducing food losses from 
spoilage during the handling and storage stage by 
enabling fresh food to get to market more quickly.56 
Others involve targeted technology, policy, and 
consumer behavior interventions. 
For more detail about this menu item, see  
“Reducing Food Loss and Waste,” a working paper 
supporting this World Resources Report available at 
www.SustainableFoodFuture.org.

        65Creating a Sustainable Food Future
CHAPTER 6 
MENU ITEM: SHIFT TO 
HEALTHIER AND MORE 
SUSTAINABLE DIETS 
The food gap assumes that by 2050 several billion people 
will increase their consumption of calories, protein, and 
animal-based foods—including not only meat but also dairy, 
fish, and eggs. This menu item involves shifting the diets of 
people who consume high amounts of calories, protein, and 
animal-based foods. 
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Figure 6-1  |   Average per capita calorie consumption exceeds average daily energy requirements in most world regions
Note: Width of bars is proportional to each region’s population. Average daily energy requirement of 2,353 kcal/capita/day is given in FAO (2014a). Individuals’ energy 
requirements vary depending on age, sex, height, weight, pregnancy/lactation, and level of physical activity.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model with source data from FAO (2019a) and FAO (2011c). 
Although we explore a range of scenarios, we 
identify reductions in consumption of ruminant 
meat (beef, sheep, and goat) as the most promising 
strategy for reducing land requirements and GHG 
emissions—while also achieving health benefits. 
Other researchers have also found that shifting 
diets can mitigate climate change, but by counting 
the full consequences of diets for land use, we find 
that diets in general—and consumption of ruminant 
meat in particular—are even more significant for 
GHG mitigation than commonly understood. 
The Challenge
The global convergence toward Western-style diets 
will make it harder for the world to achieve several 
of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, includ-
ing those related to hunger (SDG 2), good health 
and well-being (SDG 3), water management (SDG 
6), climate change (SDG 13), and terrestrial ecosys-
tems (SDG 15).
The great dietary convergence 
Around the world, diets are converging toward 
the Western style—high in refined carbohydrates, 
added sugars, fats, and animal-based foods. As part 
of this shift, per capita consumption of beans and 
other pulses,57 other vegetables, coarse grains, and 
dietary fiber is declining.58 Rising incomes pro-
vide the main stimulus for this shift because they 
allow people to eat more resource-intensive foods, 
particularly meat and dairy.59 Urbanization pro-
vides easy and convenient access to these foods and 
encourages consumption of foods prepared outside 
the home, including “convenience” or fast food.60 
Both advertising and improvements in the process-
ing and transportation of meat and other resource-
intensive foods encourage more consumption.61 
Even as chronic hunger remains widespread in poor 
countries, the average consumption of calories is 
already above daily energy requirements in most 
world regions (Figure 6-1).62 These excesses are 
likely to grow (Figure 6-2).
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Figure 6-2  |   Per capita calorie availability is on the rise
 FAO (2019a) for historical data 1961–2011; Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012) for 2050 projection, linear interpolation from 2012 to 2050.
Most people also consume more protein than they 
need, and protein consumption is still growing. 
The average daily protein requirement for adults 
is around 50 grams per day, which incorporates a 
margin of safety to reflect individual differences.63 
Although some people are deficient in protein, 
global average protein consumption per capita in 
2010 was approximately 71 grams per day. In the 
world’s wealthier regions, protein consumption was 
even higher (Figure 6-3).64 By 2050, we estimate 
that global average per capita protein consumption 
will rise to nearly 80 grams per day (Figure 6-4).65 
This overconsumption of protein results from 
growth in demand for animal-based foods. Between 
1961 and 2009, the global average availability 
of animal-based protein per person grew by 59 
percent, while that of plant-based protein grew by 
only 14 percent.66 By 2010, as Figure 6-3 shows, 
more than half the protein in the world’s wealthi-
est regions was animal-based. Arguments that this 
animal-based protein is necessary for health, or 
“efficient” because of “essential amino acids,” are 
incorrect (Box 6-1).
The continuing shifts to animal-based diets plus 
the rise in population are likely to drive a large 
growth in demand for animal-based foods (Table 
6-1). Between 2010 and 2050, we project additional 
global growth in demand for animal-based foods 
to be 68 percent.67 We project even more growth in 
demand for ruminant meat (beef, sheep, and goat) 
at 88 percent. 
1961 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
China
India
United States
Indonesia
Brazil
Nigeria
Ethiopia
Japan
European Union
WORLD
kc
al
 a
va
ila
bl
e/
ca
pi
ta
/d
ay
WRI.org        68
BOX 6-1 |  Debunking protein and meat myths 
Protein is an essential macronutrient for 
building, maintaining, and repairing the 
human body’s tissues. Nine of the 20 amino 
acids that are used to make protein cannot 
be produced by the human body and must 
be obtained from food. However, several 
myths overstate the dietary importance 
of protein, especially from animal-based 
sources.
Myth: Animal-based foods are 
necessary or efficient because they 
supply some essential amino acids. 
People cannot make nine “essential amino 
acids” (EAAs) and must therefore acquire 
them from foods. Animal-based foods 
provide all of these essential amino acids 
while individual plant-based foods—with 
the exception of soy, quinoa, and a few 
others—lack some EAAs. However, for any 
person receiving adequate calories, it is not 
difficult to acquire the required EAAs just by 
consuming a small amount of animal-based 
foods, or just by combining different plant-
based foods. Rice and beans or peanut 
butter and bread are examples of such 
combinations. 
One recent article claimed that vegan diets 
were inefficient based on a calculation 
that if a person ate only a single food, 
that person would have to eat so much 
of any plant-based food (e.g., rice) that 
a meat-based diet would produce fewer 
GHGs.a However, people do not eat only one 
food. All the alternative diets we analyze 
in this report with less or no meat supply 
EAAs many times the necessary minimum 
amounts.
And while meat also contains high 
levels of other essential micronutrients, 
including iron, A and B vitamins, and zinc, 
even a diverse diet based entirely on 
plants can provide an adequate supply of 
micronutrients.b The exception is vitamin 
B12, which only occurs naturally in animal-
based foods, but which people can obtain 
through supplements.c 
Myth: More protein is better.
More protein is not necessarily better, 
unless an individual is malnourished or 
undernourished. Although the word “protein” 
comes from the Greek proteios, meaning 
“of prime importance,” protein is no more 
important than the other nutrients required 
for good health, and many people do not 
need as much protein as they believe. For 
instance, the average U.S. adult consumed 
66 percent more protein per day in 2012 than 
the average estimated daily requirement, 
but 21 percent of adults still considered 
themselves deficient in protein in a 2014 
survey.d The World Health Organization 
suggests that only 10–15 percent of the 
daily calorie requirement needs to come 
from protein.e A balanced plant-based diet 
can easily meet this need. Meanwhile, 
overconsumption of protein is linked to 
some health problems, including kidney 
stones and the deterioration of kidney 
function in patients with renal disease.f
Myth: Plant-based foods need to be 
combined in single meals to meet 
protein nutritional needs.
In fact, separate consumption of amino 
acids during different meals still ensures 
nutritional benefitsg because the body 
breaks down proteins into separate amino 
acids, which it stores for later use.h 
Notes:
a. Tessari et al. (2016).
b. Craig and Mangels (2009).
c. Antony (2012). 
d. USDA (2014), French (2015).
e. WHO (2003).
f. WHO, FAO, and UNU (2007).
g. Young and Pellett (1994).
h. Tufts University Health & Nutrition Letter (2012).
Even these figures, based on FAO projections of 
2050 diets, may be conservative. A majority of 
global agricultural models, and other analyses that 
link animal-based food consumption to income, 
project substantially greater increases in animal-
based food consumption.68 Today U.S. per capita 
consumption of all animal-based foods is 750 kcal.69 
Although FAO projects that more than 3.6 billion of 
the world’s people will equal or approach this con-
sumption (more than 600 calories per person per 
day) (Table 6-1), its projections also imply that 6.1 
billion people in poorer regions (India, Asia outside 
of China and India, Middle East and North Africa, 
and sub-Saharan Africa) will still eat few animal-
based foods in 2050 (Table 6-1). In sub-Saharan 
Africa more than 2 billion people will consume on 
average just 200 kcal per person per day. If these 
6.1 billion people were to consume, on average, 
even 450 kcal of animal-based foods per day by 
2050, the growth in demand for animal-based foods 
would rise from the 68 percent in our 2050 baseline 
to 92 percent.70 
FAO’s projection of a continued inequitable dis-
tribution of animal-based food consumption has 
important implications when developing options 
for a sustainable food future. It means that large 
global reductions in meat and dairy consumption 
by all would be highly inequitable. Instead, policy 
should focus on substantial reductions in high-con-
suming regions. It also means that some reductions 
in animal-based food consumption by the world’s 
wealthier populations will be important just to open 
        69Creating a Sustainable Food Future
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2010 2050
gr
am
s c
on
su
m
ed
/c
ap
ita
/d
ay
Plant-based protein
Dairy
Poultry
Fish
Beef
Pork
Eggs
Sheep and goat
Plant-based protein
Dairy
Poultry
Fish
Beef
Pork
Eggs
Sheep and goat
40% Animal-
based protein
60% Plant-
based protein
36% Animal-
based protein
64% Plant-
based protein
Figure 6-3  |   Average protein consumption greatly exceeds average estimated daily requirements in the world’s wealthier 
regions
Figure 6-4  |   Both global protein consumption and the share from animal-based foods are likely to grow by 2050
Note: Width of bars is proportional to each region’s population. Average daily protein requirement of 50 g per day is based on an average adult body weight of 62 kg (Walpole et 
al. 2012) and recommended protein intake of 0.8 g per kg body weight/day (Paul 1989). Individuals’ energy requirements vary depending on age, sex, height, weight, pregnancy/
lactation, and level of physical activity.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model with source data from FAO (2019a) and FAO (2011c). 
Note: Width of bars is proportional to world population.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model with source data from FAO (2019a) and FAO (2011c).  
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Table 6-1  |   Projected regional changes in consumption of animal-based foods 
REGION POPULATION  (MILLIONS) TOTAL ANIMAL-BASED FOODS
RUMINANT MEAT  
(BEEF, SHEEP, GOAT)
2010 2050 kcal/
capita/
day (2010)
kcal/
capita/
day (2050)
% change 
per capita 
(2010–50)
% of global 
consumption 
(2050)
kcal/
capita/
day (2010)
kcal/
capita/
day (2050)
% change 
per capita 
(2010–50)
% of global 
consumption 
(2050)
European Union 528 528 772 858 11 10 68 71 4 7
U.S. and Canada 344 433 774 794 3 7 92 82 -10 6
Brazil 197 233 629 748 19 4 140 153 9 6
China 1,390 1,396 551 716 30 21 33 62 87 15
Former Soviet 
Union 288 298 575 704 22 4 93 119 28 6
OECD (other) 205 198 489 615 26 3 55 77 41 3
Latin America 
(excl. Brazil) 400 547 462 605 31 7 87 110 27 11
Asia (excl. China 
and India) 1,035 1,476 263 418 59 13 23 37 62 9
India 1,231 1,659 195 419 114 15 9 24 181 7
Middle East and 
North Africa 460 751 308 402 30 6 50 70 40 9
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 880 2,248 155 201 29 10 39 53 38 21
World 6,958 9,772 403 481 19 100 44 59 34 100
 
Note: Regions are listed in order of projected daily per capita consumption of total animal-based foods in 2050.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model with source data from FAO (2019a); UNDESA (2017); FAO (2011c); and Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012). 
up “planetary space” for additional consumption of 
animal-based foods by the world’s poor. 
The consequences of the dietary convergence for 
health and nutrition
When incomes first rise above poverty levels, 
dietary changes have health benefits, including 
some additional consumption of meat and dairy. 
These diet shifts can reduce chronic shortages of 
calories and many important nutrients, reducing 
the numbers of stunted and underweight children, 
and providing a range of health benefits, particu-
larly for children.71 (The production of modest  
levels of livestock products by the rural poor also 
plays a valuable economic role in reducing poverty 
and therefore helps avoid hunger through that 
pathway, too.)72 
However, shifts toward Western-style diets can 
cause a range of health problems. Overconsump-
tion—combined with sedentary lifestyles—affects 
nutritional and health outcomes, including weight, 
and the prevalence of noncommunicable diseases.73 
Diet-related noncommunicable diseases include 
hypertension, type 2 diabetes, stroke, cardiovascu-
lar diseases, and certain types of cancer.74 
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diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and colorectal can-
cer.93 The exact causal connections remain debated, 
with some research focusing the concern more on 
processed meats such as bacon and sausages.94 
The International Agency for Research on Cancer 
has classified processed meat as “carcinogenic 
to humans,” while listing red meat as “probably 
carcinogenic.”95 
Because of these links, the World Cancer Research 
Fund recommends a population-wide limit of no 
more than 300 grams (or about three servings) 
of cooked red meat per person per week, a limit 
incorporated into the Dutch and Swedish national 
dietary guidelines.96 Other researchers recommend 
even lower limits. Micha et al. (2017) propose  
100 grams of red meat (about one serving) per 
person per week as the maximum “optimal”  
consumption level.97
Dietary implications for health remain contentious 
because it is difficult to distinguish the effects of 
diets on human health from the effects of other 
behaviors. Yet overall, there is good reason to 
believe that moderating the shift toward Western-
style diets would be beneficial to human health.
The low feed and natural resource efficiency of 
meat and dairy 
Animal-based foods have much greater environ-
mental consequences than plant-based foods. Pro-
duction of animal-based foods accounted for more 
than three-quarters of global agricultural land use 
and around two-thirds of agriculture’s production-
related GHG emissions in 2010, while contributing 
only 36 percent of total protein and 16 percent of 
total calories consumed by people in that year.98 
These consequences result from the inefficiency of 
animal-based foods, which has long led to calls to 
reduce their consumption for environmental rea-
sons. Back in 1971, the book Diet for a Small Planet 
made these recommendations and became a best 
seller.99 Many studies (Appendix B) since then have 
estimated large potential land and GHG benefits 
from reducing meat and dairy in diets because of 
their relative inefficiency in converting feed and 
other natural resources to provide a given quantity 
of human-edible food. The efficiency of meat and 
dairy production also has its defenders, whose 
arguments were cogently presented in a report by 
The clearest evidence of diet-related health risks 
involves obesity, which is linked to all of the ill-
nesses listed above75 and to an increased risk of 
premature death.76 Obesity causes large increases 
in health care costs.77 Obesity also adversely affects 
productivity, with costs estimated in the tens of 
billions of dollars per year in the United States and 
Europe.78 The McKinsey Global Institute estimated 
the worldwide economic impact of obesity in 2012 
to be around $2 trillion, or 2.8 percent of global 
gross domestic product (GDP), roughly equivalent 
to the global cost of armed conflict or smoking.79 
The global obesity rate continues to grow. In 2013, 
2.1 billion people were overweight or obese80—more 
than two and a half times the number of chronically 
undernourished people in the world.81 Once consid-
ered a high-income country problem, the number of 
obese and overweight people is now rising in low- 
and middle-income countries.82 In China, obesity 
rates tripled between 1991 and 2006.83 Obesity is 
growing even in countries that have high levels of 
child stunting from insufficient food, such as Egypt, 
South Africa, and Mexico.84 
Globally, there is some evidence that obesity rates 
may decline at high-income levels,85 and may 
be nearing peaks in developed countries (in the 
neighborhood of 60% overweight or obese).86 Using 
a variety of trends and association, Ng, Fleming,  
et al. (2014) suggest a global increase of roughly  
10 percent from 2010 to 2050 in the rate of over-
weight and obesity.87 This trend would bring the 
number of overweight and obese people to 3.1 
billion by 2050.88
Another major area of health concern with West-
ern-style diets is the link between high consump-
tion of animal-based foods and a variety of diseases. 
For many years, the primary focus of attention 
was cholesterol and saturated fats and the linkages 
between their consumption and heart disease.89 
Although more recent studies call into question 
the links between high levels of saturated fats in 
diets and heart disease,90 there still appears to be 
evidence that switching to other fats—including cer-
tain polyunsaturated fats more present in vegetable 
oils—can have some health benefits related to heart 
disease and diabetes.91 Several studies have also 
linked red meat92 consumption directly to type 2 
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the Council for Agricultural Science and Technol-
ogy (CAST) in 1999.100 How inefficient, then, are 
animal-based foods and how do they differ from 
each other?
Although we agree with meat’s defenders that 
many estimates incorporate some assumptions that 
overstate the inefficiency of animal-based foods, 
in more significant ways most calculations tend to 
understate that inefficiency. 
 ▪ Overestimates: Failure to compare the 
effects of meat consumption with realis-
tic alternative diets. Studies that fail to com-
pare meat-heavy diets with realistic alternative 
diets can overestimate the possible environ-
mental benefits of eating less meat. Many crops 
used for animal feeds—such as maize, wheat, 
alfalfa, and soybeans—have higher caloric and 
protein yields per hectare than many crops that 
people consume as alternatives to meat, such 
as beans, chickpeas, lentils, and vegetables. For 
example, global maize yields per hectare are 
roughly five times those of pulses. Some papers 
have incorrectly assumed that, if people ate 
less meat, they would instead consume these 
high-yielding animal feeds, rather than lower-
yielding alternative foods that, in practice, they 
are more likely to eat.101 
 ▪ Underestimates: Calculating efficiency 
by weight instead of calories or protein 
and counting only some stages of pro-
duction. Some “feed conversion ratios” show 
the weight of meat out versus the weight of feed 
in.102 This practice improperly compares the 
weight of a relatively wet output (meat) to the 
weight of a relatively dry input (feed grains). 
Focusing only on the feedlot stage of beef pro-
duction and using weight measures, even critics 
of meat will often quote efficiency figures of 15 
percent for beef (roughly a 7 to 1 ratio of feed in 
to food out),103 which is far higher than the true 
efficiency of beef production (as we show be-
low). A proper analysis should count all stages 
of production and compare feed calories in to 
food calories out, or protein in to protein out.
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Notes: “Edible output” refers to the calorie and protein content of bone-free carcass. “Feed input” includes both human-edible feeds (e.g., grains) and human-inedible feeds (e.g., 
grasses, crop residues).
Sources: Terrestrial animal products: Wirsenius et al. (2010); Wirsenius (2000). Finfish and shrimp: WRI analysis based on USDA (2013a); NRC (2011); Tacon and Metian (2008); 
Wirsenius (2000); and FAO (1989).
 ▪ Underestimates: Failure to fully account 
for all animal feeds. The most significant 
underestimate results from methods that 
count the environmental consequences of only 
“human-edible” animal feeds.104 This approach 
excludes animal feed provided by crop residues 
and food processing wastes, which is defensible 
because they do not require additional land. 
But the approach also excludes grasses—wheth-
er hayed or grazed—which together constitute 
more than half of all livestock feed.105 Counting 
only “human-edible” animal feeds means that if 
an animal eats primarily grasses, it may be seen 
as producing more than one calorie food out 
for each calorie of feed in.106 This approach also 
ignores grazing land as a land-use input to food 
production. Even for most beef raised primarily 
in feedlots, this approach underestimates en-
vironmental consequences because it excludes 
all the grasses eaten by mother cows and their 
calves before calves are moved from pastures  
to feedlots.  
 
Those analyses that count only human-edible 
feeds contend that only these feeds compete 
directly with human food supplies. However, 
of grasslands, those that produce the bulk of 
animal products are lands converted to pasture 
from forests and woody savannas. Some of 
these lands could be used instead to produce 
crops for direct human consumption and oth-
ers could remain as natural vegetation to store 
carbon and provide other ecosystem services. 
 
It is true that if people consumed no animal-
based foods at all, many natural grazing lands 
would go unused for food production, and 
many residues and wastes would probably be 
underused or thrown out. But holding down 
growth in demand is not the same as eliminat-
ing consumption of animal-based foods alto-
gether. Even with large reductions in demand 
for animal-based foods, those otherwise unused 
residues and wastes will still be used because 
they are cheap, and the consequence is likely to 
be less clearing of forests and savannas.
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Figure 6-5  |   Beef and other ruminant meats are inefficient sources of calories and protein 
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BOX 6-2 |  Modeling the greenhouse gas consequences of land required for different diets: 
Comparing GlobAgri-WRR with other approaches 
The GlobAgri-WRR model estimates the 
GHG emissions from the additional area 
of agricultural land conversion required to 
produce each person’s diet. Because land 
use is increasing, every change in diet that 
reduces (or increases) land-use demands 
avoids (or adds) that amount of land 
conversion. 
Although this approach seems basic, other 
analyses have used a variety of approaches 
(Schmidinger and Stehfest 2012):
1. Land-use-change emissions are not 
estimated. Most conventional life-cycle 
assessments of agriculture (including most 
studies cited in Appendix B) estimate the 
land area required to produce the foods 
being studied but do not estimate the 
emissions associated with this land-use 
demand. Such studies limit estimates of GHG 
emissions to production emissions, such as 
methane from livestock and energy used to 
run farm machinery.
2. Only new land-use-change emissions 
are counted each year, and they 
are averaged over total agricultural 
production. Some studies count land-
use-change emissions for a crop only 
in countries where both that crop and 
agricultural land overall are expanding. For 
example, if soybean area were to expand by 
100,000 hectares per year during a study 
time frame in Brazil, and if total agricultural 
land in Brazil expanded by 100,000 ha or 
more, then the emissions from these 100,000 
ha would be assigned to soybeans in Brazil. 
To obtain the emissions per ton of soybeans, 
the emissions would be divided by the 
millions of tons of soybeans produced in 
Brazil over its more than 20 million hectares 
of cropland. As a result, the emissions per 
ton of crop would be low. By contrast, in the 
United States, if soybeans’ crop area was 
not expanding, or if it was expanding but 
agricultural land overall was not because 
other crop areas were shrinking, U.S. 
soybeans would have no land-use cost.  
As a result, if a European pork producer  
in Europe switched from using Brazilian  
to U.S. soybeans, that would be counted  
as eliminating its emissions from land- 
use change. 
Of course, switching from Brazilian to U.S. 
soybeans does not reduce the total demand 
for global soybeans or the total demand 
for land (at least if the yields are the same). 
In fact, if some consumers switched from 
purchasing Brazilian soybeans to U.S. 
soybeans, either other consumers would 
switch from the United States to Brazil or 
the United States would need to devote 
more land area to soybeans. To avoid the 
consequences of counting GHG savings 
where none are likely to occur in reality, 
other studies do a similar calculation but on 
a global basis. For example, if we assumed 
for simplicity that all the world’s soybeans 
were produced only in Brazil and the United 
States, all soybeans produced in both 
countries would be assigned emissions 
from Brazil’s 100,000 hectares of land-use-
change emissions. That would then divide 
the responsibility for Brazil’s land-use 
change among all soybeans, but the cost 
assigned to each ton of soybeans would 
be even smaller than for Brazil’s soybeans 
alone. To further illustrate this method, in a 
study period with no expansion of soybeans 
in Brazil, or if other cropland were shrinking 
by the same amount as soybeans were 
expanding, global soybean consumption 
would be viewed as having no land-use cost 
at all.
3. Land-use-change emissions are 
attributed to marginal (additional) 
agricultural production. This approach—
which is what GlobAgri uses—focuses on 
the additional emissions from the additional 
land required to produce any additional 
amount of a crop or other food. For example, 
if consuming one ton of soybeans requires 
one-third of a hectare of additional cropland, 
each ton of soybeans is responsible for one-
third of a hectare of cropland. Under this 
approach, land-use-change emissions per 
unit of food produced are much higher than 
in approach 2 and are never zero.
The problem with system 1 is simply that 
there are no land-use-change emissions 
assigned to foods.
One major problem with system 2 is that 
it does not mathematically assess the 
incremental, or “marginal,” consequences 
of consumption. To understand the 
incremental effects of demand, imagine if 
there were no yield gains in one year and no 
changes in demand. As a result, agricultural 
land area would not change. If one person 
then switched to a diet that required one 
more hectare of land, the incremental 
effect of that dietary change would be 
one hectare. Yet, in that case, every 
person’s consumption would incrementally 
contribute to this land-use change whether 
it existed in the previous year or not: If any 
other person or group of people shifted 
diets that required one hectare less to 
produce, there would be no land expansion. 
Averaging that hectare of land-use change 
instead to the total food consumption from 
every person’s diet vastly undercounts the 
consequence of each person’s consumption 
and the change in emissions that would 
result from that person’s diet. 
A simplified mathematical example also 
helps to illustrate this basic difference 
between incremental and average costs. 
Imagine a world with 100 people, each 
person eating only one ton of wheat, where 
each ton of wheat requires one hectare. In 
this world, there are therefore 100 hectares 
of wheat. Now imagine that in year two 
consumption goes up by 1 percent (perhaps 
from population growth or dietary changes), 
so there is now a demand for 101 tons of 
wheat. Farmers therefore clear one more 
hectare of land resulting in 100 tons of 
carbon dioxide emissions. The additional 
consumption of one ton of wheat therefore 
incrementally causes 100 tons of emissions. 
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BOX 6-2 |  Modeling the greenhouse gas consequences of land required for different diets: 
Comparing GlobAgri-WRR with other approaches (continued)
GlobAgri-WRR counts one ton of wheat 
in this example as causing that level of 
emissions although it amortizes these 
emissions over 20 years of consumption. 
This approach recognizes that dietary 
change by any group of people to reduce 
consumption by one ton of wheat would 
save 100 tons of emissions. But under 
method 2, the 100 tons of emissions from 
one hectare of land-use change would be 
divided by the 101 tons of wheat consumed 
by everyone, so each ton of wheat is 
assigned 0.99 tons of emissions. That is a 
large underestimate of the consequences 
of dietary change, and the problem is not 
merely conceptual but, in this example, 
mathematically incorrect. 
A likely reason some researchers have 
embraced system 2 is that standard GHG 
accounting methods assign the GHG 
costs of previous land-use change to the 
past. Under this approach, ongoing food 
consumption, unless it causes more land-
use change, has no land-use costs. Yet even 
with such an assumption, the incremental 
costs of land-use change should be 
assigned to the incremental change in 
consumption that causes this change, not 
the total consumption.
Another way of viewing the problem with 
system 2 is that it does not assign any 
carbon cost to continued consumption 
of food produced on existing agricultural 
land—this land has no opportunity cost in 
lost carbon storage. Yet continuing to use 
existing agricultural land each year to meet 
even long-existing demand has costs. If 
not used to meet that preexisting demand, 
it could be used to meet new demand, 
avoiding land-use change. For this reason, 
reducing even preexisting demand enough 
to reduce agricultural area by one hectare 
still saves a hectare of expansion. 
In fact, even if the world were experiencing 
a decline in agricultural land, each ton of 
food demand would still keep more land 
in agricultural use and therefore reduce 
the amount of abandoned land that would 
regrow forest and other native vegetation 
and sequester carbon. In such a world, the 
carbon cost of consumption would then 
be this forgone carbon sequestration. As 
we discuss in Course 3, as the locations of 
agricultural land shift around the world, the 
regrowth of carbon stocks on abandoned 
agricultural land already plays an important 
role in holding down net deforestation 
and therefore net emissions from land-use 
change. Devoting land to agricultural use, 
therefore, always has a carbon opportunity 
cost, and this cost is physical and real, not 
merely conceptual.
Although GlobAgri-WRR focuses on the 
incremental effects of each person’s 
consumption, it does not factor in economic 
feedback effects, which could alter those 
incremental effects. As prices change as 
a result of any one person’s consumption, 
that might affect how farmers farm or the 
amount of consumption by others. But when 
GlobAgri-WRR evaluates the consequences 
of any one person’s change in diet, it holds 
other people’s consumption constant 
and keeps yields and other production 
systems the same. The reasons, which 
we explain more thoroughly in Chapter 2, 
Box 2-1, include the large uncertainties in 
those estimates.a But a more fundamental 
reason is the need to analyze separately the 
effects of each menu item. For example, if 
increased food consumption were credited 
with increased yields, then we could not 
separately evaluate the effects of increased 
yields alone.
The same is true for possible feedback 
effects on consumption by others. Some 
economic models estimate that an increase 
in consumption of food by any one person 
will increase prices and force other people 
to consume less, leading to less land-use 
change, an effect that occurs for rich and 
poor alike (and generally more for the 
poor). The ultimate calculation of the GHG 
consequences of a person’s high-beef 
diet, for example, are lower than they 
otherwise would be because that person’s 
consumption is credited with the lower 
land-use requirements and emissions by 
others. This kind of model does not estimate 
the GHG costs of supplying all the food in 
one person’s diet; it estimates the net GHG 
costs of supplying that food while also 
supplying less food for others. Because 
meeting the dietary requirements of 
everyone is a requirement for a sustainable 
food future, this type of economic model 
cannot tell us the GHG contribution of any 
one person’s dietary changes toward a 
sustainable food future, which requires 
meeting others’ food demands as well. 
Note: 
a. Searchinger, Edwards, Mulligan, et al. (2015) and 
supplement; Berry (2011).
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Overall, the most appropriate methods to estimate 
efficiencies of diets should compare animal-based 
diets to reasonable alternatives; measure costs 
based on calories or protein “in” through feed and 
calories or protein “out” through meat, fish, or milk; 
count all stages of animal production; and count 
both human-edible and human-inedible feeds. 
Wirsenius et al. (2010) provides a comprehensive 
analysis of meat and dairy conversion efficiencies 
that meets our criteria (Figure 6-5). As a global 
average, energy conversion efficiencies range from 
13 percent for eggs to 1 percent for beef. One per-
cent efficiency means that 100 calories of feed are 
needed to produce just one calorie of beef. Protein 
efficiencies range from 25 percent for eggs to 3–4 
percent for ruminants, such as sheep and cattle.107 
This calculation is broadly consistent with other 
analyses that count both human-edible and human-
inedible feeds.108 
One key insight from this analysis is that all live-
stock products are inefficient; a second insight is 
that beef and other ruminant meats are particularly 
inefficient. Counting these efficiencies reasonably, 
plus counting the land-use consequences of each 
additional unit of food production, has major impli-
cations for our results.
Comparing land-use and greenhouse gas 
consequences of different foods 
Low production efficiencies are the principal reason 
that meat and dairy require more land and water 
than plant-based foods—and generate more GHG 
emissions—per calorie or gram of protein produced. 
Yet how analysts count the GHG consequences of 
this land use itself has great consequences.
The approach to land in the dietary analysis by 
GlobAgri-WRR is conceptually simple. With modest 
adjustments, we basically ask: Holding agricultural 
production systems constant, how much additional 
land would farmers use and how many additional 
GHG emissions would the associated land clear-
ing generate to produce an additional quantity of 
calories or protein from different foods?109 Because 
land-use change is a one-time event, but food 
production will continue on the land for years, we 
also amortize the land-use-related emissions over 
20 years when we wish to express annual emissions 
(Figures 6-6a through 6-6d).110
As discussed in Box 6-2, this approach of looking at 
the “incremental” consequences of dietary change— 
the amount of additional land required to produce 
each person’s diet—differs from many other 
approaches. We believe this approach is necessary 
to truly measure the consequence of a given dietary 
shift scenario. Consistent with virtually all other 
studies (Appendix B), we find that animal-based 
foods require more land and generate more GHG 
emissions than plant-based foods (Box 6-2 and 
Figure 6-6). But because we count these full incre-
mental consequences of dietary choices on carbon 
storage in vegetation and soils, our results show 
dietary choices to be more important than typical 
other estimates. 
We reach the following conclusions: 
 ▪ Meat from ruminants (beef, sheep, and goat) 
is by far the most resource-intensive food. It 
requires over 20 times more land and gener-
ates over 20 times more GHG emissions than 
pulses per gram of protein. Relative to dairy, it 
requires four to six times more land and gener-
ates four to six times more GHG emissions per 
calorie or gram of protein ultimately consumed 
by people. 
 ▪ Dairy’s land-use and GHG emissions are 
slightly higher than those of poultry per calorie 
and significantly higher than those of poultry 
per gram of protein. 
 ▪ Poultry and pork are responsible for simi-
lar GHG emissions and land use per gram of 
protein consumed, but poultry requires more 
land and generates more emissions than pork 
per calorie, mainly because of the high energy 
content of pork fat.
 ▪ Pulses, fruits, vegetables, and vegetable oils are 
generally more resource-intensive to produce 
than sugars and staple crops because of their 
lower yields; yet they are still favorable com-
pared to meat, dairy, and farmed fish. 
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Figure 6-6a  |   Foods differ vastly in land-use and greenhouse gas impacts 
Figure 6-6b  |   Foods differ vastly in land-use and greenhouse gas impacts 
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Figure 6-6c  |  Foods differ vastly in greenhouse gas impacts 
Figure 6-6d  |  Foods differ vastly in greenhouse gas impacts 
Notes for Figure 6-6a through 6-6d: Data presented are global means, weighted by production volume. Indicators for animal-based foods include resource use to produce feed, 
including pasture. Tons of harvested products were converted to quantities of calories and protein using the global average edible calorie and protein contents of food types 
as reported in FAO (2019a). “Fish” includes all aquatic animal-based foods. Land-use and GHG emissions estimates are based on a marginal analysis (i.e., additional agricultural 
land use and emissions per additional million calories or ton of protein consumed). Based on the approach taken by the European Union for estimating emissions from land-use 
change for biofuels, land-use-change impacts are amortized over a period of 20 years and then shown as annual impacts. Land-use and GHG emissions estimates for beef 
production are based on dedicated beef production, not beef that is a coproduct of dairy. (Dedicated beef is 85 percent of total beef produced in 2010, 88 percent in 2050, and 
likely even more of the marginal source of meeting beef demand.) Dairy figures are lower in GlobAgri-WRR than in some other models because GlobAgri-WRR assumes that beef 
produced by dairy systems displaces beef produced by dedicated beef-production systems.
Source for Figure 6-6a through 6-6d: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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Figure 6-7  |   Land-use and greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with the average U.S. diet were 
nearly double the world average in 2010
Note: Calculations assume global average efficiencies (calories produced per 
hectare or per ton of CO2e emitted) for all food types. Land-use-change emissions 
are amortized over a period of 20 years and then shown as annual impacts. “Other 
animal-based foods” includes pork, poultry, eggs, and fish.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model, based on FAO (2019a).
Comparing land-use and greenhouse gas 
consequences of different complete diets 
The large differences in land-use and GHG conse-
quences of different foods explain why the global 
convergence toward Western-style diets has impor-
tant implications for the resource needs and envi-
ronmental impacts of agriculture. The average diet 
of the United States provides a good illustration 
because it contained nearly 500 more calories than 
the average world diet in 2010, including nearly 
400 additional animal-based calories. In short, it 
is high in calories and high in animal-based foods, 
especially ruminant meat. As Figure 6-7 shows, the 
agricultural land use and GHG emissions associated 
with the average daily U.S. diet were almost double 
those associated with the average daily world diet.111 
Animal-based foods accounted for nearly 90 per-
cent of the production-related GHG emissions and 
agricultural land use associated with the average 
U.S. diet in 2010.112 Beef had a disproportionately 
large impact relative to other food types. While beef 
contributed only around 3 percent of the calories 
and 12 percent of the protein in the average U.S. 
diet, it accounted for 43 percent of the annual land 
use and nearly half of the production emissions 
associated with the diet.113 
Our calculations of GHG emissions from food 
consumption are larger than those of nearly all 
other previous estimates mainly because we take 
full account of the implications for agricultural land 
use of that consumption and the resulting loss of 
carbon storage in vegetation and soils on that land. 
Even the relatively modest average world diet in 
2010 resulted in annualized emissions from land-
use change and agricultural production equivalent 
to 8.4 tons of carbon dioxide. This amount is close 
to double the average world citizen’s emissions that 
were attributable to energy use that year.114 
Based on our method of averaging land-use emis-
sions over 20 years, the average U.S. diet causes 
emissions that are more than 90 percent of the 
average U.S. person’s energy use and equivalent  
to three-quarters of the emissions typically attrib-
uted to each U.S. person’s consumption of all  
goods. (Without annualizing, the carbon cost of 
converting land from natural ecosystems to produce 
this diet equals 18 years of an average U.S. person’s 
energy emissions.)115
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The magnitude of diet-related GHG emissions 
may seem odd because the total emissions from 
energy use reported in national energy accounts are 
typically much larger than the total emissions from 
agriculture. How then can each person’s diet have 
comparable significance? One way to understand 
this point is that each person, by eating differently, 
can substantially alter the amount of additional 
agricultural conversion that occurs each year. 
The Opportunity
How much could plausible global shifts away from 
the diets expected in 2050 help to close the food, 
land, and GHG mitigation gaps?
Designing diet shift scenarios
Any realistic answer must recognize that most 
people in the world eat few animal-based foods and 
even less ruminant meat. To estimate the potential 
of shifting diets in a reasonable and fair way, we 
therefore adopt a principle of equity that assigns 
reductions first to high consumers until they reach 
the threshold needed to achieve the percentage 
reduction in global per capita consumption desired 
in each scenario. To explore options for diet shifts, 
we construct and evaluate four categories of alter-
native diet scenarios in 2050. Figures 6-8 through 
6-10116 show the distribution of dietary changes 
across countries. Table 6-2 shows the full results. 
All diet scenarios can help to close our gaps, and 
some by a great deal. But we believe that, given the 
scope of the changes needed, changes in ruminant 
meat consumption stands out as the most promis-
ing strategy.
Model Results
Skinny Diet: The 2050 baseline projection indi-
cates a global population where 2.1 billion people 
are overweight and 1 billion are obese. The Skinny 
Diet scenario, the only scenario to include a net 
reduction in calories, explores a 50 percent reduc-
tion in the numbers of obese and overweight people 
below this baseline.117 
Because even obese people probably consume on 
average only 500 more calories per person per day, 
this scenario would reduce caloric consumption by 
only 2 percent globally118 and would thus close the 
crop calorie gap by only 2 percent (which is consis-
tent with simpler analyses from earlier reports in 
this series).119 The contribution to the land target 
is more significant, however, as reduced calorie 
consumption leads to agricultural land area in 
2050 growing by 84 Mha less than projected in the 
baseline scenario, thus achieving 14 percent of the 
land target. 
Despite some potentially meaningful benefits, 
reducing obesity by 50 percent would be extremely 
challenging; despite more than three decades of 
effort, there are no success stories of any national 
reductions.120 Even after substantial efforts to 
reduce child obesity in the United States, U.S. child-
hood obesity is still increasing.121 Although health 
benefits warrant major efforts to reduce obesity, 
the scope of the challenge is daunting relative to 
the land and GHG benefits, and we do not consider 
obesity reduction to be an important strategy for 
closing food, land, or GHG mitigation gaps. 
Less Animal-Based Foods Diet (Figure 
6-8). By 2050, we project that 3.6 billion people 
will live in regions where average consumption of 
animal-based foods (meats, dairy, fish, and eggs) 
is at or above 600 kcal per day, which is roughly 
the level of consumption of Brazil in 2010.122 We 
explore scenarios in which we cut back total global 
consumption of all animal-based foods by 10 
percent and 30 percent and shift this consumption 
to plant-based foods.123 
The consequences could be large. By 2050, the 10 
percent cut would reduce the food gap by 4 percent, the 
land gap by 44 percent, and the GHG mitigation gap 
by 22 percent. The 30 percent cut would be enough to 
close 12 percent of the food gap, nearly eliminate 
new net cropland expansion, cause a net reduction 
of 289 Mha in grazing area from 2010 levels, and 
close 59 percent of the GHG mitigation gap.124 
Despite these large benefits, achieving this global 
30 percent reduction in consumption of animal-
based foods would be extremely difficult, and veg-
etarian diets illustrate the challenge. To achieve this 
reduction fairly, because roughly 6 billion people 
would still eat few animal products in 2050 under 
our baseline, a 30 percent global average reduction 
would require a roughly 50 percent reduction by 
people in North America and Europe. Although the 
actual diets of vegetarians are surprisingly little 
understood, our best efforts to estimate vegetarian 
diets using a U.K. sample from the 1990s suggests 
that consumption of total animal-based foods 
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Table 6-2  |   Global effects of alternative 2050 diet scenarios on the food gap, agricultural land use, and greenhouse gas 
emissions
SCENARIO
FOOD 
GAP, 
2010–50 
(%)
CHANGE IN AGRICULTURAL 
AREA, 2010–50 (MHA) 
ANNUAL GHG EMISSIONS, 
2050 (GT CO2E) GHG MITI-GATION GAP 
(GT CO2E)Pastureland Cropland Total Agricultural production
Land-use 
change Total
2050 BASELINE 56 401 192 593 9.0 6.0 15.1 11.1
SK INN Y DIE T
Obesity/overweight 
reduced by 50% 54 
350
(-52)
159
(-32)
509
(-84) 8.9 5.4 14.3
10.3 
(-0.8)
L E S S A NIM A L-BA SED F OODS DIE T
10% shift to plant-
based foods 52
195
(-207)
36
(-56)
330
(-263) 8.5 4.1 12.6
8.6 
(-2.5)
30% shift to plant-
based foods 44
-289
(-690)
18
(-173)
-271
(-864) 7.5 1.1
a 8.6 4.6(-6.5)
L E S S ME AT DIE T
10% shift to legumes 55 276(-126)
181
(-11)
456
(-137) 8.8 5.0 13.7
9.7
(-1.3)
30% shift to 
legumes 48
-16
(-418)
123
(-69)
106
(-487) 8.1 2.2 10.3
6.3
(-4.8)
10% shift to U.K. 
vegetarian diet 55
368
(-33)
179
(-14)
547
(-46) 8.8 5.7 14.5
10.5
(-0.6)
30% shift to U.K. 
vegetarian diet 49
248
(-154)
137
(-54)
385
(-208) 8.3 4.3 12.6
8.6
(-2.5)
L E S S RUMIN A N T ME AT DIE T
10% shift to legumes 
(Coordinated Effort) 56
220
(-181)
188
(-4)
408
(-185) 8.7 4.4 13.2
9.2
(-1.9)
30% shift to 
legumes (Highly 
Ambitious, 
Breakthrough 
Technologies)
55 -154(-555)
171
(-21)
18
(-576) 8.1 1.4 9.4
5.4
(-5.6)
50% shift to 
legumes 53
-573
(-974)
154
(-38)
-418
(-1,012) 7.4 1.1
a 8.5 4.5(-6.6)
10% shift to poultry/
pork 57
221
(-181)
206
(14)
426
(-167) 8.8 4.6 13.3
9.3
(-1.7)
30% shift to poultry/
pork 58
-153
(-555)
225
(33)
71
(-522) 8.2 1.7 9.9
5.9
(-5.1)
50% shift to poultry/
pork 59
-573
(-975)
237
(45)
-336
(-930) 7.6 1.1
a 8.7 4.7(-6.4)
Notes: “Cropland” includes cropland plus aquaculture ponds. Numbers not summed correctly are due to rounding. Numbers shown in parentheses are changes relative to 2050 
baseline.
a. Indicates a scenario that led to an overall agricultural land-use reduction between 2010 and 2050. To be conservative, we set land-use-change emissions between 2010 and 
2050 to zero, and kept only ongoing peatland emissions (1.1 Gt/year).
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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Figure 6-8  |   Less Animal-Based Foods Diet scenarios reduce consumption of animal-based foods in 2050 
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model, with source data from FAO (2019a); UNDESA (2017); FAO (2011c); and Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012).
declines by only about 25 percent because vegetar-
ians mostly substitute dairy and eggs for meat.125 As 
a result, even if every person in North America and 
Europe became a vegetarian—which is unlikely—
that shift would still achieve only half of those 
regions’ responsibility for achieving the 30 percent 
global reduction in animal-based foods. 
Less Meat Diet (Figure 6-9). We explore sce-
narios in which people cut back their consumption 
of all meats (but not other animal-based foods), 
by 10 or 30 percent (to a maximum of 372 or 238 
kcal/person/day, respectively). In one variation for 
each level of cut, people substitute their meat with 
a 50/50 combination of pulses and soy. In the other 
variation, they switch to a combination of more 
plant-based foods, dairy, and eggs that reflects 
the experience of self-reported vegetarians126 as 
observed in the United Kingdom in the 1990s.127 
The switch from meat to plant-based foods only 
would achieve roughly half the savings in land and 
emissions achieved by the reduction in all animal-
based foods. For example, the 30 percent meat 
reduction would reduce the food, land, and mitiga-
tion gaps by 8 percent, 82 percent, and 43 percent, 
respectively. If these meat reductions were accom-
plished by shifting not only to vegetables but also to 
dairy and eggs, which is what vegetarians typically 
do, they would produce only half this level of reduc-
tions in land and GHG mitigation gaps (Table 6-2). 
One lesson is the significance of dairy and eggs in 
a standard vegetarian diet. Dairy in general has 
modestly greater land-use demands and emissions 
than poultry and pork, and eggs only slightly less. A 
simple shift from meat to dairy and eggs has much 
less consequence than one from meat to plants.
Less Ruminant Meat Diet (Figure 6-10). 
A fourth category of alternative diets focuses on 
reducing consumption of ruminant meats only 
(beef, sheep, and goat). These changes require large 
reductions in consumption but only by people in 
the United States, Canada, Europe, Latin America, 
and the former Soviet Union because, in 2010, they 
consumed more than half of the world’s ruminant 
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Figure 6-9  |  Less Meat Diet scenarios reduce meat consumption in 2050 
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model, with source data from FAO (2019a); UNDESA (2017); FAO (2011c); and Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012).
meat, although they comprised just one-quarter 
of the world’s population.128 Using our threshold 
approach, we explore three levels of cuts in global 
ruminant meat consumption relative to predicted 
2050 levels:
 ▪ A 10 percent cut, which would require that each 
person in Brazil, countries of the former Soviet 
Union, and the United States eat no more 
ruminant meat than the average person in the 
United States today. 
 ▪ A 30 percent cut, which would require that all 
countries limit their consumption to no more 
than present levels in the Middle East and 
North Africa in 2010.
 ▪ A 50 percent cut, which would require all 
countries limit their per capita consumption to 
China’s levels in 2010. 
For each scenario, we examined shifting the food 
consumption to pork and chicken,129 and alterna-
tively to legumes comprising an equal mix of pulses 
and soy. 
In all scenarios, the effects of all these shifts on the 
crop calorie gap are small—because only modest 
amounts of crops are fed to ruminants—but the 
effects on land use and GHG emissions are large. 
These effects are similar whether the shift occurs to 
other meats or to pulses and soy. The 10 percent cut 
would reduce the land gap by roughly 30 percent 
and the GHG mitigation gap by roughly 16 percent. 
The 30 percent cut would virtually eliminate the 
land gap and cut the GHG mitigation by more than 
half. The 50 percent cut would free up more than 
300 Mha of agricultural land. 
0
100
200
300
400
500
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2050 population (billions)
2010 consumption (base year)
2050 additional consumption (baseline)
Thresholds to reduce global
consumption (relative to 2050 baseline)
India
Sub-Saharan Africa
China
European Union
Brazil
U.S. and Canada
OECD (other)
Latin America (excl. Brazil)
Me
at
 co
ns
um
pt
ion
 (k
ca
l/c
ap
ita
/d
ay
)
30% reduction
10% reduction
Former Soviet Union
Asia 
(excl. China 
and India)
Middle East 
and North Africa
WRI.org        84
Figure 6-10  |  Less Ruminant Meat Diet scenarios reduce ruminant meat consumption in 2050 
Note: Per capita ruminant meat consumption in the United States and Canada is projected to decline between 2010 and 2050. Declines are shown as hatched bars.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model, with source data from FAO (2019a); UNDESA (2017); FAO (2011c); and Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012).
Although not analyzed here, an additional category 
of alternative diets could draw more heavily from 
nutritional recommendations. Papers such as 
Springmann, Godfray, et al. (2016) have used global 
dietary recommendations to analyze not only a 
reduction in red meat (ruminant meat plus pork) 
consumption, but also reduced sugar consump-
tion and increased fruit and vegetable consump-
tion—finding sizable reductions in agricultural 
production emissions relative to baseline diets.130 
The EAT-Lancet Commission analyzed even more 
pronounced dietary shifts away from animal-based 
foods and toward a healthy mix of plant-based 
foods, again finding large agricultural produc-
tion emissions reductions relative to baseline 
diets, although cropland and irrigation water use 
remained relatively constant with baseline levels.131 
All told, the overwhelming majority of emissions 
reductions in these researchers’ “healthy diet” 
scenarios are driven by the decreases in ruminant 
meat consumption,132 which is not surprising when 
considering the data in Figures 6-6a through 6-6d.
Per capita effects of the diet shifts in a high-
consuming country
To better understand the feasibility and importance 
of the various global diet shifts we analyzed, Table 
6-3 explains the dietary changes that would be 
required in the United States (a high meat-consum-
ing country) in 2010, according to our principle of 
equity, and Figure 6-11 shows the per capita impli-
cations of each diet for land use and GHG emis-
sions.133 We also simulated one completely vegetar-
ian diet134 as an “upper bound” against which the 
other diet shifts could be compared. 
The main lesson that emerges again is that a 
reduction in consumption of ruminant meat largely 
determines the environmental results. 
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Figure 6-11  |   Shifting the diets of the world’s “high consumers” could significantly reduce per person agricultural land 
use and GHG emissions
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model. The Vegetarian Diet scenario, which uses data from Scarborough et al. (2014), includes small amounts of meat, as “vegetarians” were self-reported.
Table 6-3  |   Applying selected diet shift scenarios to to the average U.S. diet in 2010
SCENARIO COMMENT
Average U.S. Diet Animal-based foods account for 27% of all caloric consumption; ruminant meat (overwhelmingly beef) for 3%.
Skinny Diet Reduces per capita consumption of calories by 4% across all food types.
Less Animal-Based Foods Diet, 30% 
global reduction Reduces U.S. consumption of animal-based foods by 49%, shifts to plant-based foods.
Less Meat Diet, 30% global reduction Reduces U.S. consumption of meat by 35%, shifts to plant-based foods.
Less Ruminant Meat Diet, 30% global 
reduction (shift to legumes) Reduces consumption of ruminant meat by 43%, shifts to pulses and soy.
Less Ruminant Meat Diet, 30% global 
reduction (shift to pork and poultry) Reduces consumption of ruminant meat by 43%, shifts to pork and poultry.
Vegetarian Diet
Simulates the U.K. vegetarian diet observed by Scarborough et al. (2014) scaled to 2010 per capita 
U.S. calorie consumption levels. Meat and fish consumption falls to nearly zero, but dairy and egg 
consumption rises along with consumption of fruits, vegetables, and legumes.
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BOX 6-3 |  The potential of shifting diets to reduce agricultural freshwater consumption
Just as with land use and GHG emissions, 
increasing demand for animal-based foods 
will likely increase pressure on the world’s 
freshwater resources—and shifting to 
diets with a greater share of plant-based 
foods will likely reduce that pressure. 
Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2011, 2012) provide 
a comprehensive global analysis of the 
“water footprint” of plant- and animal-based 
foods (Figure 6-12), which displays a similar 
pattern to GlobAgri-WRR’s findings for land 
use and GHG emissions, shown in Figure 
6-6. In general, animal-based foods are 
more water-intensive, with the ruminant 
meats being especially water-intensive. 
These authors estimate that beef accounted 
for one-third of the global water footprint of 
livestock production in 2000.a
The majority of agricultural water 
consumption is rainwater or “green” water. 
A product’s “green water footprint” tracks 
quite closely to GlobAgri-WRR’s estimate 
of land use. Water managers, however, 
tend to be most concerned with irrigation 
water or a food’s “blue water footprint,” 
which represents the volume of surface and 
groundwater consumed. When comparing 
just irrigation water values (shown in blue 
in Figure 6-12), the picture of water intensity 
per calorie or gram of protein across plant-
based and animal-based foods is more 
mixed. Nuts, for example, stand out as even 
more irrigation-water-intensive than beef 
at the global average level, and fruits and 
vegetables are globally on par with animal-
based foods other than beef.
In contrast to GHG emissions, whose 
significance does not vary depending on 
geographic location, the consequences of 
high agricultural water use for sustainability 
are location-specific.b “Water footprint 
estimates” of total water consumption 
therefore become especially useful when 
overlaid with maps of water stress, such 
as those produced by WRI’s Aqueduct and 
shown in Figures 1-5 and 3-1 of this report. 
Such maps allow water managers to identify 
“hotspots” where water footprint reduction 
is most urgent.c 
Sources:
a. Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2012).
b. Putt del Pino et al. (2016). 
c. Hoekstra et al. (2011). 
Key Lessons from Our Analysis of 
Potential Diet Shifts
We draw four principal lessons from our analysis of 
the GlobAgri-WRR model’s projections:
 ▪ Reducing overconsumption of calories would 
have large health benefits but would have only a 
modest impact on land use and GHG emissions 
relative to the challenge. 
 ▪ Reducing consumption of all animal products 
would have large benefits, and is important for 
the wealthy, but is hard to achieve globally be-
cause even vegetarians shift much of their con-
sumption to dairy and eggs, and because our 
baseline assumes that 6 billion people already 
eat so few animal products and they could quite 
possibly eat more. 
 ▪ Reducing consumption of all meat alone could 
close our gaps but primarily through the effects 
of eating less ruminant meat, and assuming 
that much of that meat consumption shifts to 
dairy and eggs. 
 ▪ Reducing ruminant meat consumption by the 
world’s highest consumers of these foods is a 
particularly promising strategy to achieve the 
land and GHG emissions targets. Although a 
30 percent global cut in ruminant meat would 
require 40–60 percent reductions in ruminant 
meat in the United States and Brazil, rumi-
nant meat today provides only 3–5 percent of 
their diets. Europeans would have to cut their 
ruminant meat consumption by only 22 percent 
relative to 2010 levels.
Although switching to plant-based foods would pro-
vide many additional environmental benefits and 
benefits for animal welfare, most of the climate and 
land-use benefits would occur even if consumption 
switched from beef to chicken and pork.
Since its peak levels in the mid-1970s, per capita 
beef consumption has dropped by roughly one-
third in the United States and Europe, and it has 
dropped by 27 percent in Japan since the 1990s.135 
This history provides real evidence of an ability to 
shift at least from beef to other animal products. 
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Figure 6-12  |   Foods differ vastly in freshwater requirements 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2011, 2012) (freshwater consumption) and Waite et al. (2014) (farmed fish freshwater consumption—shown as 
rainwater and irrigation combined).
Finally, a shift away from ruminant meat consump-
tion would also still leave plenty of business for 
cattle farmers and use of pasture lands. Even a 30 
percent decline in global ruminant meat demand 
(relative to our 2050 baseline) would mean that 
demand would still rise by 32 percent from 2010 
to 2050. This is a significant increase—just far less 
than the 88 percent growth anticipated under our 
baseline scenario. 
Based on this analysis, in the penultimate section of 
this report, “The Complete Menu: Creating a Sus-
tainable Food Future,” we include the Less Rumi-
nant Meat Diet (10 percent reduction, shifting to 
plant proteins) in the “Coordinated Effort” scenario 
of combined menu items, and the Less Ruminant 
Meat Diet (30 percent reduction, shifting to plant 
proteins) in the “Highly Ambitious” and “Break-
through Technologies” combination scenarios. 
Recommended Strategies
Despite the potential benefits of diet shifts, the cur-
rent trend of rising global consumption of animal-
based foods will likely continue, absent significant 
actions to shift demand.
Food choices are influenced by a variety of  
interacting factors, including price and taste of  
the food, and the age, gender, health, income, geog-
raphy, social identity, and culture of the consumer. 
Marketing, media, and ease of access to supermar-
kets and restaurants also play a role. What can be 
done to influence people’s food choices on a large 
enough scale to achieve the scenarios analyzed in 
the previous section and contribute to a sustainable 
food future? 
We recommend a new approach that focuses on 
what influences purchasing decisions. It includes 
four strategies: move beyond reliance on informa-
tion and education campaigns to effective market-
ing, engage the food industry, improve plant-based 
substitutes, and leverage government policies.
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Move beyond a reliance on information and 
education campaigns to effective marketing
Typical strategies to shift diets rely on nutrition 
labeling or public health campaigns about the ben-
efits of different food types or diets. Public health 
campaigns range from advocating for abstinence 
(e.g., vegetarianism or Meatless Mondays), recom-
mending balanced diets (e.g., the UK Eatwell plate, 
Chinese Pagoda, U.S. ChooseMyPlate, Canadian 
Food Rainbow), promoting fruits and vegetables, 
and warning against excessive consumption of 
particular food types. 
There is limited evidence, however, that consumers 
regularly use information labels or are influenced 
by education campaigns when buying food.136 A 
review of the influence of nutritional labeling, for 
example, found information to have at best a mod-
est impact on purchasing behavior.137 In addition,  
a review of the effectiveness of education cam-
paigns to increase fruit and vegetable consumption 
in Europe has reported a small impact.138 Analysis 
published in the British Medical Journal in 2011 
found a similar pattern in the restaurant environ-
ment. Calorie and nutritional information about 
food served at fast-food chains in New York  
City resulted in no change in average calories 
bought, and only one in six people said they  
used the information.139 
In light of how consumers shop, the limited effec-
tiveness of information and education strategies 
is not surprising. Consumers are bombarded with 
messages every day from multiple sources and, as 
a result, the information is likely to be screened out 
or quickly forgotten.140 Consumers tend to follow a 
shopping routine and rarely evaluate the products 
they buy.141 What ends up in the shopping cart is 
usually based on habit and unconscious mental pro-
cessing rather than on rational, informed decisions. 
Interventions to change food consumption behav-
ior, therefore, need to affect not only consum-
ers’ rational, informed decisions but also their 
automatic or unconscious decisions. This insight 
suggests that interventions must go beyond infor-
mation and education campaigns and attempt to 
alter consumers’ choices and the ways those choices 
are presented.142 For example, fishers, processors, 
and retailers in the United Kingdom have worked 
together to rebuild demand for pilchards. The fish 
were renamed “Cornish sardines.” Sardines are 
regarded favorably as a Mediterranean dish and 
preferable to the humble pilchard, traditionally sold 
in cans. Since this repositioning in the late 1990s, 
catches of pilchards in Cornwall increased from 6 
tons per year in the early 1990s to 2,000 tons in 
2008.143
Engage the food industry, especially major food 
retailers and food service providers
Global food consumption patterns are converging 
as the food industry consolidates and creates large-
scale food processors, wholesale food companies, 
supermarkets and other retail store chains, and 
restaurant chains. 
Supermarkets accounted for 70 to 80 percent of 
food retail sales in the United States and France in 
2000,144 and they are playing an increasingly impor-
tant role in developing countries. Between 1980 and 
2000, supermarkets grew their share of food retail 
sales from an estimated 5–20 percent to 50–60 
percent in East Asia, Latin America, urban China, 
South Africa, and Central Europe.145 This expansion 
continued through the first decade of the 2000s; 
supermarket sales grew at a 40 percent compound 
annual growth rate in China, India, and Vietnam 
between 2001 and 2009.146 New supermarkets 
typically open in urban areas with concentrations 
of affluent consumers before diffusing to middle- 
and lower-income consumers and expanding from 
urban to rural areas.147 Supermarkets increase con-
sumers’ access to foods more common in developed 
countries, such as meat, dairy products, temperate 
fruits and vegetables, and processed foods and 
drinks.148 
People are also increasingly choosing to dine out—
in restaurants, cafeterias, and other food service 
facilities. In the United States, expenditures on 
“food away from home” as a share of total food 
expenditures grew from 25 percent in 1954 to 50 
percent in 2013.149 In China, out-of-home food 
consumption grew by more than 100-fold between 
1978 and 2008, as people increasingly eat food 
from street stalls, traditional restaurants, and fast-
food outlets.150 This trend is driven by the growing 
share of women in the workplace, higher incomes, 
smaller households, more affordable and conve-
nient fast-food outlets, and increases in advertising 
by large restaurants.151 Given that these drivers are 
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increasingly relevant worldwide, restaurants and 
other food service facilities will likely capture a still 
higher share of global food sales in coming decades. 
Until now, efforts to shift diets have primarily been 
led by governments and nongovernmental organi-
zations. However, consumers make the majority 
of their food choices in stores and restaurants; 
influencing these choices to shift diets will require 
the engagement of the food industry, particularly 
large-scale actors in the retail and food service sec-
tors. What strategies can they use? 
SHIFT WHEEL: A FRAMEWORK FOR SHIFTING CONSUMPTION
Little is known about alternative strategies that 
could be used to reduce high consumption of 
animal-based food products, especially beef. To 
help address this knowledge gap and design more 
effective strategies, we looked across the field of 
fast-moving consumer goods—not just food—and 
examined a number of specific consumption shifts 
that have been successfully orchestrated by indus-
try, NGOs, and government. Notable examples 
include the shifts from incandescent to long-life 
light bulbs, from caged to free-range eggs in the 
United Kingdom, from big box to compact washing 
powder, from high- to low-alcohol beer in Europe, 
from butter to plant-based spreads, from trans fats 
to healthier fats, and a shift away from shark fin 
in China. While these examples draw primarily on 
experience in developed countries, the resulting 
insights are likely to be relevant to developing coun-
tries, given their trends toward shopping in super-
markets and eating outside the home. We analyzed 
these shifts by reviewing published literature and 
market data reports, commissioning sales research, 
and consulting marketing strategy professionals 
and academic behavior specialists. 
Based on this analysis, we developed the “Shift 
Wheel” (Figure 6-13), a suite of strategies and 
tactics that appear to have underpinned some of 
the historical shifts in consumption patterns. Given 
their efficacy in the past, we suggest that elements 
of the Shift Wheel will be important for shifting 
diets in the future. The Shift Wheel includes four 
complementary strategies: minimize disruption, 
sell a compelling benefit, maximize awareness and 
optimize display, and evolve social norms. 
Minimize disruption
Changing food consumption behavior is challeng-
ing because it requires breaking current habits and 
investing time and effort to establish new ones. 
Changes in taste, look, texture, smell, packaging, 
and even in-store location can be major barriers 
to changing a consumer’s food-buying decisions. 
An effective strategy is to minimize the consumer’s 
perception of differences: 
 ▪ Replicate the experience. Brands such 
as Quorn (a meat substitute made from 
mycoprotein) have, over the years, evolved their 
chicken, minced and ground beef, and tuna 
products to replicate the familiar texture of 
the meat as closely as possible. Other products 
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Figure 6-13  |   The Shift Wheel comprises four strategies to shift consumption
Source: Ranganathan et al. (2016).
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are replicating packaging formats and product 
placement. For example, several brands of 
soy milk have launched packaging that looks 
similar to that of fresh cow’s milk and, rather 
than being stored at room temperature near 
long-life ultra-high temperature processed 
(UHT) milk, are being placed in retailers’ 
chillers alongside fresh milk. 
 ▪ Disguise the change. A number of products 
have blended in new ingredients within current 
formats to help disguise the shift toward plant-
based ingredients. For example, the “Lurpak” 
Danish brand of butter has released a number 
of variants, such as “Lurpak Lighter,” which has 
around 30 percent vegetable fat blended into 
the butter. These inclusions are listed in the 
ingredients label, but the marketing leads with 
messaging about its buttery taste and spread-
ability, a result of the vegetable fat. Change 
can also be disguised through small, impercep-
tible steps (sometimes referred to as “stealth 
changes”). This approach has been used by food 
companies to steadily cut sodium and sugar 
levels in food. For example, manufacturers have 
reduced salt levels in UK bread by an average of 
20 percent over the past decade. 
 ▪ Form habits in new markets. Getting con-
sumers to purchase healthy and more sustain-
able products is less disruptive if they have yet 
to form buying habits. This approach is espe-
cially relevant to countries where consumption 
of animal-based protein and beef is rapidly ris-
ing or is projected to do so by 2050. Introduc-
ing programs that limit consumers’ shift toward 
buying more animal-based food products in 
geographies or social groups without a prior 
history or unformed buying norms can be an 
effective strategy. 
Sell a compelling benefit 
Not all food consumption shifts are disguisable; 
selling a compelling benefit requires defining and 
communicating attributes that are sufficiently 
motivating to stimulate behavior change among 
the majority of consumers. This can mean selling 
factors other than the environment.
 ▪ Meet current key needs. The UK egg  
industry has built upon and reinforced the 
consumer perception that eggs from free-range 
chickens taste better than those from cage-
reared chickens. Brands such as “Happy Eggs,” 
with their tagline “happy hens lay tasty eggs,”  
demonstrate this approach. Although free-
range eggs are 30–50 percent more expensive 
than conventional eggs, this quality association 
has helped capture around 45 percent of the  
UK market.152 
 ▪ Deliver new compelling benefit. Although 
much current messaging around the benefits of 
plant-based foods relates to health and nutri-
tion—which can be effective in certain circum-
stances—health-related messaging can be a 
double-edged sword. Studies have found that 
calling plant-based dishes “healthy” can actu-
ally create negative connotations for consum-
ers, with many experiencing “healthy” dishes as 
less enjoyable, less tasty or less filling.153 Rather 
than leading with a health message, certain 
food service outlets emphasize the unique taste 
sensations of plant-based food. For example, 
restaurants such as Dirt Candy in New York 
champion the natural sweetness of plant-based 
foods in their description of main dishes (e.g., 
Tomato Cake). And Stanford University found 
that giving vegetable-based dishes flavorful, 
indulgent, or exciting names (e.g., “twisted 
citrus-glazed carrots”) boosted sales of those 
dishes in cafeterias by 25 to 41 percent rela-
tive to less-appealing names.154 The converse is 
also true. Research from the London School of 
Economics has shown that placing plant-based 
dishes within a vegetarian box on a menu can 
reduce the chances a nonvegetarian will order 
these dishes by more than half because it is not 
based on offering a compelling benefit except  
to vegetarians.155 
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 ▪ Enhance affordability. Price is an influential 
factor in food purchases. When comparing how 
much protein is derived from animal-based 
foods in different countries, it is estimated that 
income explains 65 to 70 percent of the varia-
tion.156 That is why the falling price of chicken, 
relative to the price of beef, has played a role in 
the rise of per capita chicken consumption in 
the United States (and the decline in per capita 
beef consumption) since the 1970s.157 Because 
plant-based ingredients can be cheaper than 
animal-based ones,158 companies may be able to 
sell reformulated products with a greater share 
of plant-based ingredients at a lower price point 
and/or an increased profit. 
Maximize awareness
The more consumers are exposed to a product, the 
greater the chance they will consider purchasing it. 
Repetition, memorability, and product display tech-
niques can all influence food-purchasing decisions. 
 ▪ Enhance display. One study in New York City 
found that when supermarket checkout lines 
were stocked with more healthy foods, custom-
ers purchased more healthy items and fewer 
unhealthy ones, relative to standard checkout 
lines.159 In a retail environment, food manufac-
turers can encourage retailers to increase the 
amount and quality of space given to displaying 
their products by providing greater margins to 
retailers or running promotional campaigns, 
such as offering discounts or engaging celebrity 
chefs to feature their products. In a food service 
environment, layout and design of menus, 
buffets, and cafeteria spaces can all enhance 
the success of target dishes by increasing their 
visibility. 
 ▪ Constrain display. In some cases, unde-
sired food choices can be curtailed by limiting 
product distribution and display. Public food 
procurement policies in schools, hospitals, 
prisons, and government offices have been used 
to influence consumption habits. The complete 
removal or “choice editing” from stores is pos-
sible, but it is sensitive; 46 percent of British 
shoppers are in favor of more choice editing for 
ethical reasons but 26 percent object, and 73 
percent were against editing for health rea-
sons.160 Some countries also are experimenting 
with limiting marketing of undesirable foods. 
Chile passed a law in 2012 that limits children’s 
exposure (through marketing and sales) to 
foods that are high in calories, salt, sugar, and 
fat—and began implementing the law in 2016.161
 ▪ Be more memorable. Consumers shop 
quickly, and the majority screen out infor-
mation about new products. Companies can 
disrupt these predetermined choices by mak-
ing products more noticeable in a purchasing 
situation or by increasing their prominence 
in consumers’ thoughts. Creating memorable 
advertising campaigns and building consumers’ 
memory associations with the desired food can, 
over time, increase the probability that it will 
be remembered and purchased.162 Coca-Cola, 
for example, is associated in many consumers’ 
minds with the color red, its distinctive bottle 
shape, its logo script, and its ability to refresh 
on a hot day.163 In the United States, agricultur-
al commodity marketing programs have been 
responsible for several memorable advertising 
campaigns, such as “Got Milk?” and “Beef: It’s 
What’s for Dinner.” Developing memorable 
marketing programs for plant-based foods 
could play an important role in shifting con-
sumer behavior. 
Evolve social norms
Research has shown that the cultural environment 
and social norms of the group to which a person 
belongs can influence what and how much that per-
son eats. A study in the Journal of the Academy of 
Nutrition and Dietetics, for example, reported that 
people eat more when others around them are eat-
ing more, and choose food types based on what they 
perceive will help them fit in with a given group 
and gain social approval.164 A key challenge will be 
to moderate men’s meat consumption and increase 
their consumption of plant-based foods: studies 
have shown strong cultural associations between 
red meat consumption and masculinity,165 and men 
are more likely than women to believe that plant-
based diets are not nutritious, tasty, or filling.166 
 ▪ Inform about the issue. Although evidence 
shows that information and education alone 
do not lead to sufficient action,167 they can 
sometimes contribute to a broader effort, as 
demonstrated by their role in the past decade 
in reducing consumption of trans fats in several 
countries.168 In many cases, information can 
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lead to indirect or multiplier effects, by rais-
ing the profile of an issue, prompting product 
reformulation (in the case of labeling), or form-
ing the basis of food and nutrition policy and 
programs (e.g., national dietary guidelines).169 
 ▪ Make socially desirable. In 2012, celebrity 
chef Delia Smith helped increase UK sales of 
gammon (ham) nearly threefold relative to the 
previous year after featuring a recipe for gammon 
on television. The chef’s influence over food sales 
has been called the “Delia effect,” a term coined 
when sales of cranberries quadrupled the day 
after she used them on television.170 Plant-based 
food companies such as Beyond Meat, Silk, and 
MorningStar Farms have used athlete or male 
celebrity endorsements, prominent protein 
claims, and masculine language like “Beast 
Burger” to create associations with strength and 
power to avoid feelings of emasculation. Tossed, 
a UK-based salad chain, attracts men through 
naming certain products “Muscle Builders” and 
forming partnerships with local gyms to offer 
male personal assistants discounts if they eat in 
their stores.
 ▪ Make socially unacceptable. A number of 
campaigns have helped make a specific food so-
cially unacceptable to consumers. For example, 
in 2008 the celebrity chefs Hugh Fearnley-
Whittingstall and Jamie Oliver both launched 
high-profile TV programs and campaigns to 
highlight the issues associated with buying non-
free-range chicken. During the campaign, sales 
of free-range poultry reportedly increased by 35 
percent relative to the previous year, while sales 
of caged birds fell by 7 percent.171 In another 
example, WildAid launched a campaign to draw 
attention to the devastating impacts of shark 
fishing, helping to reduce consumption of shark 
fins in China.172 It is important to note, how-
ever, that the long-term impact of these cam-
paigns is unknown. 
In nearly all the successful case studies reviewed, 
a shift in consumption behavior required multiple 
strategies from the Shift Wheel, and typically 
involved groups across a range of sectors, including 
manufacturers, retailers, nongovernmental organi-
zations, and governments. 
Improve plant-based or cultured meat substitutes 
The size of diet shifts needed among the world’s 
affluent populations suggests that food manufactur-
ers will need to make dramatic progress in their 
development of plant-based or cultured substitutes 
for animal-based foods—particularly beef—that 
truly replicate consumers’ experiences. 
One possibility is meat cultured in laboratories—
called “clean meat” by its proponents. The objective 
is to create meat without the resource inputs and 
environmental impacts generated by conventional 
meat, by harvesting animal stem cells and grow-
ing them in a petri dish.173 In 2013, the first public 
tasting of this cultured meat at Maastricht Univer-
sity showed success in replicating the texture and 
density of real meat, although the flavor seemed 
bland.174 An even bigger challenge will be producing 
cultured meat at a competitive cost because “cell 
culture is one of the most expensive and resource-
intensive techniques in modern biology.”175 Com-
panies are working to improve cultured meats 
while reducing production costs in order to get 
these meats to market; Memphis Meats and JUST 
(formerly known as Hampton Creek) both have 
stated goals of reaching the market within the next 
five years.176
The more immediate alternative is to produce 
animal-based food substitutes from plant-based 
products. Leading brands include Quorn, Beyond 
Meat, Impossible Foods, and JUST. The ingredients 
in Beyond Meat include soy protein, pea protein, 
and carrot fiber. Impossible Foods’ plant-based 
ground beef is made from ingredients including 
wheat, coconut oil, potatoes, and plant-based 
heme.177 Heme, a molecule also found in the hemo-
globin of animal blood, contributes a meat-like 
color and flavor to the product. In 2015, Oregon 
State University researchers patented a new strain 
of red marine algae that is high in protein and tastes 
like bacon.178 The product has yet to be commercial-
ized but is showing potential. Several companies 
are manufacturing plant-based fish alternatives; 
Ocean Hugger Foods makes a tomato-based raw 
tuna substitute and New Wave Foods is producing 
plant-based shrimp.179
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In the United States in recent years, the company 
JUST has made major commercial breakthroughs 
in alternatives for other animal-based foods. It uses 
Canadian yellow peas to create an eggless mayon-
naise alternative called “Just Mayo,” and a similar 
approach to create egg- and dairy-free cookie  
dough and powdered scrambled faux eggs. The 
company is working on plant-based alternatives to 
ice cream, ranch dressing, and other animal-based 
foods. Part of JUST’s business model is to sell 
plant-based alternatives that are not only indistin-
guishable from but also cheaper than conventional 
animal-based products.180 
Significant reductions in meat consumption could 
occur just by blending plant-based ingredients 
into widely consumed ground meats. In the United 
States, ground beef accounts for between 55 and 
60 percent of total beef consumption.181 Mixtures 
of ground beef and plant-based products could be 
attractive, and several organizations—including the 
Culinary Institute of America, the U.S. Mushroom 
Council, the James Beard Foundation, large food 
service companies like Sodexo, a number of univer-
sities, and the national burger chain Sonic Drive-
In—are piloting burgers made from a blend of beef 
and 20 to 35 percent mushrooms that are com-
parable or superior to all-beef burgers in taste.182 
In the case of blended burgers, low amounts of 
mushroom (e.g., 20%) can lead to burgers that 
are indistinguishable in taste from conventional 
all-beef burgers—constituting another example of 
“disguising the change.”
In recent years, corporate investment and research 
in alternative meat products has grown rapidly.183 
Food critics appear to confirm that substitutes are 
coming closer to matching the experience of at least 
some meats.184 Because of the inefficiency of meat 
production, these alternatives have a high potential 
to become cheaper than meat. Even with a high rate 
of growth, however, the retail market is only pro-
jected to grow from $3.8 billion worldwide in 2015 
to $5.2 billion in 2020.185 By comparison, the retail 
market for conventional meat and seafood was $741 
billion in 2014.186 The industry will need to grow at 
a vastly greater rate if it is to have a real effect on 
global meat consumption. 
Leverage government policies
Governments have a wide range of policy options 
available to influence diets, including procure-
ment, taxes, subsidy reforms, and stronger policy 
coherence.187 Diet choices, in turn, affect multiple 
policy goals, including public health, agricultural 
production, rural development, climate change 
mitigation, biodiversity protection, and food and 
water security. 
Procurement
Governments provide meals in schools, hospitals, 
offices, and to the military. For example, the U.S. 
National School Lunch Program provided lunches 
to more than 31 million children each school day 
in 2012, across more than 100,000 schools. And in 
Brazil, the National School Feeding program feeds 
approximately 42 million students each day. These 
programs could have large impact if they shifted 
these meals toward less consumption of beef and 
other meats.188 For example, in Brazil, São Paulo’s 
public schools serve more than 500,000 vegetarian 
meals to students every other week.189
Taxes
Taxes may provide the strongest and technically 
most plausible measures that governments could 
take to influence consumption patterns, although 
they can be politically challenging to introduce. 
Available evidence suggests that food taxes imposed 
at the retail level on certain types of food could 
work in developed countries. Since around 2010, 
several countries have established taxes on foods 
and beverages based on health concerns (e.g., 
sugary soft drinks, candy, foods high in saturated 
fats)—including Barbados, Chile, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Hungary, Mexico, and local govern-
ments in the United States.190 Reviews of these 
kinds of efforts indicate a significant effect on 
consumption.191 
Modeling studies agree that food taxes could have 
a significant effect on consumption, using a vari-
ety of economic methods. These studies generally 
estimate substantial reductions in specific targeted 
foods and have emphasized that taxes work best 
when there are untaxed, appropriate substitutes. 
Estimated elasticities of consumption for various 
meats also suggest that a tax on beef, for example, 
could lead to substantial switching at least to 
other meats if not vegetable alternatives.192 In fact, 
        95Creating a Sustainable Food Future
U.S. consumption of beef declined by 12 percent 
just from 2007 to 2015 as retail prices rose by 51 
percent,193 although with the recession over, and 
beef production rebounding to prerecession levels, 
consumption has somewhat rebounded.194 
Studies on food taxes have also suggested impor-
tant lessons and caveats:
 ▪ Taxes imposed by countries at the production 
level, such as a beef production tax, are unlikely 
to work because production will simply move to 
another country.195 
 ▪ As the Denmark experience suggests, taxes 
imposed over broader regions are likely to 
be more effective than those imposed in a 
single country or municipality if consumers 
can simply shop elsewhere. In 2011, Denmark 
imposed taxes on foods based on fat content, 
but it abandoned the taxes a year later in large 
part because consumers were able to cross the 
border into Germany and purchase the same 
products without a tax.196 
 ▪ Taxes will be more effective when more desir-
able substitutes are untaxed. For example, it is 
more likely that people will switch from beef 
to chicken if beef is taxed more highly than 
chicken. 
 ▪ Tax rates will likely have to be substantial to 
meaningfully reduce consumption. For ex-
ample, even though one survey of estimated 
demand elasticities for meats found elasticities 
often around one (or even modestly higher),197 
such an estimate still implies that roughly a 
10 percent tax would be needed to achieve a 
10 percent reduction in consumption. In a less 
encouraging result, another study found that a 
40 percent tax on beef would reduce consump-
tion by only 13 percent,198 a sensitivity to price 
that could help explain the changes in U.S. beef 
consumption after 2008.
Except in the case of inherently unhealthy foods 
and beverages, food taxes designed to change 
consumption of animal-based foods seem politically 
unlikely today. To avoid unfair distributional conse-
quences, such taxes should also be rebated through 
subsidies or reduced taxes on other necessities. 
Nevertheless, food taxes deserve more attention 
and may become more acceptable in the future.
Subsidies
Governments should phase out subsidies that favor 
meat and dairy production and explore subsidies 
instead for healthy plant-based foods. Bailey et al. 
(2014) found that livestock subsidies in Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries amounted to $53 billion in 2013, 
and pork subsidies in China exceeded $22 bil-
lion in 2012. The U.S. Department of Agriculture 
estimated in 2009 that a subsidy lowering retail 
prices of fruits and vegetables by 10 percent would 
encourage low-income households to increase their 
consumption by 2 to 5 percent,199 and would cost 
around $600 million to implement annually. A 
more recent U.S. study also estimating the effects 
of a 10 percent reduction in fruit and vegetable 
prices came to a more hopeful conclusion that con-
sumption would rise by 14 percent, preventing or 
postponing more than 150,000 deaths from heart 
disease in the United States by 2030.200
Stronger policy coherence
Government policies are not always aligned and can 
work at cross-purposes. As a first step to assuring 
coherence, governments should establish multi-
disciplinary cross-agency task forces to identify 
policies and regulations that influence diet choices, 
assess whether they are aligned with promoting 
healthy and sustainable diets, and recommend 
changes to ensure alignment. 
For more detail about this menu item, see  
“Shifting Diets for a Sustainable Food Future,” a 
working paper supporting this World Resources 
Report available at www.SustainableFoodFuture.org. 
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CHAPTER 7
MENU ITEM: AVOID 
COMPETITION FROM 
BIOENERGY FOR FOOD 
CROPS AND LAND
Many governments are calling for large increases in “modern” 
bioenergy, believing that this will reduce GHG emissions from 
energy use. In this chapter, we estimate the potential impacts of 
scaling up the use of bioenergy derived from plants grown on 
productive land. We conclude that the proportion of plant material 
diverted from food and fiber to energy would be unacceptably 
high—and that hopes of climate benefits are misplaced. We 
recommend phasing out bioenergy targets.
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Bioenergy is any form of energy that is derived from 
recent (as opposed to fossil) plant or animal tis-
sue. For millions of the world’s people who cannot 
afford fossil fuels, bioenergy has long provided 
and continues to provide the major source of 
energy in the form of wood, charcoal from wood, 
and sometimes dung. Traditionally estimated at 
roughly one-tenth of the world’s energy supply,201 
these traditional sources of bioenergy will probably 
continue for many years to serve millions of people 
who cannot afford modern alternatives. Even so, 
reducing this traditional bioenergy use has been a 
major focus of many international efforts both to 
preserve forests202 and to reduce adverse impacts on 
human health. 203
In Europe and the United States, wood for heat 
and grass for working animals once provided the 
primary energy sources, but they proved incapable 
of meeting growing energy demands. By the middle 
and late 19th century, reliance on bioenergy had 
contributed to extensive deforestation in these 
regions, even though total energy demand at the 
time was a modest share of present consumption. 
The shift to fossil fuels played an important role in 
allowing many of these forests to regrow.204
The Challenge
Some forms of bioenergy represent little or no com-
petition for other uses of land such as producing 
food or fiber or storing carbon. For example, the use 
of wood wastes for electricity and heat generation 
in the production of paper and other wood products 
has long provided bioenergy from materials that 
would otherwise be discarded. Various studies sug-
gest potential to expand the use of biomass-based 
wastes and residues, and we discuss them briefly 
later in this chapter. 
Over the past few decades, however, many gov-
ernments have made strong pushes to expand 
“modern” bioenergy that diverts land or plants 
from alternative uses. These policies encourage 
liquid biofuels for transportation made from crops. 
Governments are also encouraging power plants 
to replace coal, at least in part, with wood pellets 
or chips generated by additional harvest of trees or 
diversion of the parts of trees that would otherwise 
provide pulp and paper. Governments have cre-
ated incentives to cultivate fast-growing grasses 
for biomass energy feedstocks on agricultural land, 
although this has not yet occurred in meaningful 
volumes. 
We call these forms of bioenergy “bioenergy from 
the dedicated use of land” because land must be 
dedicated to the purpose of producing bioenergy 
feedstocks. The productive potential of land is thus 
diverted from food and fiber production or carbon 
storage to bioenergy. This diversion still occurs, at 
least in part, even if some of the biofuel crops are 
used for food or other useful nonfuel by-products. 
We find that meeting the more ambitious bio-
energy targets and mandates currently in effect 
would divert and consume plant material equal to 
large percentages of the crops, grasses, and wood 
harvested in the world today. We further find 
that the claimed climate benefits of bioenergy are 
based primarily on an accounting error that treats 
biomass as automatically “carbon free,” meaning 
it counts the benefit of using land or biomass for 
energy without counting the cost of not using them 
for other purposes.
In 2010, our base year, biofuels provided roughly 
2.5 percent of the energy in the world’s transporta-
tion fuel (the fuel used for road vehicles, airplanes, 
trains, and ships). The source of these biofuels was, 
overwhelmingly, food crops.205 They include ethanol 
distilled mainly from maize, sugarcane, sugar 
beets, or wheat (88.7 billion liters),206 and biodiesel 
refined from vegetable oils (19.6 billion liters). 
The United States, Canada, and Brazil accounted 
for about 90 percent of ethanol production, while 
Europe accounted for about 55 percent of biodiesel 
production (Figure 7-1).207 Excluding feed by-prod-
ucts, about 4.7 percent (3.3 exajoules [EJ]208) of the 
energy content in all crops grown worldwide was 
used for biofuels in 2010.209 
For our 2050 baseline scenario, we used the FAO 
assumption that biofuels in 2050 will continue to 
provide the same 2.5 percent share of transporta-
tion fuel as they did in 2010. Because transporta-
tion energy demand will grow, this assumption 
leads to relatively modest growth in biofuels.
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Figure 7-1  |   Biofuel production in 2010 was concentrated in a few regions and a few crops 
Notes: 
a. Includes wheat (4%), cassava (1%), and other feedstocks (1%).
b. Includes China (2%) and other regions (3%).
c. Includes China (2%) and other regions (2%).
Source: EIA (2014a).
Biofuel policy becomes more consequential because 
many nations have established, or are establishing, 
targets and mandates that call for biofuels to make 
up a greater share of transportation fuel by 2030 or 
before (Table 7-1). Common targets are at least 10 
percent, and many countries view these targets as 
just steps toward even larger targets. 
What are the implications of a global 10 percent 
biofuels share of transportation fuels for the crop 
calorie gap? One way to answer this question is to 
determine the share of the world’s existing annual 
crop production that would be required to meet 
such a target. (The share of existing crop calorie 
production, rather than future crop production, 
conveys how much additional crop production is 
needed to supply these biofuels, which contributes 
to the crop calorie gap.) For 2050, the answer is 
roughly 30 percent of all the energy in today’s 
(2010) crop production (Figure 7-2). 
Because transportation fuel is only one part of the 
world’s energy use, 30 percent of all today’s crop 
energy would provide only around 2 percent of 
final, net delivered energy in 2050.210
These numbers can be used to show the implica-
tions for the crop calorie gap of increasing biofuel 
production to 10 percent of transportation fuels 
from the 2.5 percent we already factor into our 
baseline. In that event, the crop calorie gap between 
2010 and 2050 would widen from 56 to 78 percent 
(Table 7-3).211 Yet, if the world were to eliminate 
crop-based biofuels, the crop calorie gap would 
decline from 56 to 49 percent. 
Crops used in ethanol (100% = 88. 7 BILLION LITERS)
Where ethanol is generated Where biodiesel is generated
Crops used in biodiesel (100% = 19.6 BILLION LITERS)
Maize Sugarcane Sugar
beet
Othera Rapeseed Soybeans Other fats
and oils
Palm
oil
Other
veg.
oils
64% 5% 6%25% 30% 21% 13% 8%28%
Europe Latin
America
(excluding
Brazil)
Brazil Asia
(excluding
China)
United
States
and
Canada
Otherc
55% 12% 9% 7% 4%13%
United States and Canada Brazil Europe Otherb
58% 32% 5%5%
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COUNTRY MANDATE/TARGET
Angola E10
Argentina E10, B10
Australia: New 
South Wales (NSW), 
Queensland (QL)
NSW: E6, B2; QL: E3 (by 2017), E4 (by 
2018), B0.5
Belgium E4, B4
Brazil E27 and B8 (by 2017), rising to B10 (by 2019)
Canada E5, B2 (nationwide), E5–E8.5 (in 5 provinces), B2–B4 (in 5 provinces)
Chile E5, B5 (target, no mandate)
China E10 (9 provinces), B1 (Taipei)
Colombia E8, B10
Costa Rica E7, B20
Dominican Republic E15, B2 (target, no mandate)
Ecuador E10, B5
European Union 10% renewable energy in transport by 2020 with 7% cap on crop-based fuelsa
Ethiopia E10
Fiji E10, B5 (approved target in 2011, mandate expected)
Guatemala E5
India E22.5, B15
Indonesia E3, B20
Italy 0.6% advanced biofuels blend by 2018, 1% by 2022
COUNTRY MANDATE/TARGET
Jamaica E10
Kenya E10 (in Kisumu)
Malawi E10
Mexico E5.8
Malaysia E10, B10
Mozambique E15 (2016–20), E20 (from 2021)
Norway B3.5
Panama E10
Paraguay E25, B1
Peru E7.8, B2
Philippines E10, B2
Republic of Korea B2.5, B3 (by 2018)
South Africa E2, B5
Sudan E5
Thailand E5, B7
Turkey E2
Ukraine E5, E7 (by 2017)
United States
136 billion liters of any biofuel, 
equivalent to ~12% of total 
transportation fuel demand in 
2020–22b
Uruguay E5, B5
Vietnam E5
Zimbabwe E15
Table 7-1  |   Biofuel targets and mandates around the world, 2016
Notes:
E= ethanol (e.g., “E2” = 2% ethanol blend); B = biodiesel (e.g., “B2” = 2% biodiesel blend)
a. Lignocellulosic biofuels, as well as biofuels made from wastes and residues, count twice and renewable electricity 2.5 times toward the target.
b. The U.S. mandate is for a volume, not a percentage, and this volume may be met either by ethanol or biodiesel, despite their different energy contents. The estimated 
percentage of U.S. transportation fuel in 2020-22 is based on the assumption of 34 billion gallons of ethanol and 2 billion gallons of biodiesel and a U.S. Energy Information 
Administration projection of 2020 U.S. transportation energy demand. The U.S. mandate includes a goal that 16 billion gallons of the 36 billion gallons (136 billion liters) come from 
cellulosic sources, but that requirement can be waived and all 36 billion gallons could come from crops as long as maize-based ethanol does not exceed 15 billion gallons.
Source: IEA (2016a) in REN21 (2017).
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Figure 7-2  |   If crop-based biofuels provided 10 percent of the world’s transportation fuels in 2050, they would require an 
amount of energy equal to roughly 30 percent of the energy contained in global crop production in 2010
Biofuel from cellulose?
Some biofuel advocates argue that producing 
biofuels from various forms of cellulose or noncrop 
biomass rather than from food crops would avoid 
competition with food. Cellulose forms much of 
the harder, inedible structural parts of plants, and 
researchers are devoting great effort to find ways of 
converting cellulose into ethanol more efficiently.  
In theory, almost any plant material could fuel  
this cellulosic ethanol, including crop residues  
and urban organic wastes. Yet the potential for 
wastes to provide energy on a large scale is limited 
(as discussed below). Virtually all analyses for 
future large-scale biofuel production assume that 
most of the cellulosic biomass for bioenergy would 
come from fast-growing grasses and trees planted 
for energy.212
Unfortunately, growing trees and grasses well 
requires fertile land, resulting in potential land 
competition with food production. In general, 
growing grasses and trees on cropland generates 
the highest yields but is unlikely to produce more 
biofuel per hectare than today’s dominant ethanol 
food crops. For example, a hectare of maize in the 
United States currently produces roughly 1,600 gal-
lons (about 6,000 liters) of ethanol after deducting 
the part of the land that produces feed products.213 
For cellulosic ethanol production to match this fig-
ure, the grasses or trees must achieve almost double 
the national cellulosic yields estimated by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),214 and 
two to four times the perennial grass yields farm-
ers actually achieve today.215 Although there are 
optimistic projections for even higher yields, they 
are unrealistically predicated on small plot trials by 
scientists—sometimes only a few square meters,216 
which scientists can tend more attentively than  
real farmers. 
Yields on poorer, less fertile land tend to be  
substantially lower.217 More fundamentally, using 
poorer land for bioenergy still uses land. Land  
that can grow bioenergy crops reasonably well  
will typically grow other plants well, too—if not  
food crops, then trees and shrubs that provide car-
bon storage, watershed protection, wildlife habitat, 
and other benefits.
2010 FOOD CROP PRODUCTION = 71 EXAJOULES NEEDED TO MEET 
10%TARGET IN 2020
NEEDED TO MEET 
10%TARGET IN 2050
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EIA (2013), FAO (2013), and Wirsenius (2000).
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Figure 7-3  |   If the world’s entire harvest of crops, crop residues, grasses, and wood in 2000 were used for bioenergy, it 
would provide only 20 percent of energy needs in 2050
Note: Assumes primary to final energy conversion for biomass is 24% lower than for fossil energy.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Haberl et al. (2007), IEA (2017), and JRC (2011). 
The implications of possible bioenergy targets for 
all forms of energy 
Targets for transportation fuel are actually only part 
of much larger targets for bioenergy. Some govern-
ments and researchers are promoting bioenergy for 
heat and electricity generation, using not only food 
and energy crops but also wood harvested from 
forests. Both the goals and claims about the poten-
tial “sustainable” supply of biomass are ambitious. 
Today, the world uses around 575 exajoules (EJ) of 
energy,218 and some researchers claim that biomass 
could sustainably supply almost the whole of this 
amount.219 The International Energy Agency has 
at times called for a bioenergy target of 20 percent 
of global energy by 2050,220 which—at projected 
2050 levels of energy consumption—would require 
around 230 EJ of bioenergy.221 This quantity of 
biomass also features in many other strategies to 
stabilize climate.222
How much of today’s world biomass harvest 
would be required to supply 230 EJ? The answer 
is roughly all of it: all the crops, plant residues, 
and wood, and all the biomass grazed by livestock 
around the world, probably amounts to roughly 225 
EJ223 (Figure 7-3). Yet the world would still need all 
this biomass for food, livestock, wood, and other 
uses. To meet this bioenergy demand while also 
meeting projected food demand, the world would 
therefore have to approximately double the present 
total harvest of plant material and produce roughly 
50 percent more food at the same time. 
The Opportunity
Phasing out biofuels from the dedicated use of 
land provides an opportunity to close food, land, 
and agricultural GHG mitigation gaps. Yet bioen-
ergy supporters believe that land-based bioenergy 
reduces GHG emissions, is a necessary replacement 
for fossil energy, and therefore must be pursued 
despite its high land requirements. Because the 
sustainability criteria in this analysis are designed 
in part to stabilize the climate, we might agree—if 
bioenergy from the dedicated use of land truly 
reduced emissions. Yet, in this section, we explain 
our view that arguments in favor of these sources of 
bioenergy are based on a fundamental accounting 
error. Solar energy and some smaller alternative 
sources of biomass provide far superior options. 
Estimates of the energy potential of bioenergy 
grown on dedicated areas of land lead to double 
counting of land
How can some researchers estimate that the world 
could reduce GHG emissions while harvesting 
double the quantities of biomass already harvested 
in the world, given that producing existing levels of 
biomass has already required conversion of enough 
forests and other natural vegetation to contribute 
roughly one-third of the extra carbon in the atmo-
sphere? The answer, we believe, is that they simul-
taneously count the land or biomass as available to 
produce bioenergy while assuming that the same 
ALL HARVESTED BIOMASS (2000)
CROP RESIDUESCROPS GRASSES WOOD
20%
OF PROJECTED
GLOBAL PRIMARY
ENERGY USE
IN 2050
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land or biomass continues to serve its existing uses, 
including food production or carbon storage. 
The world’s lands are already growing plants every 
year, and these plants are already being used. Some 
uses involve the production of food, fiber, and 
timber—which people directly “consume.” Other 
uses include replenishing or increasing carbon in 
soils and in vegetation, which together contain four 
times as much carbon as the atmosphere.224 Bioen-
ergy cannot supply energy except at the expense of 
these other valuable uses of plants, unless bioen-
ergy is derived from or results in some additional 
source of biomass. 
Large estimates of bioenergy’s GHG reduction 
potential have overlooked this need for additional 
biomass production and have relied on biomass and 
land already in use:225 
 ▪ Much of the interest in bioenergy originated in 
the 2001 integrated assessment of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change, which 
estimated that low-carbon bioenergy could po-
tentially replace all global energy consumption 
at the time.226 This analysis assumed that bioen-
ergy crops could grow on the roughly 1.4 billion 
hectares of “potential croplands” estimated by 
FAO that were neither in food production today 
nor likely to be needed in the future. But the 
analysis failed to note that unused “potential 
croplands” consist of forests, woody savannas, 
and wetter, more productive grazing lands. 
Clearing them for bioenergy would release vast 
quantities of carbon and, in the case of graz-
ing land, sacrifice food production. The IPCC 
analysis implicitly and incorrectly assumed that 
these lands were “empty” or free to use without 
sacrificing alternative uses.  
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 ▪ More recent analyses prepared by other re-
searchers and sometimes cited by the IPCC 
have excluded denser forests from these esti-
mates but otherwise have continued to assume 
that both potential cropland and most graz-
ing lands are available for bioenergy.227 These 
papers ignore the food production on grazing 
land and have incorrectly assumed that those 
tropical woody savannas wet enough to produce 
crops are “carbon free.” Yet they too store abun-
dant carbon and provide abundant biodiversity 
and other ecosystem services.228 
 ▪ Some analyses assume that people can harvest 
trees as “carbon-free” sources of energy so long 
as they harvest only the annual growth of that 
forest.229 The rationale is that if the forest’s 
carbon stock remains stable, the harvest for 
bioenergy has not added carbon dioxide to the 
atmosphere. But this calculation ignores the 
fact that the annual growth of a forest would 
have added to the existing sum of biomass 
and stored additional carbon if it had not been 
harvested for bioenergy. The loss of one ton 
of such a carbon dioxide “sink” has the same 
effect on the atmosphere as a one-ton increase 
in carbon dioxide emissions to the atmosphere. 
Overall, despite the loss of forests in the tropics, 
the world’s forests are accumulating carbon 
and providing a large carbon sink, which slows 
climate change and is critical to future strate-
gies to reduce climate change impacts. In gen-
eral, harvesting forests for energy reduces the 
quantity of carbon that forests store more than 
it displaces emissions of carbon from fossil fuel 
combustion (at least for decades).230
All these estimates are a form of “double counting” 
because they rely on biomass, or the land to grow 
biomass, that is already being used for some other 
purpose. Because bioenergy analyses assume that 
these other purposes continue to be met, they are in 
effect counting the biomass and land twice.231 
Assumed greenhouse gas reductions result from 
the same double-counting error 
The double counting of biomass and land is equiva-
lent to treating them as “carbon free” in the sense 
that no global carbon consequences are assigned to 
their diversion for bioenergy use. 
This approach also double-counts carbon, and the 
best way to understand how is by tracing the flow of 
carbon to and from the atmosphere when bioenergy 
is produced and comparing that to how carbon 
is counted in analyses that claim bioenergy use 
reduces GHGs in the atmosphere.
The starting point is that burning biomass, whether 
wood or ethanol, emits carbon in the form of 
carbon dioxide just like burning fossil fuels. In fact, 
because of the nature of biomass’ chemical bonds 
and its water content, bioenergy emits a little more 
carbon dioxide than fossil fuels to produce the same 
amount of energy.232 Why then do some analyses 
claim that bioenergy reduces GHG emissions?
The usual explanation is that this carbon dioxide 
is automatically offset, that is, canceled out, by 
the carbon dioxide absorbed by plants when they 
grow.233 Because of this plant growth offset, the 
theory is that bioenergy does not add more carbon 
to the atmosphere, whereas burning fossil fuels 
adds new carbon to the air that would otherwise 
stay underground. Based on this theory, nearly all 
analyses estimating the climate benefits of bioen-
ergy do not count the carbon dioxide released when 
biomass is burned.234 Although such analyses may 
count the emissions from burning oil or gas in the 
course of bioenergy production—growing plants 
and converting them to biofuels—they treat the bio-
mass itself as an inherently “carbon-neutral fuel,” 
that is, a carbon-free source of energy just like solar 
or wind. For coal use, this would be the equivalent 
of counting the emissions from using coal mining 
machinery but not counting the emissions from 
burning the coal itself.
This assumption is erroneous because the first 
requirement for any offset is that it be additional. 
For example, if an employer wishes to “offset” a 
worker’s overtime by providing vacation time, the 
employer must offer the worker more vacation time 
and not merely allow the worker to take vacation 
time already earned. For this reason, if bare land—
that would otherwise remain bare—is brought 
into production to grow biomass for energy, the 
additional carbon absorbed by these plants offsets 
the carbon released by burning them. Similarly, if 
crop residues were going to be burned in the field, 
the carbon released by collecting and burning them 
for bioenergy is offset by the emissions avoided by 
not burning the residues in the field. But if maize is 
grown for ethanol by clearing forest, there is a large 
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release of carbon, so that the net effect of growing 
maize for ethanol production is to release far more 
carbon than the maize plants will absorb and turn 
into ethanol for decades. (That point is now broadly 
accepted.) 
Equally—but less well appreciated—there is no 
direct, additional carbon uptake when maize used 
for ethanol is grown on land that was already 
producing maize. That is typically what happens 
when an ethanol plant obtains its ethanol from the 
local silo, and that is the typical assumption by a 
model that assumes maize for ethanol is grown with 
no “direct” land-use change. Although the growing 
maize does absorb carbon, that maize growth and 
carbon absorption were going to occur anyway, 
and simply diverting the maize to ethanol does not 
absorb any more. By itself, stopping the analysis 
here, this maize production cannot provide a valid 
offset. (In our discussion of modeling below, we dis-
cuss whether the market responses to this diversion 
can lead to valid offsets and whether that would  
be desirable.) 
Overall, only additional biomass, which means 
either additional plant growth or reduced waste, 
provides a valid offset. Figure 7-4 illustrates scenar-
ios where bioenergy can directly lead to net GHG 
emission reductions and where it does not.235 
What about replacing crops or pasture in one 
location with faster growing grasses or trees? For 
example, corn could replace soybeans, producing 
more biomass and absorbing more carbon. Alter-
natively, energy crops may generate more biomass 
per hectare than pasture lands. But if these crops 
for bioenergy replace the other food sources, land 
somewhere else still needs to be devoted to growing 
the forgone soybeans and forage if the world wants 
to continue to eat. Replacing these food and forage 
crops elsewhere displaces the vegetation and the 
carbon that other land would store and sequester. 
For bioenergy to reduce GHG emissions without 
displacing food or forest products, it must not only 
lead to more carbon removal from the air on the 
hectares where bioenergy is grown but also lead to 
an increase in total world carbon removal by land. 
“Renewable” and “sustainable” does not make 
biomass carbon-neutral
What explains the belief that all bioenergy is 
carbon-neutral? One explanation is the common 
but incorrect intuition that anything renewable 
is carbon-free. That idea is based on thinking like 
the following: “If the world uses plant growth for 
energy and the plants grow again, it cannot cost the 
world any carbon.” This intuition also explains the 
view that “sustainable” production makes plants 
carbon-free because sustainability is what ensures 
that the same level of plant growth is fully renew-
able over the long-term.
The analogy of a monthly paycheck illustrates the 
error in this thinking. Like annual plant growth, a 
paycheck is renewable in that a new check should 
come every month. But just because the money is 
“renewable” does not mean it is free for the tak-
ing for alternative uses. People cannot spend their 
paycheck on something new like more leisure 
travel or energy without sacrificing something they 
are already buying, like food and rent, or without 
adding less of that money to their savings. To afford 
more leisure travel or energy without sacrificing 
other benefits, people need a bigger paycheck or 
they must cut some source of wasteful spending. 
Analogously, people use annual plant growth and 
the carbon it absorbs for food and forest products, 
and they leave some of the carbon to be stored 
in vegetation and soils—thereby limiting climate 
change. That annual plant growth and carbon is not 
free for the taking by bioenergy. The cost of using 
the carbon in plants to replace the carbon in fossil 
fuels is not using that carbon to eat, to build  
a house, or to replenish or increase the carbon 
in vegetation and soils. To be richer in carbon, 
one cannot merely divert plants from one use to 
another; one needs more plant growth or elimina-
tion of some plant waste. In other words, one needs 
“additional biomass.” 
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Figure 7-4  |  Why greenhouse gas reductions from bioenergy require additional biomass
Note: In scenario A, shifting from gasoline to ethanol use reduces emissions through additional uptake of carbon on land that previously did not grow plants. In scenario B, which 
is the typical bioenergy scenario, the shift from gasoline to ethanol does not reduce emissions, as the demand for bioenergy merely diverts plant growth (e.g., maize) that would 
have occurred anyway. In scenario C, higher demand for crops for ethanol drives up food and feed prices, and GHG emissions from human and livestock consumption decline, but 
at the expense of shrinking the food supply.
Source: Searchinger and Heimlich (2015).
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Modeling studies can be misleading
Nearly all studies of the potential scale of bioenergy 
accept that demand for cropland to produce food 
is likely to grow, at least until 2050. They therefore 
exclude existing cropland from the category of 
potential land for bioenergy. Yet present biofuel 
policies not only allow but even encourage biofuels 
to use crops from existing croplands. These policies 
find some support from a few economic modeling 
studies of producing biofuels on cropland today (as 
opposed to modeling studies of land-use needs in 
the future). In fact, many such modeling studies 
analyzing the GHG implications of using crops for 
biofuels find little or no GHG savings if they take 
account of the conversion to agriculture of forests 
and grasslands necessary to replace the forgone 
food production.236 However, some studies find that 
potential GHG savings of 50 percent or more can 
be gained from biofuels from some crops. Given the 
broad consensus among studies of bioenergy poten-
tial that existing cropland is unavailable to divert 
to bioenergy, what explains these other modeling 
studies that find that diverting cropland to bioen-
ergy would reduce GHGs? 
Economic models all estimate the “indirect” or 
“market-mediated” results of biofuels policies. 
When crops from existing cropland are diverted 
to bioenergy, crop prices rise and these models 
attempt to estimate the responses on land and 
consumption elsewhere. Those economic models 
favorable to bioenergy estimate one or more of 
three responses that could produce GHG benefits. 
Although each response is debatable, the more 
important point is that none of the outcomes pre-
dicted by the models would be ultimately socially or 
environmentally desirable, even assuming that the 
model prediction was accurate. 
Food reduction
First, some models estimate that many of the food 
crops diverted to biofuels are not replaced. When 
food prices rise because of the additional demand 
for biofuels, the market responses are not only 
that other farmers produce more food but also that 
some consumers consume less. The reduction in 
consumption reduces GHGs in two ways. First, if 
people eat less food, farmers do not have to clear as 
much additional land to replace the forgone food 
crops. More directly, when people eat crops, they 
release that carbon, mostly through respiration 
(and a little through their wastes). If crops are not 
replaced, then people or livestock eat fewer crops 
and physically breathe out less carbon dioxide. Eco-
nomic models used by the European Commission 
and the state of California have estimated that this 
effect is large—that between one-quarter and one-
half of the food calories (and therefore roughly that 
much carbon) diverted to biofuels is not replaced.237
It is true that if biofuel production reduces food 
consumption, the effect could contribute toward 
GHG savings. And these models do ultimately esti-
mate that biofuels generate small GHG savings. Yet, 
in such models, the reduction in emissions results 
from the reduction in food consumption, and few 
people would likely volunteer to reduce emissions 
in this way. 
In fact, any food reduction effect of such biofuels 
is likely to be particularly undesirable because it is 
likely to fall disproportionately on the poor. Unlike 
taxes that could, in theory, be imposed on high-
carbon foods such as beef, biofuels increase whole-
sale crop prices for basic commodities and for the 
rich and the poor alike. The effect on consumption 
by the poor is likely to be much greater than on con-
sumption by the rich because poor people have less 
capacity to absorb the higher costs.238 Even if these 
models are correct, such a strategy to reduce GHG 
emissions by reducing food consumption by the 
poor does not meet the poverty alleviation criterion 
of a sustainable food future. 
Yield gains
Second, some models estimate that farmers replace 
crops or cropland diverted to biofuels largely or pri-
marily by increasing their crop or pasture yields on 
existing agricultural land.239 These yield gains avoid 
clearing more land to replace the food production 
area lost to biofuels. The theory is that because 
these diversions increase crop prices, farmers 
have more incentive to add fertilizer or otherwise 
improve management on existing agricultural land. 
Yet the evidence for yield responses due to higher 
prices is weak and limited at best.240 Global yield 
growth has shown remarkably consistent trends 
that fluctuate little or not at all in response to 
annual changes in price.241 Unless yield gains rather 
than expansions of cropland replace nearly all the 
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crops diverted to biofuels, the GHG reductions from 
biofuels relative to gasoline and diesel would at 
best be modest because the emissions from clearing 
more land would negate them.242 
A more basic objection is that farmers already 
need to increase crop or pasture yields on existing 
agricultural land just to meet rapidly rising food 
demands. If biofuels grown on cropland or pasture 
are to make even a modest contribution to energy 
supplies by 2050 without sacrificing food produc-
tion or clearing more land, farmers would have 
to raise their crop and pasture yields still more. 
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, meeting 
FAO’s projections for food demand in 2050 without 
expanding harvested crop area already requires 
that global average crop yields grow at faster rates 
than in recent decades. Relying on even greater 
yield gains is a leap of faith; there is no convincing 
economic evidence to demonstrate that farmers will 
in fact achieve such levels of yield gains over the 
next several decades. 
“Marginal” or “degraded” land
Third, some models can find GHG reductions 
because they claim that much of the land that will 
ultimately be pressed into production is “degraded” 
in the sense that it has little carbon cost. Some mod-
els, for example, assume that farmers will expand 
food production primarily by using idle land or by 
reclaiming abandoned agricultural land, which the 
modelers assume would not otherwise substantially 
regrow vegetation and sequester carbon.243 Neither 
assumption has direct supporting evidence.244
For example, it has been claimed that oil palm 
for biofuels in Indonesia expands primarily onto 
already deforested land, which the modelers 
assume will neither reforest nor be used to meet 
expanding agricultural demands.245 Although there 
is evidence that much oil palm expansion does 
follow deforestation, the scenario relies heavily on 
unsupported assumptions that all cutover for-
est would never reforest or produce food or other 
benefits. Regardless, to the extent that potentially 
productive yet currently low-carbon degraded lands 
do exist, they are already needed to meet expanding 
food demands (including oil palm for food prod-
ucts) without clearing other lands. 
Double counting biomass when it plays a role in 
“bioenergy with carbon storage”
One reason some researchers continue to promote 
bioenergy is that current strategies for limit-
ing emissions enough to hold global warming to 
2 degrees Celsius no longer seem plausible and 
“carbon-negative bioenergy” seems like a way out. 
Carbon-negative bioenergy could result only if 
the bioenergy is made from a source of biomass 
that truly did not lead to GHG emissions because 
the biomass feedstock was additional. To become 
carbon negative, the biomass must then be burned 
in power plants and manufacturing facilities 
equipped with systems that capture the carbon 
dioxide emitted before it leaves the smokestack 
and store it underground. This is a form of “carbon 
capture and storage” (CCS). Viewed from a life-
cycle perspective, the aspiration is that bioenergy 
feedstock plants would absorb carbon dioxide from 
the atmosphere, the plants would be combusted to 
generate energy, and the associated carbon dioxide 
emissions would be intercepted and stored under-
ground, in a combination of bioenergy with carbon 
capture and storage (BECCS). The net result would 
be a gradual reduction in carbon dioxide concentra-
tions in the atmosphere. 
Some researchers interpret this aspiration as a 
rationale for supporting bioenergy today. In reality, 
the logic works the other way. 
First, despite this vision, carbon capture does not 
transform nonadditional biomass that cannot 
generate carbon savings into additional biomass 
that can. The only way to generate carbon-negative 
energy is to start with additional biomass. Although 
carbon capture and storage can reduce carbon 
emissions, it can do the same for coal and natural 
gas, so there is no more benefit in applying carbon 
capture and storage to nonadditional biomass than 
in applying it to fossil fuels. Our earlier analysis 
explains why there is only limited opportunity for 
additional biomass. Modelers who estimate large 
potential benefits from BECCS rely on the same 
estimates of biomass potential that are based on 
double counting (see above).246
Second, there is no benefit to applying carbon 
capture and storage even to additional biomass 
to achieve “negative emissions” unless and until 
that is cheaper than reducing positive emissions, 
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for example, from the continued use of fossil fuels. 
Generating one kilowatt hour of low-carbon energy 
through additional biomass in one location and 
applying carbon capture and storage to the burning 
of coal in another location generates precisely the 
same amount of GHG benefit as applying that CCS 
to the bioenergy itself, creating BECCS. The only 
reason to use BECCS would therefore be if it were 
cheaper, but even in favorable assessments, BECCS 
costs are estimated in the hundreds of dollars per 
ton of carbon dioxide mitigation, which is far more 
expensive than typical costs of mitigating emissions 
from power plants.247 As some people have pointed 
out, if ethanol plants are going to continue to use 
crops, it would be beneficial to capture the carbon 
released from the fermentation of those crops to 
energy—just as it would be preferable to apply 
CCS to any source of carbon dioxide—but doing 
so only captures one-third of the carbon released 
by the whole process and therefore does not make 
the production of ethanol beneficial.248 Only once 
cost-effective options for eliminating coal and 
other fossil emissions have been exhausted does 
the prospect of low-carbon biomass combined with 
carbon capture and storage perhaps provide an 
added cost-effective opportunity to mitigate climate 
change through negative emissions. 
Third, even if there were a special benefit from 
BECCS, this is not a reason to use biomass today 
without carbon capture and storage. It would 
instead be a reason to hold on to biomass and use  
it only later, once carbon capture and storage  
technologies have presumably become feasible  
and cost-effective and would be used with addi-
tional biomass.
“Additional biomass” alternatives
One option is to produce bioenergy from a feed-
stock generated by additional biomass. Such 
sources include biomass that would have been 
wasted and decomposed or burned anyway or 
biomass that would not have grown without the 
demand for bioenergy. Such feedstocks would 
reduce GHG emissions without reducing the 
production of crops, timber, and grasses that people 
already use and without triggering conversion of 
natural ecosystems. Table 7-2 segregates biomass 
feedstocks that require the dedicated use of land 
(and thus are not advisable) from feedstocks that 
are potentially beneficial to climate. 
Estimates of the technical potential to produce 
energy from these wastes vary. Some are as high as 
125 EJ per year, which would be enough to generate 
almost 25 percent of global primary energy demand 
today and 14 percent in 2050.249 More appropriate 
estimates must start by recognizing that most of 
these residues are already put to valuable use.250 
Crop residues
After accounting for residues that are already 
harvested for animal feed, bedding, or other 
purposes, the best estimate is that harvesting half 
of the remainder could generate roughly 14 percent 
of present world transportation fuel, or almost 3 
percent of today’s delivered energy.251 But even 
that estimate does not take into account the fact 
that most crop residues that are not harvested are 
important for replenishing soils. This fact is par-
ticularly critical in parts of the world such as Africa 
where soil fertility is low.252 Even in high-yielding 
locations that produce huge quantities of residues, 
such as maize production in Nebraska, one paper 
estimated that the loss of soil carbon from harvest-
ing residues for ethanol cancels out the benefit from 
replacing fossil fuels for at least a decade.253 
This “technical potential” also unrealistically 
assumes that biofuel producers would harvest half 
of the crop residues from every crop and every field 
in the world. But the economics of harvesting and 
hauling such a bulky, non-energy-dense source 
of biomass would probably restrict the harvest to 
limited areas with highly concentrated, highly pro-
ductive crops that have large quantities of residues. 
Therefore, crop residues overall are likely to be only 
a limited source of sustainable “low carbon” bio-
mass for modern bioenergy.
Wood residues
Turning to wood residues, we estimate global forest 
residues of roughly 10 EJ per year, assuming that 
all residues could be collected.254 At least some 
of these residues should be left to maintain soil 
fertility. In addition, although forest residues would 
mostly decompose, the process would still take 
many years, so burning them still accelerates the 
emissions of carbon. Harvesting and turning even 
residues into pellets also requires energy and gener-
ates emissions, and pelletizing is necessary to use 
residues more than a short distance from the forest 
source. Combining the accelerated loss of carbon 
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from the forest and all these other emissions, one 
paper calculated that even after 25 years, using U.S. 
residues for wood pellets in Europe instead of coal 
would reduce emissions by only about one-half.255
Studies sometimes group with forest residues other 
wood wastes including sawdust, wood processing 
waste, and postconsumer waste wood. Adding these 
sources brings wood residues and wastes to a total 
of 19–35 EJ per year, according to one review.256 
However, sawdust and wood processing waste are, 
for the most part, already used.257 Municipal solid 
waste might add roughly another 10 EJ per year.258 
These are technical potentials, however. In the real 
world, only some of this material could realistically 
and economically be collected.
Cover crops
Opportunities for biomass that could be additional 
because they result from additional plant growth 
might include cover crops that are planted after har-
vest of the main crop in order to reduce soil erosion 
and help replenish soil fertility. In the United States, 
for example, some farmers plant rye or a legume to 
plow into the soil to add nitrogen, while others use 
cover crops to reduce weeds, minimize erosion, or 
break up compacted soil layers. These practices are 
rare, however.259 The potential to harvest cover crops 
for bioenergy, instead of adding them to their soils, 
might encourage more cover cropping, but their 
economic viability has yet to be proved.
Table 7-2  |   Advisable and inadvisable sources of biomass for energy use
INADVISABLE: 
FEEDSTOCKS THAT 
REQUIRE DEDICATED  
USE OF LAND 
ADVISABLE: FEEDSTOCKS THAT DO NOT MAKE DEDICATED USE OF LAND
Food crops
Fast-growing trees or 
grasses purposely grown on 
land dedicated to bioenergy 
Harvests of standing wood 
from existing forests
Some forest slash left behind after harvest
Black liquor from papermaking
Unused sawdust
Municipal organic waste 
Landfill methane
Urban wood waste
Crop residues that are otherwise not used, are not needed to replenish soil fertility, and do not add 
substantial carbon to the soil or the soil functions of which are replaced by additional cover crops
Cover crops that would not otherwise be grown
Unused manure
Wood from agroforestry systems that also boost crop or pasture production 
Intercropped grasses or shrubs for bioenergy between trees in timber plantations in ways that 
maintain timber yields
Tree growth or bioenergy crop production that has higher yields and is more efficiently burned than 
traditional fuelwood and charcoal and that replaces these traditional fuels in societies that continue 
to rely on them
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Algae
Algae are sometimes viewed as a bioenergy feed-
stock that does not compete with fertile land and 
is therefore “additional” and “sustainable.” Algae 
are potentially capable of far faster growth rates 
than land-based plants, and some algae have higher 
oil production, too. Algae fall into two categories: 
microalgae, which float loosely in the water and 
have high protein content, and macroalgae, which 
are essentially seaweeds. Seaweeds currently must 
be grown in nearshore waters, which are increas-
ingly supporting other uses such as fish farming. 
Although some papers have urged greater focus on 
seaweeds, even if all the world’s cultivated seaweeds 
were presently used for energy, they would supply 
at most 0.6 percent of just the United Kingdom’s 
energy needs.260 There is a lot of ocean, however, 
and if there is some way to tap the broader ocean, 
seaweeds might become an energy source that does 
not compete with land, although their uses for food 
and animal feed would be valuable alternatives.
Microalgae, although a focus of much interest, 
face even larger limitations in providing a natural 
resource advantage. As a U.S. National Research 
Council report concluded, using microalgae to meet 
just 5 percent of U.S. transportation fuel demand 
“would place unsustainable demands on energy, 
water, and nutrients with current technologies and 
knowledge.”261 In addition to the many technologi-
cal obstacles that need to be overcome to bring 
costs down, water requirements are likely to be 
large. One estimate found that twice the present use 
of U.S. irrigation water would be needed to pro-
duce enough biofuel from microalgae to supply 28 
percent of present U.S. oil consumption for trans-
portation.262 Even if other problems were resolved, 
land requirements for algae ponds are likely to 
remain formidable. One recent optimistic estimate 
concluded that “only” 49 percent of total U.S. non-
arable land would be needed to replace 30 percent 
of U.S. oil demand with algae, even assuming no 
water, nutrient, or carbon dioxide constraints.263 
This is not an encouraging figure.
Although microalgae would use too much water and 
land to be viable, substantial energy sources, they 
might provide efficient alternatives for foods, which 
would take advantage of their high protein content 
and the special properties of their fats.264
Replacing traditional fuelwood
An entirely different category of modern bioenergy 
would be fast-growing trees, agroforestry products, 
or possibly some oil-bearing crops to supply or 
replace traditional fuelwood. Global studies nearly 
all claim that traditional uses of wood and crop 
residues for cooking and charcoal provide about 10 
percent of global energy use (although this figure 
is a very rough estimate).265 The harvest of trees 
for firewood or charcoal is a major source of forest 
degradation in some parts of the world,266 and 
traditional use of firewood and charcoal is highly 
inefficient. Although shifting to a nonbiomass 
source would be preferable, in some parts of the 
world shifting to more efficient biomass feedstocks 
might be the only feasible alternative.
Solar alternatives to bioenergy
The more promising energy alternative to the use of 
land for bioenergy is to use a solar energy technol-
ogy, such as photovoltaics (PV). Like bioenergy, PV 
converts sunlight into energy useable by people, 
and its land-use needs are often not trivial.267 But 
PV’s solar radiation conversion efficiency is far 
greater than that of biomass, and solar arrays do 
not require land with good rainfall and soils. 
Bioenergy requires so much land because growing 
plants for energy is a highly inefficient way of con-
verting the energy in the sun’s rays into a form of 
nonfood energy useable by people. Even sugarcane, 
the world’s highest yielding crop, grown on highly 
fertile land in the tropics converts only around 
0.5 percent of solar radiation into sugar and only 
around 0.2 percent ultimately into ethanol.268 Maize 
ethanol is even less efficient at making this con-
version, and even if energy crops and conversion 
efficiencies for cellulosic ethanol can match some of 
the most optimistic estimates, this efficiency might 
grow to just 0.35 percent.269 
Even in 2014, standard new PV cells available to 
homeowners in the United States would convert 16 
percent of solar radiation into electricity, and on 
a net operating basis for a home, we estimate an 
efficiency of 11 percent.270 For installations on land 
area, the efficiency depends on the spacing and tilt 
of solar cells but will still typically be around 10 
percent.271
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As shown in Figure 7-5, we calculate that PV 
today would produce, at a minimum, 40 times 
more useable energy than even cellulosic ethanol 
is likely to produce in the future.272 (Comparing 
solar energy to biomass used for electricity or 
heating rather than transportation biofuels shows 
even larger benefits for solar energy.273) One 
result is that producing bioenergy on 100 hectares 
of good farmland (assuming it were available, 
notwithstanding the challenges discussed in this 
report) would produce only the same amount 
of energy and 100 times more GHG emissions 
than using one hectare for PV and reforesting 99 
hectares.274 In addition, when solar energy is used 
to support electric cars, the added efficiencies of 
electric engines bring the ratio of solar to bioenergy 
to at least 150 to 1 (which would increase further if 
batteries were also produced using solar power).275
Even this comparison underestimates the advan-
tages of solar energy because solar installations can 
use drylands and rooftops, while bioenergy requires 
productive land that could produce food or store 
carbon if not used for bioenergy.276 For example, 
as shown in Figure 7-5, some of the “best” land for 
bioenergy is the world’s dense, tropical forests, but 
clearing this land to plant bioenergy crops obvi-
ously would come with high carbon costs. Accord-
ing to this analysis, on one-quarter of the world’s 
land, which is less productive but excluding desert 
and ice-covered areas, the ratio is a minimum of 
5,000 to 1 in favor of solar.
Biomass is more easily stored than solar energy. 
But because electric vehicles provide their own 
storage and could, if required or given incentives, 
mostly be powered during the day, the storage 
advantage for bioenergy as a vehicle fuel is less 
significant. Phasing in solar-electric cars will take 
time, so biofuels might be a legitimate short-term 
alternative if they could reduce emissions today and 
do so cost-effectively but, for the reasons given in 
this chapter, we believe they cannot. Fortunately, 
with solar power providing less than 2 percent of 
Figure 7-5  |   On 73 percent of the world’s land, the useable energy output of solar PV would exceed that of bioenergy by 
more than 100:1 
Source: Searchinger et al. (2017). 
Relative production efficiency of solar energy vs. bioenergy: 40–100x 300–1,000x >5,000x100–300x 1,000–5,000x
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Table 7-3  |   Global effects of 2050 bioenergy scenarios on the food gap, agricultural land use, and greenhouse gas 
emissions 
SCENARIO
FOOD 
GAP, 
2010–
50 (%)
CHANGE IN AGRICULTURAL 
AREA, 2010–50 (MHA)
ANNUAL GHG EMISSIONS, 2050  
(GT CO2E) 
GHG MITI-
GATION 
GAP  
(GT CO2E)
Pasture 
land Cropland Total
Agricultural 
production
Land-use 
change total
2050 BASELINE 56 401 192 593 9.0 6.0 15.1 11.1
Phase out use of crops 
for biofuels (compared to 
maintaining 2.5% transportation 
fuel in baseline) (Coordinated 
Effort, Highly Ambitious, 
Breakthrough Technologies)
49 401 (0)
164
(-28)
566
(-28) 9.0 5.8 14.7
10.7 
(-0.3)
Meet a 10% transportation fuel 
target from crop-based biofuels 78
401
(0)
298
(106)
699 
(106) 9.3 7.1 16.4
12.4 
(1.3)
Notes: “Cropland” includes cropland plus aquaculture ponds. Numbers not summed correctly are due to rounding. Numbers shown in parentheses are changes relative to 2050 
baseline.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
global energy supply and the potential to supply 
solar without storage likely in the range of at least 
20 percent,277 there is abundant room to expand 
solar to displace use of fossil fuels. Unless and until 
that reasonable potential is exhausted, there is no 
need to direct climate change effort toward shifting 
transportation fuels. And by the time solar energy 
has saturated the capacity of both transportation 
and other end uses to use it without storage, the 
large research and development investments in 
storage may have made continued displacement of 
fossil fuels by solar both practical and economic. 
Model Results
Using the GlobAgri-WRR model, we estimate the 
potential contribution to closing the three gaps that 
would result from phasing out the world’s use of 
biofuels grown on dedicated areas of land. 
A complete phase-out would reduce agricultural 
land demand in 2050 by 28 Mha, and reduce 
agricultural GHG emissions from both production 
and land-use change by 330 million tons CO2e per 
year, closing the GHG mitigation gap by 3 percent 
(Table 7-3).
More significant than phasing out existing biofuels 
is avoiding the mistake of increasing biofuel’s share 
in transportation fuels to 10 percent. Meeting the 10 
percent target would increase land demand by an 
additional 106 Mha (18 percent) and annual GHG 
emissions by 1.3 gigatons (Gt), a 12 percent hike in 
the GHG mitigation gap for agriculture.
Recommended Strategies
Because bioenergy from the dedicated use of land 
presents multiple barriers to a sustainable food 
future and does not reduce GHG emissions for 
decades, we recommend the phase-out of poli-
cies to promote this kind of bioenergy. Changing 
the world’s approach to bioenergy gains urgency 
because many recommendations and targets 
already adopted by some governments involve far 
greater use of bioenergy than we model in our 10 
percent biofuel target scenario. These more ambi-
tious bioenergy targets would make a sustainable 
food future far less achievable. Government efforts 
to use land to produce energy should focus on solar 
pathways, and any support for bioenergy should be 
limited to the “advisable” feedstocks identified in 
Table 7-2. This alternative approach to bioenergy 
would require changes in several types of policies: 
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Phase out mandates and subsidies 
Biofuels have expanded in part due to mandates 
that a nation’s or region’s transportation fuel supply 
incorporate a target share of biofuels.278 Govern-
ments have supported these mandates or targets 
with a range of tax credits and other financial 
support for biofuels and the construction of biofuel 
production facilities.279 Countries and regions that 
already have such policies in place should phase 
out these mandated targets and financial support 
packages for biofuels made from food crops and 
other feedstocks that make dedicated use of land. 
Countries and regions that are contemplating such 
policies should refrain from establishing them. 
Eliminate bioenergy produced on dedicated land 
from low-carbon fuel standards
Countries should not allow biofuels made from food 
crops or from land dedicated to biofuel production 
to qualify for low-carbon fuel standards. These 
laws—in California, British Columbia, and the Euro-
pean Union—require that the carbon-intensity of all 
the transportation fuels sold by a company decline 
by a small percentage relative to gasoline and die-
sel, typically by 10 percent.280 Proponents originally 
hoped that these laws would provide incentives to 
incorporate environmentally preferable biofuels, 
particularly those from cellulose. The policy reflects 
a time when thinking about the GHG consequences 
of biofuels ignored the land-use implications. 
California regulators later recognized the impor-
tance of land use and made efforts to incorporate 
emissions from land-use change into their analyses 
of crop-based biofuels. But we believe that, as with 
similar efforts, California’s analysis incorporated 
forms of double counting discussed earlier in this 
chapter. For example, the state credited biofuels for 
the GHG reductions that its model estimated would 
result from reduced food consumption.281
Exclude bioenergy produced on dedicated land 
from renewable energy standards
As adopted by the European Union and many 
U.S. states, renewable energy standards require 
or encourage electric utilities and—in the case of 
Europe—whole energy sectors to obtain a mini-
mum share of their annual power from renewable 
resources.282 Such laws could be a good strategy 
for encouraging solar and wind power generation, 
but most standards also treat the burning of wood 
as a qualifying source of renewable energy. The 
result has been rising harvests of trees for electricity 
and the construction of large plants in the United 
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States and Canada for manufacturing and shipping 
wood pellets to Europe.283 As many papers have 
now shown, burning whole trees or wood pellets 
increases GHG emissions for decades.284 These 
standards also threaten to create a significant 
increase in the global harvest and degradation of 
forests for relatively little energy impact: Doubling 
the world’s commercial timber harvest and using 
that additional harvest for energy would supply at 
most an additional 2 percent of global electricity 
supply by 2035.285
One solution would be to exclude wood from  
whole trees or sections of trees from the list of  
eligible resources, leaving residues as eligible. 
Another solution would be to qualify the eligibility 
of wood with proper GHG accounting. Massachus-
setts, for example, requires proper accounting of 
the GHG consequences of harvesting whole trees 
and, based on that, requires biomass to result in a 
minimum level of GHG emissions reductions com-
pared to the use of fossil fuels. As a result, the Mas-
sachussetts renewable energy standard, as it applies 
to wood-based feedstocks, provides incentives  
only for forest residues.286 This approach leaves 
electric power plants free to use forest residues—
although the potential amount of such residues is 
relatively small. 
Reform accounting of bioenergy
A variety of general climate laws and treaties 
incorporate the assumption that biomass is carbon 
neutral.287 As mandates increase to reduce carbon 
emissions, or as governments move to charge more 
money for carbon emissions, the result will be to 
make bioenergy more and more attractive. The 
Kyoto Protocol is one example. It sets limits on 
GHG emissions for the countries that have agreed 
to it, but it incorporates the accounting error of 
ignoring all carbon dioxide emitted by burning bio-
mass. The implications of this error are large. Tak-
ing an extreme example to illustrate, Europe could 
fell all of its forests, use the felled wood to replace 
coal, and count these actions as a 100 percent 
reduction in GHG emissions compared to burning 
that coal. Europe incorporated the same erroneous 
accounting into its emissions-trading system for 
power plants and large industries. This accounting 
error should be fixed wherever it occurs.
Maintain blend wall limitations
All of these recommended changes would go a long 
way, but they may not go far enough. When gaso-
line prices are extremely high, as they were in 2008, 
a number of studies have found that maize ethanol 
becomes a cost-effective replacement until maize 
prices rise to very high levels.288 This relationship 
means, in effect, that high oil prices could lead to a 
continuous expansion of maize-based ethanol at the 
rate at which farmers can expand maize production 
and still keep maize below these “breakeven” prices 
with oil. Because the expansion of maize will dis-
place other crops, this expansion of maize ethanol 
would also increase the prices of other crops. The 
result could be continuing and large pressures to 
expand agricultural area globally and consistently 
high crop prices. 
If oil prices are high enough, other limitations will 
be necessary to hold down ethanol expansion. The 
most significant of these is the so-called blend wall. 
In the United States, because few cars can use more 
than a 10 percent blend of ethanol for technical 
reasons, the limited market has discouraged whole-
salers from installing equipment to sell blends with 
higher quantities of ethanol. The U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency has approved the use of 15 
percent blends for new cars, but in recent years it 
has refused to impose expanded ethanol require-
ments for existing vehicles that might force gasoline 
wholesalers to install new equipment. In the past 
few years, the blend wall has effectively blocked 
expansion of ethanol in the United States.289 It is 
important that this blend wall be maintained.
 
For more detail about this menu item, see “Avoiding 
Bioenergy Competition for Food Crops and Land,” 
a working paper supporting this World Resources 
Report available at www.SustainableFoodFuture.org. 
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CHAPTER 8 
MENU ITEM: ACHIEVE 
REPLACEMENT-LEVEL 
FERTILITY RATES 
Population growth is driving much of the sustainable food 
future challenge, and some of this population growth is now 
inevitable because it is the consequence of high birth rates 
in the recent past. But some of this projected growth reflects 
continuing high birth rates in a limited number of countries.  
This menu item focuses on accelerating progress in education 
and public health that would likely move fertility rates more 
rapidly toward replacement levels—ideally achieving such  
rates everywhere on the planet by 2050.
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Figure 8-1  |   The world’s population is projected to grow from 7 billion people in 2010 to 9.8 billion in 2050, with roughly 
half the growth in Africa
Source: UNDESA (2017). Medium-fertility variant. 
Achieving replacement fertility levels worldwide 
would bring enormous social benefits and could 
make a meaningful contribution to the food, land, 
and GHG mitigation gaps. But such an achievement 
would bring the greatest benefits to sub-Saharan 
Africa, whose population is facing the most formi-
dable challenges to a sustainable food future.
The Challenge
According to the medium-fertility scenario in the 
UN population growth projections, global popula-
tion will rise from 7 billion in 2010 to 9.8 billion 
by 2050.290 Roughly half of this 2.8 billion increase 
will occur in Africa, and one-third will occur in Asia 
(Figure 8-1). The reasons for population growth 
differ by region. Asia’s growth will come from a 
demographic bulge of people of childbearing age 
that results from high fertility rates in the past, 
while Africa’s growth will result in large part from 
continuing high birth rates.
Overall, most of the world’s regions are close to 
achieving replacement-level fertility rates and will 
achieve or even dip below replacement level by 
2050 (Figure 8-2). The “replacement-level” rate 
is the total fertility rate291 at which a population 
exactly replaces itself from one generation to the 
next (excluding migration) and is typically around 
2.1 children per woman.292 North America and 
Europe are already below replacement level and 
are projected to remain there through 2050. Asia, 
Latin America, and Oceania had fertility rates just 
above replacement level in 2010–15, and these rates 
are likely to fall below replacement levels by 2050. 
North Africa’s average total fertility rate is projected 
to decline from 3.3 in 2010–15 to 2.4 in 2050, 
which is close to the replacement level.
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Figure 8-2  |   All regions except sub-Saharan Africa are projected to approach or reach replacement-level fertility by 2050
Source: UNDESA (2017). Medium-fertility variant. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the notable exception. By 
2010–15, it had a total fertility rate of 5.1. The 
United Nations projects that this rate will decline 
gradually over the coming four decades but will fall 
only to 3.2 by 2050—well above replacement rate. 
This trajectory will result in a population increase 
of 1.3 billion in the region between 2010 and 2050, 
more than doubling the population of sub-Saharan 
Africa from 0.9 billion in 2010 to 2.2 billion by mid-
century. Such high fertility rates in the region will 
also result in a large group of young people entering 
their childbearing years over the coming decades. 
As a result, even with a decline in fertility rate after 
2050, the region’s population will continue to grow 
to 4 billion by 2100, more than a fourfold increase 
from 2010 levels.293
This projected increase in sub-Saharan Africa’s 
population poses substantial economic, social, 
and food security challenges. The region must 
spend enormous resources on infrastructure just 
to maintain present transportation, housing, and 
living standards. As described in Chapter 2, Box 
2-4 of this report, the region is already the planet’s 
hungriest, has the lowest crop yields, and has low 
average income levels. In many parts of the region, 
soils are depleted of organic matter and nutrients, 
and rainfall levels can be quite variable. Climate 
change threatens to exacerbate the difficulty in 
growing crops, putting downward pressure on crop 
yields. As a result, the region is at the center of the 
sustainable food challenge.
The Opportunity
Sub-Saharan Africa could achieve large food secu-
rity and economic benefits and contribute to meet-
ing global and regional land-use and GHG emission 
targets if it were to lower its present total fertility 
rates to approach—and ideally reach—replacement 
level by 2050. Experience from other regions shows 
that fertility rates decline, often rapidly, wherever 
countries make progress in three key forms of social 
progress. Each form has its own inherent benefits 
for human well-being and human rights, indepen-
dent of the impacts on population growth rates.294 
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Percent of women aged 20–39 with at least 
a lower secondary education (2005–10)
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Source: UNDESA (2017).
Female education
Increasing educational opportunities for girls pro-
vides one opportunity. In general, the longer girls 
stay in school, the later they start bearing children 
and the fewer children they ultimately have.295 In 
most countries with total fertility rates of 2.1 chil-
dren per woman or lower, 80 to 100 percent of girls 
attain at least a lower secondary education―that 
is, some high school in U.S. terms. As Figure 8-3 
shows, sub-Saharan Africa illustrates this relation-
ship in reverse: the region has the lowest propor-
tion of girls attaining lower secondary education 
and the highest fertility rates in the world. 
The link between education and fertility rates 
occurs within countries, too. Ethiopia’s 2016 Demo-
graphic and Health Survey, for instance, found that 
women with no formal education have on average 
five children, while those with a secondary educa-
tion have only two.296 In addition to postponing the 
first child birth, which is a strong indicator of how 
many children a woman will ultimately have,297 
education helps women diversify and increase 
Figure 8-3  |   Sub-Saharan Africa has the world’s lowest performance in key indicators of total fertility rate, women’s 
education, use of contraception, and child mortality
Source: Harper (2012).
Source: World Bank (2016b). Source: World Bank (2016c).
Note: Maps are for illustrative purposes and do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of WRI concerning the legal status of any country or territory,  
or concerning the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries.
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income, which in addition to other benefits, typi-
cally strengthens a woman’s role in deciding how 
many children to have.298 
Reproductive health services
The second form of social progress involves increas-
ing access to reproductive health services, including 
family planning. Access to family planning counsel-
ing and technology ensures that women and men 
can make informed choices about reproduction 
and act on those decisions. Access to reproductive 
health services can also lower maternal mortal-
ity and rates of HIV/AIDS and other diseases.299 
Millions of women, educated and uneducated, want 
to space and limit their births but do not have the 
means to do so. The United Nations found that 24 
percent of women in sub-Saharan Africa who wish 
to control their fertility lack access to birth control, 
compared with 10–11 percent in Asia and Latin 
America.300 Studies by WHO and UNICEF also 
show that sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest share 
of women of childbearing age using contraception 
(Figure 8-3).301 
Infant and child mortality
Reducing infant and child mortality assures parents 
that they do not need to conceive a high number of 
children to assure survival of a desired number.302 
On average, countries with low fertility rates have 
low infant and child mortality rates.303 Once again, 
sub-Saharan Africa illustrates this relationship in 
reverse (Figure 8-3). 
Every country that has educated girls, provided 
access to reproductive health, and reduced infant 
and child mortality has also greatly reduced its 
fertility rates, regardless of national religion or 
culture. This progress has occurred even in many 
countries that were either extremely poor at the 
time or had large areas of extreme poverty, includ-
ing Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Peru. As shown in Box 
8-1 and Figure 8-4, this progress can occur with 
surprising speed.
In addition to the inherent benefits of each form 
of social progress, achieving replacement fertility 
rates would also likely lead to economic benefits 
through a “demographic dividend.”304 During and 
for several years after a rapid decline in fertility, a 
country simultaneously has fewer children to care 
for―freeing up resources―and a greater share of 
BOX 8-1 |  Is it possible to reduce fertility rates 
quickly?
Could sub-Saharan Africa achieve replacement-level fertility by 
2050? History from other regions suggests it could. Although some 
researchers once believed that only developed countries could 
dramatically lower their birth rates,a a number of less-developed 
countries have done so as well. For example, Peru, Uzbekistan, and 
Bangladesh all went from fertility rates of just under 7 in 1960 to 
below 2.5 by 2014.b Yet these countries were still relatively poor in 
2015, ranking 81st, 122nd, and 139th out of more than 170 countries in 
per capita income.c Being “economically developed” does not seem 
to be a precondition for lowering total fertility rates.
Moreover, reductions in fertility rates can occur rapidly. In Vietnam, 
the fertility rate dropped from 7.4 to 2.0 in 30 years, partly in 
response to government penalties for larger families. Brazil went 
from a fertility rate of 6.2 to around 2.8 in an equivalent number 
of years without government mandates. And Iran’s fertility rate 
declined from 5.2 to 2.2 in the 11 years between 1989 and 2000, also 
without mandates. These experiences show that rates can drop 
rapidly in a variety of cultures and without coercion.
Sources: 
a. Coale (1973). 
b. World Bank (2016a). 
c. World Bank (2016b). 
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its population in the most economically productive 
age bracket. Researchers have estimated that this 
demographic dividend was responsible for up to 
one-third of the economic growth of the East Asian 
“Tigers” between 1965 and 1990.305 With good gov-
ernance, sub-Saharan African countries should also 
be able to reap a demographic dividend if fertility 
levels fall.306
Model Results
Using the GlobAgri-WRR model, we examined two 
scenarios for sub-Saharan Africa only, in which 
sub-Saharan Africa reduces its fertility rate by 2050 
relative to the baseline (the UN medium-fertility 
scenario). We then analyze the consequences for 
the food, land, and GHG mitigation gaps both glob-
ally and in sub-Saharan Africa.
UN low-fertility scenario. In its low-fertility 
scenario, the UN analyzes reductions in total fertil-
ity rates that are 0.5 children per woman lower 
in each country in each year than in the medium-
fertility scenario. The low-fertility scenario has the 
effect of reducing sub-Saharan Africa’s fertility rate 
in 2050 from 3.2 to 2.7. According to our analysis, 
this fertility path reduces the region’s population 
by 216 million compared to the baseline medium-
fertility scenario.307 
Replacement-level fertility scenario. This 
more ambitious scenario has the effect of further 
reducing sub-Saharan Africa’s fertility rate from  
2.7 to the replacement level of 2.16.308 According 
to our analysis, the region’s population is then 
reduced by 446 million compared to the medium-
fertility scenario.309 
Figure 8-4  |   Total fertility rates can decline rapidly
Source: World Bank (2017c).
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At the global level, achieving replacement-level 
fertility would close 5 percent of the crop calorie 
gap, but it would reduce sub-Saharan Africa’s crop 
calorie gap by nearly one-third.310 Even the UN 
low-fertility scenario would reduce this regional 
food gap by one-seventh, and we consider either 
reduction level significant for reducing the risk of 
food insecurity (Table 8-1). 
The environmental benefits would also be signifi-
cant. The UN low-fertility and our replacement fer-
tility scenarios would cut global land-use change by 
roughly 100 and 200 million hectares, respectively, 
and would close the global GHG mitigation gap by 
9 and 17 percent, respectively. Assuming that FAO’s 
yield and diet projections for the region are correct, 
achieving replacement-level fertility would avoid 
more than 60 percent of the projected net land-use 
change in the region. 
Although beyond the time horizon of this report, 
the effects going forward to 2100 would be even 
more significant because the regional population 
is now expected to be more than four times 2010 
levels. But the population could be held to a dra-
matically lower level if the region reaches replace-
ment-level fertility by 2050. 
Recommended Strategies
Most African countries have adopted a goal of 
reducing population growth.311 Fertility rates have 
been declining in most sub-Saharan African coun-
tries, albeit at varying rates.312 Countries in the 
region that have been improving women’s educa-
tion, access to reproductive health care, and infant 
mortality rates have experienced rapid declines 
in fertility rates (Box 8-2). The challenge is that 
the current rate of improvement in the region has 
proved slower than previously estimated and is not 
fast enough to avoid a doubling of the continent’s 
population by 2050. As a result, between 2010 and 
2015 the United Nations raised its projected 2050 
world population from 9.3 billion to 9.8 billion.313 
The priority must be to accelerate the three forms of 
social progress: increased educational opportunities 
for girls; improved access to reproductive health 
services, including family planning; and reduced 
rates of infant and child mortality. Because each 
of these three is deserving of its own book, we will 
not elaborate further except to note that they are 
mostly within the authority of national govern-
ments. Governments control most of the funds and 
set policies for the public education and health care 
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Table 8-1  |   Effects of 2050 fertility rate reduction scenarios on the food gap, agricultural land use, and greenhouse gas 
emissions
SCENARIO
FOOD 
GAP, 
2010–50 
(%)
CHANGE IN AGRICULTURAL 
AREA, 2010–50 (MHA)
ANNUAL GHG EMISSIONS, 2050  
(GT CO2E) 
GHG MITI-
GATION 
GAP  
(GT CO2E)Pastureland Cropland Total
Agricultural 
production
Land-use 
change Total
GLOBAL EFFECTS
2050 BASELINE 56 401 192 593 9.0 6.0 15.1 11.1
UN low-fertility scenario 
(216M fewer people) 
(Coordinated Effort)
54 335 (-66)
148
(-44)
483
(-111)  8.9 5.2 14.0
10.0 
(-1.0)
Replacement-level 
fertility scenario (446M 
fewer people) (Highly 
Ambitious, Breakthrough 
Technologies)
51 277(-125)
113
(-78)
390 
(-203)  8.7 4.4 13.2
9.2 
(-1.9)
EFFECTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
2050 BASELINE 192 158 104 262  1.1 2.1 3.1 N/A
UN low-fertility scenario 
(216M fewer people) 
(Coordinated Effort)
164 110 (-48)
72
(-32)
182
(-80)  1.0 1.4 2.4 N/A
Replacement-level 
fertility scenario (446M 
fewer people) (Highly 
Ambitious, Breakthrough 
Technologies)
135 59(-99)
38
(-66)
97 
(-164)  0.9 0.8 1.6 N/A
Notes: “Cropland” includes cropland plus aquaculture ponds. Numbers not summed correctly are due to rounding. Numbers shown in parentheses are changes relative to 2050 
baseline. Although it is straightforward to define a “food gap” for sub-Saharan Africa (i.e., change in regional crop calorie production between 2010 and 2050 baseline), it is not 
straightforward to define a GHG mitigation gap for the region because the 4 Gt CO2e target is global.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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BOX 8-2 |  Progress in Botswana and Rwanda
Botswana’s experience suggests that well-structured investments 
aimed at the three strategies can reduce fertility rates. In particular, 
a countrywide system of free health facilities that integrates 
maternal and child health care, family planning, and HIV/AIDS 
services has played an important role.a Mortality rates for children 
under five declined from 83 per 1,000 in 2000 to 44 per 1,000 in 
2015.b Contraceptive use increased from 28 percent in 1984 to 53 
percent in 2008.c For many years Botswana provided free education 
to all, and it still exempts the poorest from school fees, resulting in 
an 85 percent literacy rate and a rate of 88 percent of girls enrolled 
in lower secondary education. The result: Botswana’s fertility rate 
declined from 6.1 in 1981 to 2.9 by 2015.d 
Rwanda is at an earlier stage of making similar progress. All children 
are entitled to nine years of free education in state-run schools, 
with six years of primary education and three years of secondary 
education. In 2010, President Paul Kagame announced plans to 
extend free education for an additional three years of secondary 
education, and between 2011 and 2015 the number of students 
in upper secondary education increased by 12 percent.e Girls’ 
education in Rwanda is more widespread than ever before, with a 
net primary enrollment rate of 97 percent in 2015, up from 91 percent 
in 2008.f An extensive system of free health care for the poorest has 
helped lower Rwanda’s mortality rate for children under five from 
184 per 1,000 in 2000 to 42 per 1,000 in 2015.g Support and education 
for family planning has increased the rate of contraceptive use from 
17 percent to 52 percent, and cut unmet needs for family planning in 
half to 19 percent.h As a result, Rwanda’s total fertility rate is in steep 
decline, from 8.0 as recently as 1985–90 to 4.8 in 2012.i
Sources and notes:
a.  World Bank (2010b).
b.  World Bank (2016c). 
c. World Bank (2016b). 
d. World Bank (2010b); UNDESA (2017).
e. Rwandan Ministry of Education (2016).
f. Rwandan Ministry of Education (2016). 
g. World Bank (2016c). 
h. Muhoza et al. (2013). 
i. Total fertility rate for 1985–90 from UNDESA. Figure for 2012 from the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency at http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=rw&v=31.
systems in most countries. Governments, therefore, 
need to devote more resources to improving educa-
tional opportunities for girls, family planning, and 
reducing infant and child mortality. Governments 
also need to strengthen the technical skills, human 
capacity, and institutional coordination of agencies 
responsible for delivering education and health 
reforms. 
One further opportunity might also come with 
increased farm mechanization. Rural women in 
sub-Saharan Africa do much of the farming  
and also face heavy demands on their time for  
gathering wood and water, cooking, and caring  
for children.314 The demand for labor can be an 
incentive for farming families to have many chil-
dren. Improving yields per hectare and yields per 
unit of work should reduce the perceived need for 
many children.
Civil society organizations have an important role 
to play, too. They can raise awareness, deliver ser-
vices, and monitor performance. In some countries, 
such as Thailand, civil society organizations have 
successfully generated resources to ensure effective 
design and delivery of maternal and reproductive 
health services.315 Bilateral and multilateral  
development agencies can also contribute by  
supporting programs that advance gender equity  
in education, strengthen family planning programs, 
and improve health services for mothers and their 
young children. 
 
For more detail about this menu item, see  
“Achieving Replacement-Level Fertility,” a working 
paper supporting this World Resources Report 
available at www.SustainableFoodFuture.org. 
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CHAPTER 9 
POVERTY IMPLICATIONS 
OF RESTRICTING 
GROWTH IN FOOD 
DEMAND 
This report makes the case for holding down growth in excess 
demand for certain agricultural products as a means both to 
meet food needs sustainably while reducing pressure on the 
environment, and to keep prices low enough that food can be more 
accessible to the poor. 
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Governments have often pursued policies to boost 
agricultural development by stimulating demand—
in the past decade or so with a global push for 
biofuels. Hunger and development advocates have 
also sometimes pointed to the deleterious effects of 
low global food prices on small farmers, particularly 
when focusing on the consequences of agricultural 
subsidies in wealthier countries.316 Are policies to 
reduce food loss and waste and to reduce demand 
for bioenergy and meat therefore antipoor?  
Like producers of any product, all farmers find 
farming more profitable, and investments more 
justifiable, when prices are higher. Moreover, some 
biofuel supporters in particular have argued that 
increasing demand for biofuel crops should create 
new market opportunities for poor farmers.317 But 
when crop prices rose dramatically in 2007 and 
mostly stayed high through 2012 (at least in part 
because of the diversion of crops to biofuels),318 
organizations combating hunger complained.319 
Some commentators then wondered whether they 
were complaining about what they had wished 
for.320 This conundrum raises several questions. 
Which is the problem: higher prices or lower 
prices? Should agricultural policies seek to boost 
prices or lower them? Or should policy seek to get 
prices to a “golden mean”? 
By themselves, these are poor questions because 
they do not distinguish between the different 
kinds of forces that drive prices. For example, if 
crop prices rise because the prices of fertilizer 
or other inputs rise due to higher energy costs, 
then these increases in prices will be bad for 
farmers and consumers alike. If crop prices fall 
because of a reduction in demand due to a global 
recession, then poor people buy less food and the 
overall consequences are similarly bad for both 
small farmers and consumers. In contrast, if the 
productivity of small farmers increases (if they 
produce more food for each day of their labor), then 
their incomes will rise and food prices will tend to 
fall—to the benefit of farmers and consumers. These 
examples illustrate that both rising prices and 
decreasing prices are associated with good or bad 
outcomes depending on their cause.  
The concern over the adverse impacts of low prices 
is mostly associated with the global consequences of 
subsidies in developed countries.321 Those subsi-
dies can to some extent benefit the poor around 
the world by lowering food prices, but they also 
harm farmers in the developing world who are not 
comparably subsidized.322 If one group of farmers is 
subsidized and another is not, then the subsidized 
farmers will be able to sell at a lower price than the 
unsubsidized farmers, who will have to respond 
through some combination of producing less, 
paying lower wages, or making less profit. The case 
against these subsidies is not that low prices are  
bad per se but that, at whatever price level, discrim-
inatory subsidies in the developed world unfairly 
suppress agricultural development in developing 
countries, denying economic opportunities and 
making poorer countries vulnerable to food  
shocks. (The issue of agricultural subsidies is  
discussed at greater length in the final section of 
this report, “Cross-Cutting Policies for a Sustain-
able Food Future.”)
By contrast, the literature shows that when food 
prices fall as a result of gains in agricultural produc-
tivity, the lower food prices contribute to economic 
development.323 There is little dispute that lowering 
food prices by increasing agricultural productivity  
is desirable.  
The remaining question, then, is whether raising 
food prices by increasing demand is desirable. On 
the environmental side, the effects are clear. Rising 
food prices can encourage improvements in the 
efficiency of land and water use, but those same 
higher prices will also send signals to farmers to 
expand agricultural production on new land―or to 
use more water or chemicals—to reap more profits 
from increased production. Rising prices due to 
increasing demand therefore do not distinguish the 
sustainable from the unsustainable ways of increas-
ing production. In contrast, falling food demand 
and production overall mean less demand for water, 
land, and chemicals. 
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What about the effects of rising food prices on 
the poor? There is general agreement that, in the 
short-term, higher food prices caused by increasing 
demand harm the poor and increase malnutrition, 
despite much variation in regional impacts and 
many complexities. Food consumes a large portion 
of the disposable incomes of the world’s poor. The 
approximately 1 billion people who lived on $1.25 
per day or less in 2011 typically devoted more than 
50 percent of their income to food. The percent-
age is still high for the additional 1.2 billion people 
living on $2 per day or less.324 Studies have consis-
tently found that, even in rural areas, the majority 
of poor people are net food purchasers, either 
because they hold too little land or because they are 
landless.325 If staple food prices rise, then the poor 
either eat less, cut back on more nutritious foods to 
maintain caloric intake, or cut back on purchasing 
other goods, such as health care or education.326  
A few studies claim that, in the medium or longer 
term, higher food prices globally help the poor 
because they stimulate more agricultural activity 
and demand for labor, either directly on farms 
or through broader stimulation of rural econo-
mies.327 However, the economics of these studies 
are challenging because they must employ a range 
of assumptions or engage in a range of uncertain 
estimates of the effects of agricultural demand on 
wages and on how wage gains in one sector trans-
late into gains in others. These studies also appear 
to conflict with some fundamental economic rea-
sons to believe that higher food prices spurred by 
demand competition for food are generally harmful 
to the world’s poor and hungry:
 ▪ First, the hungriest regions in the world—
namely, portions of sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia—import large quantities of food 
staples on a net basis.328 Although results will 
vary by country, poor countries as a whole 
will therefore have to transfer more money to 
richer countries when global staple crop prices 
increase. This fact means they will be poorer. 
Any economic gains accruing to farmers in net 
food-importing poor countries can therefore 
only result from a transfer of wealth from other 
people in those countries. Some of those other 
people will be wealthy, but many will be poor or 
living just above the poverty line.  
 ▪ Second, although Latin America is a large net 
food exporter, and will benefit at the gross 
economic level from higher prices, large farms 
dominate its production, particularly of staple 
crops. The benefits to the poor of higher farm 
prices will therefore be diffuse, while the harm 
will be direct.  
 ▪ Third, the basic economic finding that demand 
for food falls when prices rise suggests that 
higher food prices harm the poor. When prices 
rise, demand decreases.329 Although the ef-
fects of global price increases vary greatly from 
country to country and among groups of poor 
people, the evidence is strong that poorer con-
sumers reduce their consumption more than 
richer consumers.330 The reasons are obvious. 
Poorer consumers are less able to afford higher 
prices, so richer consumers outcompete them 
when supplies are limited. Moreover, poor con-
sumers eat foods with less processing, and thus 
the food prices they pay more directly reflect 
the wholesale prices of crops.
More research may help to resolve these ambigui-
ties, but even strategies designed to boost prices by 
boosting demand can only be sustained by continu-
ally boosting that demand even further. Demand 
increases spur price increases mainly by creating 
temporary shortages that allow producers to charge 
higher prices as long as the shortages persist. As 
farmers boost production, prices mostly come back 
down.331 Unless policymakers are willing to continu-
ally drive higher and higher demand—with more 
and more environmental effects—policies to boost 
prices by spurring demand are not sustainable. The 
better way to address the challenges of poor farm-
ers while striving for a sustainable food future is to 
target their specific needs while holding down the 
growth in food demand.
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solar radiation map, which yields 72,000 GJ/ha/yr. (Map available at 
http://solargis.info/doc/_pics/freemaps/1000px/ghi/SolarGIS-Solar-
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This calculation also assumes optimistically that the net energy yield 
of maize ethanol is 50% after accounting for all the energy used in its 
production.  
 
For cellulosic ethanol, using the highest projected future switchgrass 
yield by the Department of Energy at any point in the United States 
of 24 tCM/ha/yr, Geyer (2013), and the assumption of 100 gallons of 
ethanol per ton of dry matter implies a conversion efficiency of solar 
radiation into fast-growing grasses of perhaps 0.7%, and into ethanol 
of 0.35%. (Switching to less productive land would reduce this ef-
ficiency because the solar energy would remain generally the same 
or grow but the biomass output would decrease.)
270. Calculations for rooftop solar and solar farms differ. This figure for 
rooftop solar assumes a 16% photovoltaic cell, a 20% loss in actual 
operation of a rooftop solar installation, including losses from con-
version of DC power to AC power and a further 11% cost for paying 
back the energy used to construct and install the system. Photovol-
taic efficiencies and payback times are from Fthenakis (2012), and 
the 20% efficiency loss is based on typical conversion cost figures 
using the PVWatts calculator website by the National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy (http://pvwatts.
nrel.gov/pvwatts.php).
271. See the explanation in the following note. 
272. This calculation was originally performed for Installment 4 in this 
series, “Avoiding Bioenergy Competition for Food Crops and Land” 
(Searchinger and Heimlich 2015) and was subsequently published in 
peer-reviewed literature in Searchinger et al. (2017). The supplement 
to that paper explains this calculation as follows: 
 
The global solar energy vs bioenergy comparative calculation was 
based on a GIS (geographic information systems) analysis, which 
compared the net energy output of potential bioenergy production 
against the output of photovoltaics. The area analyzed excluded area 
covered permanently by ice and the driest deserts because such 
areas could not produce bioenergy although they could produce 
solar energy.  
 
Biomass production was estimated by cell using a modified version 
of the LPJmL model (Beringer et al. 2011; Searchinger, Estes, Thornton, 
et al. 2015) that simulates energy crop productivities comparable to 
net primary productivity (NPP). This model adjusts LPJmL biomass 
production to match the NPP of the native vegetation of a cell. In 
general, agricultural biomass production rarely exceeds that of 
native vegetation (Field et al. 2008; Haberl et al. 2013). We further 
assumed production of 379 liters per metric ton of biomass as 
discussed above, and that all energy used to produce and transport 
biomass and refine it into ethanol would be either provided by the 
biomass itself or offset by electricity by-products. Using ethanol, 
these assumptions imply that 47 percent of the gross energy in the 
biomass becomes useable energy. 
 
For PV production, this analysis used a global data set of Global 
Horizontal Irradiance (GHI) available from the U.S. National Renew-
able Energy Laboratory. The GHI is the total solar radiation received 
by a horizontal PV cell and is a weighted sum of the Direct Normal 
Irradiance (DNI) and the diffuse light (all sunlight that comes to the 
panel from other areas of the sky except the narrow beam from the 
sun. (https://eosweb.larc.nasa.gov/sse/global/text/22yr_swv_dwn). 
 
We used a net efficiency of 10% for solar radiation. This efficiency is 
based on the 17% PV efficiency of standard PV cells today, and an 
85% performance ratio (halfway between standard 80% and 90% 
ratios today) (ISE 2016), plus our estimate from above that 11% of the 
energy generated by the PV is used to pay back the energy used to 
produce and install the PV. We then further assume a coverage fac-
tor of 78%. As noted above, coverage factors can vary greatly for PV 
in practice, in part because PV is typically installed on infertile land, 
for which land area needs are not a concern. As the primary purpose 
of this analysis is to compare PV on land that might grow bioenergy 
reasonably well, we assume that some effort would be made not to 
use land unnecessarily. Where tilting is still desired, for example, 
solar arrays, can be spaced to allow grazing to occur between ar-
rays, and as they become cheaper, tilting becomes less important. 
With space constraints varying from 50% to nearly full coverage, 
we deliberately chose 78% in part to generate an even 10% to avoid 
creating a false sense of precision in this analysis. 
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Although we are counting energy used for PV to obtain net ef-
ficiencies, we are not incorporating production energy use into the 
efficiencies for bioenergy. 
 
This analysis calculated that on 73% of the world’s land, the useable 
energy output of PV would exceed that of bioenergy by a ratio of 
more than 100 to 1. For the remaining quarter of the world’s land, 
the average ratio is still 85 to 1, and the lowest ratio is 40 to 1. This 
relatively “better” land for bioenergy consists primarily of areas 
whose native vegetation would have been dense forest, and which 
today includes the world’s densest remaining tropical forests and 
the North American and European areas of the world’s best farmland. 
This land is therefore the land most valuable for carbon storage, food, 
and timber. If energy production chose from the top 25% of land with 
the highest efficiency advantage for PV, the minimum ratio of PV to 
bioenergy production would be 5,000 to 1. 
 
This analysis should be viewed only as illustrative. At finer resolution, 
much land, such as some steeply sloped land, would be suitable 
neither for biomass production nor for PV.
273. See Table 3 in Searchinger et al. (2017). 
274. Searchinger et al. (2017).
275. Calculations are shown in Searchinger et al. (2017).
276. These numbers actually understate the real differences in efficiency 
for three reasons. First, the cellulosic ethanol figures compare solar 
PV conversion efficiencies in commercial operation today with 
ethanol production that assumes large future improvements both in 
growing grasses or trees and in refining them into ethanol. Although 
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COURSE 2  
Increase Food Production 
without Expanding 
Agricultural Land 
In addition to the demand-reduction measures addressed in Course 1,  
the world must boost the output of food on existing agricultural land.  
To approach the goal of net-zero expansion of agricultural land, 
improvements in crop and livestock productivity must exceed historical 
rates of yield gains. Chapter 10 assesses the land-use challenge, based  
on recent trend lines. Chapters 11–16 discuss possible ways to increase  
food production per hectare while adapting to climate change. 
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CHAPTER 10
ASSESSING THE 
CHALLENGE OF LIMITING 
AGRICULTURAL LAND 
EXPANSION
How hard will it be to stop net expansion of agricultural land? 
This chapter evaluates projections by other researchers of 
changes in land use and explains why we consider the most 
optimistic projections to be too optimistic. We discuss estimates 
of “yield gaps,” which attempt to measure the potential of farmers 
to increase yields given current crop varieties. Finally, we examine 
conflicting data about recent land-cover change and agricultural 
expansion to determine what they imply for the future.  
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The Challenge
The baseline scenario we use to define our “gaps” 
assumes the continuation of crop and pasture yield 
gains similar to those achieved in the 50 years 
since the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) first began estimating global 
yields in 1961. But even achieving such baseline 
yield gains will be difficult because many of the 
major transformative factors that drove yield gains 
for these decades—a period that encompassed the 
Green Revolution—have already been heavily used. 
For cropland, these transformations have come in 
three areas: 
 ▪ Fertilizers. Farmers worldwide used very 
little synthetic fertilizer in 1960. Today, most 
of the world heavily exploits synthetic fertil-
izers, and some countries apply far more than 
needed. Only sub-Saharan Africa as a region 
uses little fertilizer, and it could make large 
gains by applying more.1
 ▪ Irrigation. From 1962 to 2006, irrigation 
area roughly doubled.2 However, because few 
additional areas remain that can plausibly be ir-
rigated with available water, FAO projects that 
irrigated land will expand by only an additional 
7 percent between 2006 and 2050.3 
 ▪ Seeds. In 1962, most of the world used seeds 
improved only by farmers. But in the subse-
quent five decades, much of the world adopted 
scientifically bred seeds, although use of im-
proved seeds remains low in Africa.4
Although technology is still improving, the agricul-
tural community will have a hard time matching 
the effect of introducing—for the first time—such 
fundamental technologies as fertilizers, irrigation, 
and scientifically bred seeds. 
A major factor in the improvement of pasture and 
the efficiency of livestock production has been the 
replacement of animal power with fossil fuel power. 
In much of the world, even in 1960, animal power 
played a major role in agriculture and transporta-
tion. Switching to fossil fuels reduced the need for 
vast areas of pasture that would have been devoted 
to grazing and growing feed for animals. Fossil fuels 
also reduced the energy and therefore feed burden 
on multipurpose animals, allowing them to use the 
energy in their feed exclusively for building weight 
or producing milk rather than for producing power. 
Although the effects of these transformations have 
been quantitatively estimated carefully in only a 
few countries,5 these transformations have occurred 
worldwide to a greater or lesser extent.
The shifting of agricultural production toward 
developing countries presents another yield chal-
lenge. Because food demand is growing mostly 
in these countries, and most of the demand will 
be met through domestic production rather than 
through imports, the share of global cropland 
located in developing countries is projected to grow. 
Average yields in those countries currently are 
lower than they are in the developed world. This 
shift in cropland toward developing countries thus 
will drag down global average yields until develop-
ing world yields catch up. For example, even if 
annual maize yields were to roughly triple in East 
Africa between 2010 and 2050, every additional 
hectare produced in Africa would still generate only 
slightly more than half the yield that a U.S. hectare 
produced in 2010.6 
Even matching historical rates of yield growth 
overall will not be enough. Absent efforts to reduce 
growth in food demand, the amount of absolute 
growth in annual food production that will be 
needed each year from 2010 to 2050 is larger than 
the increase in food production that was achieved 
each year in the previous 50 years. And between 
1962 and 2006, even though yield growth supplied 
80 percent of all the growth in crop production 
(measured by weight), cropland area still expanded 
by 220–250 million hectares (Mha), equivalent to 
roughly 30 percent of the continental United States 
and more than total U.S. cropland.7 Demand for 
milk and ruminant meat is also likely to grow at a 
substantially faster rate in the next four decades 
than it did in the previous five decades.8 Therefore, 
going forward, both crop output per hectare and 
milk and meat output from ruminants per hectare 
must grow each year more than they did historically 
if we are to avoid net land-use expansion.
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Understanding Other Estimates of 
Agricultural Land Expansion
As with our own GlobAgri-WRR projections, most 
other agricultural modeling teams project large 
growth in agricultural area in their baseline 2050 
scenarios (Table 10-1). Schmitz et al. (2014) com-
pared 10 separate agro-economic models of crop-
land expansion, using similar population assump-
tions to ours. Six of the 10 model results projected 
an amount of cropland expansion at least as large 
as that in our baseline while only one projected 
a decrease.9 Similarly, five of the eight economic 
models that made pasture area projections esti-
mated increases in pasture area, with the largest 
estimate of approximately 400 Mha coming from 
the Global Biosphere Management Model (GLO-
BIOM) runs used at the time.10 
Noneconomic models and projections using recent 
trend lines tend to predict even larger expansion 
of agricultural land. For example, Bajzelj et al. 
(2014) estimate a total of 1.1 billion ha of cropland 
and pastureland expansion between 2009 and 
2050,11 Tilman and Clark (2014) project a 600 Mha 
increase in cropland alone, and an earlier projec-
tion of cropland expansion by Tilman et al. (2011) 
was even larger, at roughly 1 billion ha (in part due 
to substantially higher meat demand projections at 
the time).12  
Some analyses are much more optimistic. Of the 
agro-economic models compared in Schmitz et al. 
(2014), one projected a decline in cropland area, 
and three models projected declines in pasture-
land.13 A 2011 modeling analysis by the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) using the Integrated Model to Assess the 
Global Environment (IMAGE) predicted a very 
small decline in cropland area by 2050, despite 
increases until 2030.14 The FAO projection in 2012 
foresaw only modest net cropland expansion of  
69 Mha. 
Table 10-1  |  Selected projections of future agricultural land requirements
FEATURE OECD / 
IMAGE  
FAO GLOBIOM BAJZELJ ET 
AL.
TILMAN ET 
AL.
GLOBAGRI-
WRR (THIS 
REPORT)
Time period 2010–50 2006–50 2000–50 2009–50 2005–50 2010–50 
Cropland -8 Mha +69  Mha +266 Mha +655 Mha +1,000 Mha +192 Mha
Pastureland -52 Mha N/A +121 Mha +426 Mha N/A +401 Mha
Natural ecosystems N/A N/A -503 Mha gross N/A N/A -593 Mha net
Comment Cropland 
increase of 110 
Mha from 2010 
to 2030, but 
net decline 
of 8 Mha by 
2050
Cropland increase 
of 107 Mha in 
tropics, offset by 
decline of 48 Mha in 
temperate zone
Projection on low 
side because 2050 
UN population 
projections have 
since grown by 0.6 
billion people
Decline in natural 
ecosystems 
offset by 103 Mha 
of plantation 
forest growth
Based on the 
continuing 
growth of crop 
and pasture 
yields at 
historical rates
Extrapolation 
from current 
trend lines in 
yield growth, 
income growth, 
and demand for 
crop calories
See Chapter 2 for 
assumptions
Note: N/A signifies that data are not available or not discussed in the respective study.
Sources: GLOBIOM analysis prepared by Schneider et al. (2011); FAO projection from Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012); OECD projection prepared by the 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and reported in OECD (2011); Bajzelj et al. (2014); and Tilman et al. (2011).
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Although no one can know for certain what future 
growth will be, we consider key parts of the analyses 
underlying the more optimistic baseline projections 
to be too optimistic because of their reliance on out-
of-date population estimates or overly optimistic 
yield growth estimates.
Estimates of Yield Growth May Be 
Overly Optimistic 
Population estimates. Some of the more opti-
mistic projections are now out of date because 
population projections have been revised upward 
since the original analysis was completed. For 
example, the 2012 FAO projection used UN popula-
tion projections of 9.1 billion for 2050, while the 
most recent midlevel UN projections estimate 9.8 
billion people by 2050.15 As a result, the amount 
of projected population growth between 2010 and 
2050 is now nearly one-third higher than previ-
ously estimated. Because we use FAO projected 
yields in 2050 and account for the larger food 
demands of a higher population, our cropland 
expansion estimates are higher.  
Yield growth estimates. Some models assume 
faster yield growth than others. On balance, the 
FAO estimates that we use project yield gains from 
2006 to 2050 at roughly the same rates as those 
achieved from 1962 to 2006 in terms of absolute 
annual increases in production (additional kilo-
grams per hectare per year [kg/ha/yr] relative to 
the immediately preceding year).16 By contrast, the 
OECD/IMAGE projection, citing essentially stable 
cropland (Table 10-1), projects yield growth by 
2050 that is 25 percent higher than forecast in the 
2012 FAO projections. Although no one can legiti-
mately predict the future with high confidence, we 
are skeptical of very high growth rates in crop yields 
or meat and dairy output per hectare of grazing 
land, for a number of reasons that we discuss in the 
subsections below.
Use of compound (instead of linear) crop  
growth rates 
Some projections have mistakenly assumed that 
yields have percentage growth rates that compound 
each year, instead of growing in a linear fashion.17 
Compound, or exponential, growth rates are like 
bank interest: to generate the same percentage 
growth in yield over time, the absolute increase in 
yield must get larger each year.18 However, crop 
yields have usually grown linearly. The global yield 
of cereals, for example, has grown for more than 
50 years at a surprisingly consistent rate on an 
absolute basis, with each hectare globally produc-
ing roughly 45 kg more each year than it did the 
previous year (Figure 10-1). Careful analyses have 
shown that even regional growth rates in crop 
yields—although they have varied by region, crop, 
and period—are best represented by linear growth.19 
The assumption of compound growth rates by some 
studies has therefore led to assessments of future 
yields that are far too optimistic (Box 10-1).
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Figure 10-1  |  Global cereal yields have grown at a linear rate over the past five decades
Source: WRI analysis based on FAO (2019a).
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BOX 10-1 |  The significance of linear yield growth for predicting future land-use needs 
A poorly grounded assumption that explains 
several overly optimistic projections of future 
crop yields and land-use needs is that yields 
grow by a stable percentage each year. In 
other words, if yields grow by 1.5 percent this 
year, they will continue to grow at 1.5 percent 
year after year and, like a bank account, the 
growth will compound. This assumption of 
compound growth leads to large absolute 
yield growth over time, as illustrated by a 
figure borrowed from Grassini et al. (2013), 
which shows how compound growth 
rates used by six separate studies led to 
projections of high future yields (Figure 10-2).
In fact, as Grassini et al. (2013) also showed, 
although yields grow at different rates in 
different places at different times, when 
yields grow, they almost always grow in 
linear fashion. In other words, as illustrated 
in Figure 10-2, U.S. maize yields increase by a 
consistent number of kilograms per hectare 
each year. Papers that use compound growth 
rates are overly optimistic, such as one paper 
claiming that the world had reached “peak 
farmland,” meaning that the world would 
no longer need to expand cropland to meet 
rising food needs.a
By contrast, other papers improperly project 
an alarming future by pointing out that 
percentage growth rates for cereals have 
been declining: they were 3 percent per year 
in the 1960s and are now around “only” 1 
percent. From this decline, the studies infer a 
decline in technical improvements and grave 
problems in the future.b But linear growth 
means that the percentage growth rate 
declines. When average world cereal yields 
were only 1.5 tons per hectare per year (t/ha/
yr) in 1962, producing an additional 45 kg/ha 
each year meant 3 percent growth. By 2017, 
once world yields reached 4.1 t/ha/yr, that 
same 45 kg/ha means growth closer to only 
1 percent.c 
Studies can also mislead when they express 
future growth in demand as a compound 
growth rate. Future demand growth out 
to 2050, measured linearly, is going to be 
larger than previous growth. Yet because 
of the same fundamental math, the same 
absolute increase in demand for food each 
year will result in declining compound 
(percentage) growth rates in demand. As 
a result, using a compound growth rate for 
demand can make it seem as though the rate 
of growth in demand is declining. A seminal 
report by the FAO, which recognized that 
yield growth rates are linear, nevertheless 
characterized growth in demand as declining 
using compound rates.d Using linear rates 
correctly to characterize growth in yields 
but compound growth rates incorrectly 
to characterize declining growth rates in 
demand can lead to a mistaken impression 
that land use will not expand. 
Notes and sources:
a.  Ausubel et al. (2012). In this paper, the compound 
growth rate is complicated by the fact that the authors 
analyzed different contributions to yield growth, but 
the overall effect was to use a compound rate.
b.  For example, Alston et al. (2010) include a chart 
showing large declines in annual crop yield growth 
rates from the period 1961–90 versus 1990–2007. See 
also Foresight (2011a).
c.  Authors’ calculations from FAO (2019a). This 
comparison is between the average yield from 
1961–63 and the average yield from 2012–14.
d. Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012). 
Note: Each line with a number in this figure refers to a separate study as follows: (1) Nelson et al. (2010); (2) Reilly and Fuglie (1998); (3) Heisey (2009); (4) Edgerton (2009); (5) 
Hertel et al. (2010).
Source: Grassini et al. (2013).
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Figure 10-2  |   The example of U.S. corn (maize) shows how compound yield growth rates lead to overly optimistic future projections
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Inconsistency with trend lines
Our “alternative 2050 baseline” scenario, which uses 
more recent (and slower) crop yield growth trends 
from 1989 to 2008,20 projects even larger cropland 
expansion than our 2050 baseline (Figure 2-4). 
Thus, estimates that use FAO’s projected (faster) 
yield growth based on 1962 to 2006 rates of gain 
may be too optimistic. One study that used detailed 
agricultural census data for subnational units found 
some worrisome conditions over the 1989–2008 
period, including stagnating wheat yields in 
Bangladesh and in some parts of India and Europe.21 
This study also showed that yield growth had, at 
best, plateaued over more than one-quarter of all 
lands producing wheat, maize, soybeans, or rice.  
Overly optimistic estimates of economic 
responses to demand 
The Future Agricultural Resources Model (FARM) 
model, which is the only model in the 10-model 
comparison by Schmitz et al. (2014) that predicts 
a decline in cropland area, builds in an assump-
tion that, as demand increases, yields also increase 
substantially and these gains are enough to lead  
to cropland area decline.22 Other models also incor-
porate such an assumption to varying degrees,  
including GLOBIOM, the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP), and Modelling International 
Relationships in Applied General Equilibrium 
(MIRAGE) models.23 This important assumption 
warrants discussion.
There are many reasons why yields are likely to 
increase over time. For example, improvements 
in technology will increase yields. In addition, as 
countries develop economically, the relative costs 
of nonland inputs decline due to such factors as 
improved transportation, manufacturing, and 
distribution, and even improved education and 
training. As a result, agricultural yields are likely to 
grow, just as productivity grows in other sectors. In 
addition, as wages increase with development, use 
of machinery becomes more economical relative to 
labor. Mechanization increases the benefit of using 
flatter, often more productive, lands, which favor 
use of larger machines.  
Yet none of these drivers of yield growth mean that 
demand growth itself will push up yields even more. 
Yields today represent a mix of different inputs, 
including fertilizers, water, seeds, machinery, labor, 
and land. Yield increases generally require a shift 
by farmers toward proportionately greater reliance 
on inputs other than land, or they require gains in 
the efficiency of use of all assets (which economists 
call gains in total factor productivity). Implicit in 
the claim that increases in demand and prices will 
cause producers to increase their yields is a claim 
that higher crop prices will cause producers, when 
they expand production, to use less additional land 
and more additional inputs of other kinds (such as 
fertilizers, pesticides, labor, and machinery). That 
would cause food production to expand via higher 
yields rather than via use of more land with existing 
or even lower yields. However, there is no inherent 
theoretical reason why this should occur.
In areas where land is limited, farmers may boost 
yields because increasing production by means of 
nonland inputs is, on average, cheaper than access-
ing new land. This scenario would seem more likely 
to occur in relatively land-constrained areas, such 
as Asia and North America. But in other regions 
where extending agricultural land is cheaper,  
such as parts of Africa and Latin America, land 
expansion will play a larger role. Because yields 
are also lower in these regions, any expansion of 
production there due to increased demand will 
lower global average yields. The effect on global 
yield depends on the global average response to 
increased demand. 
Although demand growth may push up yields, there 
is little rigorous economic evidence to show that it 
actually does—as we discuss in Chapter 7  
on bioenergy.  
Overly narrow focus on grains 
Although modeling studies tend to address all 
crops, some papers focus only on grains, which 
creates a more optimistic picture because demand 
for grains is likely to grow more slowly in the future 
than in the past. For example, as shown in Figure 
10-3, wheat and rice yields would not need to grow 
at their historical rates to meet future demand 
without land expansion, but fruits and vegetables, 
soybeans, pulses, and roots and tubers would need 
to grow significantly faster. Overall, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, yields would have to grow roughly 
10 percent faster from 2010 to 2050 to meet our 
projected demands without net expansion of agri-
cultural land.24 
WRI.org        154
Overly optimistic estimates of government and 
private action
Some analysts adopt a baseline that represents their 
best estimate of what will happen in the future, 
including changes they anticipate in government 
policies, technology, and corporate or farmer 
behavior. For example, the Model of Agricultural 
Production and its Impact on the Environment 
(MAgPIE) model assumes that governments faced 
with the prospect of higher demand and crop prices 
will increase their investments in agricultural pro-
ductivity. This in turn is assumed to lead to larger 
future yield gains than those that have occurred in 
the past or that would occur in the future without 
this additional investment.25 Such an optimistic 
approach raises important questions about how 
most usefully to set a baseline. 
It is true that growth in yields between now and 
2050 will in part reflect government and private 
policies that respond to the challenge of a sus-
tainable food future. But if a baseline projection 
predicts bold, helpful responses, observers might 
perversely interpret such an optimistic baseline 
scenario as a signal that there is no problem that 
needs fixing. The bold responses would then never 
materialize. We think the most useful “business-
as-usual” 2050 scenario should more or less reflect 
historical trends in food production and consump-
tion patterns so that policymakers can compare the 
future challenge with what has occurred in the past. 
Figure 10-3  |   Future yield growth in many crops will need to be higher than in the past to meet projected food demand 
on existing agricultural land
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model, WRI and ACE analysis based on Alexandros and Bruinsma (2012).
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Overly optimistic estimates of pasture  
efficiency gains 
Projecting the future need for pastureland is inher-
ently challenging. Too few solid data exist on which 
to make projections of increasing yields of ruminant 
meat and milk per hectare of grazing land. This 
“pasture yield” depends on the growth in the share 
of ruminant feed that is derived from crops and 
other nonpasture sources, on increasing efficiency 
in turning each kilogram of feed into a kilogram 
of meat or milk, and on increasing production or 
offtake of grass from each hectare of grazing land. 
Unfortunately, the data for each of these three 
factors are poor for recent years, and worse to 
nonexistent for previous decades. Small changes 
in any of these projections can result in very large 
changes in pasture area requirements because the 
world already has so much pasture area—more than 
one-quarter of the world’s vegetated land (roughly 
3 billion ha). Our projections use indirect ways to 
estimate each of these numbers, and all of them  
are debatable.  
It is very hard to determine why some models have 
low pasture expansion projections because the 
underlying assumptions are rarely described ade-
quately. Nearly all economic models have extremely 
rough representations of the livestock sector in 
general. The decline in pasture area predicted by 
the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM), 
which projects one of the larger declines, is due to a 
larger assumed increase in agricultural productivity 
than we project and a smaller increase in demand 
for milk and meat than we project. Chapter 11 on 
increasing livestock efficiency describes the chal-
lenges in greater detail.
There are enormous challenges in estimating total 
pastureland area, but we are skeptical of optimistic 
baseline estimates of declining pasture area by 
2050 for several reasons: 
 ▪ As described below, recent years have wit-
nessed large-scale gross clearing of forest and 
woody savannas for pasture.  
 ▪ Just as shifts in crop production to lower-yield 
countries will hold down average global rates 
of crop yield growth, so will those geographic 
shifts in meat and milk production hold down 
average global pasture yields. 
 ▪ Most important, a simpler way of projecting 
trends leads to even more pessimistic results 
than our baseline. A simple projection would 
merely examine previous average global growth 
trends in meat and milk per hectare of pasture-
land over time and project that growth forward 
to 2050. This simple ratio of output per hectare 
of grazing land would reflect all different driv-
ers of efficiency gains (more output per kilo-
gram of feed, more use of crops as feed, more 
grass per hectare, and shifts in locations of pro-
duction). Although we do not truly know how 
much grazing land is used for meat versus for 
milk, dividing all meat and milk production by 
the total pastureland area leads to trend lines 
that project only 30 to 35 percent increases 
in meat and milk per hectare by 2050 relative 
to 2010 (Figure 10-4).26 In contrast, expected 
increases in global demand of 88 percent (for 
ruminant meat) and 67 percent (for dairy)—de-
scribed in more detail in Chapter 6 on shifting 
diets—mean that meat and milk output per 
hectare of pastureland must grow at well above 
historical rates to avoid pastureland expansion. 
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Our own baseline scenario for 2010–50 projects 53 
percent growth in dairy output, 62 percent growth 
in beef output, and 71 percent growth in sheep and 
goat meat output per hectare. These projections are 
based on more complicated methods of estimating 
historical trends that attempt to tease out separate 
trends in output per animal, increases in the use of 
crop-based feeds, and increases in the quantity of 
grass consumed per hectare of pasture. Although 
these growth rates are faster than the historical 
trend measured just as output per hectare, they are 
not enough to prevent pastureland from expanding 
by 401 Mha between 2010 and 2050. 
Using “yield gap” analysis to estimate potential  
to meet food needs without expanding 
agricultural land 
One way of analyzing the potential to increase food 
production while maintaining the same net area 
of agricultural land is to estimate “yield gaps.” 
Yield gaps represent the difference between the 
actual yields that farmers currently obtain and the 
potential yield that they could obtain. Farmers can 
increase yields either by planting crops that have 
been bred for a higher potential yield, or by improv-
ing farm management so that actual yields come 
closer to achieving the crops’ yield potentials (i.e., 
closing the yield gap).  
The definition of yield potential is not straightfor-
ward, and researchers use different methods to 
estimate that potential, which effectively establish 
different meanings of the “gap.” Several approaches 
focus on “technical potential,” but even they use 
different standards for estimating this potential. 
Researchers compare actual yields to potential 
yields that can be estimated in three different ways: 
as the highest global yield, as the yields achieved 
by researchers in the region under careful manage-
ment, or as the yields estimated by crop models 
assuming excellent management without pests 
or pathogens.27 Each method of comparison will 
generate a different yield gap.  
Figure 10-4  |  Historical growth in pasture output per hectare shows a linear pattern
Source: WRI analysis based on FAO (2019a).
1961 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Kg
 of
 m
ilk
 pe
r h
ec
ta
re
 of
 pa
stu
re
 pe
r y
ea
r
Kg
 of
 ru
m
ina
nt
 m
ea
t p
er
 h
ec
ta
re
 of
 pa
stu
re
 pe
r y
ea
r
        157Creating a Sustainable Food Future
One persuasive analysis, however, has estimated 
that farmers are unlikely to achieve more than 
80 percent of potential yields in the real world, in 
part because of economic constraints and in part 
because of the significant role played by chance 
in determining annual yields.28 Applying this “80 
percent rule” to technical potential is one way of 
estimating a “practical” yield potential and, by com-
paring with existing yields, of estimating “practical” 
yield gaps.
Another approach to estimating a “practical poten-
tial” involves comparing average yields of one set 
of farmers with yields achieved in comparable 
agroecological settings by other farmers. These 
other farmers may be nearby or anywhere in the 
world deemed to have comparable agroecological 
conditions. For example, yield gaps may be defined 
as the difference between the average yields farmers 
actually achieve and yield levels that are just higher 
than yields achieved by 90 percent of farmers in the 
same conditions.29
A challenge of this approach is that farms that 
appear comparable will often have important site-
specific differences. In reality, high and low per-
formers often use lands of different qualities even 
within the same region. In addition, some farms 
generate high yields in some years because farmers 
plant at just the right time—planting is followed by 
the right rainfall patterns and temperatures during 
growth, reproduction, and harvesting. Yet planting 
decisions involve a significant element of luck. The 
element of luck means that different farmers tend 
to be high performers in different years,30 and using 
the highest yields will overestimate what even the 
best farmers can achieve on a consistent basis. Both 
of these challenges mean that estimates of yield 
gaps using these methods will tend to be too large.
An even more fundamental factor in overestimates 
of yield gaps is the effect of data errors, even when 
they are random. Yield gap studies use different 
data sets to find differences in yield that can be 
explained only by management, and these data sets 
in effect create two basic maps. One map shows 
yield potential and the other shows actual yields. 
Errors in the maps that lead to a higher yield 
potential than actually exists, or that lead to lower 
actual yields than really occur, will each lead to 
erroneously large “yield gaps” between the actual 
and potential. Moreover, errors in opposite direc-
tions will not offset each other and balance out the 
estimates of aggregate yield gaps because yield gaps 
are based on the high estimates of yield potential 
and, often, the low estimates of actual yields. It 
is the spread between potential and actual yields 
that defines the gaps, and, because data errors lead 
to larger spreads than actually exist, they lead to 
higher gaps than actually exist.31  
Beyond this tendency to overestimate yield gaps, 
different yield gap analyses often generate widely 
varying results, even when they focus on a relatively 
small local area.32 Global analyses face greater chal-
lenges because of data quality, which Neumann, 
Verburg, et al. (2010) forthrightly acknowledge 
“might even outrange the yield gap itself.” Even 
when analyses generate similar aggregate estimates, 
they may hide widely varying results at national and 
regional level. For example, two well-known global 
exercises both found large, somewhat consistent 
global yield gaps—a 58 percent gap for total calories 
in Foley et al. (2011), and roughly 50 percent gaps 
for wheat and rice and a 100 percent gap for maize 
in Neumann, Verburg, et al. (2010). Yet Foley et 
al. (2011) found that the largest yield gaps exist 
among farmers in intensively managed regions, not 
among farmers in less intensively managed regions. 
The farmers in the former regions, such as India, 
northeastern China, and parts of the United States, 
had gaps of more than 4 t/ha/yr, whereas yield 
gaps in most of sub-Saharan Africa were mostly less 
than 1 t/ha/yr.33 These results would be discourag-
ing because high crop prices, government support, 
and infrastructure already provide farmers in the 
high yield-gap regions of India, China, and the 
United States with high incentives to boost yields. 
However, in complete contrast, the global yield gap 
study by Neumann, Verburg, et al. (2010) estimated 
large maize yield gaps in Africa (5–9 t/ha/yr) and 
much smaller gaps in the United States (less than 
2 t/ha/yr in most areas). All of these limitations 
suggest that yield gap analyses should be used with 
great caution. 
Nevertheless, a wide variety of studies, using a wide 
variety of methods, find substantial yield gaps.  
Fischer et al. (2014) used this range of evidence, 
and good scientific judgment, to estimate yield 
gaps crop by crop and region by region. The study 
amounts to a case for both optimism and caution 
when summed to global averages. Among the major 
crops, the review found that the largest potential 
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for closing yield gaps exists for maize, with a global 
weighted yield gap of roughly 100 percent (i.e., 
a potential for doubling), with generally much 
larger gaps in developing countries. The rice yield 
gap was similarly found to be large, at roughly 70 
percent. The review also found high yield gaps of 
100 percent or more in the developing world for 
other important food crops, including sorghum, 
millet, and cassava. By contrast, global estimated 
yield gaps were only roughly 50 percent for wheat, 
and 30 percent for soybeans. In the case of soy-
beans, the lower yield gap is explained mainly by 
the fact that all three countries that dominate global 
soybean production—the United States, Brazil, and 
Argentina—have high yields already. 
These yield gaps are grounds for tempered opti-
mism, but applying the 80 percent rule of practical 
yields achievable by farmers leads to more sober-
ing results. For example, applying the 80 percent 
rule to wheat results in only a 40 percent gap. That 
is roughly enough to meet projected demand for 
wheat consumption, but only if all farmland  
everywhere achieves this practical potential— 
a big challenge.  
Ultimately, we derive three lessons from this 
review. One, although the world has significant 
technical potential to increase yields even on rain-
fed land, the potential is not so great that achieving 
necessary yield gains will be easy. Two, because the 
existing practical potential is not huge, the world 
cannot afford to waste any farmland, or “leave any 
farmland behind.” Three, in addition to just closing 
yield gaps, crop breeding will probably be necessary 
to increase yield potentials. The ability to increase 
potential yields has probably diminished as yields 
grow higher and higher, and researchers mainly 
estimate potential by focusing on recent rates of 
change. Yield potentials continue to grow rapidly 
for some crops, such as maize, while others grow 
more slowly.34 Only new breeding can increase 
potential yields, and we focus on that along with 
other breeding opportunities in Chapter 12.
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Data Limitations Obscure the Extent of 
Agricultural Land Expansion
What can we learn from recent evidence regarding 
agricultural land expansion? The answer, unfortu-
nately, is unclear due to imperfect data. The answer 
also involves three different analytical challenges: 
the analysis of gross forest-cover loss, which can 
be driven by agricultural conversion but also by 
logging or fire; the analysis of gross forest-cover 
gain in separate areas, and therefore the calculation 
of net forest-cover loss that must combine gross 
forest-cover loss and gain; and the allocation of 
forest-cover losses and gains to different drivers. 
Overall, there is very strong evidence that gross 
tree-cover loss is continuing at high rates and prob-
ably accelerating, good evidence that gross agricul-
tural conversion is a major driver of that conver-
sion, and less clear evidence of what is occurring on 
a net basis. We briefly review the different kinds  
of evidence.
Satellite studies of cropland and pasture  
Perhaps the best evidence of trends in land use 
comes from studies of satellite imagery. Most his-
torical satellite-based land-use change studies use 
satellite images from the Landsat program of the 
U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion. These images cover the majority of the earth’s 
surface many times each year, and analyzing such 
large data quantities in many regional contexts still 
remains a scientific challenge. Different research 
groups develop different computer algorithms to 
interpret what land changes are occurring based on 
the amount of light reflected from the sun in vari-
ous ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum. These 
algorithms often result in very different interpreta-
tions of land-cover change. 
Satellite images cover the whole earth but the 
images are grainy. Human interpretation of large 
areas is not practical, although human interpreta-
tion is usually more accurate than computer algo-
rithms when analyzing individual satellite images 
for changes in land use and land cover. As discussed 
below, large discrepancies in different satellite 
mapping programs are reported in the literature, 
as are higher rates of inaccuracy when comparing 
these automated global mapping interpretations to 
more reliable manual interpretation using higher-
resolution imagery available on aerial photography 
platforms such as Google Earth.35 
WRI’s Global Forest Watch (GFW) publishes maps 
of loss of “tree cover” using estimates from the 
Hansen data set based on algorithms developed at 
the University of Maryland (UMD).36 According to 
Zeng, Estes, et al. (2018), this data set has a higher 
rate of accuracy (that is, the percentage of land-
cover classes that was correctly determined) than 
other global land-cover mapping data sets, as deter-
mined by comparisons with manual interpretation 
of high-resolution aerial photographs in selected 
geographic locations.37 On the basis of this data set, 
GFW estimates that the world had average “gross” 
losses of 20 Mha of forest cover each year from 
2001 through 2018 (Figure 10-5).  Moreover, the 
levels of forest-cover loss have been rising unevenly 
but substantially from an average of roughly 15  
Mha in 2001 and 2002 to almost 30 Mha in 2016 
and 2017.
Tree-cover loss may be due to causes other than 
agricultural expansion, including forestry and fire.  
Curtis et al. (2018) analyzed forest loss data from 
2001 to 2015 and estimated that roughly half of 
tree-cover loss was due to forestry and wildfires 
while the remainder, roughly 10 Mha per year, was 
due to conversion to agriculture.   
Curtis et al. (2018) attributed roughly half of the 
agricultural conversion to a category they called 
“shifting agriculture,” which was not considered  
“deforestation” because the authors theorized that 
agriculture was not expanding but just shifting 
around within an area in long-term rotations of 
agriculture and forest.  “Shifting” or “swidden” agri-
culture is a type of agriculture long recognized and 
practiced by farmers with limited access to fertil-
izers to allow crop fields to regain fertility through 
natural regrowth. 
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We disagree that the actual areas cleared should 
be characterized as “shifting agriculture” rather 
than as agricultural expansion and therefore new 
conversion, on the basis of the methodology used 
in the study. We believe that a more appropriate 
term is “mosaic” agricultural conversion. The most 
significant criterion used by Curtis et al. (2018) 
to designate “shifting agriculture” was that, in 
any 100 square kilometer grid cell, if more than 
a minimal part of the cell was reforesting then all 
the expansion would be characterized as “shifting 
agriculture” and not “deforestation.” That defini-
tion encompasses a wide array of areas that would 
be experiencing true expansion of agricultural land 
area if any of the following were also present in 
these areas:  
 ▪ Some true rotational agriculture 
 ▪ Some agricultural abandonment (regardless of 
whether the farmers who abandon the land are 
shifting to other parts of the area)   
 ▪ Some regrowth of forest area from local clear-
ing of forest for wood products 
Figure 10-5  |  The world lost more than 360 million hectares of tree cover between 2001 and 2018
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This method results in nearly all agricultural expan-
sion in Africa being defined as “shifting agriculture” 
and not “deforestation”—a problem acknowledged 
by the authors—even though multiple studies, 
including by many of the same authors, have 
found that agricultural expansion into new areas 
is occurring in Africa on a large scale.38 Not only 
are completely new areas being cleared in Africa, 
but some farmers who have long practiced shifting 
agriculture also are reducing the length of their 
rotations, thus allowing less forest regrowth.39 That 
is also a form of net agricultural expansion. In addi-
tion, the methodology explains, for example, why 
Curtis et al. (2018) generally attribute agricultural 
clearing in northern Thailand as being for “shift-
ing agriculture” and not “deforestation.” However, 
separate, more detailed local analyses have shown 
that agriculture is not just shifting around in this 
region but also expanding, both in lowlands and 
in mountains areas.40 While expansion is carried 
out by smallholder farmers, they are not practicing 
subsistence agriculture. They are predominantly 
producing commodity crops such as maize and 
should be viewed as part of the global response to 
increased food demands.41
At the global level, the Hansen maps incorporated 
into Global Forest Watch (GFW) support the propo-
sition that gross global agricultural conversion of 
forests has amounted to at least 10 Mha per year 
since 2001, and that this level of conversion has 
likely been increasing. These estimates also leave 
out some additional areas of agricultural expansion. 
For example, they will not capture some conver-
sion of natural forests to tree crops, such as rubber. 
Nor will they include conversion of many woody 
savannas and grasslands because the Hansen maps 
apply only to clearing of forests with 30 percent tree 
canopy or more (meaning that at least 30 percent of 
the ground is covered by leaves on trees). 
Satellite-derived maps that try to interpret conver-
sion of sparser, savanna woodlands are less likely to 
be accurate. Other studies, some using radar-based 
approaches, find that substantial conversion of 
such woodland savanna areas is occurring as well.42 
These savanna landscapes occupy large portions of 
Africa and Latin America that are known to be areas 
of agricultural expansion.43 
Gross expansion, however, is not the equivalent 
of net expansion. Although areas identified by 
Curtis et al. (2018) as expansions of shifting agri-
culture should be viewed as gross deforestation, 
the reforestation found in these areas suggests that 
some agricultural land is being abandoned both 
long-term and as a part of the multiyear rotations 
of croplands and forest that are a part of tradi-
tional “shifting” or “swidden” agriculture. Even in 
large-scale commodity agriculture, as we discuss in 
Course 3, substantial areas of land may be aban-
doned as agriculture shifts to other areas that can 
be hundreds of kilometers or even continents away. 
GFW researchers estimate that roughly one-third 
of total deforestation between 2001 and 2012 
was offset by reforestation of some kind of forest 
somewhere in the world. They further estimate 
that the greater part of reforested area was likely 
regrowth following previous fire or forestry and not 
agricultural abandonment.44 But the method used 
for this part of the analysis was unlikely to capture 
all reforestation.45  
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Although we focus here on the implications of GFW 
studies, a variety of alternative analyses of defor-
estation and other land-use changes complicate 
the lessons. Some studies are broadly consistent 
with GFW. For example, one study by Kim et al. 
(2015) of the 34 tropical countries with extensive 
forest areas found gross forest loss rates of 7.8 Mha 
per year, and net loss of 6.5 Mha per year. This is 
comparable to GFW’s estimate of gross annual loss 
of  7.5 Mha per year and net loss of 5.5 Mha per 
year in these same 34 countries between 2001 and 
2012. Other analyses are inconsistent with GFW 
and find lower rates of gross and net forest loss.46 
In part reflecting these lower forest loss rates, they 
also sometimes find only modest net expansion of 
cropland and pasture area since 2000, which GFW 
does not explicitly estimate although its results sug-
gest much more. 
There are other methodological differences, but 
one important factor may be the spatial resolution 
of satellite images used. The GFW and Kim et al. 
(2015) analyses used Landsat images that cover, 
on average, about one-tenth of a hectare, whereas 
alternative analyses that find less net forest loss are 
often derived from images with coarser resolution, 
with pixels representing 6 or 10 ha, or even larger 
areas on the ground.47 In landscapes that have a mix 
of patches of forest and cropland, it is often difficult 
to interpret both land-cover and land-use changes 
from satellite images with larger pixel sizes.48 The 
evidence indicates that analyses using images with 
larger pixel sizes tend to detect fewer small farm 
fields49 and therefore may leave out expansion of 
small farm fields in complex landscapes. 
Overall, the implications of the GFW estimates 
we have presented are that gross conversion of 
forest for agriculture, both cropland and pasture, 
has likely been greater than 10 Mha per year since 
2001. Additional conversions of savannas and 
natural grasslands to agriculture are likely, though 
not reflected in these data. 
FAO cropland data 
FAO reports two kinds of data regarding cropping, 
one suggesting an unprecedented expansion, the 
other suggesting meaningful but more modest 
expansion. 
Harvested area refers to the number of hectares 
actually harvested each year, which is different 
from the area classified as “cropland.” If farmers 
plant and harvest two crops on a hectare in a year, 
it counts as two harvested hectares, and if they do 
not plant or harvest crops on a hectare in a year, 
it counts as zero. Cropland, according to FAO’s 
definition, is supposed to refer to any land that 
has been planted to a temporary or perennial crop 
at any time over the previous five years, although 
FAO does not actually insist that countries use this 
definition, and at least some do not. 
According to FAO data, global harvested area 
expanded from 2002 to 2016 at an unprecedented 
rate of 15.1 Mha per year.50 (That increase com-
pares to an average annual increase of only 4 Mha 
from 1982 to 2002; see Figure 10-6.)51 By contrast, 
according to FAO data, global cropland has been 
expanding at a rate of roughly 4.3 Mha per year 
since 2002.52 
In theory, the difference between harvested area 
and cropland area could reflect a large increase in 
double-cropping, or a large decrease in the num-
ber of hectares left fallow. Both practices increase 
harvested area without increasing cropland. Some 
researchers interpret the data in these ways.53 
However, we believe that independent data do not 
support this explanation, and that the discrepancy 
probably represents flaws in the data for cropland, 
or harvested area, or both. For example, the few 
specific analyses of changes in double-cropping 
do not support the idea of large increases in the 
practice. Independent reports suggest that double-
cropping in Brazil increased by a total of roughly 
6.5 Mha from 2002 to 2014, with nearly all the 
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double-cropping involving maize after soybeans.54 
But elsewhere, the independent data do not show 
large increases in double-cropping. For example, 
FAOSTAT data on harvested area versus cropland 
area would logically imply either an increase in 
double-cropping or a decline in fallow area of 13 
Mha in China from 2000 to 2011.55 However, a 
remote-sensing study found a 4 Mha decline in 
double-cropping and an increase—not a decrease—
in fallow lands of 1 Mha during this time period.56 
In the United States, although FAO data might 
suggest an increase in double-cropping, there was 
virtually no change in double-cropping from 1991 to 
2012, according to U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) statistics.57 
One explanation is that some countries are prob-
ably undercounting their expansion of cropland by 
not reporting cropland in ways that meet the FAO 
definition. For example, FAOSTAT reports a 20 
Mha decline in U.S. cropland from 2002 to 2012, 
which reduces the global expansion of cropland 
reported by FAOSTAT. This decline reflected 
reporting by the USDA, but, according to the USDA, 
true cropland area did not decline in the United 
States.58 The decline in “cropland” reported was due 
instead to a decline in reported area of “cropland 
pasture,” that is, land that the U.S. government 
had characterized as cropland because of historical 
use as cropland but much of which had long been 
used for pasture. The decline in cropland area thus 
Note: The 15 major crops are barley, cotton, groundnuts, maize, millet, oats, rapeseed, rice, rye, sorghum, soybeans, sugar beet, sugar cane, sunflower seed, 
and wheat.
Source: WRI analysis based on FAO (2019a).
Figure 10-6  |  Harvested area for 15 major crops has expanded by about 125 million hectares since 2002
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appears to be mainly a consequence of a recategori-
zation of land, most of which should not previously 
have been considered cropland according to FAO 
definitions because it had not been cropped for at 
least five years. According to FAO definitions, the 
United States should also have declared a 4 Mha 
increase in cropland between 2002 and 201659 
due to the return to cropping of land previously 
taken out of production for more than five years in 
the Conservation Reserve Program. However, the 
United States did not report an increase in cropland 
because it had continued to report land in the pro-
gram as “cropland” even though it had been planted 
in grasses and trees for more than five years.
Although such underreporting may play a role, the 
reality is that we do not really know what explains 
the discrepancy between the expansion of harvested 
area and the expansion of cropland because the 
data are just too uncertain. FAO uses data reported 
by countries, and there is no independent way of 
evaluating the data on harvested area or even any 
integrated source of information on the different 
methods countries use. 
Cropland area might appear to be easier to estimate 
because of the potential use of aerial or satellite 
photographs, but at this time, the challenges, 
uncertainties, and discrepancies in satellite inter-
pretations create major uncertainties. Even reports 
from advanced agricultural countries that devote 
substantial resources to assessing cropland appear 
to have limitations. In one unsettling example, a 
2018 satellite study suggests that Brazil has been 
widely misreporting its cropland. Although FAO-
STAT reports Brazilian cropland as increasing from 
65 Mha to 86 Mha between 2000 and 2004, this 
study found that Brazil’s cropland was actually only 
26 Mha in 2000 and had expanded to 47 Mha by 
2014. The study suggested that part of the discrep-
ancy probably occurred because Brazil had been 
reporting harvested area as cropland, but much of 
the discrepancy could not be explained.60 Because 
Brazil is renowned for its satellite studies of land 
use and for its agricultural research agency, this 
result raises questions about data from countries 
with fewer resources available for such analyses.
Overall, substantial uncertainty remains. There 
appears to be a large and perhaps unprecedented 
increase in harvested area globally. The cropland 
data do not show a similar increase. The discrep-
ancy cannot be well explained by an increase in 
double-cropping or a decline in fallow lands. Some 
of the discrepancy—at least in the United States—
appears to be due to an underreporting of cropland. 
In general, however, the data are too uncertain to 
be reliable and data discrepancies raise questions 
that cannot now be answered.  
FAO pastureland data   
FAOSTAT pastureland data report that global pas-
ture area actually declined by 140 Mha from 2001 
to 2016. If true, these data would indicate a trend 
toward future pasture area declines, but a closer 
look suggests otherwise. 
Of the reported decline, 81 Mha occurred in Austra-
lia—the result of a decision to no longer character-
ize some extremely dry grazing lands as permanent 
pasture. An additional 36 Mha of the reported 
decline occurred in Sudan (both Sudan and South 
Sudan), which might be the result of drought but 
given changes in government may also be the result 
of an estimation or accounting change. Some real, 
but much smaller declines do seem plausible in 
places such as China, due to reforestation programs 
on dry, hilly pastures.61  
The challenges with Australian and Sudanese 
pastureland data are emblematic of much larger 
challenges, which start with an ambiguity about 
what constitutes pasture in the first place.62 Esti-
mates of pastureland area range from less than 2 
billion ha,63 to 2.8 billion ha (based on adjustments 
to FAO data),64 to 3.35 billion in FAOSTAT as of 
2010, and reach 4.5 billion ha in another study.65 
The largest estimate includes wide areas assumed 
to support occasional browsing by animals even 
if not consistently grazed. Among the critiques of 
the FAO figure, one research team found that 500 
Mha of pastureland reported by FAO, on the basis 
of country reports, were simply too dry to support 
permanent grazing on any meaningful level (e.g., 
large areas reported by Saudi Arabia).66  
One puzzle is that FAOSTAT reports an increase 
in pastureland in Latin America of only 11 Mha 
from 2001 to 2013.67 Both a region-wide study 
and numerous local studies have documented that 
much larger gross deforestation in Latin America 
is largely and probably primarily due to expansion 
of pasture.68 Between 2001 and 2013, a study using 
Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer 
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(MODIS) satellite images found gross pasture 
expansion of 97 Mha.69 A 30 Mha conversion of 
pasture to cropland reduced this net expansion, 
as well as some unknown amount of reversion to 
forest, but the gross figures still suggest a large net 
expansion of pasture.  
For these reasons, we do not consider FAOSTAT 
data on pasture reliable and think that net pasture 
expansion is likely occurring based on the analyses 
in Latin America. However, on a global and prob-
ably also regional basis, there also appears to be a 
shift from drier, less productive grazing land, such 
as that being reforested by Chinese conservation 
programs, toward wetter, more productive grazing 
land, such as that in Latin America. This shift in 
effect uses more of the productive potential of land 
even if land area does not expand.  
Reasons for Optimism: Smarter 
Agriculture
Although the ability to increase output simply 
by adding fertilizer or water has been declining 
because fertilizers are already heavily used in most 
areas and additional water resources for irrigation 
are limited, agricultural output has continued to 
grow. Since 1960, the annual growth rate of agricul-
tural production, as measured by economic output, 
has remained constant. (The increase in economic 
output is not exactly the same as an increase in 
yield but they are closely related.)70 Yet the role of 
increased inputs and land in this growth declined 
from 95 percent in the 1960s to only 25 percent 
in the 2000s.71 Instead, 75 percent of the gain 
in output in the 1990s and 2000s resulted from 
improvements in total factor productivity, which 
means improved technology or better use of exist-
ing technology (Figure 10-7).72 Much of the gain 
has resulted from the spread of advanced farming 
technologies, particularly to China, Brazil, and 
Argentina. Although these farming improvements 
have not been sufficient to eliminate agricultural 
land expansion altogether, they suggest the poten-
tial power of farming advances.  
 
The following chapters discuss a variety of menu 
items for farming smarter and “leaving no farm-
land behind.”
Source: Fuglie (2012).
Figure 10-7  |   The primary source of growth in agricultural output has shifted from input increases to improvements in 
total factor productivity
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CHAPTER 11
MENU ITEM: INCREASE 
LIVESTOCK AND PASTURE 
PRODUCTIVITY
Global attention has tended to focus on achieving increases in 
crop yields. But given the much greater extent of pastureland 
and the importance of croplands in providing animal feed, 
increases in the efficiency of livestock farming are at least 
equally important. This menu item explores opportunities 
to boost livestock productivity to reduce both land use and 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
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The Challenge
The world’s farmers now annually raise roughly 1 
billion pigs, 1.7 billion cows and buffalo, 2.2 billion 
sheep and goats, and 61 billion chickens,73 and use 
more than 3 billion ha of pasture land and hun-
dreds of millions of hectares of cropland to do so. 
These animals are responsible for generating most 
of the GHG emissions associated with production 
processes (as opposed to land-use change) in the 
agriculture sector. (This issue is discussed in more 
detail in Course 5.) 
With projected increases in animal-based foods 
overall of 68 percent, increases in dairy of 67 
percent, and in ruminant meats of 88 percent,74 the 
world’s farmers and ranchers will have to produce 
far more milk and meat per hectare and per ani-
mal if the world is to avoid billions of hectares of 
expansion of pasture area and cropland for feed 
and vastly increased GHG emissions from livestock 
alone. 
Improving the efficiency of milk and meat produc-
tion is critical. If the world were to achieve no 
further productivity gains after 2010 (efficiencies 
remain at 2010 levels), meeting expected demand 
for meat and milk in 2050 would require cropland 
and pasture area to expand by 2.5 billion ha. This 
enormous amount of land clearing would release 
an average level of 20.6 Gt CO2e in land-use change 
emissions each year.75 This level amounts to almost 
the entire global “budget” of 21 gigatons for all GHG 
emissions by 2050, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Increases in the efficiency of milk and meat produc-
tion are also critical for holding down production-
related emissions from livestock. In our base year 
of 2010, livestock generated 3.3 Gt CO2e, or roughly 
7 percent of total human-caused GHG emissions 
excluding land-use change and production of ani-
mal feeds. Without any efficiency gains in livestock 
production, those production emissions would 
rise to 6.3 Gt by 2050. In our baseline scenario, 
efficiency gains hold those increases to 4.9 Gt by 
midcentury.76 
Projected Efficiency Gains
Fortunately, past experience suggests that milk 
and meat efficiencies are likely to grow. Between 
2010 and 2050, at the global level, our baseline 
projection assumes a 53 percent increase in dairy 
products produced per hectare of grazing land, a 62 
percent increase in beef produced per hectare, and 
a 71 percent increase in sheep and goat meat per 
hectare. These increases are the synergistic effect of 
three separate changes:
 ▪ More crop feeds. We project an increased use of 
crops in animal diets, with those crops mostly 
replacing crop residues, which have poor nutri-
tional qualities for animals. 
 ▪ An improvement in the efficiency of converting 
each kilogram of feed to meat or milk. Based 
on analysis of historical trend lines, we assume 
each ton of feed will produce 20 percent more 
beef, 22 percent more sheep and goat meat, and 
16 percent more milk globally. 
 ▪ Each hectare of land used for grazing or for cut 
forage will provide on average 23 percent more 
forage.77 
For poultry and pork production, on a global basis, 
our projections assume roughly 20 percent increases 
in output of meat per kilogram of feed for poultry and 
pork meat, and 10 percent for eggs. We extend the 
projections of Wirsenius et al. (2010) to 2050, which 
assume modest gains in feed efficiency in developed 
countries but large gains in developing countries. 
Realizing these global efficiency gains even in our 
baseline, however, will be very challenging. One 
reason is that demand for livestock products is 
growing most where livestock productivity is lower. 
Even if these regions greatly improve their effi-
ciency, the shift of some share of production from 
developed countries to developing countries has the 
effect of lowering average global efficiency levels. 
Another reason is that, as discussed in Chapter 10, 
our estimates project overall increases in output of 
ruminant meat and milk per hectare of grazing land 
that already exceed simple extensions of historical 
trend lines (Figure 10-4). Finally, climate change 
will cause many challenges for livestock production: 
high heat tends to stress animals, reduce production, 
and increase disease. In many locations, increasing 
temperatures also can reduce water availability.78 
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Yet even with such optimistic estimates, which 
include efficiency improvements in every world 
region, our baseline still projects pastureland 
expansion of 401 Mha between 2010 and 2050. A 
less optimistic projection, involving a 25 percent 
slower rate of feed efficiency gain between 2010 
and 2050, would see pasture area expand by 523 
Mha between 2010 and 2050, and annual emissions 
from land-use change rise from 6 gigatons (in our 
2050 baseline) to 7.1 gigatons. 
The Opportunity
The scale of opportunities for productivity gains 
differs between pork and poultry, on the one hand, 
and ruminant meat and dairy, on the other.
Pork and poultry
Concentrated production systems for pork and 
poultry in developed countries have achieved such 
high levels of efficiency in meat and egg produc-
tion, both per animal and per ton of feed, that most 
analysts believe they are approaching biological 
limits—as well as limits on humane conditions for 
raising animals. A European research effort con-
cluded in 2012 that pig and poultry production in 
Europe was likely to improve in feed efficiency by 
only 1 percent or less.79 
In developing countries, there is ample room to 
increase the feed conversion efficiency of “back-
yard” pork and poultry production by shifting to 
crop-based feeds, but those shifts do not save land 
overall because backyard systems rely heavily on 
local wastes and scavenging, which our analysis 
treats as “land free.” Future land-use savings 
are likely to be achieved primarily by farmers in 
developing countries adopting developed-world 
production techniques. This development is already 
the principal driver of pork and poultry expansion 
in emerging economies such as Brazil and China. 
Although at least one paper has speculated that 
there is still more room for productivity gains in 
advanced systems such as those in Europe,80 we 
consider the global efficiency gains from 2010 to 
2050 in our baseline scenario already high and thus 
we do not model additional increases in efficiency of 
pork and poultry systems.
A major focus in the future should be on raising 
pigs and poultry in concentrated conditions that are 
more humane and create less air and water pollu-
tion. Good animal husbandry requires increasing 
space for animals and better waste management. 
Some analyses have found that raising animals in 
more humane conditions reduces efficiency,81 but 
other studies have found that it can reduce mortal-
ity and lower stress, thereby increasing productivity 
and reducing emissions.82 The details obviously 
matter, and we believe these kinds of improvements 
should receive substantial attention.
Ruminant meat and dairy
In contrast to poultry and pigs, the evidence 
indicates broad technical potential to increase the 
efficiency of meat and milk from cattle, sheep, and 
goats. These ruminants are responsible for more 
than 90 percent of estimated direct emissions from 
livestock both in 2010 and in our 2050 baseline 
scenario,83 and their feeding uses all pastureland 
and roughly 20 percent of all crops devoted to 
livestock.84 Three interrelated efficiency gains for 
ruminants are important to reduce both land-use 
demands and direct production emissions from 
these forms of livestock:
 ▪ Production per hectare of land. Growing 
improved grasses and shrubs, and fertilizing 
and grazing them well, will improve both the 
quantity and quality of forage the land produces 
and the percentage of the forage ruminants will 
consume.
 ▪ Production per kilogram of animal feed. The 
quality of feed, which is based largely on its di-
gestibility and protein content, determines both 
how much forage a ruminant will consume and 
how much growth and milk the ruminant will 
produce from the forage. Because animals first 
use food energy to maintain themselves before 
gaining weight or producing milk, eating feeds 
with low digestibility provides little additional 
energy to add weight or produce milk. Once 
maintenance thresholds are met, improving 
feed quality results mainly in more growth or 
milk, which means output grows disproportion-
ately with higher-quality feed.85 
 ▪ Production per animal. Even when ruminants 
consume no more energy than they need to 
maintain themselves, they still produce GHGs. 
In general, faster-growing or higher-milk-
producing animals that receive higher-quality 
feed direct more of their feed into milk or meat 
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and less into just maintaining themselves. 
The effect is to reduce the GHG emissions per 
kilogram of meat or milk produced. Judged on 
the basis of a whole herd, the gains are even 
larger. Much of the feed consumed or emissions 
generated by a herd of cows, sheep, or goats is 
by mothers engaged in producing their young. 
And some feed is consumed and some emis-
sions produced by animals that die before being 
slaughtered or finishing their milk production. 
As animals increase their reproductive rates 
and as their mortality declines, they will also 
increase the amount of meat and milk produced 
per kilogram of feed or per ton of GHGs. Figure 
11-1 illustrates the close relationships between 
production emissions and output per animal in 
the case of milk.
Each of these efficiency gains reduces both land-use 
demands and associated GHG emissions, particu-
larly of methane emissions—the dominant form of 
emissions from ruminant production (excluding 
land use).86 
A striking feature of Figure 11-1 is that improving 
the most inefficient systems generates the largest 
marginal returns in the form of reduced emissions. 
Once milk or meat production is already efficient, 
additional efficiency measures (e.g., shifting to 
even more crop-based feed), achieve only modest 
additional increases in GHG efficiency. Helping 
inefficient livestock systems—often those of small 
farmers—to improve therefore provides large 
opportunities for environmental gains.
Improving inefficient livestock systems also pro-
vides large opportunities for improved nutrition 
and poverty reduction. The vast bulk of the roughly 
900 million livestock keepers in sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asia work on small, mixed farms.87 In 
India, small and marginal farmers own 60 percent 
of female cattle and buffaloes. Women farmers play 
a particularly prominent role.88 Systematic govern-
ment investment and supportive policies led India 
to become the world’s largest dairy producer, with 
heavy participation by small farmers.89 Not only can 
efficiency gains in developing countries by defini-
tion lead to more milk and meat while using fewer 
resources, but efficiency gains by small farmers will 
be critical to their continued ability to enhance their 
incomes through farming. 
Note: Dots represent country averages.
Source: Gerber et al. (2013).
Figure 11-1  |   More efficient milk production reduces greenhouse gas emissions dramatically
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Technical options 
The wide range in beef and dairy production 
efficiencies across production systems and regions 
indicates that high technical potential exists for 
improvement. According to FAO data, in 2006, the 
yield of meat per beef carcass was 166 kg (carcass 
weight) in developing countries compared to 271 
kg in developed countries.90 The quantity of feed 
required per kilogram of beef is four times greater 
in Africa than in Europe.91 In fact, variations 
between the most feed-efficient beef systems in 
Europe and North America and the least efficient 
systems in Africa and South Asia vary by a factor of 
20, and dairy system efficiencies vary by a factor of 
10.92 Land-use requirements are calculated dif-
ferently by different studies, but as estimated by 
Herrero et al. (2013), land-use requirements vary 
by a factor of 100. 
GHG emissions generated per kilogram of beef or 
dairy protein also vary widely—even without count-
ing emissions from land-use change. One study’s 
findings show ranges of a factor of 30 (Figure 
11-2).93 A study by FAO in 2010 found that, on aver-
age, GHG emissions per liter of milk produced in 
Africa were five times those of North America.94 
Fortunately, dairy and meat production in the 
developing world does not need to employ con-
centrated feedlots to become more efficient. Even 
today, Indian dairy production emits only half as 
many GHGs per liter of milk as African dairy pro-
duction, according to the same 2010 FAO study.95 
The principal opportunities for improvement are 
well known, and can also build resilience to climate 
change. They fall into three basic categories: better 
feeding, better health care and overall animal man-
agement, and better breeding. 
Better feeding 
Improved feeding strategies fall into several cat-
egories, including the use of improved forages 
and better grazing, supplemental feeds, and more 
digestible crop residues. 
Improved grasses and use of legumes and 
trees. Planting pastures with “improved” grasses 
(grasses bred for higher yields) and using adequate 
amounts of fertilizer produces larger amounts of 
more digestible forage. Adding legumes can reduce 
the need for fertilizer and increase the protein 
content of forage, but ruminants may selectively 
graze out the legumes. Rotating animals periodi-
cally through different parts of a field, or different 
Figure 11-2  |   Inefficient beef production systems result in far higher greenhouse gas emissions per unit of meat output
Note: Maps are for illustrative purposes and do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of WRI concerning the legal status of any country or territory, or concerning 
the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries. 
Source: Herrero et al. (2013).
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fields, often by moving electric fences, also leads 
animals to consume more of the available forage 
while it is most nutritious and tends to maximize 
grass growth by keeping grasses at optimal grow-
ing heights. (There is a scientific debate about 
whether very well-managed, continuous stocking 
can achieve the same gains.) In some areas, mixing 
cattle with sheep or goats—animals that graze dif-
ferently from bovines—improves the efficient use of 
the whole pasture and can reduce worms and other 
pest problems.96 In parts of Africa and Asia where 
“cut and carry” systems of forage predominate, 
large potential also exists to improve the production 
of more digestible and protein-rich forage crops, 
including both grasses and high-protein shrubs. 
Supplemental feeds. Nearly all of the world’s 
grazing lands have seasons when rainfall is too low 
or temperatures too cold to produce abundant and 
high-quality grass. Animals can lose much weight 
in these seasons. The need to keep animal numbers 
down so that they do not starve results in stocking 
densities (animals per hectare) that are too low 
to fully exploit available grass in the rainy season. 
Supplements can include crops or silage, which is a 
crop (often maize) harvested with both stovers and 
grains, chopped up and preserved, or hay harvested 
and preserved in the wet season. 
Some supplemental feeding of animals with feed 
grains or oilseed cakes, which are highly digest-
ible and some of which have high protein content, 
typically leads to substantial production gains and 
reductions in emissions per kilogram of milk or 
meat.97 Industrial by-products like brewers’ yeast 
and the leaves of some shrubs (such as Leucaena 
and Calliandra) can also provide highly nutritious 
supplements. 
At very high levels of use, reliance on crops will 
often continue to increase production, but it may 
not continue to decrease GHG emissions—at 
least when compared to intensive pasturing. For 
example, U.S. dairy production, which relies heavily 
on grains, produces more milk per cow but has 
higher production emissions than European dairy.98 
This is because the higher GHG emissions from 
producing crops (rather than pasture) begin to 
cancel out the yield benefits of more milk per cow. 
In fact, factoring in land use can more clearly show 
the advantages of highly intensive grazing. One 
study found that soil carbon losses from converting 
intensive pasture in the Netherlands to maize to 
supply dairy feed would lead to net increases in 
atmospheric carbon for at least 60 years, despite 
the reductions in methane from cow digestion due 
to the higher-quality feed.99
More digestible crop residues. Ruminant 
animals can only eat so much food at any one time. 
The more digestible the food, the more energy 
animals derive from each kilogram of feed; and the 
more rapidly animals digest this feed, the more they 
can consume. 
Roughly 16–19 percent of the world’s beef and 
dairy feeds are crop residues,100 but most have low 
digestibility, and reliance on their use is heavily 
concentrated in poorer countries. But opportuni-
ties exist to introduce crop varieties with more 
digestible residues. Farmers in India, for example, 
have adopted such sorghum varieties, which does 
much to explain why India’s higher dairy produc-
tion is more efficient than Africa’s.101 In contrast, 
few African farmers have adopted crop varieties 
with more digestible residues, although doing so 
should greatly improve both milk output and GHG 
emissions efficiency.102 For African farmers to fully 
exploit this opportunity, grain varieties with more 
digestible residues will need to be adopted into local 
breeding programs. Other technical opportunities 
have long existed to improve stover digestibility 
by treatment with urea. Agricultural development 
programs have initiated many pilot efforts, but 
cumbersome labor requirements or the costs of 
urea have hindered adoption.103 
Improved health care and overall animal management 
Livestock health problems—from ticks to viral and 
bacterial infections that reduce growth and milk 
production—suppress fertility and increase mortal-
ity. Basic veterinary services, including vaccines and 
tick control, therefore would increase production. 
Other management techniques are also available 
that enable animals to have babies more frequently, 
and help the young animals grow better. Timing 
breeding so that young animals are born before the 
start of wet, forage-abundant seasons rather than 
dry, hungry seasons can also have a large impact.104 
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Better breeding
Some livestock breeds grow faster and produce 
more milk than others. Improved feeding in general 
should make possible more widespread use of high-
yielding breeds, although some native breeds are 
better able to handle heat stress and do better when 
feeds are less nutritious. Regardless of breed, farms 
that keep track of their animals’ production and use 
the highest producing animals to breed new cows 
can steadily increase their productivity over time. 
In the developed world, the opportunities for 
efficiency gains among ruminants largely depend 
on new breeding. For decades, the focus of breeding 
has mostly been production per animal, leading to 
breeds of animals that can consume vast quantities 
of feed and put on weight or produce milk in high 
amounts. Coincidentally, this breeding has led to 
overall efficiency gains because more of the energy 
in feed goes into production of meat or milk rather 
than maintenance of the animal. 
An alternative breeding strategy might focus 
explicitly on breeding animals for their efficiency 
in converting feed into milk or weight gain. That 
is, the same or increased meat or milk production 
would be achieved with little or no increase in feed 
volumes. The opportunity appears substantial—and 
should also have benefits in developing countries—
because different individual animals appear to 
have a substantial range of efficiencies. However, 
the field of breeding deliberately for feed efficiency 
is in its infancy, and there can be economic trade-
offs between maximizing how much milk or meat 
a single animal produces versus how much milk or 
meat a kilogram of feed produces, so the potential 
benefits at this time are uncertain.105
Using these different ways of improving efficiency, 
many farms have shown high potential for efficiency 
gains in developing countries, even in a changing 
climate. The following provide some examples:
Silvopastoral systems in Colombia. On 
roughly 4,000 ha in Colombia, farmers have 
developed intensive silvopastoral systems that 
provide a highly productive and environmentally 
efficient method of producing milk or beef. Farmers 
plant many separate layers of vegetation: a layer of 
highly productive grasses dominated by stargrass 
complemented by three rows of shrubs or trees. 
According to researchers at the country’s Centro de 
investigación en sistemas sostenibles de producción 
agropecuaria (Center for Research on Sustainable 
Agricultural Production Systems),106 Leucaena 
shrubs play a particularly critical role. These  
shrubs fix nitrogen, which fertilizes the grasses, 
and create protein-rich leaves for the animals. The 
shrubs grow fast, and when cows bend the branches 
to eat the leaves, the branches do not break but 
rather bounce back. The tree layer increases humid-
ity under the canopy, which promotes grass growth 
and provides shade to reduce heat stress  
on animals. 
Compared to extensive grazing, farms adopting 
intensive silvopastoral systems have generated 
several times the milk per hectare and better resist 
drought.107 Production of milk can even be 70 
percent higher than otherwise well-managed and 
fertilized pasture. Silvopastoral areas also have 
enhanced carbon stocks and biodiversity, including 
a reported 71 percent increase in bird abundance 
and diversity compared to standard extensive 
grazing.108 These systems require a high up-front 
investment and complicated management but 
have proved highly profitable where developed.109 
Although the Colombian systems represent perhaps 
the most intensive form of silvopastoralism, a wide 
range of silvopastoral systems exists across differ-
ent continents and biomes.110 
Improved grazing systems in the Cerrado 
of Brazil. Over the past several decades, Brazil 
has cleared millions of hectares of the Amazon 
rainforest, the Atlantic Coastal rainforest, and the 
diverse, woody savanna known as the Cerrado for 
grazing. Around two-thirds of the resulting 175 Mha 
of pasture are planted in Brachiaria, an adapted 
African grass. If supported with lime and fertilizers 
and other good grazing management, Brachiaria 
has the potential to produce as much as 140 kg of 
beef per hectare and more than 200 if combined 
with legumes or some crops in the final months of 
finishing.111 But when Brachiaria is not fertilized, it 
becomes increasingly unproductive and productiv-
ity can fall below 30 kg of beef per hectare per year, 
comparable to other common and poorly managed 
systems.112 
A variety of forms of improved management can 
provide increasingly large gains in production and 
reductions in GHG emissions per kilogram of beef 
in the Cerrado. In a recent analysis, the combina-
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tion of adding fertilizer and lime every 10 years, 
supplying basic mineral licks, and making efforts 
to breed more productive cattle more than doubled 
production per hectare from unmanaged pasture 
and reduced production emissions by 30 percent 
per kilogram of beef. The same study found pos-
sible a fourfold increase in production per hectare 
and a 50 percent drop in production emissions per 
kilogram of beef through addition of legumes in the 
pasture area, a schedule of fertilizing pasture every 
five years, additional control of parasites, some crop 
supplements during animal finishing, and greater 
attention to the timing of breeding, so that calves 
are born at the start of the wet season.113 
Dairy farms in Kenya. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
mixed crop-livestock systems produce the vast 
majority of milk and meat. Farmers maintain cows 
in stalls and feed them mostly a combination of 
crop residues and forage grasses that are either cut 
from wild growth or from deliberately raised forage 
grasses. Historically, milk production has been very 
low. Overall, production from sub-Saharan African 
herds is only around 1 liter per cow per day, com-
pared to more than 16 liters per cow from Western 
European herds.114 
There are many examples of improvements. One 
from Heifer International describes a small farmer 
who boosted production 350 percent through more 
regular tick control and deworming, increased 
use of dried napier grass and green maize stalks, 
and haying of wild grasses during wet seasons to 
feed during dry seasons.115 Overall, although many 
farmers in East Africa have made large gains by 
adopting napier grass, a highly productive and 
nutritious grass,116 great potential exists to expand 
and improve napier production through more 
precise matching of grass varieties to environments, 
improved application of fertilizers, and closer 
integration into cropping systems.117 Thousands 
of farmers in East Africa have also adopted high-
protein shrubs, such as Calliandra. One study 
estimated that each kilogram of Calliandra leaves 
fed to cows will increase milk production by roughly 
one-third of a liter per day.118 Because this kind 
of shrub fixes nitrogen, intercropping also boosts 
yields both by improving soil productivity and by 
attracting stem borers—a problematic pest—away 
from maize.119 
Another analysis in Kenya found that changes 
in feeding systems led to fivefold differences in 
methane emissions per liter of milk among seven 
districts, while a mere 10 percent increase in the 
digestibility of feed led to emissions reductions of 
almost 60 percent per liter of milk.120 Additional 
research suggests the potential in much of sub-
Saharan Africa to improve feed digestibility by 
roughly 10 percent through a range of measures 
including more digestible stovers or an increase 
in the use of concentrated grains to 2 kg per day. 
This study estimated that either intervention could 
reduce methane emissions per kilogram of milk or 
meat by two-thirds or more.121
Overall potential for improvement
To entirely avoid any expansion of grazing lands 
by 2050, assuming no reductions in demand from 
our baseline, beef production per hectare of grazing 
land would have to increase by 82 percent instead 
of the 62 percent in our baseline, dairy produc-
tion by 67 percent instead of the 53 percent in our 
baseline, and sheep and goat meat by 106 percent 
instead of the 71 percent in our baseline. Because 
we build large increases in productivity into our 
baseline, we are reluctant to hypothesize much 
larger increases. However, we imagine scenarios 
with larger or smaller increases in productivity per 
ha, achieved through greater increases in the effi-
ciency of feed (the quantity of output per kilogram 
of feed measured in dry matter). Table 11-1 shows 
the scenario results. In our increased productivity 
scenario, pasture expansion falls from 401 to 291 
Mha. However, if productivity were to grow at a 
rate 25 percent slower than in our baseline, pasture 
expansion would increase from 401 to 523 Mha.
Data and methodological challenges have so far 
prevented us from developing what we consider 
to be economically valid projections of livestock 
improvement potential. Analyses often suggest that 
improvements should be economical. Henderson 
et al. (2016), for example, analyzed different farms 
using the same basic production systems in Africa 
and found that some farmers could produce twice 
as much output per dollar of input. Yet no one has 
come up with a good way of estimating the cost of 
overcoming the various obstacles that stand in the 
way of these improvements. 
        175Creating a Sustainable Food Future
One way of appreciating the challenge is to look 
more closely at Latin America. We project increased 
production of beef in Latin America between 2010 
and 2050 to be 92 percent. That level of produc-
tion increase would require comparable percentage 
rate gains in output per hectare of grazing land to 
avoid additional land conversion to pasture. In fact, 
our 2050 baseline projects very large-scale inten-
sification in the region, with an increase in beef 
per hectare of 74 percent in Brazil and 78 percent 
in the rest of Latin America. But given the gap 
between demand growth and pasture efficiency, we 
still project 123 Mha of pasture expansion in Latin 
America.122
What would it take for Latin America to produce 
these increased volumes of beef and dairy without 
expanding agricultural land? Of Latin America’s 
roughly 400 Mha of grazing land devoted to beef 
production (by our calculation), roughly 100 Mha 
are arid. The arid lands have substantially less 
potential for intensification without heavy reliance 
on crop-based feeds. To achieve our estimated 
2050 production in Latin America without clear-
ing additional pasture and while intensifying only 
the 300 Mha of wetter pasture lands, production 
on those wetter areas would have to more than 
triple, to around 162 kg/ha. But of these 300 Mha 
of wetter pasture, some grow native grasses, whose 
conversion to improved grasses would have adverse 
consequences for biodiversity—consequences 
that do not fit our criteria for a sustainable food 
future.123 Other hectares are steeply sloped or in 
remote areas to which supplying inputs is difficult. 
Assuming intensification occurred on two-thirds 
of the wetter pastures (200 Mha), production per 
hectare would have to grow to around 215 kg/ha.124 
According to Cardoso et al. (2016), such increases 
are possible in the Cerrado, but only under the 
Table 11-1  |   Global effects of 2050 livestock efficiency change scenarios on agricultural land use and  
greenhouse gas emissions
Notes: a. Pasture output growth (per hectare) between 2010 and 2050 is 62% for beef, 53% for dairy, and 71% for small ruminants.
“Cropland” includes cropland plus aquaculture ponds. Numbers not summed correctly are due to rounding. Numbers shown in parentheses are changes relative to 2050 
baseline. Coordinated Effort scenario assumes same rates of growth as projected in the 2050 baseline.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
SCENARIO
CHANGE IN AGRICULTURAL 
AREA, 2010–50 (MHA) 
ANNUAL GHG EMISSIONS, 2050  
(GT CO2E) 
GHG 
MITIGATION 
GAP  
(GT CO2E)Pastureland Cropland Total
Agricultural 
production
Land-use 
change Total
No change in livestock 
efficiencies between 2010  
and 2050
2,199 
(+1,798)
256 
(+64)
2,455 
(+1,861) 10.6 20.6 31.2
27.2 
(+16.1)
2050 BASELINE and 
Coordinated Effort (pasture 
output grows by 53–71%a 
between 2010–50) 
401 192 593 9.0 6.0 15.1 11.1
Less optimistic: 25% slower 
rate of ruminant feed efficiency 
gains 
523 
(+121)
203 
(+11)
726 
(+132) 9.2 7.1 16.3
12.3 
(+1.3)
More optimistic: 25% faster 
rate of ruminant feed efficiency 
gains (Highly Ambitious and 
Breakthrough Technologies)
291 
(-110)
182 
(-10)
473 
(-121) 8.8 5.1 13.9
9.9 
(-1.1)
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most efficient present forms of management on 
some farms. This most efficient management would 
include fertilizing, plowing, and replanting grasses 
every five years, and either some substantial reli-
ance on crops for feed in the last 90 days before 
slaughter or the successful introduction of legumes 
into pastures (which is usually challenging because 
animals selectively graze them).
The suggestion from this Cerrado analysis is that 
every wetter, feasible, and appropriate hectare 
of land in Latin America would have to intensify 
production to a maximum level to meet rising  
beef needs without expanding into forests and 
natural savannas. 
Recommended Strategies
Improvements in pasture receive a fraction of 
the global attention directed to improvements in 
cropland, but a sustainable food future will require 
a new level of global commitment. We offer four 
recommendations to address the most serious 
obstacles facing livestock farmers.
Establish national and international goals 
for livestock efficiency gains—particularly 
ruminant systems—and develop technical 
programs to implement them. Because the 
importance of sustainable livestock intensification 
is underappreciated, the establishment of specific 
national and international goals could help focus 
efforts. Efficiency can be measured by all the basic 
metrics discussed in this section: output per animal, 
per ha, and per kilogram of feed. But output per 
kilogram of GHG emissions does an excellent job 
of reflecting them all. Efficiency goals should reflect 
the carbon costs of land-use change and should 
recognize that different groups of farmers start 
from different levels of efficiency; targets should 
encourage improvement of each group. 
Develop analytical systems to track and plan 
ruminant efficiency gains. Data about different 
farms and their intensification potential are limited 
in most countries, particularly those using diverse 
feeds. Modeling systems at the national or interna-
tional level today are probably meaningful enough 
to identify large-scale potential for improvement. 
However, they must make a large number of 
assumptions because of the lack of data, and such 
models cannot be used to plan improvements at the 
level of individual farms or groups of farms.  
To pursue efficiency goals, countries should develop 
data and monitoring systems that characterize their 
livestock production systems, estimate their pro-
ductivity and emissions, and examine opportunities 
for improvement. Such systems should work at the 
farm level and scale up to the national level, and 
easily incorporate new information. Governments 
should institutionalize them in policymaking and 
nurture their development with the involvement of 
private research organizations.
Data and monitoring systems should also guide 
research with an enhanced commitment to filling 
in the many gaps in knowledge about livestock sys-
tems. For example, even though Leucaena shrubs 
achieved a breakthrough in Colombia’s intensive 
silvopastoral systems by providing a fast-growing, 
flexible source of protein and soil nitrogen, Leu-
caena does not grow well in highly acidic soils. 
For Colombia’s silvopastoral system to work in 
these soils, Leucaena will need to be adapted, or 
an alternative legume must be bred to perform 
the same functions. In much of Africa and Asia, 
livestock improvements rely on improved produc-
tion of cut-and-carry forage grasses, and enormous 
potential exists to improve understanding of how 
these grasses are produced today and how they can 
be improved. In more advanced systems, advances 
in GPS technology make it easier to better analyze 
the management and consumption of existing 
natural grasslands125 so forage can be exploited at 
the optimum state of maturity.126 
Protect natural landscapes. Even though 
pasture intensification will be economical in 
many locations, without efforts to protect natural 
landscapes, expansion of pasture will still occur 
wherever it is cheaper than intensification. Analysis 
by Embrapa, the Brazilian agricultural research 
agency, has shown that expanding pasture into 
forest can be cheaper than rehabilitating pasture.127 
One study in the early 2000s showed that a modest 
form of intensification, fertilizing degraded pasture, 
was cost-effective in the western Amazon but that 
a more intensive form, using some supplemental 
feeds, was not.128 Another more recent study in 
the state of Mato Grosso estimated that intensive 
cattle raising in itself is not profitable unless it is 
particularly well-managed.129 A modeling analysis 
of Brazilian pasture intensification published in 
2015 found that intensification was strongly tied to 
higher land prices and lower transportation costs, 
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themselves related to market centers, and that 
on average, the intensification options were more 
expensive than expansion options by $80 per ha.130 
Not surprisingly, Brazil has tended to intensify 
cattle production in some locations while expanding 
cattle pastures in others. Between 2000 and 2006, 
for example, even as cattle density in the Brazilian 
Amazon greatly increased, the pasture area there 
still increased by roughly 25 percent.131 
There are compelling ecological reasons to protect 
natural landscapes. In addition, intensification 
strategies may prove economically beneficial for 
a country in the long run because they stimulate 
the development of more sophisticated agricul-
tural support services and because they may allow 
governments to better target regional infrastructure 
and support services. Intensely managed livestock 
also require more employment to substitute labor 
for land. But in the short run, some individual 
ranchers will still tend to prefer pasture expansion 
if it is allowed and if they are not required to pay 
the environmental costs of converting forests.
Countries with natural forests or other natural 
ecosystems that could be converted to grazing lands 
will need to enact policies to protect that land from 
conversion. Likewise, companies seeking the same 
outcome will need to incorporate avoided deforesta-
tion considerations into their purchasing decisions. 
Such actions must make the political, legal, market, 
and/or reputational cost of conversion higher than 
the near-term financial benefit of conversion. We 
discuss how this can be done in more detail in the 
final section of this report, “Cross-Cutting Policies 
for a Sustainable Food Future.”
Integrate programs to support intensifica-
tion with a greater focus on feed quality. 
Livestock farmers face many obstacles to taking full 
advantage of intensification opportunities, includ-
ing lack of formal and secure tenure over land, 
high cost of inputs, and limited access to relevant 
technical information.132 The evidence shows that 
market access also has a major impact on intensifi-
cation. For example, farmers have little incentive to 
increase milk production beyond subsistence levels 
if they cannot easily sell their milk.133 
The potential interventions to address these 
challenges are known, and include programs to 
strengthen tenure, create cooperative marketing 
efforts, improve transportation or retail networks 
to lower input costs, introduce social insurance to 
reduce food security risks, enhance education ser-
vices provided by extension agents, create farmer-
to-farmer networks, and form cooperatives. We 
discuss these issues in “Cross-Cutting Policies for 
a Sustainable Food Future.” Many countries have 
programs targeting one or more of these issues, 
though they are often inadequately funded. 
Often, however, farmers will need to overcome 
all these challenges simultaneously to be able to 
intensify. One option would be to create systems 
that target a variety of programs for a group of 
farmers committed to working together for sustain-
able intensification. In areas where forests or other 
natural ecosystems are at risk of conversion, or 
where grazing land has little intensification poten-
tial but could be restored as forests, these programs 
could support efforts to combine intensification 
with forest protection or restoration. For example, 
governments might allow these groups of farmers 
to compete against each other with initial proposals 
for improvement and commit resources to the most 
promising groups with the most ambitious forest 
protection commitments. Combining such efforts 
into programs that generate measurable reductions 
in emissions per kilogram of beef or milk and spare 
natural ecosystems should also increase the capac-
ity of such projects to attract international funding 
as “climate-smart agriculture.”
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CHAPTER 12
MENU ITEM: IMPROVE 
CROP BREEDING TO 
BOOST YIELDS
Because crop breeding has driven much of the world’s 
previous yield gains, this menu item involves advancing crop 
breeding. Great promise exists both in boosting regular efforts 
to “incrementally” breed better crops, and in taking advantage 
of rapid progress in techniques of molecular biology.
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The Challenge
Breeding new crop varieties can increase yields in 
a number of ways. Breeding can result in plants 
that grow more densely, that direct more of their 
energy into the edible portions of plants, or that 
more efficiently use water and nutrients. New crop 
varieties can better exploit local day lengths and soil 
conditions, resist disease or pests, or cope with dry 
periods and other stresses. Breeding can increase 
the maximum yield that crops achieve under ideal, 
fully watered conditions, which is called the “yield 
potential.” Breeding can also help farmers achieve 
yields that are closer to the potential in real-world 
conditions, thanks to characteristics that better 
resist disease, periods of drought or flooding, or 
other sources of stress.
Although farmers increase crop yields in part by 
using better seeds and in part through better man-
agement (especially increased fertilizer use), disen-
tangling the contribution of each is difficult. Green 
Revolution crops, for example, produced higher 
yields mainly when combined with fertilizer appli-
cation and irrigation. Despite this challenge, typical 
estimates claim that, since the Green Revolution, 
breeding has been responsible for roughly half of 
all crop yield gains.134 In the future, crop breed-
ing will probably have to bear more of the burden 
because, as discussed, except in sub-Saharan Africa 
agriculture has already exploited most of the “easy” 
potential ways of increasing yields: adding more 
water, using chemical inputs, and introducing  
basic machinery.135 
To provide continuing yield gains, breeding will 
need to become more nuanced. In the past, much 
yield gain in the major cereals wheat and rice 
resulted from shifting biomass from vegetative 
parts to seeds and shortening and stiffening the 
stems so they could support more grain (resulting 
from higher fertilizer application) without falling 
over. These traits, which were largely responsible 
for the Green Revolution, are in some cases reach-
ing their biological limits; crops can only grow 
so close to one another before they have no more 
space, and crops can only direct so much of their 
growth into edible portions before they will no 
longer stand upright. These limits, plus the need 
to boost crop yields even faster than in historical 
trends, present the crop breeding challenge. 
The Opportunity
Four major related opportunities exist to increase 
crop yields through improved breeding: speed-
ing up crop breeding cycles, marker-assisted and 
genomics-assisted breeding, improvement of 
“orphan” crops, and genetic modification.
Speeding up “incremental” breeding cycles in 
developing countries
Although there is a continuum of breeding efforts, 
it is helpful to think of breeding as focused on 
big “step-changes” in varieties, achieved through 
major changes in traits, on the one hand, and small 
continuous improvements, on the other. Major 
step changes in yield, disease resistance, or stress 
tolerance are often the result of incorporating rare 
genes with large and visible effects, or of changing 
from open-pollinated to hybrid crops. Such major 
changes involve concentrated efforts by researchers 
to develop new varieties. Famous historical exam-
ples include the creation of successful hybrid maize 
seeds in the United States in the 1930s; dwarf wheat 
and rice in the 1960s, which allowed crops to pro-
duce more seeds without stems breaking under the 
weight; and new breeds of Brachiaria—an African 
grass—developed in the 1980s and 1990s, which 
allowed the pasture grass to thrive in Brazil’s highly 
acidic soils. By contrast, continuous incremental 
improvements result from the steady accumulation 
of thousands of favorable genes with small effects. 
Incremental improvements result from a continu-
ous process of selecting higher-yielding individual 
crops and breeding them. 
Commercial breeding of maize in the United States 
sets the standard for the continuous incremental 
improvement that results from modern crop breed-
ing. A few major seed companies follow a series of 
steps to regularly improve their varieties.136 They 
create new in-bred lines of maize to assure genetic 
consistency, cross-breed these new lines to create 
new “hybrid” varieties (crosses of two lines), test 
the new results for performance and select new 
commercial varieties from the best performers, set 
out test strips widely across the corn (maize) belt 
of the United States every year, examine yields and 
other characteristics and select desirable perform-
ers, and finally leverage an extensive seed network 
so farmers quickly adopt the new commercial 
varieties. 
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Faced with competitive pressures, these seed com-
panies have new breeding cycles that require only 
four to five years from one generation of products 
(hybrids) to the next. This timeline contrasts with 
public breeding programs in developing countries, 
which often take 10 years or more to develop a 
new generation of seeds, plus many more years to 
disseminate them. By overlapping their efforts, U.S. 
seed companies are releasing improved varieties of 
major cereals every two or three years. As a result, 
studies find that the average hybrid maize seed used 
in the United States is only 3 years old, compared to 
17 years for maize in Kenya, and 13 years for wheat, 
and 28 years for rainfed rice in India.137 
A variety of techniques are available to speed up 
breeding. For example, breeding outside of the 
main crop-growing season (such as the winter or 
dry season) can double rates of improvement and in 
some tropical countries requires irrigation only of 
test fields.138 Doubled haploid breeding can accel-
erate the breeding process by inducing plants to 
produce identically matching chromosomes in each 
pair within only two seasons, a process that nor-
mally takes six or seven generations. This technique 
makes it possible to purify strains of plants with 
desirable traits, which can then either be released 
as true-breeding varieties (in rice or wheat, for 
example) or crossed with other, similarly purified 
plants to form hybrids (as is common  
with maize).139 
Virtually every country in the world has some basic 
set of institutions for national crop breeding that 
receives financial support from the national gov-
ernment and technical support from international 
networks. But funding levels often vary from year 
to year. Breeding is a multiyear effort and requires 
well-trained breeders who develop knowledge over 
years of experience. Ultimately, funding that is both 
adequate and consistent is the key to successful 
crop breeding. 
It is also difficult to get improved seed varieties 
rapidly into circulation. Although many analyses 
assume that farmers in developing countries reuse 
their own seeds from year to year, in many cases 
smallholder farmers purchase a significant propor-
tion of their seeds from local markets or from fellow 
farmers.140 Yet only about 2.4 percent are “certified 
seeds” from private sector companies. Commercial 
farmers who have the funding to buy private sector 
seeds and can evaluate them are far more likely to 
buy these seeds more frequently, and to test new 
varieties offered by their seed supplier. Competi-
tion among seed companies in the United States 
and Europe also fosters sales efforts that lead to 
more rapid adoption. Government seed companies 
often lack these incentives. Because purchasing 
commercially provided seeds creates markets for 
more rapid variety development (by providing seed 
companies with a steady revenue stream), there are 
synergistic benefits between fostering improved dis-
tribution systems and more rapid adoption rates. 
The potential of marker-assisted and genomics-
assisted breeding
Crop breeding has primarily improved crops by 
crossing different individual members of the same 
plant species, different varieties of the same plant 
species, or sometimes assisting self-pollination 
by the same plant to achieve consistent traits. To 
generate new genetic diversity with which to experi-
ment, breeders occasionally have used mechanisms 
such as radiation to create new plant mutations. 
They then test to determine whether any muta-
tions are favorable and, if so, spread them through 
conventional cross-breeding.
Until recently, breeders primarily bred new crops 
by crossing two individual members of the same 
species, which they select for breeding based on 
how those crop varieties performed in the field—
while occasionally using estimates of whether they 
contained certain gene types (alleles). Breeders 
then repeatedly select offspring with the most 
desired traits for dissemination or for subsequent 
crossing. Even with the advent of genetic modifica-
tion discussed below, conventional breeding has 
driven yield gains in part because most traits that 
lead to higher crop yields result from many genes 
and their interactions with environmental factors.141 
Conventional breeding provides the means by 
which breeders can affect large numbers of genes 
(even without knowing precisely which genes or 
their genetic codes). 
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Even as breeding has continued in this way, molec-
ular biologists have developed dramatically faster 
and cheaper methods of analyzing deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA), providing new mechanisms to acceler-
ate and enhance crop breeding. One mechanism, 
called marker-assisted breeding, allows breeders 
to map and label portions of DNA associated with 
agronomically useful traits. 
With these techniques, even without growing crops, 
breeders can identify those seedlings from among a 
large population that are most promising for further 
breeding. This approach reduces the time required 
to develop new crop varieties because breeders 
need not sow millions of plants or wait for indi-
vidual plants to grow to determine which individu-
als to cross.142 Thus, while “low-tech” conventional 
breeding may require a minimum of 7 to 17 genera-
tions of crops to produce a new cultivar, marker-
assisted breeding can cut this breeding cycle down 
to just a few generations.143 The International Rice 
Research Institute (IRRI) demonstrated the poten-
tial of this approach in 2009 by introducing a rice 
variety that could survive submersion under water 
for up to two weeks. IRRI developed this variety 
in just three years after it identified the relevant 
genetic marker for flood tolerance, a trait found in 
a traditional variety grown in a flood-prone part of 
India. Since then, IRRI has delivered 10 additional 
varieties that are resistant to flash flooding in South 
and Southeast Asia.144 
Like genetic engineering, marker-assisted breeding 
by itself is primarily of value for simple traits deter-
mined by a single gene. But within the past decade, 
improvements in “genomics” have created oppor-
tunities to increase and accelerate yield improve-
ments by analyzing groups of genes. Genomics 
applies DNA sequencing methods and genetic map-
ping to analyze the function and structure of whole 
(or large portions of) genomes—the complete set of 
DNA within a single cell of an organism.145 Genom-
ics also includes the evaluation of the large portions 
of DNA that do not “code” for new proteins but 
rather play critical roles by determining when genes 
are turned on and off.146 A breeder that desires to 
breed-in many traits now may be able to predict 
through a combination of a DNA map and statisti-
cal analysis whether or not individual plants have 
all the genes needed to yield the desired traits.147 
Genomics has the potential to make conventional 
breeding not only faster but also better. Conven-
tional approaches require that breeders use indi-
rect methods to identify seeds with the favorable 
underlying genes, which they can confirm only 
once those genes express themselves in beneficial 
traits in actual plants. The new genomics-assisted 
techniques allow breeders to identify and breed for 
promising gene combinations that are predicted to 
occur when parents with complementary traits are 
crossed. Breeders can then test for the presence of 
these genes in offspring and push these combina-
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tions forward through continued breeding even if 
the first generations of offspring do not themselves 
express favorable traits. That may occur, for exam-
ple, because the trait, such as yield, only becomes 
evident in large field plots and cannot be accurately 
measured in single plants in a greenhouse. 
In general, large commercial seed companies have 
extensively incorporated genomic techniques into 
their breeding programs.148 Much crop breeding is 
undertaken by the public sector, however, and the 
achievements of these techniques are still limited 
for several reasons, in part because they are new 
and in part because the facilities to use such tech-
niques are less available in developing countries.149 
Although genomics is already speeding up plant 
breeding, the extent to which genomics will enable 
major new improvements remains unclear. Breed-
ing for complex traits that depend on many genes 
and their relation to the local environment is 
inherently complicated. Although identifying genes 
is becoming easier, knowing what these genes do 
and how they respond to a variety of environmental 
settings is hard, time-consuming, and complicated. 
For complex traits, the size of the crop population 
under study must be large, the assessment of traits 
should be reliable and replicable, and the popula-
tion of crops studied must be of the same variety. 
Fortunately, technological advances are creat-
ing new capacities in techniques known as “high 
throughput phenotyping.” They include using 
sensing devices to monitor attributes of plant 
growth in the field and robotic platforms that can 
make reliable measurements of traits that have 
been difficult to quantify, such as water use, photo-
synthetic capacity, root architecture, and biomass 
production. 
The information gathered will be cumulative. As 
scientists identify the molecular functions of differ-
ent strands of DNA and their relationship to traits, 
they gain increasing ability to predict what combi-
nations of DNA are optimal for specific crop types 
and environments. In addition, breeding institu-
tions can share different responsibilities. Globally 
oriented research institutions can engage in “pre-
breeding” that uses some of these new techniques 
to develop promising plant material while local 
institutions can incorporate promising germplasms 
into local varieties. This kind of division of respon-
sibilities is occurring in partnerships between U.S. 
and European universities, the CGIAR system, and 
national organizations.150 
Improvement of orphan crops
The advances in marker-assisted breeding and 
genomics create additional potential to breed 
improvements into orphan crops.151 The term 
orphan crops generally refers to crops that have 
received relatively little research attention, often 
because they are little traded on global markets. 
Yet they are important for food security in many 
regions.152 Orphan crops include sorghum, millet, 
potatoes, peas, cassava, and beans. By one defini-
tion, 22 orphan crops occupied almost 300 Mha 
in 2017 (Figure 12-1). Because of their importance 
to poor smallholder farmers, improving orphan 
crop yields to even half of their maximum potential 
would have greater benefits for food security in 
regions such as sub-Saharan Africa than improve-
ments in any other crops.153
Marker-assisted selection and genomics should 
make it easier to achieve quick yield improvements 
in these less-studied crops in two ways. First, these 
technologies can increase the pace of breeding pro-
grams. Second, these technologies may in the future 
enable breeders to understand the gene combina-
tions that have already led to yield gains in more 
intensely studied crops, and then select for them in 
orphan crops. 
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Figure 12-1  |   Orphan crops occupy nearly 300 million hectares
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(2019a).
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Genetic Modification 
Genetic modification (GM) typically refers to 
inserting specific genes—often from a different 
species—into the genome of a target plant. This 
approach differs from conventional plant breeding, 
which selects individual plants with desired traits 
and sexually crosses whole genomes from the same 
or very closely related species to produce offspring 
with random mixes of genes from the parent plants. 
To date, most GM crop traits have been inserted 
into just four high-value crops: maize, soybeans, 
canola, and cotton. Of the 190 Mha annually 
planted in GM crops—approximately 12 percent 
of global cropland154—the vast majority are in the 
United States, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, India, and 
China.155 
GM crops overwhelmingly employ one of two basic 
traits. The first conveys absolute resistance to the 
herbicide glyphosate. This allows farmers to spray 
glyphosate—originally effective against virtually all 
weeds—directly over crops that the herbicide would 
otherwise kill. This trait is most used for soybeans 
and maize. The second trait is the production of 
a natural insecticide from the bacterium Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt), which is particularly effective 
against insect larvae such as those of the corn 
rootworm and the corn borer. Bt traits are used 
predominantly in maize and cotton. 
Genetically modified crops: the debate so far
Genetic modification has potential to improve crop 
breeding and increase yields, but it is the subject 
of by far the most contentious public policy debate 
surrounding plant breeding. We believe that the 
merits of GM technologies lie primarily with  
traits other than glyphosate resistance or Bt, as  
we discuss below. But because the public debate 
about GM crops has focused so heavily on these two 
traits, we summarize the debate here. The debate 
also encompasses extending the use of these crops 
to Africa.  
The debate focuses on four issues: food safety and 
human health, environmental toxicity and pest 
resistance, crop yield effects, and economic effects 
on farmers, particularly a shift of profit and control 
to major corporations. We draw heavily on a 2016 
study by the National Academies of Sciences, Engi-
neering, and Medicine, which, based on our own 
independent review of the evidence, does a careful 
job of presenting the evidence.
Food safety and human health 
Fear that GM crops are not safe for human con-
sumption drives much of the public opposition to 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). At this 
time, there is no evidence that GM crops have 
harmed human health.156 The vast majority of stud-
ies have found no adverse health effects.157 Even 
GM critics argue that they oppose GM crops mainly 
because the risks have been insufficiently studied.158 
Much attention has focused on possible links 
between glyphosate and cancer. Significantly, this 
debate is not about whether the genetic modi-
fication itself causes cancer, but on the toxicity 
of glyphosate, whose use is enabled by breeding 
glyphosate resistance into crops. Most studies have 
found little to no evidence of glyphosate causing 
cancer in humans.159 One of the most alarming 
studies of GM crops claimed to find a large increase 
in cancers in lab rats. However, the sample involved 
only 10 rats of each gender, and food safety insti-
tutes criticized it for a high likelihood of random 
error.160 Over the objections of the authors, the 
Journal of Food and Chemical Toxicology retracted 
the study.161 A subsequent review of the study by the 
U.S. National Academies of Science, Engineering, 
and Medicine was less critical of the study’s method 
but still did not find that it showed statistically sig-
nificant evidence of concern.162 In its 2016 assess-
ment, the U.S. National Academies of Science, 
Engineering, and Medicine found no differences in 
cancer rate trends of different cancers in the United 
States and Europe, despite the U.S. embrace of 
these crops and Europe’s resistance.
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Although the evidence as a whole does not show 
health effects, that does not mean glyphosate itself 
is harmless. Many studies of glyphosate, whether 
epidemiological or using animals, have suggested 
pathways through which glyphosate or the chemi-
cals that occur as it is broken down by microorgan-
isms in the environment could cause health effects, 
possibly even including cancer.163 One concern is a 
potential link between high exposure to glyphosate, 
generally in farmworkers, and a higher rate of  
non-Hodgkins lymphoma.164 As another example, 
even though the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency found that glyphosate is not an endocrine 
disrupter through traditional pathways, other 
researchers identified possible effects through  
more unusual pathways.165 
The evidence on Bt crops suggests that health 
effects have probably been positive overall because 
Bt crops, so far, have enabled many farmers to 
reduce significantly their overall use of insecticides. 
These insecticides, particularly those used in China 
and India, are generally more toxic than Bt.166 That 
is true even though in some areas Bt crops have 
led to an increase in “secondary” pests—pests not 
controlled by Bt—and reducing the secondary pests 
can, in turn, require more pesticide use. However, 
several studies show that Bt crops can also contrib-
ute to reductions in secondary pests167 and, thanks 
to reduced overall use of insecticides, can even 
promote beneficial insects that reduce pests on 
neighboring maize, peanut, and soybean fields.168 Bt 
crops have also reduced use of insecticides on non-
Bt crops by reducing the presence of major pests, 
such as corn stem borer.169
Although neither glyphosate nor Bt is without 
health concerns, the human health evaluation of 
Bt and glyphosate-resistant crops depends not on 
their absolute health risks but on their health risks 
relative to the alternatives. For most farmers, the 
alternative means use of other pesticides that raise 
more concerns than glyphosate and Bt. The scope 
and increase in use of both glyphosate and Bt crops 
warrant continued health studies, but the evidence 
to date is that these GM crops have not increased 
health risks compared to the alternatives and,  
in the case of Bt, may be contributing some  
health benefits.170
Environmental toxicity and pest resistance
Much of the environmental criticism of glyphosate-
resistant and BT crops acknowledges the advan-
tages of reduced toxicity in the short term but 
argues that they may lead to greater toxicity in the 
long term. 
Any increased reliance on specific pesticides can 
lead to more rapid development of resistance to 
those pesticides in weeds or invertebrate pests so, 
over a longer period, use of these GM crops could 
lead to the loss of benefits from the lower toxicity 
of glyphosate and Bt. There have been examples 
of crop infestations by insects that are resistant 
to some Bt proteins. Resistance to the effective 
proteins in fall armyworm emerged within three 
years of introducing multiple types of Bt in Bra-
zil.171 In South Africa, the one sub-Saharan African 
country to use Bt maize, a variety was introduced in 
1998 but some resistance evolved in stem borers by 
2006. That form of Bt maize was withdrawn from 
the market in 2013 and replaced by a new variety, 
to which insects have also started to develop resis-
tance.172 A 2016 study reported 16 separate cases of 
Bt resistance, each of which took an average of only 
five years to evolve.173
One strategy to reduce the evolution of resistance 
has been, where feasible, to introduce crops with 
multiple Bt proteins. Bt crops can generate a variety 
of proteins that harm insects, and the types of 
proteins and level of harm vary. Breeding multiple 
Bt proteins into crops may reduce the likelihood of 
resistance developing because even genetic muta-
tions that lead to resistance to one Bt protein will 
not give pests an advantage if they remain vulner-
able to the other Bt proteins.174 But forms of cross-
resistance to multiple Bt proteins can also evolve, 
although the science is complicated and depends 
on the proteins.175 Stacking of Bt proteins may help 
reduce the rate of evolution of resistance, but it will 
probably not stop it entirely.
Growing herbicide resistance is a significant con-
cern for glyphosate-resistant crops. Twenty-four 
weeds in the United States have become resistant, 
including several that are major problems, particu-
larly for soybean production.176 Large seed com-
panies have responded by introducing varieties of 
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soybeans that are also resistant to older herbicides, 
such as 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4–D) 
and dicamba. Relative to insecticides, these 
chemicals (like other herbicides) have lower human 
toxicity concerns. But these older herbicides pose 
significant environmental concerns as they are far 
more toxic to broad-leaved plants and more likely 
to “drift” on winds from farm fields to adjacent 
lands and damage nontarget plants.177 
A key strategy to reduce the evolution of pest 
resistance is for farmers to continue to plant crops 
without the GM traits on some of their fields, 
creating pest “refuges” where non-Bt or non-
glyphosate-resistant crops can be grown. In these 
areas, weeds and insects without resistant genes 
would continue to survive. They can then breed 
with insects that evolve resistance after exposure to 
GM crops in other fields and the offspring will die 
when exposed to Bt plants or glyphosate (so long as 
whatever resistant gene evolves is recessive). The 
effectiveness of this pest refuge approach varies 
with the toxicity of the Bt plant and the size of the 
refuge, among other factors. In general, countries 
with larger refuges and well-managed farms tend 
to delay emergence of resistance, and in some 
cases have prevented resistance from appearing 
for roughly 20 years.178 But farmers do not always 
follow the practice. Small farmers in particular 
struggle to set aside and maintain refuges, refuge 
area requirements are sometimes too small, and 
resistance can evolve anyway. 
The emergence of resistant weeds is one reason 
why glyphosate-resistant traits have not always led 
to a reduction in the aggregate use of herbicides. 
Usage depends on the crop. The total application 
of herbicide active ingredients to U.S. maize crops 
declined by 18 percent from 1991 through 1994 even 
as herbicide use shifted toward glyphosate, a safer 
product.179 Yet the overall herbicide application to 
soybeans in the United States grew by 70 percent 
over the same period , both because the application 
rate for glyphosate increased and because glypho-
sate use did not significantly reduce the application 
of other herbicides by volume.180
In addition to risks that glyphosate-resistant crops 
may not ultimately reduce use of other pesticides, 
increased application of glyphosate is also a con-
cern. Even if it is less toxic to humans and less likely 
to drift than some other pesticides, glyphosate still 
likely has adverse effects on some other organ-
isms. The greatest risk is probably to some aquatic 
species.181 At least one study raises concern that 
glyphosate may be harming honey bees,182 whose 
hive collapses in the United States have posed 
major challenges to pollination and agriculture 
itself. As with other pesticides, these environmen-
tal effects are seriously understudied. Because 
the global use of glyphosate is high and continues 
to expand, continued research into both human 
and environmental effects of glyphosate remains 
appropriate.
Crop yield effects
Whether glyphosate-resistant and Bt crops have led 
to yield gains is open to some debate. Neither trait 
by itself was designed to boost the yield potential 
of these crops, as opponents of GMOs point out. In 
addition, the introduction of a new gene often leads 
to “yield drag” because conventional versions of 
those crops continue to improve during the time it 
takes breeders to integrate the new gene into local 
crops. Yields eventually catch up for a particular 
GM gene,183 but the insertion of new genes will 
repeat the drag effect in the future, although more 
rapid breeding techniques generally should reduce 
this drag. 
Yields improve not only when maximum yield 
potential increases but also when farmers are bet-
ter able to control stresses, such as pests, on their 
crops. Easier weed management enabled by use 
of glyphosate-resistant crops, or greater control of 
insects that attack crop roots enabled by Bt, could 
in theory boost yields. In addition, greater profit-
ability thanks to reduced losses caused by pests 
could lead farmers to make other investments that 
improve overall yields. Therefore, the question is 
what net effects on yields GM crops have produced 
in the real world. 
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A huge number of studies, using almost as many 
different approaches, have tried to answer this 
question. They have offered a range of answers, 
but fundamental methodological challenges make 
it difficult to get a definitive answer. Studies that 
compare test plots of well-managed GMOs with 
well-managed alternative plots often find little or no 
effect on yields, particularly from glyphosate-resis-
tant crops.184 However, their methods make them 
less likely to recognize the potential for real-world 
gains from the greater ease of pest management 
that GM crops may allow because, for example,  
Bt reduces the need to apply pesticides at all and it 
is easier to apply glyphosate on top of crops rather 
than carefully around them. Conversely, compari-
sons of real-world yields obtained by farmers who 
adopt and farmers who do not adopt GM crops  
are confounded by the fact that early adopters  
tend to be farmers already achieving higher yields. 
Also, farmers who pay more for GM seeds are  
likely to plant them on better fields and pay more 
attention to them.185 Similarly, studies based on 
country comparisons tend to ignore the fact that 
countries adopting GM crops already had high and 
rising yields.186 
In 2016, the National Academies of Science, Engi-
neering, and Medicine produced a particularly care-
ful review of the evidence from the United States, 
building on a report by the National Research 
Council in 2010. The bulk of the evidence shows 
different results for glyphosate-resistant crops and 
Bt crops. 
The net effect on yields of glyphosate-resistant 
crops has probably been either zero or very small.187 
There are wide differences in study results, and 
substantial uncertainties because of methodologi-
cal differences between studies, but this is the most 
reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the 
evidence to date. By contrast, the evidence tends 
to show some yield gains from Bt crops. The 2010 
study concluded that Bt had led to 5–10 percent 
yield gains for cotton188 and perhaps smaller gains 
for maize.189 The 2016 study found repeated evi-
dence of gains of this size in both maize and cotton, 
based on studies of direct plot comparisons; some 
studies showed larger gains.190 Yet the 2016 report 
found that despite this evidence from farm-level 
studies, U.S. yields in the major GM crops had not 
grown any more rapidly after the introduction of 
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GM varieties than they had before. The authors also 
found no reason to believe that yields might not 
have grown as fast without the advent of GM crops. 
The report plausibly concluded, “Although the sum 
of experimental evidence indicates that GE [genetic 
engineering] traits are contributing to actual yield 
increases, there is no evidence from USDA data that 
they have substantially increased the rate at which 
U.S. agriculture is increasing yields.”191
In developing countries, the evidence for yield 
gain is stronger and intuitively more likely, both 
because many farmers will have less access to other 
pesticides and because pests tend to flourish more 
in warmer environments, which are more common 
in developing countries. Most of the studies have 
focused in particular on Bt cotton and have found 
increases in yields.192 The largest apparent success 
occurred in India, which experienced yield gains in 
cotton of 56 percent between 2002 and 2011, which 
corresponded to the introduction of Bt cotton. 
Doubters properly point out that nearly all of this 
rise occurred from 2002 to 2005, when official Bt 
cotton adoption rates were only 6 percent.193 Yet 
other researchers noted that even in this period, 
some farmers were unofficially adopting the seeds, 
suggesting that the 6 percent adoption rate was an 
underestimate and pointing to a significant role 
of Bt cotton in yield gains.194 Although improved 
management of cotton overall probably played an 
even larger role, the evidence tends to justify claims 
that Bt cotton helped significantly increase yields, 
particularly in locations where pests addressed by 
Bt were most prevalent.195 
Overall, the weight of the evidence supports the 
proposition that GMOs to date have led to meaning-
ful but not large yield gains on average for Bt crops. 
Nonetheless, precise data are lacking. 
Effects on costs, labor productivity, and equity 
A fourth concern with genetic engineering is the 
expense and control of GM crops. Most farmers 
need to buy new seeds annually and GM seeds cost 
more than traditional varieties. The concern is that 
private seed companies will extract more of the 
income generated by farming, leaving farmers  
with less. 
Although seeds cost more, they also bring economic 
benefits. In addition to yield gains, particularly 
for Bt crops, both major types of GM crops reduce 
the work and expense of pest control. Studies have 
generally found sizable savings from reduced labor 
and, in the case of Bt, from the costs of alterna-
tive insecticides, which explains the high rates of 
adoption of these seeds in countries like Brazil, the 
United States, and Argentina.196 
The question is whether these economic benefits 
outweigh the higher seed costs and improve overall 
profitability. The answer is largely determined by 
the pricing policies of companies, which naturally 
seek to profit to the extent they can from their 
seeds, and from the level of competition among 
companies. But farmers generally will not buy the 
seeds unless they make their farms more profitable. 
Not surprisingly, studies have generally found that 
those farmers who purchased seeds found them 
profitable.197 The evidence suggests that GM seeds 
may not be profitable in years or locations with low 
pest pressures. 
The evidence has been more mixed where small 
farmers are concerned, although many studies have 
found substantial benefits for small farmers.198 
There are prominent examples of farmers in parts 
of India and West Africa beginning then abandon-
ing the use of Bt cotton.199 Higher seed costs, even if 
more than compensated for by increased yields, can 
be more of a burden for small farmers than large 
farmers because they are often less able to raise the 
initial capital needed to purchase seeds and other 
inputs. Higher input costs also increase the risks 
associated with bad weather and crop failure. Small 
farmers may be less able to balance these added 
losses in bad years with the greater benefits in good 
and average years. This is the case even though 
small farms can be as productive as large farms,  
or more so, in many farming systems.200 The avail-
ability of credit to small farmers is one important 
determinant of whether they can benefit from  
GM crops.
Despite this mixed record, the evidence that GM 
crops could enable small farmers to farm better is 
strong. The impediment appears to be the price. If 
good seeds could be provided at low cost or without 
a premium, the benefits could be compelling. For 
example, maize farmers in Africa face substantial 
challenges from insects such as stem borers that 
can be controlled with Bt.201 They are also facing 
substantial losses from the fall armyworm, recently 
arrived from the Americas. With support from 
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USAID and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 
public breeding institutions are working  
to provide Bt maize in Africa that works against 
such pests without the price premium normally 
paid elsewhere. 
Outstanding challenges to introducing GM crops 
more widely in Africa are thus both technical—for 
example, whether a Bt variety can be developed to 
kill fall armyworm and other threats to maize in 
Africa without quickly leading to resistance—and 
economic. Most small farmers in Africa do not pur-
chase seeds annually, either because they cannot 
afford hybrid seeds or because higher-priced seeds 
are too risky given weather variations. Introducing 
genetically engineered crops without address-
ing these issues is unlikely to contribute to yield 
increases or socioeconomic development.
Some conclusions regarding the debate over 
major GM crops 
Although claims both for and against GM technol-
ogy have often been overstated, the best evidence 
is that GM technology has already provided some 
yield gains from Bt crops and has probably reduced 
toxicity both to humans and the environment, 
relative to the use of alternative crop varieties that 
require more pesticide use. For many farmers, both 
crop traits have led to increased profitability and 
reduced labor requirements, although the experi-
ence of small farmers has been has varied. Less 
positively, both glyphosate itself and Bt, like other 
pesticides, pose concerns. The big, unknown ques-
tion is whether or how long these traits can remain 
functional before being overwhelmed by resistance, 
and what would replace them if and when resis-
tance undermines their utility. 
Although the controversy over today’s dominant 
GM crops has led us to provide this summary, we 
do not believe that debate over these particular 
GM traits should dictate policy about the entire 
technology of genetic engineering. The case for 
using this technology is compelling when the full 
range of potential gains and costs is taken into 
consideration.
Regarding health effects, there is a scientific 
consensus that food safety does not justify rejecting 
genetic modification in general. That is the view of 
such entities as the U.S. National Research Council, 
the European Joint Research Centre, the American 
Medical Association, the American Academy for 
the Advancement of Science, and the combined 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine.202 There is also a general consensus 
that while GM technology enables a range of crop 
modifications, some of which should appropriately 
require significant safety testing, the basis for regu-
lation should generally be the types of changes in a 
crop rather than the method for generating them.203 
Even conventional breeding techniques can include 
such methods as using radiation to generate more 
mutations.204 GM technology is probably more 
capable of altering plants in ways that raise new 
risks, but many uses of GM technology are unlikely 
to pose any more significant risk than conventional 
crop breeding.205
In addition, while the market power granted by 
patents to private companies can raise equity  
and even efficiency concerns in any industry,  
patents play an important role in the seed industry 
that is broader than their application to GM tech-
nology. And GM technology does not always involve 
private patents. The public sector can also be a 
source of GM innovation, with the technology then 
licensed freely.
Use of genetic modification to resist diseases 
One important reason not to allow the debate over 
Bt and glyphosate-resistant crops to dictate GM 
policy is the potential uses of GM technology to 
breed pest-resistant traits into crops under serious 
pest attack. In Hawaii, for example, papayas would 
probably have been wiped out without the benefits 
of GM technology. Hawaiian papayas faced a viru-
lent virus but were protected by insertion of genes 
from the virus itself into the papaya, generating a 
kind of plant immune response.206 Because of public 
resistance to GMOs, this variety has not spread 
much to the developing world.207 Likewise, current 
work demonstrates the potential for controlling 
potato late blight worldwide with GM technology.208 
Transgenic potato varieties under trial in Uganda 
are unaffected by this pathogen.209 GM soybeans 
with resistance to Asian soy rust are under develop-
ment by a major seed company: this disease causes 
annual losses of around $2 billion in Brazil, and the 
chemical sprays used for disease control are losing 
their efficacy.210 GM tomatoes have demonstrated 
resistance to bacterial spot in successive years of 
field trials in Florida, where the disease has been 
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the number one endemic disease problem affecting 
tomatoes for over 40 years.211 
Although data sets are incomplete,212 studies 
estimate that various diseases, animals, and weeds 
cause yield losses of 20 percent to 40 percent of 
global agricultural production.213 Crop diseases can 
originate from many different sources, including 
viruses, bacteria, fungi, oomycetes, nematodes, and 
parasitic plants. Scientists have started to under-
stand that, like animals, plants can respond to and 
defend themselves against infections and parasites. 
Although plants, unlike animals, do not have 
mobile defender cells such as antibodies, each cell 
relies on its own immunity and responds to sys-
temic signals emanating from infection sites.214 The 
plant has proteins that detect pathogens and trigger 
immunity responses, including signals for a cell to 
die to prevent further spread of the disease.215 
When selecting for disease-resistant crop variet-
ies, breeders are essentially selecting for genes 
that will code more effective detector chemicals.216 
But using conventional breeding takes time, and 
pathogens are often able to overcome resistance 
conferred by a single, major gene.217 By identifying 
the genes that promote pathogen susceptibility and 
removing them, or by identifying the genes that 
promote pathogen immunity and adding them, GM 
plant breeding can limit plant vulnerabilities and 
enhance resilience. 
The world’s crops are likely to become increasingly 
exposed to a greater variety of diseases because 
the expansion of trade and travel makes it easier 
for disease pathogens to move around and because 
warmer, wetter weather overall makes it easier for 
pests to thrive. In addition, any yield breakthroughs 
by particular crop varieties encourage other farm-
ers to use the same varieties. Broad adoption of the 
same or similar varieties increases resistance devel-
opment in the disease organism, and major crops 
may become more susceptible to global diseases.218 
Genetic techniques do not displace conventional 
breeding but allow for more varied and faster 
responses to diseases in some cases. 
Emerging new techniques of genetic identification 
and modification
When deliberate genetic modification of DNA to 
improve seeds first began, the primary technique 
involved a kind of “gun” that injected hundreds 
of copies of a gene into a cell in the hope that the 
gene would attach itself somewhere and express 
itself. Only by growing the offspring could scien-
tists determine whether the new genes were doing 
anything. The technique was essentially a time-
consuming form of trial and error, which greatly 
favored large companies because only they could 
afford the scale of effort. Over time, biologists have 
developed a variety of alternative techniques that 
could deliver genes more precisely, in less time-
consuming and expensive ways. 
In 2013, scientists reported dramatic progress 
with gene editing using an evolving method, 
called CRISPR-Cas9 (CRISPR). Although some of 
what this method allows can be achieved by other 
methods,219 CRISPR is far more agile, inexpensive, 
and quick. CRISPR allows biologists to precisely 
target genes at any location in strands of DNA to 
turn genes on and off at will. It also allows them to 
cut and insert new genetic material of their design 
in precise locations.220 Scientists can also insert 
genetic switches into plants that will activate genes 
only if they are exposed to certain chemicals or 
light. Each year since 2013, scientists have been 
announcing new variations on the technique that 
offer a range of new options. For example, scientists 
can now edit individual “base pairs” of DNA rather 
than entire genes. Among the other opportuni-
ties provided by CRISPR, scientists can study and 
modify the 98 percent of DNA that does not pro-
duce proteins but much of which has other impor-
tant, though little understood, functions. 
CRISPR is so new that no one can confidently 
predict which advances it will ultimately generate 
in crop breeding. Breeders caution that at this time 
there is limited knowledge of what the different 
parts of plant genomes do. In addition, most crop 
yield gains result from multiple gene interactions, 
so the process of conventionally breeding desired 
plants with each other is likely to continue to drive 
the majority of yield gains for the foreseeable 
future. Yet CRISPR offers many new opportunities:
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 ▪ The process enables gene editing to occur with 
less yield drag. This drag results from taking 
one crop variety with a desired special trait but 
not necessarily other high-yielding qualities 
and cross-breeding it multiple times with elite, 
high-yielding varieties to generate a high-yield-
ing variety with that same special trait. CRISPR 
enables breeders to introduce specific traits 
directly into elite varieties, circumventing the 
need for cross-breeding multiple times.
 ▪ CRISPR makes it easier for plant breeders to 
turn genes off, breed a variety, and then quickly 
obtain information about what the gene does. 
Over time, knowledge of the functions of differ-
ent parts of the genome should accumulate and 
enable more deliberate breeding.
 ▪ CRISPR enables gene editing to achieve more 
complex results because sequentially using 
CRISPR makes it easier for researchers to alter 
multiple genes in a plant as well as to influence 
noncoding DNA, which regulates whether genes 
are expressed. 
Combined with improved genomic information, the 
new potential to deliberately and intelligently edit 
DNA seems likely to offer high potential for crop 
yield improvement. The new techniques also make 
it possible for much smaller research teams to use 
genetic modification techniques. This could reduce 
the likelihood that genetic modification will be 
dominated by a few, large companies. But it is also 
possible that small companies will help develop new 
traits then sell them to larger companies to get the 
new traits through expensive regulatory processes. 
In addition, CRISPR is unlikely to alter the fact that 
large companies dominate sales of some crop seeds, 
such as maize; the result could be to give large 
companies ultimate control over the seeds even if 
traits are developed elsewhere.
At the same time, the ease of the new technique also 
raises issues of health and environmental safety 
because the technique is likely to become wide-
spread. Even talented high school students can now 
learn to do genetic modifications. How the world 
will manage these new techniques raises questions 
that go far beyond crop breeding. 
Recommended Strategies
The combination of the great need for yield gains 
and new technologies to map or edit DNA makes a 
strong case for increased dedication to crop breed-
ing. We offer four recommendations:
Boost breeding budgets 
Substantial investments by a wide range of institu-
tions will be required to improve breeding where 
it is now slow and take advantage of new technolo-
gies.221 The challenge is particularly acute in devel-
oping countries, where these innovative approaches 
to plant breeding are still essentially out of reach 
for most public-sector researchers. Developing 
countries need more scientists trained in modern 
breeding technologies, more transfer of these 
technologies from developed countries, and new 
data management systems and computational tools 
to support market-assisted and genomics-assisted 
breeding. Reports of agricultural research spending 
do not separate out crop breeding and are incom-
plete, but, overall, the world probably devotes only 
around 1.4–1.7 percent of agricultural GDP to agri-
cultural research and development (R&D), which is 
less than the rate of total research spending relative 
to the total global economy (2.1 percent).222 
Limited R&D funding is compounded by the high 
volatility of funding in the world’s poorest coun-
tries, which in part depend on—and therefore 
respond to—the interests of international donors.223 
But crop breeding requires stable funding because 
breeding is inherently a gradual and cumulative 
process. A good example is the funding for the 
CGIAR network of agricultural research institu-
tions, which were set up in the 1960s as part of 
the Green Revolution effort. After many years of 
stagnation, CGIAR’s budget grew rapidly after the 
food crises in 2008–11, from $707 million in 2011 
to $1,067 million in 2014. However, its budget 
declined again to $848 million in 2017.224 The need 
for increased and consistent agricultural R&D is 
discussed in more detail in the final section of this 
report, “Cross-Cutting Policies for a Sustainable 
Food Future.”
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Share genomic advances 
Public and private sector researchers can accelerate 
yield enhancements by developing and publicizing 
basic genomic data and methods. The Genomes 
Online Database (GOLD)225 is designed for such a 
purpose. Likewise, Mars Incorporated paid for the 
genetic sequencing of a common variety of cocoa 
and then publicly released it without patent in 
2010 to speed up research on improving yields for 
the plant.226 In general, mapped genomes of major 
row crops are now being shared. Going forward, 
sharing information as it is discovered about what 
different DNA sequences actually do will be equally 
important. 
Leverage new technologies 
Crop breeding programs should take full advan-
tage of advances in new technologies. This lesson 
means that conventional breeding should embrace 
marker-assisted and genomics-assisted breeding, 
supported by better data management, sensors, and 
other tools to more quickly and cheaply identify the 
functions of different genes. 
Whatever the debate about Bt and glyphosate-resis-
tant crops, they represent only a few of GM tech-
nology’s potential uses. Breeding disease-resistant 
traits into crops under serious threat is a problem 
to which genetic engineering may, in some cases, be 
the only solution if the crop is to be saved. CRISPR 
opens up a wide range of additional possibilities to 
increase yields in subtle ways, sometimes by adding 
new genes, and sometimes by influencing when 
genes turn on and off. These techniques also hold 
out promise for improving the environmental per-
formance of crops, as we discuss in Chapters 27 and 
28, by reducing emissions from nitrogen fertilizer 
use and rice cultivation. Although new regulatory 
systems will be needed to address the broad ease-
of-use of these technologies (with implications  
that go far beyond crop breeding), the techniques 
offer too much opportunity for crop breeding to 
ignore them.
Increase research on orphan crops 
Researchers at universities, agriculture agen-
cies, and agricultural companies should broaden 
their scope beyond the most intensely researched 
crops—maize, wheat, rice, and soybeans—to give 
increased attention and funding to orphan crops. 
Advanced plant breeding tools like CRISPR may 
help quickly improve orphan crops, which often 
have intractable breeding improvement challenges. 
Sorghum is a good example, with many quality and 
productivity problems, especially in the numerous 
varieties cultivated in Africa. As genes of interest 
are identified and linked to important phenotypes, 
in a wide variety of ways CRISPR holds poten-
tial to improve orphan crops more quickly, and 
breeders are already reporting a variety of rapid 
improvements.227 
Some movement in this direction is under way. 
In 2003, CGIAR launched its 10-year Generation 
Challenge Programme to improve crops in drought-
prone and harsh environments through genetic 
diversity and advanced plant science. From 2009 
to 2014, the program focused on drought tolerance 
for nine crops, six of which are orphans: beans, 
cassava, chickpeas, cowpeas, groundnuts, and 
sorghum.228 In addition, CGIAR has launched a 
research partnership initiative on grain legumes. 
Furthermore, the African Orphan Crops Consor-
tium229―consisting of companies, nongovernmental 
organizations, and international institutes―is 
undertaking an effort to sequence the genomes of 
100 little-studied food crops in Africa. Although 
promising, the research dollars involved are still 
small. By 2014, the consortium had raised $40 
million per year from developed countries, with 
a promise of $100 million more from African 
countries.230 Nevertheless, more efforts to improve 
orphan crops and research funding are needed. 
For more detail about this menu item, see “Crop 
Breeding: Renewing the Global Commitment,” a work-
ing paper supporting this World Resources Report 
available at www.SustainableFoodFuture.org. 
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CHAPTER 13
MENU ITEM: IMPROVE 
SOIL AND WATER 
MANAGEMENT
Many agricultural soils are degraded, and degradation is 
particularly acute in many areas where yield gains are most 
needed for food security. This menu item explores the potential 
to boost yields by restoring these degraded lands through 
practices such as agroforestry, water harvesting, and fertilizer 
microdosing. 
WRI.org        196
The Challenge
Although reliable data are lacking, FAO estimates 
that 25 percent of all cropland suffers from signifi-
cant soil degradation.231 Sources of degradation 
include water and wind erosion, salinization, nutri-
ent depletion (of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potas-
sium), and loss of soil organic carbon.232 Although 
protecting and rebuilding agricultural soils is the 
foundation of agricultural “conservation,” and 
although many projects have focused on such 
efforts in Africa, soils there continue to degrade.
Land degradation is of special concern in the 
world’s more arid croplands, often called “dry-
lands,” although we are not referring here to 
grazing areas too dry for growing crops.233 Drylands 
cover 41 percent of the earth’s surface and account 
for approximately 44 percent of global food pro-
duction.234 About 43 percent of Africa is drylands235 
and we focus in this chapter on sub-Saharan Africa. 
One challenge facing drylands is that rainfall levels 
often do not permit agricultural production to grow 
to match high rates of population increase, which 
can lead to overuse. A 2016 World Bank analysis 
examined the challenges in African drylands, high-
lighting population growth as a central stressor. 
While sub-Saharan drylands are expected to expand 
by 20 percent in some scenarios, the population in 
these areas is expected to grow by 58–74 percent by 
2030, leading to overuse and land degradation, as 
well as possible social conflict.236
Loss of soil organic carbon is a particular chal-
lenge. Organic carbon helps soils hold moisture and 
provides the kinds of chemical bonding that allow 
nutrients to be stored but also easily exchanged 
with plants. Soil organic carbon originates from 
decomposed plants. Because microorganisms in 
nearly all soils constantly break down soil organic 
matter and release the carbon into the atmosphere, 
maintaining soil organic carbon requires continual 
replenishment. In the case of cropland, replenish-
ment comes from the decomposition of plant roots 
and residues, or from the addition of material 
such as manure. Loss of soil organic carbon is also 
problematic because organic matter contains virtu-
ally all of the potentially plant-available nitrogen 
and 20–80 percent of the phosphorus in soils.237 In 
fact, if cropping removes more nitrogen than it adds 
through fertilizer or nitrogen fixation, soil organic 
carbon will decline because the nitrogen must come 
from the breakdown of existing organic matter.
African soils are not only low in organic matter 
but have long been losing carbon and nutrients.238 
These losses probably result in part from insuf-
ficient replenishment of carbon and in part from 
insufficient addition of nitrogen.239 The problem has 
been exacerbated in sub-Saharan Africa by adverse 
conditions for carbon and nutrient retention. The 
combination of old soils and high temperatures 
creates conditions where thriving microorganisms 
are able to consume, respire, and therefore trans-
fer the carbon in soils into the air year-round.240 
Organic matter’s ability to retain water is particu-
larly important in this region because of the highly 
variable rainfall.241 The growing season is also often 
short, and a relatively small percentage of rainfall is 
actually used by growing crops.242 Multiple stud-
ies have now documented that low organic matter 
reduces crop response to fertilizer application and 
makes fertilizer application uneconomical for vast 
areas of farmland.243 
Overall, the low levels of organic matter in African 
soils create a vicious circle because they lead to low 
yields, which in turn lead to less replenishment of 
soil carbon by crop roots and residues, and thus 
further losses in soil organic matter. But where 
crop yields are high, carbon levels not only can be 
maintained but even increased. Several papers have 
estimated that this is the case in China.244 
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The Opportunity
A range of soil and water management practices 
has evolved over the past several decades to address 
low levels of soil organic matter, as well as nutrient 
depletion and moisture stress.245 Many are obvious 
and fundamental practices of agriculture: adding 
fertilizers, irrigating, and plowing crop residues and 
animal manure back into soils. The challenge is to 
come up with practical and economical solutions 
for many poor farmers who cannot afford fertilizers, 
lack access to large irrigation systems, have little 
access to mechanization, start with low crop yields, 
and must choose between competing demands for 
crop residues, such as animal feed or domestic fuel. 
We start by exploring three techniques that have 
shown particular promise in dryland areas of 
Africa: some forms of agroforestry, rainwater har-
vesting, and fertilizer microdosing. We then sum-
marize the debate around “conservation agricul-
ture,” and some ideas for new or revised approaches 
based on that debate.
Agroforestry
Agroforestry is any form of farming in which farm-
ers deliberately integrate woody plants―trees and 
shrubs―with crops or livestock on the same tract of 
land. The term is broad and can refer to any form of 
agriculture that uses woody plants, including rub-
ber, fruit production, and cocoa. Here we focus on 
the incorporation of trees into production systems 
for row crop agriculture. 
A major success has occurred with the rejuvenation 
of agroforestry parklands in the Sahel. Since the 
mid-1980s, farmers have assisted in the regenera-
tion of trees across more than 5 million ha, par-
ticularly in Niger but also in Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Senegal, and Ethiopia.246
Although farmers have used a variety of trees, the 
species Faidherbia albida highlights the poten-
tial to use trees to restore soil fertility. Because it 
fixes nitrogen, its roots fertilize the surrounding 
soil, and because the tree’s leaves drop during the 
growing season, they avoid shading out crops while 
also adding more nitrogen and mulch. A number 
of studies have shown an increase in yields in the 
areas around these trees. In the Kantché district of 
southern Niger, a region with high levels of on-farm 
tree densities, a 2012 study found that farmers had 
produced grain surpluses every year since 2007, 
even in the below-average rainfall year of 2011.247
In addition to the Sahel, farms in Kenya, Zambia, 
and Malawi have also adopted Faidherbia, and 
studies have shown yield gains there too. For exam-
ple, in Zambia, trial sites under Faidherbia albida 
canopies yielded 88–190 percent more maize than 
sites outside of canopies (Figure 13-1). 
Well-managed agroforestry systems can generate 
benefits in addition to enhanced crop yields.248 For 
example, depending on the species, trees might pro-
vide fruit, nuts, medicines, and fiber—all important 
for direct human use. Large branches can be cut to 
make poles for home construction or to sell in local 
markets for additional income. Branch trimmings 
can be used for firewood. For example, Leucaena 
leucocephala trees, which grow at a rate of 3–5 m/
year and supply wood at a rate of 20–60 m³/ha/
year, are efficient producers of firewood.249 Seed 
pods and leaves can serve as fodder or forage for 
livestock; Leucaena hedgerows provide 2–6 tons 
of high-protein forage per hectare per year.250 
Leaves can be sold in markets; leaves of one mature 
baobab in Niger’s Mirriah district vary in value 
from US$28–US$70, an amount sufficient to buy 
at least 70 kg of grain in the market.251 Among 
other benefits, agroforestry systems help farmers in 
drylands build some economic resilience to drought 
and climate change. When the crops fail, the trees 
continue to produce. 
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Rainwater Harvesting 
Without attention to soil and water conservation, 
the loss of rainwater due to runoff from denuded 
fields can be significant. In Mali, for instance, 
70–80 percent of rainwater falling early in the rainy 
season is lost to runoff, and rainfall runoff takes 
away about 40 percent of the nutrients applied 
to the soil through organic and mineral sources 
of fertilizer.252 A variety of simple, low-cost water 
management practices can effectively capture and 
collect rainfall before it runs off farm fields.253 By 
slowing water runoff, such practices help farmers 
adjust to fluctuations in rainfall. These “rainwater 
harvesting” practices include:
 ▪ Planting pits ("zaï")
 ▪ Half-moon-shaped, raised earthen barriers 
(“demi-lunes”)
 ▪ Lines of stone placed along contours (“bunds”)
 ▪ Earthen barriers or trenches along contours 
(“ridge tillage”)
Yield improvements from rainwater harvesting can 
vary from 500 to 1,000 kg/ha, depending on other 
factors such as soil fertility management.254 Farm-
ers in Burkina Faso using rainwater harvesting 
techniques such as stone bunds and zaï to capture 
rainfall and reduce runoff have increased their 
yields from 400 kg to more than 900 kg/ha in some 
studies.255 And combining techniques on the same 
farm can increase yields more than one technique 
on its own (Figure 13-2).256 
Multiple studies indicate that rainwater harvesting 
can help buffer farmers from the effects of erratic 
and reduced rainfall and increase crop yields.257 
In Mali, for instance, the practice of ridge tillage 
reduces rainfall runoff and helps to capture scarce 
rainfall in a dry year. The practice has resulted in 
soil moisture increases of 17–39 percent. Ridge 
tillage allows earlier sowing and prolongs vegetative 
growth by as much as 20 days, thereby increasing 
millet yields by 40–50 percent. Ridge tillage also 
has resulted in an increase of 12–26 percent in soil 
carbon, and an increase of 30 percent in fertilizer-
use efficiency.258 
Figure 13-1  |   Maize yields are higher under Faidherbia trees in Zambia
Note: Average maize grain yields from trial sites under and outside canopies of mature Faidherbia albida trees across regions in Zambia.
Source: Shitumbanuma (2012).
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Fertilizer Microdosing 
Microdosing fertilizer is a complementary prac-
tice that involves applying often just a capful of 
fertilizer directly to crop seeds or young shoots at 
planting time or when the rains fall.259 Microdosing 
enables expensive fertilizer to go as far as possible 
with the least amount of waste. Approximately 
473,000 smallholder farmers in Mali, Burkina 
Faso, and Niger have used the technique and have 
experienced increases in sorghum and millet yields 
of 44–120 percent, along with increases in family 
incomes of 50–130 percent.260
Field results indicate that combining agroforestry, 
water harvesting, and microdosing has significant 
promise.261 Agroforestry increases soil nitrogen, 
organic matter, and moisture. Water harvesting 
helps improve soil moisture and recharge ground-
water. Fertilizer microdosing adds phosphorus 
and potassium where soils lack these elements. 
When conducted in tandem, agroforestry and water 
harvesting prepare the soil for the fertilizer, maxi-
mizing fertilizer-use efficiency.262
Conservation Agriculture
Conservation agriculture is typically defined as 
farming that involves three basic practices: 
 ▪ Minimizing soil disturbance by reducing the 
amount of tillage: seeds may be planted into 
small excavated basins rather than into tilled 
soil, or seeds are drilled into fields (“no-tillage” 
planting). 
 ▪ Retaining vegetation on fields after harvest: 
farmers leave crop residues on the field (the 
dominant practice in developed countries), 
mulch from trees or other plants is applied, 
and/or a cover crop is maintained during the 
dry season or winter. 
 ▪ Rotating different crops on the same land: 
rotation is used particularly to include more 
legumes and thereby to build soil nitrogen, to 
the benefit of all crops in the rotation.263 
Figure 13-2  |   A combination of rainwater harvesting practices is more effective at increasing grain yields than one 
practice (Burkina Faso)
Note: These two groups of villages are located on the northern central plateau of Burkina Faso. 
Source: Sawadogo (2006). 
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Together, the goal of these techniques is to reduce 
soil erosion, increase soil organic matter and mois-
ture content, add nitrogen, and help control pests. 
In theory, these practices should be available even 
to farmers who cannot afford expensive agricultural 
inputs. Development projects in Africa have often 
pushed these conservation agriculture methods, 
and farmers practicing them with the aid of such 
projects have often increased their yields signifi-
cantly and been able to make more efficient use of 
fertilizer and water.264 The International Fertilizer 
Development Center, a U.S.-based NGO, has been 
encouraging these kinds of efforts in conjunction 
with some increased use of conventional fertilizers, 
and has reported large yield increases by farm-
ers participating in its projects.265 Of course, even 
without external encouragement, farmers in Africa 
have historically intercropped nitrogen-fixing beans 
and rotated in soil-enhancing crops. 
Yet, despite the promise of conservation agricul-
ture, adoption rates have been modest, and many 
farmers abandon efforts after development projects 
end. In Zambia, for instance, official government 
policy has strongly encouraged conservation agri-
culture since the 1980s.266 Yet FAO studies examin-
ing practices in 2008 of two key traits—minimum 
soil disturbance and planting basins—found not 
only extremely low adoption rates of 5 percent 
nationwide, but also that 95 percent of farmers 
nationwide who had previously used these practices 
had abandoned them.267 
Although studies of participants in development 
projects have often found large yield gains from 
conservation agriculture,268 more recent studies 
have argued that this favorable literature “is subject 
to (i) data from experimental plots, (ii) small data 
sets from a non-representative group of farmers, 
or (iii) selection or other endogeneity problems.”269 
In a study of conservation agriculture in practice in 
Zambia, FAO found no consistent yield gains from 
changed tillage or maintenance of residues with 
the exception of farms in the drier, eastern part of 
the country, where the practices probably helped to 
preserve soil moisture.270 This FAO study also found 
that yield gains from virtually all practices evalu-
ated were often wiped out by unexpected periods of 
drought. Other analyses of conservation agriculture 
also find a lack of yield gains when they analyze 
farms that are not part of experiments directed by 
researchers.271 
These experiences have led many researchers to 
challenge conservation agriculture, even scientists 
who specialize in nitrogen-fixing crops or soil 
carbon.272 In doing so, they have highlighted many 
practical obstacles to adoption of conservation 
agriculture practices:
 ▪ Labor. Without mechanization and access to 
herbicides, large reductions in tillage require a 
great deal more work. Tillage has traditionally 
been the main way of dealing with weeds, and 
lack of tillage necessitates either more use of 
herbicides or laborious hand-weeding. Caring 
for trees offsite and then mulching them and 
adding them to soils is also time-consuming. 
In the absence of mechanization, smallholder 
farming already requires massive labor efforts, 
and farmers tend not to have the time or desire 
to add to these efforts.
 ▪ Caloric needs and agronomic challenges with legumes. Legumes such as beans 
provide protein and flavor to diets, but they 
produce fewer calories than maize, cassava, or 
yams per ha. Farmers who are already short 
on calories have less potential to add beans. 
In much of Africa, beans also face disease 
problems or various challenges with soil 
fertility.273
 ▪ Competition for residues. Crop residues are 
major sources of animal feed, and even farm-
ers who do not have livestock often allow other 
farmers with livestock to graze their fields.274 
 ▪ Uncertain yield effects. At a minimum, un-
certain yield effects make investments of both 
funds and labor risky.
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 ▪ Short-term decreases in yield. Even if and 
when practices add organic matter to soils, the 
added carbon tends to absorb and immobilize 
nitrogen. Unless farmers have increased access 
to nitrogen fertilizer, soil carbon practices will 
often lower yields in the short term, and in fact, 
building soil carbon will require additional 
nitrogen.275
These challenges do not mean that adding soil 
carbon by retaining residues or reducing tillage 
through conservation agriculture practices could 
not have advantages. Rather, these challenges mean 
that effects are complex, and merely urging farmers 
to incorporate these practices into their existing 
farming systems will often be unsuccessful. 
New approaches? 
The technical potential to restore soils is not at 
issue. For many years, researchers have developed 
promising strategies for revitalizing African soils 
that tend to work both in research plots and often 
for the duration of aid projects with participat-
ing farmers.276 For example, researchers explored 
“enhanced fallows,” which involve planting trees 
or shrubs on farm fields for two or more years, 
and then plowing the biomass into the soils.277 
Related efforts plant trees along field borders or in 
small plots and bring the biomass generated to the 
crop field.278 Research studies have demonstrated 
potential for large yield gains from these kinds of 
efforts.279 
The challenge is that these approaches tend to 
require more labor and costs for inputs, and the 
practice may involve at least a temporary loss 
of income. As a result, African farmers have not 
adopted soil conservation practices enough even 
to stabilize, let alone reverse, current levels of soil 
degradation. The lack of wide-scale adoption sug-
gests the need for new approaches. We believe two 
strategies may hold promise. 
One approach is to focus more on the changes in 
farm practices and agronomic factors that would 
make soil-building strategies more profitable and 
practicable. They include mechanization to reduce 
labor demands, development of quality fodder 
grasses that can grow well in land areas other than 
typical cropland, timely access to fertilizer, and 
reductions in the diseases that heavily affect  
bean production.280
A second approach involves working incremen-
tally on a farm to restore one small piece of land 
at a time. Incremental restoration reduces labor 
requirements and takes less farmland out of 
production at any one time. By concentrating 
resources, including labor, nitrogen, and available 
carbon, the hope would be to restore a small area 
quickly to the point where it will generate large 
yield gains, thus providing economic return soon 
enough to justify farmer efforts. With enough yield 
gains and use of nitrogen-fixing crops, such areas 
could potentially enter a “virtuous cycle” whereby 
soil carbon continues to build over time. 
Another possible option involves various ways 
of converting residues or household wastes into 
biochar, a residue of pyrolysis similar to charcoal. 
Although there continues to be scientific debate and 
uncertainty, biochar appears to provide at least a 
more stable form of concentrated carbon to soils 
that can also provide other agronomic benefits.281 
Those benefits appear to include, at least for some 
soils, enhanced nutrient effectiveness, probably 
through enhanced cation exchange. Many tropi-
cal soils are acidic, and biochar can also benefit 
yields by reducing that acidity. The key challenge 
is finding an economical and practical mechanism 
for increasing the production and use of biochar. 
Again, the incremental approach to farm fields 
might provide a viable approach. 
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Recommended Strategies
Experiences in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere 
underscore the importance of several strategies for 
scaling-up improved soil and water management 
practices. Four strategies hold particular promise:
Strengthen understanding 
Evidence of which practices truly work for farmers 
and help to restore productivity is weak in much of 
Africa. Data about the costs and benefits are mostly 
lacking for both technical and social outcomes and 
obstacles. One way to improve understanding is for 
donor agencies to build this kind of technical and 
socioeconomic analysis into their project budgets 
for monitoring and evaluation. Agroforestry seems 
to have particular potential, but no good system 
exists for systematically evaluating where and why 
farmers find agroforestry successful. A promising 
start is that the World Agroforestry Center has 
built a website for agroforestry in Africa to organize 
information in a systematic way. Further progress 
will require expanded funding to support stronger 
evaluations of agroforestry projects and use of this 
website to organize that information systematically.
Increase communication and outreach 
Practical methods exist to spread knowledge of 
conservation management.
Amplify the voice of champions. Champions 
of improved soil and water management practices 
should be identified and their voices amplified. 
Champions can come from the public or private 
sectors. Some of the most effective champions are 
farmers who have already adopted these practices. 
Facilitate peer-to-peer learning. Farmers can 
learn from other farmers working under simi-
lar agroecological conditions. Over the past two 
decades, farmer-to-farmer visits for knowledge 
sharing have become increasingly common. 
Use technology to directly communicate 
with farmers. Mobile phones are becoming 
a widespread tool for information sharing. The 
Web Alliance for Re-greening in Africa282 has 
developed a “Web of Voices” that links the use of 
mobile phones with radio stations and the inter-
net. Likewise, radio stations can air programs in 
which experienced farmers share their knowledge. 
In southern Tunisia, for instance, a regional radio 
station had a special weekly program during which 
farmer innovators shared their experiences and 
answered questions. 
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Support institutional and policy reforms 
Accelerating the spread of improved soil and water 
management practices requires enabling policies 
and legislation. Specific recommendations include 
the following:
Reform outdated and counterproductive 
forestry legislation. Despite repeated attempts 
to enact reforms, the forest codes in Senegal, Mali, 
Burkina Faso, and other countries still contain 
many provisions that allow forest service agents to 
impose fines or to otherwise discourage farmers 
from investing in protecting or regenerating trees in 
agroforestry systems. Reforming these laws is dif-
ficult when it involves changes to provisions related 
to the taxes, fines, and permitting requirements 
that some forest agents exploit to supplement their 
meager incomes. These forest codes are intended 
to conserve remaining areas of natural forests and 
woodlands but, because they lack specific provi-
sions governing the management of multipurpose 
trees in farming systems, they are liable to have a 
perverse effect that contributes to reducing tree 
cover in agricultural landscapes.283 
Establish more secure land tenure and man-
agement rights over trees. Smallholder farm-
ers will only adopt these improved soil and water 
management practices when they feel they can reap 
the benefits of the improved practices. This means 
that land tenure and forestry legislation need to 
eliminate ambiguities and ensure that farmers 
have secure rights to their land and the resources 
flowing from that land. These resources should 
include trees on cropland that have been protected, 
regenerated, or planted by farmers. And farmers 
should be allowed to freely harvest and market the 
full suite of products from their farming systems, 
including wood and nontimber forest products from 
agroforestry systems.
Strengthen local institutions to improve 
natural resource governance. Experience 
underscores the critical importance of developing 
the capacity of local institutions—such as tradi-
tional or modern village development committees—
to negotiate and locally enforce rules governing 
access to and use of natural resources, particularly 
the protection and management of on-farm trees 
and of natural vegetation. This requires locally 
enforceable rules to sanction illegal cutting of trees, 
limit damage caused by livestock to on-farm trees, 
and control bush fires.284
Pursue new models for increasing soil carbon in 
depleted croplands 
Aid agencies and governments need to pursue new 
approaches for rebuilding soils, and we suggest 
considering the two strategies we discuss above. 
One involves working on the impediments to soil 
conservation measures (such as bean diseases) and 
boosting production of high-quality forage grasses 
as a substitute for crop residues. The other involves 
projects that focus on incrementally restoring 
fertility to small portions of farms, perhaps as small 
as one-tenth of a hectare, through comprehensive 
programs that bring together all of the components 
needed. They would include financial assistance to 
allow farmers to forgo the food production involved 
and adequate fertilizers to feed the microorgan-
isms necessary to turn plant carbon into stable 
soil carbon. One advantage of such an incremental 
approach is that it would allow programs to assist 
many farmers within the same budget.
For more detail about this menu item, see “Improving 
Land and Water Management,” a working paper 
supporting this World Resources Report available at 
www.SustainableFoodFuture.org. 
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CHAPTER 14
MENU ITEM: PLANT 
EXISTING CROPLAND 
MORE FREQUENTLY
One way to produce more food on existing cropland is to plant 
and harvest crops on that land more frequently. The ratio of 
the quantity of crop harvests in a year—the harvested area―to 
the quantity of arable land is known as the “cropping intensity.” 
Globally, FAO estimates cropping intensity at only 0.82 because 
much cropland is kept fallow. This chapter explores the practical 
potential for increasing cropping intensity and finds limited 
information.
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The Challenge
Two factors influence global cropping intensity in 
different directions. The first is the amount of fal-
low land—cropland that is not harvested in a given 
year. The identification of land as fallow implies 
that cropland is being rested, which results in a 
cropping intensity of less than one. The second fac-
tor is the number of crop harvests per year. In some 
warm climates with irrigation or sufficient rainfall 
throughout the year, farmers plant and harvest two 
cycles of crops—and in a few locations three—each 
year on the same tract of land. Multicropping cre-
ates a cropping intensity greater than one. In Ban-
gladesh, for example, farmers on average achieve 
1.56 crop harvests each year per hectare  
of cropland.285 
The need to increase food production and avoid 
expansion of agricultural land means that it is 
generally desirable to increase cropping intensity. 
In principle, if land is cropped once per year or  
once every several years, cropping it twice per year 
will produce more food, save land, and reduce  
GHG emissions. There are, however, three signifi-
cant challenges.
One challenge is economic. Using a simple global 
crop model, IIASA has estimated that the potential 
for increasing double-cropping—even on rainfed 
lands—is large and that half of all land suitable for 
growing cereals could technically support two crops 
per year.286 “Suitable land” counts both existing 
cropland and potential cropland, including forests. 
However, this estimate includes any land capable of 
producing any crop with up to 10 percent of global 
average yields. According to FAO global estimates, 
approximately half of all double-cropped land is 
irrigated, and farmers probably plant two crops a 
year on only 6 percent of rainfed area.287 Unless 
farmers are missing opportunities, the realistic 
economic prospects for expanding double-cropping 
on rainfed lands must therefore be far more limited 
than those projected by IIASA.
Second, the prospect of increasing double-cropping 
through irrigation is limited at best, and even 
present levels may not be sustainable. For example, 
cropping intensity across India is already at 140 
percent, with Punjab ranking highest among Indian 
states at 190 percent.288 However, because much 
of India is experiencing increasing water shortages 
and falling groundwater reserves,289 it is not clear 
whether existing levels of double-cropping can even 
be maintained.
Third, some efforts to reduce fallow lands would 
come with large costs in carbon and habitat values, 
particularly in areas that practice long-term shift-
ing cultivation. Under shifting cultivation prac-
tices, land is allowed to regrow natural vegetation, 
typically trees, to rebuild soil fertility. Both the root 
growth and eventual clearing and often burning of 
the trees adds carbon and nutrients to the soil. In 
the forest part of the cycle, the trees can provide 
substantial carbon storage and habitat value, creat-
ing a landscape with higher values for both  
on average. 
According to a recent estimate, areas of shifting cul-
tivation, both cultivated and fallow, currently cover 
280 Mha of land.290 This same study found that 
although fallow periods during shifting cultivation 
are declining, which reduces the share of land that 
is forested on average in the shifting agricultural 
landscape, shifting cultivation is persisting as a 
system. In these areas, a shift to permanent or more 
regular cultivation is not carbon-free or without 
loss of habitat.
The Opportunity
Increases in cropping intensity from 85 to 89 
percent, based on FAO estimates, are already 
factored into our baseline projections. According to 
GlobAgri-WRR, this increase would avoid roughly 
70 Mha of land clearing. FAO projects that irrigated 
lands will provide roughly two-thirds of this crop-
ping intensity gain, presumably from an increase in 
double-cropping.291 These estimates are based on 
the judgments of regional experts, but there is no 
documentation to evaluate them further. 
Recent FAO data appear to suggest a much more 
rapid increase in cropping intensity than is sug-
gested by its 2050 projection, which we rely on for 
this report. The data suggest that between 2000 
and 2011 alone, increases in cropping intensity pro-
vided the equivalent of 101 Mha of cropland farmed 
each year, and in that way avoided the conversion 
of 101 Mha of land from forest or other carbon-rich 
ecosystems.292 On this basis, some researchers 
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record a rapid escalation in cropping intensity.293 
Unfortunately, for reasons we discuss in Chapter 10 
on the land-use challenge, data on cropland extent 
submitted to FAOSTAT can be highly unreliable, 
which means the changes in cropping intensity are 
also unreliable (Chapter 10). 
An alternative way to increase cropping intensity 
involves leaving land fallow less often. Adjusting for 
areas that are double-cropped, about 350–400 Mha 
of cropland were not harvested in 2009 according 
to FAOSTAT data.294 (This amount roughly matches 
the 450 Mha estimate based on 2000 data from 
a paper by Siebert et al. [2010] that attempted to 
analyze cropping intensity globally.) Planting this 
land more frequently would appear to provide a 
good opportunity to increase production without 
increasing land area. However, there are several 
limitations:
 ▪ As discussed above, some fraction of this land 
probably represents land in shifting cultivation, 
in other words, land with long-term fallows. 
More frequent planting would entail substantial 
environmental costs.
 ▪ According to maps by Siebert et al. (2010), fal-
low lands are concentrated in dry areas where 
rainfall is probably not sufficient to plant crops 
every year. 
 ▪ Some fallow lands should actually be consid-
ered “abandoned.” For example, U.S. cropland 
includes lands enrolled in the U.S. Conserva-
tion Reserve Program, and most of these lands 
have been planted with grasses or trees for 
more than five years.295 Cropland also appears 
to include large areas of abandoned agricul-
tural land in the former Soviet Union.296 Unlike 
truly occasional fallow land, abandoned land 
reverts to forest or grassland (according to 
what the soils and climate can support), which 
sequesters abundant carbon and provides 
other ecosystem services. One study estimated 
carbon accumulating at a rate of 2.45 tons of 
carbon per hectare per year on abandoned land 
in Russia.297 Returning this land to productive 
use may be preferable to plowing up the world’s 
remaining intact ecosystems, but it still comes 
at an environmental cost.
Notwithstanding the broad uncertainty and poten-
tial adverse effects of some increases in cropping 
intensity, there clearly are opportunities for prog-
ress. Brazil, for example, has seen an increase of 
roughly 9 Mha of maize planted as a second crop 
between 2001 and 2016.298 Brazil appears to have 
substantial potential for more double-cropping, 
although one study has estimated that climate 
change will greatly undermine that potential.299 
Overall, the data limitations bar any confident 
assessment of the potential or likelihood of 
increased cropping intensity, or of the environ-
mental implications of such an increase. Increases 
in double-cropping and reductions in short-term 
fallow land area probably provide an important 
mechanism for holding down agriculture-driven 
land-use change. In some long-term fallow regions, 
more intense cropping of regularly cropped land 
might allow long-term fallow areas to permanently 
regenerate to forests or grasslands. But where  
and how such intensification of cropping occurs  
will determine its economic, social, and environ-
mental merits. 
We assume that with great effort, cropping intensity 
might be increased by 5 percent more to 93 per-
cent. This level of increase would reduce cropland 
demand by roughly 81 Mha and reduce annual 
emissions from land-use change by 646 Mt CO2e, 
relative to baseline.
Recommended Strategies
Analysis of the potential to reduce fallowing or 
increase double-cropping is so limited that mak-
ing recommendations is difficult. Nonetheless, 
one obvious recommendation is for scientists and 
agronomists to conduct more detailed analysis of 
realistic, potential increases in cropping intensity. 
These studies should be detailed and spatially 
explicit, meaning that they should build in data 
reflecting small-scale differences in weather and 
soils by location. They should also account for limi-
tations on irrigation water availability and  
build in at least some basic economic calculations. 
Only with this type of analysis can governments  
and researchers determine which improvements  
in infrastructure or crop varieties can contribute  
to making increased cropping intensity economi-
cally viable.
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CHAPTER 15
ADAPT TO  
CLIMATE CHANGE
This course has focused on efforts to boost livestock and 
crop yields on existing agricultural land, but such efforts will 
not occur in a static world. Technology is changing but so is 
the world’s climate. In this chapter, we explore priorities for 
agricultural adaptation to climate change. While priority actions 
sometimes require targeted interventions, they often overlap 
with and reinforce the need to implement other production-side 
menu items presented in this report. 
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The Challenge 
Climate change and agriculture are a two-way 
street: “business as usual” growth in food produc-
tion adversely affects the climate, but climate 
change itself poses challenges by adversely affect-
ing food production. FAO’s projections of crop 
yield growth, which we incorporate into our 2050 
baseline, make no attempt to account for climate 
change. Yet the world is on track for warming by 
0.5–2 degrees Celsius (°C) or more by 2050 relative 
to preindustrial conditions and probably greater 
than 4°C by 2100.300 In 2007, the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reported that 
scientists projected, on balance, that climate change 
would lead to net global yield gains in 2050 due to 
beneficial conditions for cropping in the temperate 
zone.301 But by 2014, new research had convinced 
the IPCC that, with a warming of 2°C above late-
twentieth-century levels, average global crop yields 
are “more likely than not” to decline by at least 5 
percent by 2050—with even steeper yield declines 
by 2100 (Figure 15-1).302 
Overall, climate change will adversely affect yields 
in a few basic ways: through changes in tempera-
ture, changes in rainfall patterns, and sea level rise. 
Note: This figure includes projections for different emission scenarios, for tropical and temperate regions, and for adaptation and no-adaptation cases combined. 
Source: Porter et al. (2014), Figure 7-5.
Figure 15-1  |   Negative impacts of climate change on crop yields are projected to become increasingly likely throughout 
this century
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Temperature 
Higher temperatures at critical times have direct 
effects on the growth of some crops. Most stud-
ies have focused on maize and wheat, yet tea and 
Arabica coffee are other clear examples.303 Much of 
researchers’ increasing pessimism about climate 
effects on crops results from an increased under-
standing of the direct consequences of heat.304 
For example, just a few days of exceptionally high 
temperatures at critical periods of growth, such as 
vulnerable reproductive stages, will reduce yields.305
Warmer temperatures are likely to change the dis-
tribution of pests and pathogens and either reduce 
or cause timing mismatches with pollinators306 
in ways that reduce crop yields. Warmer winters 
reduce overwintering mortality of some insects and 
promote their early maturation.307 This results in 
earlier predation and an increase in the spread of 
plant pathogens by insect vectors.308
Higher temperatures dry out the atmosphere 
and soils due to evaporative loss, which, in turn, 
increases the rate at which plants transpire and 
therefore lose water.309 Although warmer tempera-
tures will mean greater rainfall globally somewhere, 
these conditions will lead to greater water depriva-
tion in other areas. Even in areas that do not dry 
out on average, this enhanced drying will increase 
the frequency of days when crops do not have opti-
mal access to water. 
Rainfall
In some regions, overall drier conditions will result 
in shorter growing seasons and increase the risk of 
large losses or absolute crop failures, although in 
some colder regions growing seasons will lengthen 
due to increased frost-free days.310
More of the rainfall that occurs will take place 
in intense storms.311 Even in relatively “normal” 
rainfall years, the result will be more days with 
insufficient soil moisture levels and more problems 
related to floods and erosion. 
Serious droughts and floods will also become 
more frequent, with the areas affected by drought 
disasters projected to grow from 15 percent to 
approximately 44 percent of the planet.312 Regions 
facing the greatest increases in instances of drought 
disaster include southern Africa, the United States, 
southern Europe, Brazil, and Southeast Asia. One 
study found that droughts caused annual average 
losses in global cereal production of 6.7 percent 
from 1964 to 1984. Losses rose to 13.7 percent 
between 1985 and 2007.313 Regional models for 
sub-Saharan Africa indicate that maize yields could 
decrease by more than 50 percent in some areas by 
2050 due to increased aridity.314 
Water stress on cropping, already significant in 
some areas, is likely to increase due to both growing 
water demand and climate change (see Figure 1-5).
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Sea level rise 
Sea level rise will result in saltwater inundation 
of agricultural land and saltwater intrusion into 
coastal aquifers that irrigate coastal crops. With 
a 1 meter (m) rise in sea levels, almost 11 percent 
of South Asia’s agricultural land is projected to be 
vulnerable to flooding.315
Climate change will also have some positive effects. 
First, even as some regions become drier, others 
will become wetter—which is generally beneficial 
for crop growth.316 Second, higher temperatures in 
some colder, temperate areas will allow for longer 
growing seasons. Studies in northern China, for 
example, have projected significant benefits as 
warming temperatures enable two crops per year.317 
Third, higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
stimulates plant growth by raising photosynthetic 
activity in many crops, increasing nitrogen use 
efficiency, and decreasing water use.318 Expected 
benefits from these three effects largely explain 
why the IPCC as late as 2007 expected positive net 
effects on global crop yields in the relatively more 
moderate warming previously expected by 2050. 
Over time, however, the weight of the evidence has 
shifted. Governments funded a series of outdoor 
experiments in which equipment sprayed out 
additional CO2 to test how crops and other plants 
responded. Although the experiments confirmed 
much of what indoor trials had shown, research-
ers found roughly half of the expected yield gain 
in crops overall, in part because crops funneled a 
smaller than expected portion of their additional 
total growth into edible parts.319 This lower expecta-
tion of the benefits of CO2, combined with increas-
ing evidence of harsh effects of higher temperatures 
and more variable rainfall, shifted the overall 
estimate of yield impacts of climate change—even at 
moderate warming levels—to negative. 
The problem of uncertainty
Although the evidence is increasingly pessimistic, 
estimates of the scale of global impacts are highly 
uncertain and regional and local impacts are even 
harder to estimate. Uncertainty results from three 
core issues.
First, the degree of warming is uncertain because 
of gaps in our understanding of how the climate 
changes in response to concentrations of CO2 that 
are higher than those prevailing over the past 
100,000 years (although this uncertainty about 
warming has less effect on crop model projections 
than uncertainty about precipitation changes). 
Second, the complexity of regional climate patterns 
generates great uncertainty in climate models, 
particularly those that attempt to estimate changes 
in precipitation as discussed below. Scientists 
try to overcome differences in model outputs by 
using suites of models; however, this approach 
mainly helps to better define the greatest areas of 
uncertainty and does not necessarily produce more 
accurate estimates. This uncertainty applies not 
merely to changes in average conditions but also to 
variability, which is important to crop responses. 
Third, estimates of changes in crop yields due to a 
changing climate vary because crop models differ. 
The high level of uncertainty in projections should 
actually be a cause for even more serious concern 
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because we have no assurance that the midrange 
projections are the most likely. Several studies 
project far more serious impacts. For example, a 
2012 World Bank study estimated that by midcen-
tury, global yields of wheat, maize, and soybeans 
could decline by 14–25 percent, 19–34 percent, 
and 15–30 percent, respectively, with a warm-
ing of 2.2°C to 3.2°C compared to preindustrial 
temperatures.320 
The midrange IPCC projection of yield effects also 
relies primarily on crop models, whereas analysis 
using statistical models sometimes projects larger 
effects. Crop models attempt to simulate dynamic 
processes of crop growth and their response to 
variations in soil quality, radiation, rainfall, and 
temperature. Statistical models mostly relate crop 
yields to past trends in temperatures and rainfall. 
One statistical study in 2009 found dramatic effects 
on yields of maize, soybeans, and cotton in the 
United States for each cumulative total of 24 hours 
during the growing season that temperatures rose 
above 29°C. Using this relationship, the study indi-
cated yield losses of 30–46 percent by 2100 under 
the most favorable (least warming) climate scenario 
and by 63–82 percent under the most rapidly 
warming scenario.321 Another recent study projected 
that climate change could eliminate all trend line 
growth in overall agricultural productivity, or total 
factor productivity, by 2050.322
There is also growing evidence that crop yields have 
already declined because of climate change.323 In 
one analysis, statistical models linking crop yields 
to weather from 1980 to 2008 showed that declines 
and increases in soybean and rice yields balanced 
out on a global scale, they also indicated that 
climate change depressed the growth in yields of 
maize by 3.8 percent and of wheat by 5.5 percent.324 
In some countries, according to this analysis, 
estimated climate change effects were significant 
enough to freeze yields and thereby cancel out all 
benefits of improving technology.
Behind the global effects lie more serious regional 
food security concerns, because a substantial body 
of evidence indicates that the worst consequences of 
climate change are likely to be felt in sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia, the two most food-insecure 
regions of the world.325 Some crops such as cassava 
and peanuts might actually increase yields under 
climate change, although the effect would likely be 
highly variable across crop varieties and regions.326 
However, cereal yields will most likely decline. One 
study using a crop model projects wheat declines 
in sub-Saharan Africa of 23–27 percent by 2050.327 
Some important cash crops—such as coffee and 
cocoa—will no longer thrive in parts of their pres-
ent growing areas.328 Efforts to move these crops to 
higher elevations will threaten forests in mountain 
areas, further contributing to GHG emissions.329
Shorter growing seasons may be even more of a 
problem in Africa. Growing seasons measure the 
periods when temperature and rainfall are adequate 
to produce crops, and Africa’s short growing 
seasons are already a challenge for agriculture and 
food security. One study projects greater than 20 
percent declines in the length of growing seasons 
in much of sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 15-2).330 
Combining shorter growing seasons with increased 
variability in rainfall would make farming substan-
tially riskier. 
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All of these changes combine to pose serious risks 
to food security, particularly by increasing the 
volatility of food supplies and prices.331 Studies 
generally predict that climate change will lead to 
increased food prices by 2050, with estimated aver-
age price increases ranging from 3 percent to 84 
percent—a wide range—relative to a world without 
climate change.332 Nelson et al. (2009) estimated 
Figure 15-2  |   Climate change could shorten growing seasons in much of sub-Saharan Africa by more than 20 percent by 2100
that, due to climate-related price increases, the 
number of malnourished children under the age of 
five could increase by roughly 20 percent by 2050, 
relative to a world without climate change.333 Lloyd 
et al. (2011) estimated increases in moderate stunt-
ing of up to 29 percent and in severe stunting of 23 
percent to 62 percent by midcentury relative to a 
world with a stable climate.334 
>20% loss
5–20% loss
No change
5–20% gain
>20% gain
Length of growing
period in the
2090s compared
with the 2000s
Source: Verhage et al. (2018), using methods from Jones and Thornton (2015). 
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The Opportunity
The quantitative estimates of climate change 
impacts cited above generally assume no adapta-
tion. What potential exists for adaptation and what 
can the world do now to take advantage of that 
potential? A number of researchers have used crop 
models to make quantitative estimates of adapta-
tion potential (Box 15-1), primarily by modeling 
effects on yields if farmers changed crop varieties 
or were able to irrigate. These analyses suggest 
substantial potential to adapt, but the range of esti-
mates remains large, and there are significant rea-
sons to doubt the most comforting estimates. The 
major practical problem in formulating adaptation 
plans today is that regional climate models typically 
make widely varying predictions about changes 
in regional and local precipitation. For example, 
models disagree about whether West Africa will be 
wetter or drier,335 how rainfall will be distributed 
between the two monsoons in Sri Lanka,336 and how 
changes in climate oscillations such as El Niño will 
affect intraseasonal extreme rainfall in the contigu-
ous United States.337 Even where models agree, 
there is uncertainty. For example, although most 
models predict that southern Africa will become 
drier, it actually appears now to be becoming wet-
ter.338 In some locations, even if rainfall increases, 
the increased losses of water from soils and plants 
because of higher temperatures may make condi-
tions for plants effectively drier.339 Because precipi-
tation plays such a fundamental role in agriculture, 
these variations—with some exceptions—make it 
impossible to develop plans that are sufficiently 
reliable to guide changes in the types of crops farm-
ers in the area should grow. 
In part because of this constraint, the most 
important efforts needed are those improvements 
in farming that would be valuable regardless of 
climate impacts—what are known as “no regrets” 
strategies. For example, if farmers are better able 
to manage the rainfall variability that exists today, 
they will be better able to handle the even greater 
variability that will exist tomorrow. If farmers have 
greater social security to deal with their risks today, 
they will be better able to deal with the increased 
variations in crop production likely to occur in  
the future. 
In addition, in most cases, general improvements 
in farming will be more important than specific 
adaptation strategies for the simple reason that the 
former’s scope of impact is potentially larger. For 
example, if farmers could raise yields by 50 percent 
using improved management to close a yield gap, 
an estimated 10 percentage point adverse effect of 
climate change would generally still leave a net gain 
of 40 percent in yield.
For these reasons, both researchers and policymak-
ers have been struggling to separate actions that 
adapt to climate change from more general agri-
cultural development strategies.340 Despite uncer-
tainties, there are some clear, general patterns of 
climate change that greatly enhance the importance 
of resolving an existing agricultural challenge and 
that therefore merit special focus. Likewise, some 
climate-related physical changes in specific agri-
cultural locations are sufficiently likely that major 
adaptation efforts can start—and in some cases 
have already started. We therefore focus on four 
adaptation measures that are specific applications 
of the menu items described in Chapters 12 and 13: 
 ▪ Enable farmers to select alternative crop 
varieties
 ▪ Cope with rainfall variability
 ▪ Breed to overcome highly likely big climate 
challenges (e.g., extreme temperatures)
 ▪ Change land management practices to deal with 
predictable physical changes
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Improve incremental crop breeding and systems 
for farmers to select alternative crop varieties
One lesson from the adaptation analyses discussed 
in Box 15-1 is that, as the climate changes, farm-
ers will often be able to lessen effects on yields by 
switching to alternative crop varieties that already 
exist somewhere in the world. But for many farm-
ers, selecting new seed varieties is not as simple as 
picking a different seed each year from a catalog. 
Researchers are modeling seed traits that exist 
somewhere but that are not necessarily both 
adapted and available to each local condition. For 
farmers to be able to adapt, therefore, they need 
effective regional breeding systems to adapt vari-
eties to the regions, and they also need to better 
marketing systems for acquiring seeds.
As Atlin et al. (2016) point out, “The best predictor 
of the climate in the very near future, (i.e. the next 
ten years) is the current climate . . . [so] farmers 
who are at least risk with respect to climate change 
are [therefore] those who use varieties bred very 
recently.” Therefore, as climate evolves over time, 
“the most important climate change adaptation 
tools for crop production are thus breeding and cul-
tivar delivery systems that rapidly and continuously 
develop new varieties and replace old ones.” In gen-
eral, these incremental breeding systems and seed 
distribution networks are weakest in sub-Saharan 
Africa, as discussed in Chapter 12. Climate change 
enhances the importance of improving them. 
Cope with rainfall variability through improved 
water management
Higher rainfall variability will be a nearly universal 
phenomenon of climate change. Farmers will face 
longer periods of droughts, more frequent tor-
rential storms, and a general trend toward more 
concentrated delivery of regular rainfall.341 Farmers 
can adapt somewhat to this variability by shifting 
planting dates. Greater understanding of climate 
patterns and improved weather forecasting  
may help farmers plan their annual cropping  
decisions appropriately.
Many farmers would also benefit from enhanced 
irrigation. Unfortunately, for reasons discussed in 
“The Scope of the Challenge,” we do not believe that 
major new irrigation projects meet our sustain-
ability criteria or will be economically or techni-
cally feasible in most locations because of the level 
of current water shortages and the high share of 
extractable water already used for irrigation. But 
small-scale irrigation efforts such as small storage 
basins,342 small reservoirs, and direct river and 
groundwater pumping in locations where abundant 
water still exists are more environmentally benign. 
Small farmers in sub-Saharan Africa have par-
ticularly undeveloped access to groundwater. One 
study estimated that small-scale irrigation could 
be economically expanded by roughly 100 Mha in 
the region, benefiting between 113 million and 369 
million people.343 In addition, farmers can benefit 
from the rainwater harvesting techniques described 
in Chapter 13. 
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BOX 15-1 |  Quantitative estimates of adaptation potential
To provide quantitative estimates of the 
effects of adaptation, researchers can use 
“process-based” crop models and estimate 
how crop yields would change not only under 
a different climate but if farmers adapted by 
using different crop varieties or irrigation. 
Process-based models simulate the different 
biological processes in plants and how they 
are influenced by factors such as rainfall, 
soils, and temperature; they therefore can 
estimate how plants with different growing 
seasons or other rainfall or temperature 
needs would respond. They differ from 
statistical models, which try to use direct 
evidence of how crop yields in the real world 
have varied with weather changes over time. 
Although different models generate varying 
results, the majority show a high potential for 
avoiding many of the worst impacts. 
A comprehensive comparison of models has 
now calculated that adaptation could fully 
offset expected cereal declines of roughly 
20 percent caused by temperature effects.a 
On average, models also estimated that 
adaptation could offset half of declines due 
to changes in precipitation. These analyses 
on the whole suggest enormous potential for 
adaptation, mostly from the relatively modest 
effort of selecting alternative crop varieties or 
changing planting dates. 
Looking at these process-based models in 
more detail, however, leads to more cautious 
conclusions: 
 ▪ Even with adaptation, the average projec-
tion of these models indicates adverse 
effects on rainfed crops due to changes in 
average precipitation. 
 ▪ Regional effects would still be severe for 
some crops after adaptation. For example, 
averaging multiple studies to estimate 
temperature effects still projects an 
almost 10 percent decline in maize yield in 
tropical climates in a world experiencing 
a 2°C increase over preindustrial average 
temperatures.b
 ▪ Just as the overall effects of climate 
change vary from model to model, so do 
the benefits of adaptation. Some studies 
still project adverse effects on global 
cereal yields of 30 to 40 percent with a 
temperature increase of 2–3°C.a Because 
models make different predictions, it is 
natural to focus on some form of “aver-
age” results. But no statistical rule applies 
here to make the average more likely, and 
it is quite possible that some of the worse 
results will turn out to be more accurate. 
Lobell (2014) summarizes several reasons 
to believe that these adaptation analyses 
are overly optimistic. Process-based models 
often leave out many of the features that 
climate change may adversely affect, such 
as temporary temperature extremes and 
variability in moisture conditions. Some 
adaptation studies analyze the benefits of 
adaptation measures without distinguishing 
whether they are effective in dealing 
with climate change or just in improving 
agriculture in general. A new crop variety 
or irrigation scheme may boost crop yields 
regardless of climate change. Although 
implementing such improvements can be 
important, all measures to boost yields in 
effect help to compensate and therefore 
“adapt” in a broad sense to climate change. 
To analyze the effect of “adaptation” alone, 
we need to measure only the additional 
effect a measure would have as a result of a 
changing climate.
Perhaps most significantly, many studies 
using statistical models find significant 
adverse effects from climate change on 
current crop yields in the United States and 
Europe already. In these regions, farmers 
have a wide choice of seed selection, can 
regularly upgrade their seed varieties, and 
have detailed information about which 
varieties perform best in specific localities. 
If switching crop varieties were enough to 
offset adverse effects of climate change, 
these adverse effects should not be 
occurring. 
Overall, the evidence from crop models does 
suggest significant capacity to adapt. But 
there is high uncertainty about the extent 
to which adaptation can offset the adverse 
effects of climate change, and it is doubtful 
that currently available forms of adaptation—
although significant—can fully offset these 
adverse effects.
Sources:
a. Challinor et al. (2014).
b. Lobell (2014).
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Breed new traits to overcome large, highly likely 
climate challenges (e.g., extreme temperatures)
This recommendation concerns not simply improv-
ing the systems for incremental breeding but 
deliberately developing new traits. For example, 
despite many uncertainties, scientists have shown 
that maize and wheat are extremely sensitive to 
high temperatures, particularly during grain filling 
and silking—the reproductive stage during which 
grains are pollinated. Twenty thousand field trials 
in Africa have reported large maize yield losses for 
each 24 hours of temperature above 30°C, which 
typically occurs wherever average temperature dur-
ing the growing season is 23°C or more.344 Rising 
temperatures are also likely to preclude Arabica 
coffee production in many midlevel mountain areas 
currently devoted to this crop.345 Breeding maize, 
wheat, and coffee to withstand higher temperatures 
is therefore urgently needed, but the task will not 
be easy because, at this time, all existing varieties of 
these crops exhibit temperature stresses. 
Some crop breeding needs for adaptation fall into 
the category of fundamental crop research, which 
may have low odds for success but high potential 
for gains. For example, one study has projected that 
hotter, drier climates and increasing plant transpi-
ration could lead to water shortages in the U.S. corn 
(maize) belt, where farmers use limited irrigation.346 
Adaptation could include breeding for a variety of 
sophisticated changes in metabolic plant processes 
to reduce transpiration rates.
These kinds of adaptations require innovative 
genetic tools and breeding systems along with well-
trained plant scientists. Breeders need to receive 
sufficient resources and concentrate efforts to breed 
greater resilience to the already identified and likely 
climate change effects. Encouragingly, there are 
already some modest efforts in this direction.347
Change land management practices to deal with 
likely physical changes (e.g., sea level rise)
Rising sea levels are among the certain impacts of 
climate change. In recent years, rapid ice melt in 
Antarctica has surpassed expectations, leading to 
augmented projections that, if emissions remain 
high, sea levels would most likely rise 1.5 m and 
possibly more by 2100.348 In addition to much 
larger areas that become vulnerable to occasional 
flooding, one study indicates that sea level rise of 1 
m would inundate roughly 0.4 percent of agricul-
tural land in developing countries (roughly 6 Mha), 
and a rise of 2 m would inundate about 0.7 percent 
(roughly 12 Mha).349 While these global percentages 
are low, effects would be harsh for farmers and 
economies at the local level. In Bangladesh, agri-
culture has already experienced adverse impacts 
due to saltwater inundation and salinity intrusion, 
resulting in a conversion of 500 ha of agricultural 
land per year (in the study area) to saline land and 
a decline in rice production.350 The coastal areas of 
the Mekong Delta in Vietnam are similarly experi-
encing saltwater intrusion.351
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In these areas, work to build resilience has already 
started. In Bangladesh, efforts include coastal 
afforestation, cultivation of saline-tolerant crops, 
homestead and floating gardens, embankment 
cropping, and shifts in livelihoods, including to 
shrimp farming.352 In Vietnam, agricultural changes 
have been mainly driven by national-level poli-
cies. Physical infrastructure projects appear to be 
the favored approach to minimizing the effects of 
sea level rise, but there has been a combination 
of adaptation activities, including upstream flow 
control, agronomic measures, and regeneration of 
coastal ecosystems.353 In both Bangladesh and Viet-
nam, fully inundated areas may require transitions 
to aquaculture, and the extent of inundation will 
determine the types of aquaculture that are feasible.
Although not certain, there is also a high risk that 
some of the drier arable lands in Africa will cross 
thresholds and become unsuitable for crop produc-
tion due to decreased rainfall and/or greater rain-
fall variability. Africa already has highly variable 
rainfall seasons that result in short crop-growing 
seasons in many areas. Delays in rainfall, or periods 
of little or no rainfall during the wet season, can 
lead to high rates of crop failure. The aggregation of 
climate change impacts may lead to circumstances 
in which parts of Africa must abandon crop agricul-
ture and transition to agropastoralism or pastoral-
ism, which is capable of handling both drier and 
more variable rainfall conditions.354 
Recommended Strategies
Most needs for adaptation overlap with the menu 
items we discuss in this report and involve fine-tun-
ing menu item strategies. For example, increasing 
food production in Africa requires improvements 
to incremental breeding and seed distribution 
systems, which would also help crops to evolve with 
changing climates. Building social welfare systems 
would allow small farmers to withstand periods of 
hardship without selling their assets, and the need 
for resilience will increase with climate change. 
Many systems that are important today, such as 
small-scale water-supply systems in Africa and 
institutional capacity to respond to plant diseases, 
will only become more important in the future.
In some contexts, information about the future cli-
mate is sufficiently clear or local to call for specific 
new efforts that would otherwise not be justified. 
Examples include breeding new traits for many 
crops that enable them to handle high tempera-
tures, and adjusting agricultural production in 
coastal areas affected by rising sea levels. Over time, 
as evolving weather patterns become clearer, more 
of these examples will emerge.
Overall, we believe countries and global organiza-
tions should view the need for adaptation as adding 
urgency to the broader menu for a sustainable  
food future. 
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CHAPTER 16
HOW MUCH COULD 
BOOSTING CROP AND 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTIVITY 
CONTRIBUTE TO CLOSING  
THE LAND AND GREENHOUSE 
GAS MITIGATION GAPS?
This chapter uses the GlobAgri-WRR model to explore the combined 
potential of the measures described so far in this course to limit 
agricultural land expansion and reduce agricultural GHG emissions, 
even as the world feeds a growing population.
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The menu items in Chapters 12–14 (improve crop 
breeding, improve soil and water management, and 
plant existing cropland more frequently) all increase 
crop production per hectare to meet growing food 
demand while avoiding further land clearing and 
associated GHG emissions. What is the combined 
potential of these menu items? And to what extent 
might climate change hinder progress if the adapta-
tion measures discussed in Chapter 15 are not pur-
sued? Table 16-1 summarizes the effects of several 
crop yield change scenarios, based on the GlobAgri-
WRR model. All scenarios but the final one in Table 
16-1 hold cropping intensity constant from the 2050 
baseline level. The final scenario uses the yield growth 
in our baseline but increases cropping intensity.355 
Our analysis first shows that differing conceptions of 
an appropriate “2050 baseline” lead to vastly differ-
ent amounts of future cropland expansion. A purely 
theoretical scenario that holds crop yields constant 
from their 2010 levels, and assumes no change in 
projected demand, would require cropland expansion 
of more than 950 Mha between 2010 and 2050 to 
meet projected food demand and accompanying high 
land-use-change emissions (more than 12 Gt CO2e 
per year during that period). Using FAO’s projected 
growth in yields and cropping intensity (which follows 
historical trends from 1962 to 2006), as we do in 
GlobAgri-WRR, expansion is limited to 171 Mha and 
land-use-change emissions to 6 Gt per year. Using 
more recent and slower estimates of yield growth 
from 1989 to 2008 from Ray et al. (2013), cropland 
area would expand 301 Mha by 2050 relative to 2010, 
with annual land-use-change emissions of 6.9 Gt.
As discussed in Chapter 15, a changing climate has the 
potential to depress crop yields, especially in the trop-
ics. We therefore explore a scenario with a 15 percent 
decline in crop yields across the board relative to our 
2050 baseline projection.356 This scenario in effect 
would lower average global crop yield growth between 
2010 and 2050 from 48 percent to only 28 percent.357 
Thus, a “mere” 15 percent decline in yield would 
increase the necessary expansion in cropland during 
this period to 437 Mha, nearly tripling the cropland 
expansion relative to our 2050 baseline scenario. This 
large additional expansion would increase the land 
gap by 45 percent and the GHG mitigation gap by 23 
percent, relative to the 2050 baseline.
On a more positive note, we model scenarios of addi-
tional increases in crop yields between 2010 and 2050 
to simulate large-scale implementation of the crop 
breeding and soil and water management menu items 
discussed in Chapters 12 and 13. We model additional 
increases in crop yields that are 20 percent and 50 
percent larger than those in our baseline, which would 
push global yield increases between 2010 and 2050 
from 48 percent under our baseline projection to 56 
percent and 69 percent, respectively. Such scenarios 
would represent enormous agricultural progress, as 
both would require more substantial yield increases 
than the historical period 1962 to 2006, which encom-
passed the Green Revolution, and would be achieved 
in a period of greater resource scarcity and under a 
changing climate.
The scenario that increases yields by 56 percent 
compared to 2010 would bring the amount of neces-
sary cropland expansion between 2010 and 2050 
down to 80 Mha. The scenario that increases yields 
by 69 percent would actually achieve a net reduction 
in cropland area of 39 Mha. Even this highest yield 
scenario, however, would only cut the land gap by 35 
percent because it would not affect pasture. 
Because sub-Saharan Africa is such an important 
“hotspot” for achieving a sustainable food future, as 
described in Box 2-4, we also examined scenarios of 
different levels of yield growth just for that region. 
Under our baseline scenario, cropland would expand 
by 102 Mha in sub-Saharan Africa, by far the most 
of any region.358 A scenario with 20 percent slower 
yield growth (relative to baseline) would increase the 
additional cropland demand in the region to 138 Mha. 
Going the other direction, 20 percent faster crop yield 
growth would lower the additional cropland demand 
in sub-Saharan Africa to 73 Mha.
Finally, although our 2050 baseline raises global 
cropping intensity from 85 percent in 2010 to 89 
percent in 2050, we explore a scenario that increases 
cropping intensity to 94 percent. That additional 
increase would reduce cropland expansion from 171 
Mha (under our baseline) to only 90 Mha, closing the 
land gap by 14 percent and the GHG mitigation gap by 
6 percent.
At some level, the implications of these different 
scenarios are all the same: boosting yield growth and 
cropping intensity (at least for lands that are already 
regularly cropped) is critical to achieving a sustainable 
food future.
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Table 16-1  |   Global effects of 2050 crop productivity change scenarios on agricultural land use and  
greenhouse gas emissions 
SCENARIO
CHANGE IN 
CROPLAND AREA, 
2010–50 (MHA)
ANNUAL GHG EMISSIONS, 2050 
(GT CO2E) GHG MITIGATION 
GAP (GT CO2E)Agricultural production
Land-use 
change Total
No change in crop yields from 2010 952 (+781) 9.6 12.2 21.8
17.8 
(+6.8)
2050 BASELINE (crop yields grow 48% 
between 2010–50) 171 9.0 6.0 15.1 11.1
Crop yields grow at 1989–2008 rates using 
Ray et al. (2013)
301 
(+130) 9.0 6.9 15.9
11.9 
(+0.8)
15% global decrease in crop yields due to 
climate change with no adaptation
437 
(+265) 9.3 8.2 17.6
13.6 
(+2.5)
20% additional global increase in crop 
yields
80 
(-92) 8.9 5.3 14.3
10.3 
(-0.8)
50% additional global increase in crop 
yields
-39 
(-210) 8.8 4.4 13.2
9.2 
(-1.8)
20% decrease in crop yields in sub-
Saharan Africa
207 
(+35) 9.0 6.3 15.3
11.3 
(+0.3)
20% additional increase in crop yields in 
sub-Saharan Africa
142 
(-29) 9.0 5.8 14.8
10.8 
(-0.2)
5% additional increase in global cropping 
intensity
90 
(-81) 9.0 5.4 14.4
10.4 
(-0.6)
Notes: Numbers not summed correctly are due to rounding. Numbers shown in parentheses are changes relative to 2050 baseline.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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COURSE 3  
Protect and Restore Natural 
Ecosystems and Limit 
Agricultural Land-Shifting
Increasing agricultural productivity and reducing the rate of growth in 
demand for agricultural products permit greater protection of ecosystems 
and their stored carbon. But these strategies alone are not sufficient. 
Course 3 focuses on the land management that needs to complement 
these efforts. One guiding principle is the need to make land-use decisions 
that enhance efficiency of both agriculture and ecosystem services. 
Another is the need to explicitly link efforts to boost agricultural yields with 
the protection of forests and other natural lands.
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Introduction
Holding down growth in food demand (Course 1) 
and boosting agricultural yields (Course 2) could 
prevent expansion of the net global area of agri-
cultural land. In the case of our more ambitious 
scenarios, these two strategies could even lead to a 
decline in agricultural land area. But our calcula-
tions are based on the net need for agricultural 
land. Our model assumes that every hectare of land 
that is not converted because of reduced growth in 
demand (or increased yields on existing hectares) 
saves the carbon that would otherwise be released 
by converting that additional hectare. Unfortu-
nately, the land-use challenge is more complicated 
than that. Even if net expansion of agriculture is 
eliminated, agricultural production will continue 
to shift from one place to another. These shifts 
often involve conversion of biologically diverse and 
carbon-rich habitats, which immediately releases 
long-stored carbon and harms biodiversity.  
Although necessary to hold down net expansion of 
agricultural land, yield growth for some crops in 
tropical countries could even accelerate these shifts, 
by making farming more profitable and giving 
farmers an incentive to clear new land. Translat-
ing yield gains into full benefits in the real world 
therefore requires land management efforts that are 
designed to minimize gross—not just net—agricul-
tural expansion and reduce the environmental costs 
of any expansion that does occur. 
To achieve climate and ecosystem goals, some 
active restoration efforts are also required. Agri-
cultural land that is abandoned—whether as a 
result of agriculture shifting to other locations or 
net declines in agricultural land area—tends to 
naturally regenerate into forests and other native 
habitats. However, active restoration could enhance 
benefits for carbon storage and other ecosystem 
services. Today, a limited amount of agricultural 
land is so marginal that it is incapable of generating 
higher yields in practice and warrants restoration 
right away. Little-used drained peatlands release so 
much carbon dioxide that they also deserve priority 
action. 
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THE CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES  
OF AGRICULTURAL  
LAND-SHIFTING
Agricultural land is not only expanding overall but also shifting its 
locations among and within regions and countries, which imposes 
environmental costs. This shifting is not to be confused with 
what is sometimes called “shifting” or “swidden” agriculture, in 
which farmers with few inputs engage in multiyear crop rotations, 
allowing exhausted fields to reforest before clearing them again. 
CHAPTER 17
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Global and Regional Shifts in Locations 
of Agricultural Land
At the global level, agriculture is generally shifting 
from the North toward the South. Between 1961 
and 2013, cropland declined by 126 million hectares 
(Mha) in Europe and North America but expanded 
by 331 Mha in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and 
Oceania.1 As discussed in Chapter 10, pasture area 
is also shifting, declining by 66 Mha in Australia 
and New Zealand between 1994 and 2014 while 
expanding in Latin America.2 
This trend is likely to continue because population 
and demand for food will increase more rapidly 
in developing countries. For example, using older 
UN population growth projections, the UN Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) projected 
that cropland area would decline by 38 Mha in 
developed countries between 2006 and 2050 even 
as it expands by another 107 Mha in developing 
countries.3 Using the GlobAgri-WRR model, we 
also project a shift in the global share of agricultural 
land. Because future trade is so difficult to esti-
mate, we assume that the percentage of each food 
imported or exported will remain at the same levels 
as in 2010, which means the model does not allow 
a higher percentage of food consumed in develop-
ing countries to come from developed countries 
in the future. Even so, the model estimates that 
agricultural land will expand by an additional 474 
Mha in developing countries but by only 119 Mha in 
developed countries (Table 17-1).4 We believe that 
even this relatively small role for developed coun-
tries may be an overestimate because our baseline 
scenario probably does not fully capture the effects 
of increasing land-use competition in developed 
countries.
Table 17-1 | Projected change in agricultural land use by region, 2010–50 (baseline scenario)
REGION CHANGE IN CROPLAND AREA (MHA)
CHANGE IN 
PASTURELAND AREA 
(MHA)
TOTAL CHANGE IN 
AGRICULTURAL AREA 
(MHA)
Asia (excluding China and India) 42 61 103
Brazil 2 34 37
China -25 -1 -26
European Union -17 8 -8
Former Soviet Union 0 -33 -33
India 32 2 34
Latin America (excluding Brazil) 12 68 80
Middle East and North Africa 8 10 18
OECD (other) 5 52 57
Sub-Saharan Africa 104 158 262
United States and Canada 27 43 70
Total 192 401 593
Note: Figures may not sum correctly due to rounding.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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Gross versus net agricultural expansion
Many years of satellite image studies show that 
locations of agricultural land also shift substantially 
within regions.5 Figure 17-1 shows an analysis by 
FAO based on satellite imagery of forest losses and 
gains by continent from 1990 to 2005. Although 
both Africa and South America had net losses of 
forest, these were substantially smaller than gross 
losses, which implies that agricultural land expan-
sion in some places is outpacing reversion to forests 
on abandoned agricultural land elsewhere.6 Asia, 
too, had large gross losses, particularly of native wet 
tropical forests. The continent experienced a net 
forest gain overall (nearly 50 Mha between 1990 
and 2010), but this gain was largely due to estab-
lishment of tree plantations, particularly in China.7
A separate study of deforestation in Latin America 
from 2001 to 2010 found that gross forest loss 
exceeded net forest loss by three to one (Figure 
17-2). In the United States, 3 Mha were converted 
to cropland between 2008 and 2012, even as 1.8 
Mha of cropland elsewhere in the country were 
abandoned or otherwise taken out of food produc-
tion.8 In Europe, one study found 1.6 Mha of agri-
cultural expansion from 1990 to 2006, but 2.1 Mha 
of other agricultural land reverted to some kind of 
forest or other more natural vegetation.9 
Although these shifts in the locations of agriculture 
permit some abandoned lands to regenerate, the 
trade-off tends to be poor from the perspective 
of biodiversity and carbon storage. New cropland 
is being established primarily in the tropics and 
subtropics, where biodiversity is much higher.10 
Many newly converted lands were formerly natural 
or relatively natural forests and grasslands,11 whose 
biodiversity is often irreplaceable.12
Because conversion in the tropics often occurs 
on relatively intact native ecosystems, the carbon 
losses are often higher per hectare than conversion 
of agriculture in other parts of the world. It is at 
least as important to note that tropical yields also 
tend to be lower. As a result, the carbon storage lost 
per ton of crops produced is higher in the tropics 
than in the temperate and boreal zones.13 Time also 
matters. The losses of carbon during land conver-
sion mostly occur immediately, while restoring 
carbon in vegetation and soils occurs gradually over 
longer time periods.14 
In addition, farmers tend to abandon land that is 
dry and at higher elevations, whereas they tend 
to clear wetter and more productive ecosystems, 
which tend to be richer in carbon and biodiversity.15 
Overall, gross land conversion caused by shifting 
locations of agricultural land presents a major envi-
ronmental challenge that has received insufficient 
global attention. 
Figure 17-1 | Gross forest losses are far greater than net forest losses because locations of agricultural lands are shifting
Source: FAO (2012a).
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Figure 17-2 |  While forests recovered in some areas of Latin America from 2001 to 2010, even larger areas were cleared 
elsewhere for agriculture
Source: Aide et al. (2012).
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Drivers of Agricultural Land Expansion 
and Location Shifting 
Several powerful forces are driving shifts in location 
of agricultural land, and they are likely to continue 
pushing expansion in many locations even if the 
total, global demand for agricultural land stabilizes. 
One important driver is high growth in demand for 
food in specific regions. Another is rising demand 
for specific food types that are best grown in the 
tropics. A third is the advance of roads and other 
infrastructure across the global South that is open-
ing up new, financially cheap but environmentally 
expensive lands for agriculture.
Some regions face high growth in demand  
for food 
In some countries or regions, the growth in food 
demand is likely to be so great that it will prove 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent 
some expansion of agricultural area. 
Sub-Saharan Africa poses the greatest challenge, 
as explored in Box 2-4, because the likely growth in 
domestic food demand will make some expansion of 
agricultural land inevitable. Although we use FAO’s 
predictions of robust yield growth in the region of 
roughly 250 percent between 2006 and 2050,16 our 
baseline projection is that the region’s cropland will 
nevertheless still expand between 2010 and 2050 
by roughly 100 Mha. If we use less optimistic yield 
trends based on 1989–2008 rates—our “alternative 
baseline”—we project cropland expansion of 241 
Mha.17 These projections assume that the region 
continues to rely heavily on other countries for its 
staple foods, importing roughly 20 percent of meat 
and milk and 18 percent of cereals.18 
Other analyses come to similar conclusions. One 
study found that even if countries in West Africa 
were able to more than double their rates of cereal 
yield gain between 2001 and 2014 (and triple their 
rates of maize yield growth) out to 2050, their 
imports of cereals would still have to grow from 21 
percent to 45 percent by midcentury if they did not 
expand their cropland.19 Actual self-sufficiency in 
maize would require yield growth of roughly 144 
kilograms (kg) per hectare per year, which is five 
times the rates of yield gain from 2001 to 2014 in 
Africa and roughly 3.5 times the global average rate 
of yield growth. Some estimates indicate that for 
sub-Saharan Africa to become self-sufficient in crop 
calories, cereal yields would have to increase four-
fold between 2007 and 2050. Using FAO 2050 yield 
estimates, crop area would have to grow by 140 
Mha from 2006 to 2050 just to maintain roughly 
present levels of imports.20 
Some regions will meet high international growth 
in demand for vegetable oil and animal feeds
The growing demand for vegetable oil and high-
protein animal feeds, and the ability of tropical and 
subtropical countries to meet this demand well 
by producing palm oil and soybeans, represents 
another driver of gross land expansion in some 
countries and a likely shift of agricultural produc-
tion to their lands. 
Soybeans are inputs to both vegetable oils and 
animal feeds. Globally, soybeans were grown on 84 
Mha in 2003 and 111 Mha in 2013,21 a 33 percent 
increase over one decade despite advances in breed-
ing and management of this heavily researched 
commodity crop. Other researchers have projected 
that even with yield gains, the global area dedicated 
to soybeans will need to increase by another 30 
Mha by 2050 or even by 2030 to meet estimated 
demand.22 Latin America is a good region for grow-
ing soybeans, with Brazil and Argentina already 
being two of the world’s three principal producers. 
Even in Africa, where soybean yields to date have 
been low, vast areas have relatively high growth 
potential.23 The economics of rising demand, rela-
tively lower land costs in emerging and developing 
countries, and good yield potential will continue to 
drive expansion of soybean planting in these areas.
Continued growth in demand for palm oil will also 
place enormous pressures on tropical rain forests, 
which provide the best conditions for growing oil 
palm trees. With an average global yield of 3.7 tons 
of oil per hectare, oil palm generates seven times 
the oil yield per hectare of soybeans.24 In 2015, 
oil palm provided 31 percent of the world’s veg-
etable oil production by tonnage, even beating out 
soybeans (at 24 percent) as the world’s dominant 
vegetable oil crop.25 The 13 Mha of oil palm planta-
tions around the world in 201126 are heavily con-
centrated in Indonesia and Malaysia, which together 
accounted for 85 percent of global palm oil supply in 
2015.27 But the industry is making inroads into West 
Africa, Central Africa, and South America.28 Despite 
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some efforts to curtail the use of palm oil,29 experts 
predict that palm oil will meet an even larger share 
of future vegetable oil demand because of its high 
productivity and low cost. One estimate projects a 
need for at least an additional 12 Mha of oil palm 
plantations globally from 2009 through 2050 to 
meet worldwide demand―and potentially more.30 
And if palm oil production does not expand but veg-
etable oil demand continues to grow as projected, 
even more hectares of land would be converted 
to grow lower-yielding vegetable crops to meet 
projected demand. 
The global South is developing its roads and other 
infrastructure 
Agriculture is also expanding in many areas 
because of new roadbuilding. Studies have shown 
that new or improved roads into forests typically 
lead to large areas of deforestation and agriculture 
expansion along those roads.31 In the Brazilian 
Amazon, for example, 95 percent of deforestation 
has occurred within 5.5 kilometers (km) of a road.32 
Not only do roads provide economic access to new 
areas but, over time, economic activity starts to 
grow, especially extractive and agricultural activi-
ties. Vested interests in further clearing and road-
building emerge. Large roads tend to lead to serial 
networks of smaller roads.
The environmental effects of roads go beyond direct 
land-clearing. Roads allow people to hunt wildlife 
and harvest timber illegally and create paths for 
invasive species.33 Vehicles on roads kill large num-
bers of animals and pose particular problems for 
species that migrate over large areas.34 Roads also 
encourage logging.35 New roads are now penetrating 
many of the world’s last remaining forest wilder-
nesses, including the Amazon, Papua New Guinea, 
Siberia, and the Congo Basin.36
New roads present an enormous challenge to for-
ests and other natural areas because roadbuilding 
also plays a major role in economic development 
generally and in the improvement of agriculture 
on existing croplands and pasture.37 Poor roads 
increase the costs of inputs, decrease the prices 
farmers receive for outputs, increase food storage 
losses, and create significant additional uncertain-
ties for investors. Many studies have shown that 
boosting yields of milk and of many crops is often 
not economical in the absence of good market 
access, which requires acceptable road networks.38 
The rutted, rural roads common in Africa, Latin 
America, and even much of Asia are therefore major 
impediments to agricultural improvement. 
For these reasons, roads are often built through 
forests and other natural areas to spur economic 
development rather than (primarily) to open up 
new areas for farming. For example, roads may be 
constructed to connect cities or to increase access 
to ports: the purpose of a road paved through the 
Amazon forest from Mato Grosso in the south to 
Santarém on the Amazon River in the north was 
to make it less expensive to export soybeans and 
other crops from Mato Grosso, an already heavily 
developed agricultural state. But a side effect was to 
encourage additional deforestation along the road 
(Figure 17-3).39 
Governments have extensive plans for roadbuild-
ing, at different stages of realization, all over the 
world.40 One study has documented 33 new or 
growing transportation and development corridors 
in sub-Saharan Africa, extending over 53,000 km. 
Ten of these roads are active, nine are proposed 
for upgrading, and 14 are planned.41 The study 
found that the transportation networks (includ-
ing a few railroads) would bisect 408 protected 
areas and 574 Mha of protected habitats, and that 
many would “promote serious and largely irrevers-
ible environmental change.” Roadbuilding also 
appears to be getting a boost from international 
infrastructure funding. The G20 group of wealthy 
countries committed to double the current value 
of global infrastructure by 2030 by investing 
$60–70 trillion worldwide.42 The addition of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to the 
global multilateral bank scene in 2016 is likely to 
accelerate infrastructural investment. AIIB expects 
to double its lending within the next five years and 
to fund major infrastructural projects such as gas 
pipelines, railways, and motorways.43 Realistically, 
if roadbuilding follows present plans, large-scale 
deforestation of intact old-growth forests is all but 
certain to occur.
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The Potential of Yield Gains to Shift 
Locations of Agriculture
Because boosting global output per hectare is a 
mathematically necessary way to meet increases 
in food demand without land-use change, yield 
gains are a critical course on our menu. Unfortu-
nately, yield gains can also accelerate shifting and 
local expansion of agricultural land, particularly 
in developing countries.44 Initial studies struggled 
to explain this phenomenon and some even sug-
gested that yield gains might increase not just local 
but even global land use for agriculture. But more 
recent research has pointed out that expansion 
occurs at the country level when increased yields 
lead to greater competitiveness and more exports.45 
In effect, yield gains do tend to reduce global 
agricultural land use if compared to the alternative 
of growth in demand without yield gains—but yield 
gains can also lead to increased agricultural area 
where those yield gains occur. It is important to 
appreciate why.
The “consumption rebound” effect?
One potential explanation is that boosting yields 
helps lower prices, and people respond by consum-
ing more food—a consumption “rebound effect.” If 
consumption increases by a larger percentage than 
yields, agriculture will expand into new lands. We 
consider this consumption effect to be generally a 
small and inappropriate concern.
First, the economic evidence is strong that, on 
balance, global yield gains will save land. For 
most foods, people only modestly increase their 
consumption of crops when prices decline.46 As a 
result, a 1 percent decrease in price will generally 
cause substantially less than a 1 percent increase 
in consumption of crops. In addition, a 1 percent 
increase in crop yield by itself will cause less than a 
1 percent decrease in crop price because land is only 
one cost of production and decreasing land cost by 
1 percent does not decrease total costs by 1 percent. 
In addition, farmers may achieve higher yields by 
increasing other inputs, and therefore increasing 
their costs.47 Putting these two effects together, 
although a 1 percent increase in yield by definition 
Figure 17-3 |  Roadbuilding has led to deforestation and agricultural expansion in Pará, Brazil
Source: Imagery © 2019 Landsat/Copernicus, Map data © 2019 Google.
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means a 1 percent decrease in land area to produce 
the same amount of food, it will in general cause 
less than a 1 percent increase in consumption and 
will therefore save land overall. 
Second, a sustainable food future requires improv-
ing food availability for billions of poor people who 
spend large percentages of their income on food. 
Lower food prices help to meet their needs, and 
intentionally seeking higher prices than necessary 
is not morally acceptable. An alternative past with 
no Green Revolution would have included more 
hunger and less food consumption.48 Increasing 
the capacity of the poor to consume food, in part by 
keeping food prices low, is one of the requirements 
for a sustainable food future.
Such an approach does not preclude use of prices 
to influence overconsumption by the wealthy, 
but that influence must occur through taxes. The 
consumption of the world’s wealthy people is little 
affected by farmgate food prices for two reasons: 
price increases have less effect on their consump-
tion, and farmgate prices are a small component of 
the retail food prices that people pay in developed 
countries.49 Increases in farmgate food prices would 
therefore mainly affect the poor, and the only prac-
tical way to use prices to target consumption by the 
rich is through taxes at the retail level.
One exception may be yield gains for beef and other 
ruminant meats. These yield increases may not 
increase total food or total meat consumption, but 
they may cause consumers to consume more beef 
and less chicken or vegetable sources of protein. 
These dietary shifts would not benefit nutrition or 
the poor but would increase land-use demands and 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Studies also esti-
mate that prices have a substantially larger effect on 
meat consumption than on other foods (sometimes 
with absolute elasticity values around 1, which 
means that a 10 percent decrease in price would 
result in a 10 percent increase in consumption).50 
Yield increases therefore do have some realistic 
potential to increase beef consumption. Increases 
in pasture yields still play a critical role in our 
menu for a sustainable food future, and it is hard to 
imagine a future scenario that freezes agricultural 
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production. Even so, breeding that enables crops 
to grow in different locations can still cause land 
shifting in these regions; for example, breeding 
and development of crop varieties that can grow 
in drier, shorter growing seasons is likely a con-
tributor to grassland conversion in the U.S. Great 
Plains.53 
Failing to implement measures to boost yields 
in developing countries would be both morally 
unacceptable and foolish. It would be morally 
unacceptable because it would leave too many 
people dependent on farming at a disadvantage, and 
because relying on food imports is a risky strategy 
for poor countries.54 It would also be foolish, in part, 
because not all drivers of yield gains will reduce 
costs of production and encourage local expansion. 
For example, protecting forests will force farmers to 
focus more on boosting yields through greater use 
of labor or technical inputs and will increase rather 
than decrease costs. More fundamentally, without 
yield gains poor countries with growing food demand 
are all but certain to expand their agricultural lands. 
Unless they increase yields, as African experience has 
shown, they will expand agricultural land area.55 In 
addition, if no countries increase their yields, massive 
expansion of agricultural land is inevitable. Despite 
the risks of locational shifts of some agricultural land, 
failing to boost yields is a sure-lose strategy.
The only solution is both to boost yields and to use 
government policies where necessary to protect 
forests (and other natural ecosystems) and avoid 
shifting of locations of agricultural land. Private 
sector approaches that try to eliminate deforesta-
tion from their supply chains can also contribute. 
Although yield gains can pose risks, the challenge 
is to minimize the risks and harness yield gains for 
their positive outcomes.
land expansion without achieving vast increases 
in pasture yields. But if higher yields lead to lower 
prices, some compensating measures to avoid 
increased consumption of ruminant meat may also 
be necessary.
The “local production rebound” effect
The more important and environmentally challeng-
ing problem is what can be called a local production 
rebound effect.51 Yield gains—even if they spare 
land globally—may encourage local conversion of 
forests, savannas, and other natural ecosystems by 
lowering local production costs. In other words, 
yield gains can improve the economics of farming 
per hectare, giving farmers incentives to put more 
hectares into production to increase their total 
profit. This pattern likely underpins expansion of 
soybeans, maize, and beef in Brazil and Argentina, 
and of oil palm in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
This kind of locational shifting of agricultural 
lands does not occur because of yield gains per se. 
If all countries increased their yields in a way that 
lowered production costs by the same amount, no 
country would gain a competitive advantage.52 The 
shifting occurs when yields increase and production 
costs decrease in some countries more quickly than 
in others. Countries where yields grow and costs 
decline more will be able to produce and export 
crops or livestock at lower prices and might there-
fore expand the land area dedicated to those com-
modities to meet increased internal and external 
demand.
This challenge does not mean that yield gains 
should be avoided because they risk encouraging 
local production rebound effects. In general, yield 
gains in North America and Europe are unlikely 
to trigger regional expansion of agricultural land 
because cropland area has been in long-term 
decline in these regions due to yield gains and 
stabilizing populations. If yield gains improve 
these regions’ competitive advantage, that is likely 
to result only in maintaining more cropland in 
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MENU ITEM: LINK 
PRODUCTIVITY GAINS 
WITH PROTECTION OF 
NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS
How can the world and farmers achieve the benefits of yield gains 
while also protecting natural landscapes? The heart of our answer 
is that efforts to achieve both need to be linked. The two goals of 
pursuing higher yields and protecting natural landscapes need to 
be linked by national and local governments, international funders, 
and private companies. 
CHAPTER 18
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As part of this linkage, governments also need to 
develop integrated, spatially explicit, and evolving 
analytical systems to target roadbuilding and agri-
cultural assistance where it can do the most good 
and avoid the most harm. This chapter starts by 
assessing whether governments can protect natu-
ral resources and how, then discusses the various 
methods for linking efforts to improve agricultural 
productivity with protection of natural landscapes.
How Governments Can Protect Natural 
Landscapes
Can governments protect natural landscapes? An 
extensive literature discusses the various avail-
able measures. The core lesson is that landscape 
protection presents great political and governance 
challenges but that governments have effective 
measures available to them to protect natural lands 
if they can mobilize the political will and master the 
governance. 
Stop giving away public land for conversion
The most direct measure governments can use to 
protect natural landscapes from conversion is to 
stop giving this land away or selling it. The effects 
can be significant because, in much of the world, 
governments own the majority of natural land, and 
conversion occurs only when they grant the right 
to convert. In Indonesia, for example, the national 
government claims ownership of nearly all forest 
(subject to possible claims by Indigenous Peoples 
as a result of a Constitutional Court ruling).56 This 
land can become available for agricultural devel-
opment through reclassifications granted by the 
national forest agency on application by private 
companies.57 By refusing to reclassify these lands, 
the national government can protect forest from 
agricultural conversion if it so chooses. However, 
both the national forestry ministry and regional 
land use authorities derive substantial revenues 
from land use concessions and transfers, which 
poses one of several political challenges faced by the 
government.58 
In parts of Latin America, the “acquisitive prescrip-
tion” doctrine has allowed those who clear public 
forest for farming to acquire ownership after a few 
years. Even though this claim to public land may be 
restricted to farms of a certain size, large landown-
ers can subsequently come in and assemble large 
estates from the original claimants. In Colombia, 
for example, the principle of acquisitive prescrip-
tion dates back to the original civil code. A 2002 
law shortened the waiting period to acquire owner-
ship from ten to five years after the forest has been 
converted to agricultural or similar productive use. 
One of the purposes of this legal doctrine is to pre-
vent the possible injustice of a person abandoning 
land then returning to claim it after someone else 
has taken it over and put it to productive use. In 
Latin America, the principle was usually established 
to encourage conversion of natural lands to agri-
cultural use. It allows seizure of government land 
and therefore allows people to claim ownership by 
clearing government-owned forest.59 Changing such 
laws is fundamental to forest protection. 
In Costa Rica and Brazil, changing laws on land 
titling so that people no longer acquire title to land 
by clearing it has played an important role in reduc-
ing deforestation.60 Land titling laws can be effec-
tive in preventing conversion to cropland because 
such conversion involves substantial investment. 
If those who illegally convert fear that their claims 
to land ownership will not be recognized, and their 
future farm income jeopardized, experiences show 
that conversions will be reduced. 
Unfortunately, although Brazil no longer promises 
legal title to those who deforest, it has a history of 
retroactively granting rights to those who illegally 
did so.61 This encourages new cycles of illegal 
land-clearing. While governments can control how 
and where private parties may claim ownership or 
rights to develop public lands, in some cases they 
must attempt to strike a difficult balance between 
enforcement of land-use restrictions and the needs 
of impoverished smallholders.62 Where farmers 
have clear title to their land, governments can 
combine enforcement with support for agricultural 
improvement on existing farmland to build social 
support.
Implement land-use restrictions
In the case of private lands or lands on which 
concessions have already been granted, there is 
no alternative but to pass laws restricting further 
conversion. Costa Rica, for example, passed a law 
in 1996 prohibiting further forest conversion. It has 
been mostly effective, if not perfectly enforced.63 A 
study of productive lands in northern Costa Rica 
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between 1996 and 2010 showed that the defor-
estation ban in 1996 cut in half the conversion of 
mature forest to cropland—in this case mostly pine-
apple and banana plantations.64 In 2011, Indonesia 
imposed a moratorium on granting new agriculture 
and logging concessions in primary forests and 
peatlands.65 Following the 2015 fires, the morato-
rium on opening peatlands was extended to cover 
areas already licensed but not yet developed.66 
Establish protected natural areas
Although the mere designation of protected areas 
does not guarantee protection from deforestation, 
studies have generally found that such designations 
typically result in lower levels of deforestation. One 
global review found that areas of land designated 
as a protected area (e.g., national park, wilder-
ness area, national monument) were consistently 
associated with lower levels of deforestation.67 
The study concluded that the efficacy of protected 
areas was probably a result of the heightened legal 
protection, remoteness, and/or poor agricultural 
potential.68 The latter two features, however, high-
light a requirement of future policy. Natural areas 
that might be good for agriculture are typically not 
chosen to become protected areas, but in some 
parts of the tropics it is these lands that are most 
at risk of deforestation. Going forward, therefore, 
an important strategy will be to establish a string 
of protected areas to block the path of agricultural 
expansion and thereby further encourage boosting 
yields on existing agricultural lands.
Establish and respect Indigenous Peoples’ 
territories
Establishing protected lands for Indigenous 
Peoples, and respecting their integrity, in addi-
tion to recognizing the legitimate claims of such 
people to the land, also often leads to low levels 
of deforestation.69 The conservation of forests in 
Indigenous Territories in the Xingu watershed 
of Brazil is a well-documented case where tribes 
guard the forests against illegal loggers, miners, and 
other intruders while forests continue to be cleared 
outside the territories. Community titling of indig-
enous lands appears to have significantly reduced 
both forest clearing and disturbance in the Peruvian 
Amazon.70 
Enforce the law
The above measures work well only if they are com-
bined with consistent enforcement.71 Law enforce-
ment can take the form of fines for illegal clearing, 
seizure of illegally converted lands, evictions of ille-
gal squatters, and arrests of illegal ranchers. Three 
features could help make enforcement credible and 
politically supported over the long term. First, the 
“stick” of law enforcement should be complemented 
with the “carrot” of positive economic incentives for 
those people who might be most affected. Second, 
law enforcement needs to avoid being unjust or 
repressive toward marginal communities, either 
in reality or in perception. Third, law enforcement 
needs to be fair; it should not selectively go after the 
poor while letting the rich and politically powerful 
go untouched.72
Increase transparency of land use and land-cover 
change
All the approaches to protecting natural ecosystems 
listed above benefit from adequate spatial monitor-
ing which can detect adherence to and violations of 
the law and land designations. “Radical transpar-
ency” made possible by modern-day monitoring 
technologies (e.g., satellites, drones, cloud comput-
ing, the internet) can be a powerful foundation for 
accountability and enforceability. Global Forest 
Watch now has several satellite-based monitor-
ing systems on its platform, capable of detecting 
the felling of trees at high spatial and temporal 
resolutions and combining those data with maps of 
protected areas, indigenous reserves, moratorium 
boundaries, extractive industry concessions, and 
more.73 What is needed next are systems that can 
detect clearing of any form of natural ecosystem 
vegetation (beyond forests) since it is not just for-
ests that are being converted to agriculture. 
Of course, any one of these measures alone will be 
insufficient; it is the combination that has impact. 
Brazil illustrates this potential. The country has 
long had laws restricting the percentage of land on 
any farm that may be cleared (the “Forest Code”), 
yet enforcement lagged. Beginning around 2005, 
however, Brazil moved to enforce these laws, partic-
ularly in the Amazon, resulting in large reductions 
in deforestation rates, all while agricultural produc-
tion continued to increase. Brazil reorganized its 
police enforcement and took actions against corrup-
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tion. The country started using satellite monitoring 
(e.g., DETER and PRODES systems) to identify 
illegal deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon.74 
The country established new protected areas in 
the “arc of deforestation.” Perhaps most creatively, 
Brazil identified municipalities where deforesta-
tion was most acute and put them on a “black list” 
for receiving public finance and rural agricultural 
credit (more on this form of “linking” protection 
and production below). 
Linking Productivity Gains and Natural 
Landscape Protection 
Although governments have mechanisms they can 
use effectively to protect natural landscapes, there 
are several reasons why explicitly linking such 
mechanisms with efforts to boost production on 
existing agricultural land is probably necessary both 
practically and politically to achieve this protection: 
 ▪ Linkage can help ensure that land protection does not undercut food 
production. It will be nearly impossible to 
protect natural areas if yields do not grow on 
existing agricultural land because the unsatis-
fied demand for food will push up prices and 
increase food insecurity.75 Not only is such a 
result unacceptable in and of itself, but it also 
would likely undermine political support for 
land conservation and increase the incentive for 
some agricultural interests to circumvent legal 
protections.
 ▪ Linkage can help equitably share the burden of climate reductions. Many 
relatively poor countries are currently signifi-
cant sources of land-use change emissions but 
have small overall per capita GHG emissions. 
At the same time, the economies of many poor 
countries are heavily dependent on agriculture, 
and these countries face rising food needs. 
For them, global equity considerations require 
the international community to support their 
agricultural development on existing land in 
return for protecting their remaining natural 
landscapes.
 ▪ Linkage can help sustain domestic political support for both goals. Agricul-
tural sectors that drive deforestation and other 
land-use change often have substantial political 
influence. Linking preservation of natural land-
scapes with strategies to increase agricultural 
productivity may be politically necessary at the 
national level to assure both national govern-
ments and agricultural sectors that agriculture 
can continue to prosper. 
We propose three approaches to achieving such 
linkages:
 ▪ Finance: Structure domestic and international 
financing to simultaneously support yield gains 
and natural ecosystem protection and/or resto-
ration.
 ▪ Land-use planning: Develop and use “living” 
analytical tools in the form of detailed land-use 
plans that prioritize areas for agricultural yield 
enhancement (including “climate-smart” road 
networks and other public infrastructure) and 
protect natural ecosystems. 
 ▪ Conversion-free supply chains: Mobilize 
buyers, traders, and financiers of agricultural 
commodities to purchase or finance only com-
modities not linked to deforestation or other 
ecosystem conversions.
Finance
Domestic and international sources of finance 
offer avenues for linking yield enhancements with 
natural ecosystem conservation.
Domestic finance
Domestic sources of agricultural finance (e.g., 
national development banks, private banks) often 
help farmers and ranchers by providing low inter-
est loans. To make the linkage, these loans could 
set eligibility conditions that preclude farmers and 
ranchers from converting forests or other natural 
ecosystems. Such lending conditions could be 
retrospective, wherein the bank assesses natural 
ecosystem clearing on the farmer’s or rancher’s 
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land in the past. If there has been clearing after 
a certain year, the landholder is not eligible for a 
loan. Alternatively, the conditions could be prospec-
tive, wherein the farmer or rancher incurs a penalty 
(e.g., higher interest rate, hefty fine, loan call back) 
if he or she clears a natural ecosystem after receipt 
of the loan. Such conditioned loans would incentiv-
ize the landholder to invest in improving yields 
on his or her existing agricultural fields instead of 
clearing more land.
The Brazilian Amazon provides a successful illus-
tration.76 Rural credit supplies about 30 percent 
of the annual financing of farmers and ranchers in 
Brazil, and thus can be a powerful lever for behav-
ior change. In 2008, the Brazilian National Mon-
etary Council introduced Resolution 3,545, which 
conditioned rural credit in the Amazon biome on 
proof of a farmer’s or rancher’s compliance with 
legal and environmental regulations. One of these 
regulations was a limit on the amount of forest 
that a landholder could legally clear (20 percent of 
one’s land). As a result, the amount of deforestation 
declined. According to one estimate, in the absence 
of the conditioned credit, deforestation rates in 
the Brazilian Amazon would have been 18 percent 
higher than actually observed in the 2009 through 
2011 period.77 
This linkage has also been important to maintain-
ing political support for Brazil’s forest protection, 
which has played a key role in reducing deforesta-
tion rates from their peak in 2004 (though rates 
have recently risen again) (Figure 18-1).78 Work by 
EMBRAPA, Brazil’s national agricultural research 
institution, helped demonstrate the capacity of 
Brazilian agriculture to continue to grow by boost-
ing yields without clearing more land.79 Brazil then 
explicitly linked its proposals to strengthen forest 
protection with additional incentives for agricul-
tural intensification, both in its 2004 action plan for 
forest protection and its follow-up “ABC” climate 
plan in 2009.80 
Figure 18-1 | Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon has receded from historical highs
Source: Brazilian National Space Research Institute (INPE).
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International finance
Developed countries have committed to provid-
ing billions of dollars to developing countries to 
help them mitigate and adapt to climate change—
although only some of these funds have started to 
flow. But the funding for forest protection and for 
agricultural improvement tend to come through 
different channels. The World Bank, for instance, 
develops climate or environmental projects to 
protect forests and separately develops projects to 
boost agriculture productivity. Some countries pro-
vide funds for forest protection under the banner 
of REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries). 
At the same time, some countries provide funds for 
agricultural development. The link between agricul-
tural improvement and natural ecosystem protec-
tion is rarely drawn. 
This should, and can, be rectified. The main rea-
son is to increase the likelihood of meeting both 
food production and forest protection needs, and 
preventing the needs of one from undermining the 
other. Linkages also would offer benefits to the key 
players. For example, international funders, mainly 
richer countries, would see their funds advancing 
two goals—poverty alleviation and climate protec-
tion. National governments would be able to make a 
more powerful case for financial support by achiev-
ing multiple objectives at once. And agricultural 
interests, whether big or small farmers, would 
improve production on their existing land while 
avoiding the risks of forest conversion.
Overall, there is a strong global, shared public 
interest in improving agricultural productivity in 
developing countries so long as that productivity 
helps protect forests. If funds are effectively linked, 
they can make the case for more funding, and they 
can provide benefits for agricultural interests that 
might otherwise resist forest protection. 
Land-use planning 
Land-use planning is a policy tool that governments 
can use to concentrate agricultural production in 
certain, high-yielding areas while designating natu-
ral areas as protected from conversion. To achieve 
this goal, land-use plans will need to be specific 
(geospatially and more), “living,” and cover devel-
opment of road and related infrastructure.  
Plans need to be specific
We believe effective land-use planning tools need 
to have multiple features, including the ability to 
achieve the following objectives: 
 ▪ Characterize the location of existing produc-
tion systems in as much detail as practicable to 
support technical and economic assessments of 
their potential for boosting yields.
 ▪ Apply at the local level, but aggregate 
production, emissions and land-use data to the 
regional and national level to allow assessments 
of national achievement.
 ▪ Identify the technical opportunities for 
sustainable agriculture intensification on 
existing agricultural lands.
 ▪ Provide analyses of the economic feasibility 
of improvement options for different types of 
farms.
 ▪ Identify the location of priority areas for 
sustainable intensification, and areas that must 
be preserved or restored.
 ▪ Identify the location of lower opportunity-cost 
lands when there is an unavoidable need for 
agricultural expansion (as discussed in Chapter 
19).
Plans at this level of detail could serve many 
purposes: 
 ▪ Guide public policies as well as public and 
private funders on where to invest. 
 ▪ Reassure agricultural producers of their 
potential to increase production without 
clearing new lands.
 ▪ Quantify impacts on GHG emissions, including 
from land-use change, and how they would 
change with various improvements to 
agricultural development.
 ▪ Provide a technical basis for specific 
international agreements as well as domestic 
and international funding.
 ▪ Inform private sector and civil society 
priorities.
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Plans need to be “living” 
Such comprehensive planning tools will require 
detailed but evolving technical tools—not merely 
one-time maps and plans. Any immediate effort to 
develop these kinds of systems will meet resource 
constraints and data limitations and rely on mod-
els, such as crop models, that are imperfect. If 
people are to have faith in such efforts, the systems 
employed must be able to easily incorporate new, 
improved, and more detailed information as it 
becomes available. For such planning systems to 
work, they must therefore be reflected in computer-
based programs that are continually updated and 
modified. 
Supporting development of such plans should be a 
major concern of international institutions focused 
on either agriculture or climate, such as the World 
Bank. They should be a particular priority, as we 
describe in the next chapter, where agricultural 
expansion is inevitable, and we offer more detailed 
recommendations for funding such plans in that 
chapter. 
Plans need to address roads and other infrastructure
A key use of such plans should be to identify where 
to build, rehabilitate, or improve roads and where 
to place other agriculture-related infrastructure. 
The only hope for reconciling the need for new 
roads for agricultural development in developing 
countries with protection of natural areas is to plan 
and build “climate-smart” road systems—systems 
that avoid incursion into remaining natural ecosys-
tems while enhancing the ability of the agricultural 
sector to access markets. 
Climate-smart road systems primarily involve 
focusing road improvements in existing agricultural 
areas, particularly where there is high potential for 
agricultural improvement. A recent study identi-
fied some priority areas at the global level for both 
road-building and avoiding road construction based 
primarily on climate-smart principles.81 It and other 
studies have found, for example, areas of Africa 
with very poor roads that could reap great benefits 
from merely improving existing roads (e.g., paving 
dirt roads), not necessarily adding major new ones. 
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Such an approach would support high agricultural 
yields, keep transportation costs low, and contrib-
ute greatly to preservation of both carbon stocks 
and biodiversity.82
In general, this planning approach should be 
undertaken at high resolution at national and sub-
national levels and then incorporated into govern-
ment land-use and infrastructure plans. It should 
be a prerequisite for international funding of road 
improvements.
Conversion-free supply chains
Buyers, traders, and financiers of agricultural com-
modities can choose to purchase or finance only 
commodities not linked to deforestation or conver-
sion of other natural ecosystems. Conversion-free 
purchasing policies have the potential to persuade 
farmers, agricultural companies, and even political 
jurisdictions (e.g., districts, states) to meet growing 
demand by boosting yields instead of by expanding 
agricultural area. Otherwise, these farmers, agricul-
tural suppliers, and jurisdictions would risk losing 
business customers, market access, and finance.  
The most notable deforestation-free supply chain 
commitment is that of the Consumer Goods Forum 
(CGF). The CGF now comprises 400 of the world’s 
leading consumer goods manufacturers and retail-
ers from 70 countries, with combined annual sales 
of €2.5 trillion (about $2.8 trillion). In 2010, the 
board of the CGF committed to achieving zero net 
deforestation in supply chains for four commodities 
by 2020 and to curtail procurement from suppli-
ers who do not comply. These commitments cover 
the agricultural commodities of palm oil, beef, soy, 
and pulp and paper. The impact of these pledges 
is trickling upstream. For example, major trad-
ers of palm oil have made similar pledges to buy 
and sell only deforestation-free palm oil. Getting 
major traders involved could help ensure that the 
supply chain pressure reaches markets where the 
CGF may not have as much influence, such as palm 
oil for home cooking in some Asian countries. As 
of late 2016, more than half the companies that 
source palm oil and wood products had made “zero 
deforestation” commitments, as well as 21 percent 
of companies that source soy and 12 percent that 
source beef.83 The CGF could also reach small to 
medium-sized farmers or grower companies—which 
are not publicly visible and do not have robust 
sustainability commitments—if companies applied 
their commitment not only to their direct suppliers 
but also to their suppliers’ suppliers.84 
Financiers of agricultural commodities are tak-
ing steps, too. A number of banks have agreed to 
a Soft Commodities Compact designed to sup-
port business customers in their efforts to reduce 
commodity-driven forest conversion.85 The compact 
commits banks to work with consumer goods com-
panies and their supply chains to develop appropri-
ate financing solutions that support the growth of 
markets producing palm oil, soy, and beef without 
contributing to deforestation. Twelve banks had 
adopted the compact as of January 2019.86 
Voluntary actions by private corporations, in part 
motivated by civil society campaigns, will have their 
greatest effect when they reach a scale sufficient to 
influence an entire industry and motivate national 
legislators. In the mid-2000s, Greenpeace launched 
an effort to pressure European companies not to 
purchase soybeans from Brazil because of defor-
estation. These pressures helped lead to a com-
mitment by the Brazilian Vegetable Oils Industry 
Association and the National Grain Exporters 
Association to establish a moratorium on the 
production and trade of soybeans grown on lands in 
the Brazilian Amazon that are deforested after July 
24, 2006.87 International agricultural traders such 
as Cargill and Bunge played an important role. The 
moratorium has been quite effective in the Brazilian 
Amazon. In the two years before the moratorium, 
30 percent of soy expansion in the Brazilian Ama-
zon occurred on newly deforested land. Since the 
moratorium, the share dropped to about 1 percent; 
almost all of the 1.3 Mha of new soy plantings from 
2006 to 2013 in the region were on previously 
cleared lands.88 One study showed that the mora-
torium is protecting lands that could otherwise be 
legally converted.89
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At the same time, the moratorium did not under-
mine Brazil’s soybean industry. Since implementa-
tion, soy production has continued to grow, mostly 
through intensification.90 Nonetheless, some 
expansion of soybean area has occurred in the 
Brazilian Cerrado and the Bolivian Amazon. This 
leakage indicates that private efforts will be most 
useful only when they reach a scale large enough to 
motivate government policies as well. 
To realize its potential, the conversion-free supply 
chain model needs more companies and financial 
institutions to make conversion-free supply chain 
commitments so that together they account for a 
significant share of market demand (or financing) 
of each agricultural commodity. Otherwise there is 
a risk of sizeable market “leakage,” whereby suppli-
ers merely divert deforestation-linked agricultural 
commodities to a large market of buyers that have 
not made commitments. Companies and banks also 
need to follow through on their commitments. And 
follow-through requires monitoring and account-
ability mechanisms.91 Given that commitments for 
2020 will likely not be met, how the CGF and other 
industry players respond and adjust their strate-
gies will be critical to the future success of this 
approach. 
“Jurisdictional” approaches
A potentially potent way of implementing these 
three approaches is to operate at the jurisdictional 
scale. The “jurisdictional approach” refers to a 
comprehensive approach to land-use governance, 
decision-making, and zoning across a legally 
defined jurisdiction (e.g., state, district) or ter-
ritory.92 Part of the theory of change is that those 
jurisdictions that succeed in implementing these 
approaches—and thus succeed in decoupling 
agriculture from ecosystem conversion—would start 
to receive preferential investment by companies 
and financial institutions. For example, they could 
be considered “low-risk” sources of supply or safe 
places for investment for companies making forest 
protection commitments. Other jurisdictions might 
observe these benefits and start to shift themselves. 
Examples are beginning to emerge. Launched at the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) 21 climate confer-
ence in Paris in 2015, the Brazilian state of Mato 
Grosso’s “Produce, Conserve, and Include” strategy 
and plan aims to promote sustainable agriculture, 
eliminate illegal deforestation, and reduce GHG 
emissions—all at the same time. Responding to con-
cerns about losing access to international soybean 
markets, it has 21 performance targets and involves 
40 partner organizations. Currently, deforestation 
remains relatively low while the agriculture sector 
in Mato Grosso, led by soybeans, thrives.93 
Produce, protect, and prosper
The underlying strategy of this chapter can be sum-
marized as one of “produce, protect, and prosper.” 
To achieve a sustainable food future, protection 
of forests and other ecosystems must occur at the 
same time as enhancements in crop and livestock 
yields. In addition to linking production and protec-
tion, people will need to “prosper” through the 
growth of their local economies; increased security 
of food, feed, and fiber; and reductions in poverty 
through job and income growth. Without such ben-
efits, political support for sustainable intensification 
and for conserving natural areas might be lost over 
time. 
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MENU ITEM: LIMIT 
INEVITABLE CROPLAND 
EXPANSION TO 
LANDS WITH LOW 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
OPPORTUNITY COSTS
Although the goal should be to avoid all agricultural expansion, in 
some locations agricultural expansion is inevitable. As discussed 
in Chapter 17, agricultural land will expand for local food production 
in much of Africa, for example, and oil palm plantations will 
expand in Southeast Asia. In these situations, the land-use plans 
we described in Chapter 18 need to guide where this expansion 
should go. How should they do so? 
CHAPTER 19
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The Challenge
How should we define low opportunity-cost 
lands?
We begin by focusing on our disagreements with 
some previous analyses which claim that many 
broad categories of land should be viewed as either 
“free” to use or involve little carbon cost, typically 
because they are not existing cropland or dense 
forest, or because they are forests that have recently 
been cut. The errors generally track those discussed 
in Chapter 7 regarding bioenergy, which similarly 
assume that these categories of land are available 
to grow biomass crops at no or little cost in carbon 
storage or food production and with low or no 
social opportunity costs. Examples include aban-
doned agricultural land, which is not free because 
it would typically regenerate to forest or other 
natural vegetation; pasture land, which both stores 
carbon and produces food; woody savannas, which 
store abundant carbon and tend to have high biodi-
versity; and cut-over forests, which also regenerate 
if left alone or replanted. 
A surprising number of studies refer to the 
potential to expand bioenergy or crop production 
onto lands they term “marginal” or “degraded.”94 
Unfortunately, as well summarized by Gibbs and 
Salmon (2015), these terms have no precise mean-
ing. Studies that use them offer multiple definitions 
but none that identify unused categories of land. 
These terms are frequently applied to lands that are 
considered marginal for cropping—but this quality 
does not make them marginal for purposes such as 
carbon storage or pasture.95 Quite often, the terms 
are applied to lands already in agricultural use but 
typically experiencing some form of soil degrada-
tion. Their reclamation can and should be part of 
the effort to increase crop and pasture yields. They 
cannot provide lower opportunity-cost lands for 
agricultural expansion for the obvious reason that 
they are already in agricultural production. Even 
lands that are so unproductive that they store little 
carbon and produce low yields—and therefore are 
not good candidates for expanding agriculture 
anyway—are often extensively used by the poor.96 
The problem in each case is failing to recognize that 
virtually all land has some kind of opportunity cost. 
The opportunity
The goal is to find lands with relatively low environ-
mental and other opportunity costs but with good 
productive potential on which to expand agricul-
ture. Several principles guide the search:
 ▪ Because these opportunities are a matter of 
degree, a proper analysis requires far more 
subtle evaluation than simply assessing broadly 
defined land-use categories and incorporating 
potential food yields. 
 ▪ To reflect carbon effects, the analysis must ac-
count not just for existing carbon but also for 
likely future carbon sequestration (e.g., from 
regrowing forests on abandoned agricultural 
land or in forest areas that have been recently 
harvested for wood). Each year globally, regen-
eration replenishes most of all annual carbon 
losses from forest clearing and therefore plays a 
fundamental role in slowing climate change.97 
 ▪ The analysis must focus not just on the loss 
of carbon per hectare but also on the loss of 
carbon per ton of crop that would likely be 
produced, which in turn depends on the likely 
yields.98 Land may store little carbon, but if it 
will also produce few crops, farmers will need 
to clear more land and release more total car-
bon to produce the same amount of food. 
Several studies support the hypothesis that target-
ing specific lands can meet food needs with lower 
environmental costs than using other lands. In 
Tanzania, one study looked at multiple criteria in 
addition to potential yield when considering areas 
for agricultural investment. Ideal areas for agricul-
tural expansion varied depending upon whether the 
criteria included social capital, forest conservation, 
and farm management. Sometimes the use of differ-
ent criteria led to conflicting answers.99 
A second study focusing on Zambia found good 
results from a “compromise” approach giving equal 
weight to maximizing potential yield, minimizing 
transportation costs, minimizing carbon releases, 
and minimizing impacts on biodiversity. Such an 
approach reduced the potential transportation, 
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carbon, and biodiversity costs by 80 percent while 
reducing the average potential yield of each new 
hectare by only 6 percent, compared to a strategy 
that focused on yield-enhancement alone.100 This 
same paper showed that the “farm blocks” of land 
formally designated for agricultural expansion by 
the government were poor choices to achieve any of 
these four objectives.
Studies of this type recognize that land has different 
potentials. In general, wetter lands are more pro-
ductive and better at producing crops, but they also 
store more carbon and support more biodiversity. 
Yet the relationship is not perfect. Rainfall patterns 
and soil types may reduce the productivity of crops 
more than of trees and therefore forests. Access to 
transportation and other infrastructure may make 
it more profitable to farm in one location than 
in another with higher, raw crop potential. Both 
carbon storage and biodiversity are undermined 
on lands with a history of human alteration. The 
biodiversity of any one hectare of land also depends 
heavily on the lands around it. If the only goal were 
agricultural profitability or productivity, these envi-
ronmental considerations would be irrelevant. But 
if the goal is to achieve a sustainable food future, 
considering the wider advantages and disadvan-
tages of farming different hectares of land opens up 
the potential to find options that are still beneficial 
to agricultural productivity and profitability while 
reducing environmental effects.
Indonesia has been a major focus of study because 
expansion of oil palm plantations into forests and 
peatlands has been occuring rapidly and because 
growth in global demand for vegetable oil makes 
some continued expansion of oil palm inevitable. 
One study estimated that optimal location of new 
oil palm plantations to double Indonesia palm oil 
production between 2010 and 2020 could avoid all 
primary and secondary forest loss. This outcome 
could avoid all biodiversity effects analyzed in the 
study, cut land-use change emissions by 30 percent, 
and reduce loss of other food production by two-
thirds compared to the most likely “business-as-
usual” scenario.101 Ideally, farming would expand 
only into areas that have truly low environmental 
and social opportunity costs yet could still be 
productive croplands. To the extent that such 
lands exist, they will generally be lands that receive 
enough rainfall to be productive but face some 
kind of biological and physical barrier to significant 
natural regeneration. 
One category of such low opportunity-cost, poten-
tially productive land includes areas in Southeast 
Asia that were once logged or farmed then aban-
doned, and overrun by Imperata grasses. Imperata 
grasses store only modest quantities of carbon and 
will sequester little future carbon so long as they 
remain subject to frequent fire.102 They also support 
far less biodiversity than forests103 and are of poor 
quality for livestock, which leaves them with limited 
economic benefits. And the return on investment 
from establishing oil palm on converted Imperata 
grasslands can be favorable even when compared 
with the return on investment of establishing oil 
palm on recently cleared forests.104 These lands are 
not truly free of opportunity costs: many occur in 
mosaics with some tree cover and some agriculture 
by smallholders. This is probably why they are 
burned. Even the densest Imperata stands could 
be replanted as forests but their use for oil palm 
would be appropriate because the alternative would 
likely be clearing of valuable primary or secondary 
forests. Although no one really knows how much 
Imperata grassland there is, estimates include 3.5 
Mha105 in Kalimantan and 8 Mha in all of Indone-
sia.106 In theory, this area could provide most if not 
all of the additional expansion needed in Indonesia 
for another decade.107
In the real world, other factors also play an impor-
tant role, including transportation access and social 
and legal acceptance (Box 19-1). These barriers are 
at least potentially subject to change with appropri-
ate investments, zoning changes, incentives, and 
community outreach.
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BOX 19-1 | Mapping lands suitable for sustainable oil palm expansion in Indonesia
Figure 19-1 |  Screening out lands that do not meet environmental, economic, and legal criteria reduces the area of land 
suitable for oil palm expansion in Kalimantan, Indonesia
Over the past several years, WRI has been 
working with Indonesian partners from 
government, industry, nongovernmental 
organizations, and research organizations 
to identify lands with lower environmental 
opportunity costs that have the potential 
to support sustainable oil palm plantation 
expansion in Indonesia. 
In this mapping effort, we use an 
environmental suitability screen to filter 
out lands that, if converted to crops, would 
have large environmental costs in terms 
of carbon and/or biodiversity. In particular, 
it screens out all primary and secondary 
forests, swamps, peat soils of any depth, 
conservation lands and bodies of water, 
and their buffer zones. It also screens out 
human settlements, some agricultural lands,a 
aquaculture ponds, airports, and other large 
infrastructure. Figure 19-1 (left) shows the 
results of applying this screen to Kalimantan, 
Indonesia (on the island of Borneo).
Because not all the lands that pass the initial 
screening will be suitable for oil palm, the 
method layers on additional screens. The 
economic viability screen identifies those 
areas with appropriate elevation, slope, 
rainfall, soil depth, soil type, soil drainage, 
and soil acidity for an oil palm plantation to 
be profitable. Areas not meeting these criteria 
are eliminated from the map. Figure 19-1 
(center) shows the results of layering in the 
economic screen.
The method then layers on a legal availability 
screen that factors in land-use zoning and 
community rights. Lands located in areas not 
zoned for agriculture can be difficult, but not 
impossible,b to convert into oil palm or other 
crops. Figure 19-1 (right) shows the results of 
layering on the legal availability screen for 
Indonesia. 
Finally, for the areas that remain, a social 
acceptability screen discerns—via field-
based stakeholder engagement and 
workshops—the interest and willingness 
of communities that live in and around a 
candidate site to have oil palm developed 
there. WRI’s experience is that some 
communities support oil palm development 
while others do not.
As is evident from these figures, although the 
area of opportunity may seem large at first; 
the amount of land that remains practically 
possible for conversion to crops (in this 
case oil palm) is smaller after incorporating 
important parameters such as economic, 
legal, and social factors. 
The lands that meet environmental criteria 
are not necessarily low-cost: most of these 
lands would reforest if not used by people, 
and human uses may produce a range of 
small-scale agricultural products. In the 
face of the world’s fast-growing demand 
for vegetable oil, however, focusing oil palm 
expansion on these lands constitutes a vast 
improvement over alternatives that directly 
convert valuable natural forests.  
For more details about this method, see 
Gingold et al. (2012). 
Notes: 
a.  The method screens out existing plantations and 
intensively used agricultural areas according to 
Ministry of Forestry land cover data. To more precisely 
fit the definition of lands with low environmental 
opportunity costs suitable for cropland expansion, 
the method should screen out all active cropping 
areas, which must be determined via field surveys. 
b.  It would require having the relevant zoning agency 
(or agencies) rezone the tract of land into a class that 
allows for agriculture. 
Source: Gingold et al. (2012).
Lands meeting the environmental criteria 
for supporting sustainable oil palm
Not suitable Suitable
Lands meeting the environmental 
and economic criteria for supporting  
sustainable oil palm
Lands meeting the environmental, economic, 
and legal criteria for supporting  sustainable 
oil palm
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Recommended Strategies
Where agricultural land expansion is inevitable, 
selecting areas for expansion that have relatively 
low environmental opportunity costs is one part 
of the effort we describe in this course to link yield 
improvements and protection of natural areas. But 
how can governments best identify such expansion 
areas?
Our main additional recommendation in this menu 
item is for governments to develop the kinds of 
land-use modeling tools we describe in studies for 
Indonesia, Tanzania, and Zambia to identify where 
inevitable land expansion should take place. Such 
tools will have to assess yield potential, likely costs 
of production, and carbon and biodiversity effects. 
International institutions such as the World Bank 
should help fund them. Several aspects of this chal-
lenge merit emphasis.
Quick results. Because different stakeholders 
have different interests, a tool must quickly show 
the results of different compromises. Individuals 
and groups are more likely to find common ground 
if they can see outcomes and decide whether they 
are acceptable. The Zambia model discussed above 
has this kind of feature to allow stakeholders to see 
easily the consequences of assigning different levels 
of importance to different goals.
Intuitive presentation of outcomes. Planning 
tools must overcome many technical challenges. 
There are many data limitations, and some goals 
are difficult to measure because they are so com-
plex. Biodiversity will always remain a challenge to 
express in one simple unit because it may be valued 
in many different ways. For example, analyses 
may focus on the total number of species using an 
area of land, or they may focus only on threatened 
species, or on different taxa (such as vertebrates 
or categories of vertebrates), or they may identify 
areas based on loss of similar habitat types. Quan-
titatively, each objective can be measured using dif-
ferent units (e.g., units of carbon, biodiversity, and 
profitability), which are not directly comparable. 
Different methods of quantification will have differ-
ent results, such as ranking areas by percentile or 
by absolute quantities. A useful planning tool needs 
to present outcomes for each scenario in units that 
make intuitive sense to people as far as is practi-
cable, for example, in tons of crops per hectare, 
dollars of profit (if economic analysis is included 
in the model), and tons of carbon released. Not all 
modeling approaches are equally good. 
Adequate funding. To develop and maintain 
a proper land-planning tool, dedicated resources 
are required. To focus on just one important input, 
estimating potential crop yield requires use of some 
kind of crop model. Good crop modeling requires a 
great deal of data, such as detailed soil data, which 
is typically not available broadly for all locations, 
and some of which may not be completely available 
in any location. Funds needed to be spent to make 
the data as accurate as possible. 
Monitoring and updating. Resources must 
also be dedicated to determine whether predictions 
prove accurate, to reprogram the tools as neces-
sary, and to update results as the world changes. 
Monitoring, recalibrating, and updating are not a 
one-time exercise but must be continued over time 
to ensure that predictions remain accurate. 
Policymakers tend to be in a rush and often want 
results with limited resources. Because modelers 
can always make broad assumptions if necessary, 
they can generate models that look misleadingly 
convincing but that lack the rigor necessary to jus-
tify their use for important decisions. These kinds 
of mapping enterprises at the national level will 
require ongoing budgets in the low millions, not 
hundreds of thousands, of dollars. These efforts are 
not easy, but there is also no alternative if the goal 
is to achieve reasonable outcomes. International 
institutions that focus on climate or development 
need to support these efforts and use them before 
funding major new roads or other infrastructure 
investments.
 
For more detail, see “Limiting Cropland Expansion to 
Lands with Low Environmental Opportunity Costs,” 
a working paper supporting this World Resources 
Report available at www.SustainableFoodFuture.org. 
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MENU ITEM: REFOREST 
ABANDONED, UNPRODUCTIVE, 
AND LIBERATED 
AGRICULTURAL LANDS
Some agriculture will inevitably shift from one location to another. 
Reforestation of abandoned agricultural land or restoration to some 
other natural vegetation will be required just to maintain net forest 
and savanna area. However, the potential for global reforestation 
is sometimes overestimated. Large-scale reforestation to mitigate 
climate change will be possible only if enough agricultural land is 
“liberated” through highly successful efforts to slow growth in food 
demand and boost agricultural productivity.
CHAPTER 20
WRI.org        266
The Challenge 
Many climate mitigation strategies involve seques-
tering carbon by restoring land now in agricultural 
use to forest or other natural vegetation. “Forest 
landscape restoration” typically means the process 
of restoring ecological functionality by enhancing 
the number and diversity of trees on the land-
scape.108 Restoration can start from completely 
deforested areas, from degraded forests, or from 
fragmented forests. It can end up in a variety of 
land covers and uses, ranging from vast tracts of 
dense natural forests (which would have the highest 
standing carbon stocks and biodiversity benefits), 
to mosaics of wooded areas of land adjacent to 
agricultural areas, to integrated agroforestry and 
silvopastoral systems, all the way to mosaics of 
commercial tree farms and natural forests. 
In this chapter, we examine the subset of forest 
landscape restoration that returns areas of land to 
dense natural forests, woodlands, and/or woods 
adjacent to agricultural areas (i.e., reforesta-
tion). (Restoration to agroforestry or silvopastoral 
systems is covered in Chapters 11 and 13.) We focus 
this chapter still more narrowly on reforestation 
because forests store more carbon than any other 
form of terrestrial ecosystem.
Reforestation can occur in one of three ways: spon-
taneous natural regeneration, in which vegetation 
regrows without human assistance; assisted natu-
ral regeneration, in which land managers reduce 
obstacles to natural regeneration (e.g., remove fire 
or grazing animals) and then “let nature take its 
course”; and active reforestation, in which land 
managers make significant interventions to rees-
tablish vegetation, such as growing young trees in 
nurseries and then planting them. Replanting can 
involve the use of varying mixes of natural species 
or only one or a few species designed to maximize 
wood output. But what is the real reforestation 
opportunity, how should land-planning efforts 
decide where to reforest, and how can reforestation 
be advanced? 
Many climate studies have found a large potential 
for reforestation, often in the hundreds of millions 
of hectares. Examples include broader assessments 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), the “Stern Report” on the costs of climate 
mitigation, and many original underlying studies.109 
One study even developed a scenario that includes 
the reforestation of all grazing land that was origi-
nally forested before being converted by humans, 
and would therefore cover large tracts of Europe.110 
Our analysis is less optimistic, and we explain why 
we disagree with these high estimates at the end 
of this chapter (Box 20-1). Ultimately, our analysis 
is not necessarily at odds with some of the more 
modest estimates of reforestation potential, but 
we believe the core condition is that “potentially 
reforestable” land must not also be needed for 
ongoing food production. Unless this condition is 
appreciated and taken into account, reforestation of 
land in one location will likely lead to more land-
clearing in other locations, which undermines its 
environmental benefit. An alternative poor outcome 
is that reforestation could lead to reduced food 
consumption, which undermines its public benefits 
as well as its long-term political support. 
The Opportunity
Using this core criterion, we identify three 
categories of land that offer real potential for 
reforestation: 
 ▪ Abandoned lands. Although abandoned ag-
ricultural lands will tend to regenerate on their 
own, there is potential to more actively reforest 
land that is abandoned as a result of agriculture 
shifting locations.
 ▪ Agriculturally marginal and unimprov-able lands. These lands generate marginal 
agricultural output today and have little practi-
cal potential for intensification in the future.  
 ▪ “Liberated” lands. These lands occur if 
demand reduction (Course 1) and productivity 
improvements (Course 2) result in net reduc-
tions in the area of agricultural land. 
Improved reforestation of abandoned land 
Opportunities exist to enhance the reforesta-
tion of agricultural land abandoned as a result of 
shifting locations of agriculture, even while net 
deforestation occurs globally. As the satellite image 
studies discussed in Chapter 17 reveal, abandoned 
agricultural lands usually regenerate to forest 
anyway—sometimes naturally and sometimes with 
the active support of land managers and govern-
ment. By around 1900, the East Coast of the United 
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States was largely deforested, but it now is home to 
extensive areas of forest; the same is true for large 
parts of western Europe. Although most of this 
land reforested naturally, the United States actively 
supported reforestation through the Civilian 
Conservation Corps during the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. Between the mid-1950s and 1970, South 
Korea invested massively in reforestation, raising 
the country’s forest cover levels from 35 percent to 
64 percent.111 The Chinese government reports that 
since 1991 it has spent $47 billion to plant trees on 
28 Mha of formerly marginal agricultural land.112 
Notwithstanding these efforts, opportunities exist 
to improve the quality of this reforestation both to 
store more carbon and to support more biodiversity 
and ecosystem services—in line with the goals of the 
broad field of restoration ecology.
As just a single illustration, researchers have shown 
that planting leguminous trees in abandoned fields 
of Brazil’s Atlantic Forest region dramatically 
increases the rates of biomass growth and enables 
other, more varied trees to grow as well.113 Govern-
ments now often support reforestation of aban-
doned agricultural land, but they typically focus on 
plantation forests, often using a single fast-growing 
commercial tree species. These kinds of trees are 
better suited to meet demands for timber products 
and therefore also earn a more rapid economic 
return. However, they are less capable of storing 
carbon, have limited biodiversity when compared to 
natural ecosystems, and are more prone to risks of 
fire, storm damage, and pest damage.114 For exam-
ple, a study of China’s reforestation program in 
Sichuan province estimated that the planted forests, 
typically monocultures, had a dramatically lower 
bird and bee diversity than even the croplands they 
replaced.115 
In at least some situations, planting more diverse, 
native, and relatively slow-growing species provides 
a realistic economic option, potentially produc-
ing comparable or only slightly lower economic 
returns. In these cases, even modest government 
interest in biodiversity would warrant reforestation 
of higher quality. Even for plantations, one study 
in China has shown that just mixing blocks of two 
to five different plantation forest types results in 
substantially more diverse bird populations, with 
no reduction in economic returns.116 
Because agriculture is likely to continue to shift 
locations both within countries and around the 
globe—at least to some extent—the shifting will 
likely continue to lead to carbon and biodiversity 
losses unless governments adopt more policies 
to establish more natural forests on abandoned 
agricultural lands.
Marginal lands with little intensification potential 
Reforestation opportunities exist on agricultural 
lands that are producing only limited quantities of 
food today and whose potential for improved food 
production in future is low. Steeply sloped grazing 
land often falls into this category; examples include 
some of the pasturelands in Brazil’s Atlantic Forest 
region. These hilly lands produce only around 30 kg 
of beef per hectare per year, which contrasts with 
the potential to produce around 150–200 kg/ha of 
beef on well-managed grazing land.117 Yet the steep 
slopes make impractical the critical pasture intensi-
fication options, which rely on mechanized plant-
ings. In contexts like this, an analysis of the trade-
offs between cattle intensification and reforestation 
would support reforestation. Little-used, drained 
peatlands represent another prominent example 
of lands with good restoration potential. Peatlands 
are so significant globally that we address them 
separately in the next chapter. We do not know how 
many hectares of agricultural land truly qualify as 
“marginal lands with little intensification poten-
tial” because no one has yet done the right kind of 
analysis at this scale.
Reforesting even low-yield agricultural land has 
some potential to lead to land-clearing elsewhere, 
although it is less risky than taking high-yielding 
lands out of production. Taking full advantage of 
this opportunity therefore requires some additional 
yield gains on existing agricultural lands or equi-
table demand reductions.
Reforesting lands “liberated” by yield gains and 
sustainable demand strategies 
Land might be liberated for potential reforestation 
if the strategies to moderate growth in food demand 
and/or increase crop and livestock yields achieve 
sufficient success to result in net global reduc-
tions in agricultural land area. Although we have 
described how challenging such goals are, some of 
our combined scenarios of multiple menu items 
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would in effect achieve net agricultural land reduc-
tions. We provide quantitative estimates of their 
potential in hectares and associated reductions in 
GHG emissions in the penultimate section of this 
report “The Complete Menu: Creating a Sustainable 
Food Future.”
Overall, properly recognizing the limitations that 
food production imposes on reforestation highlights 
some important lessons. One is that reforestation 
at scale requires reducing the need for agricultural 
land first while protecting other natural areas from 
conversion. Another is that, precisely because there 
will probably be only limited areas where refor-
estation is the best use of agricultural land, those 
opportunities need to be exploited. 
Recommended Strategies
Forest landscape restoration is increasingly 
prominent on the global agenda. Under the Bonn 
Challenge—a global effort to bring 350 Mha into 
restoration by 2030—57 national and subnational 
actors have thus far committed to restore 170 Mha 
(Figure 20-1).118 More than 100 countries have 
included restoration in their nationally determined 
contributions to the Paris Agreement. 
Some funding has also emerged. The World Bank is 
investing $1 billion in restoration projects between 
2015 and 2030 in Africa, and more than $2 billion 
in private finance has been pledged under Initiative 
20x20 in Latin America. 
Other reports have provided useful guidance for 
moving ahead with reforestation,119 and we focus 
here on three key recommendations for moving 
forward.
Figure 20-1 |  Bonn Challenge commitments have been made by 57 national and subnational governments  
(as of February 2019)
Note: Maps are for illustrative purposes and do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of WRI concerning the legal status of any country or territory, or concerning the 
delimitation of frontiers or boundaries. 
Source: Bonn Challenge (2019).
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Properly identify “marginal and unimprovable” 
agricultural lands for reforestation 
In a world that needs both more food and more 
carbon storage, the only way to increase both is to 
make more efficient use of land. Focusing on food 
and carbon storage alone, it makes little sense to 
remove land from food production if that food 
production is efficient or could be made efficient. 
Reforestation and other forms of restoration 
should in general therefore focus on land with good 
restoration potential but with low food production 
and limited realistic potential to improve it. For any 
particular hectare, how can one know if and when 
such reforestation or restoration of other natural 
habitats would be a more efficient use of land? 
The challenge is to find a common measure for 
testing the efficiency of land use when producing 
different outputs, such as different foods, bioen-
ergy, or forest. Intuitively, in a world that needs (for 
example) both maize and forest carbon storage, it 
is obvious that if land can produce a great deal of 
maize and little forest, it is best used for maize—and 
vice versa. But how much maize equals how much 
forest carbon? One approach is to calculate the car-
bon opportunity cost of using land one way rather 
than another.
The Carbon Benefits Index120 provides an example 
of such an approach based on the assumption 
that producing a ton of any particular food in 
one location will avoid the need to clear other 
land to produce a ton of that same food. As a 
result, the carbon savings of producing a food on 
any particular hectare of land is the carbon that 
would otherwise be lost on average elsewhere to 
produce the same food. To estimate this “carbon 
opportunity cost,” the index uses the average 
global loss of carbon from vegetation and soils 
that has resulted from producing a kilogram of 
that particular food. Each food—for example, corn, 
lentils, or chicken—has a particular cost based 
on the type of land that was cleared to produce 
it on average globally and the average yield of 
crop. The index also incorporates differences in 
production emissions, so that producing a kilogram 
of a food with fewer production emissions than 
the global average generates a carbon savings, 
while producing a kilogram of food with higher 
than global average emissions generates a carbon 
cost. In addition, the index counts any increase or 
loss in carbon on land as a carbon benefit or cost. 
Overall, the index makes it possible to compare the 
benefits in terms of total GHG emissions (CO2e) 
avoided under the alternative options of generating 
a ton of any particular food, preserving land as 
forest, regenerating land as forest or other natural 
vegetation, or using land for bioenergy. 
Using this analysis, for example, reforesting highly 
sloped, poorly grazed land in the original Atlantic 
Forest in Brazil produces clear net gains, but the 
best use of already-cleared land for pasture in the 
Cerrado would likely be to intensify its pasture 
production.121 This index, or something similar, 
could also be used to identify the most suitable 
lands to convert to agriculture when agricultural 
expansion is inevitable—identified in this report as 
low environmental opportunity cost lands. 
Increasing global carbon storage is not the only 
goal of reforestation. Protecting biodiversity could 
be reason enough to justify reforestation of some 
areas, even of productive agricultural lands, as 
could preventing high levels of erosion or encourag-
ing tourism. Yet for climate purposes, the general 
principle should be that governments encourage 
changes in land use from one category to another 
when doing so would result in a sizeable net per-
centage increase in global carbon benefits. Miti-
gating climate change while meeting food needs 
will require that land-use decisions maximize the 
output of each hectare of land.  
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Integrate more native species in  
reforestation efforts 
Although governments have a long history of finan-
cially supporting reforestation of abandoned agri-
cultural lands—or lands where declining productiv-
ity implies that abandonment will be likely—their 
efforts have too often favored forest plantations. To 
achieve a better carbon balance, more biodiversity, 
and better forest protection from pests, storms, and 
fires, governments should support more regrowth 
of native species, as South Korea, among other 
countries, is now doing.122
Actively support farmer-assisted regeneration 
Many farms include areas that are unsuitable for 
food production but where occasional cattle graz-
ing or the spread of fires are enough to block tree 
regrowth. Farmer-assisted natural regeneration can 
occur in these conditions if soil, water, and climate 
are suitable for natural recovery, and if compet-
ing productive uses of the land are low. Another 
requirement is that native source populations for 
BOX 20-1 | Why Estimates of Reforestation Potential Tend to Be Too Optimistic
Although the potential for reforestation is 
real and might be further increased with 
successful efforts to hold down the rate 
of growth in demand for food and boost 
yields, reforestation potential today is 
typically overestimated. Good policymaking 
depends on understanding why. 
The economic costs of reforestation 
are typically gauged by estimating the 
costs of using land to plant trees that will 
sequester carbon. In such an approach, 
reforestation potential in any of the vast 
areas of agricultural land that occupy land 
where forests once existed is just a matter 
of price. 
The most common method to estimate the 
cost of using land is simply to value land at 
its rental value and then to add the costs of 
planting and maintaining trees.a Although 
often incorporated into more elaborate 
models, the costs of carbon sequestration 
equal rental value and the annualized value 
of these other costs divided by the tons 
of carbon that can be sequestered each 
year. For example, if the rental value of a 
hectare of cropland is $100, and it would 
be possible for trees to remove 10 tons of 
carbon dioxide per hectare each yearb then 
the land-use cost is $10 per ton of carbon 
dioxide removed. (For simplicity, we ignore 
planting costs in this example.) So long as 
people value climate mitigation at $10 per 
ton, this method would therefore conclude 
that it is economical to restore forest on 
this hectare of cropland.
Unfortunately, the rental price of land 
does not reflect the true cost of both 
sequestering carbon and meeting all food 
needs. Rather, the rental value reflects 
what farmers would pay to use land in 
one way, compared to the next cheapest 
market alternative, which includes actions 
that release carbon or diminish production. 
For example, one alternative to renting 
any hectare of land might be that farmers 
clear another hectare of land instead. 
Overall, farmers will only pay rent to use 
existing agricultural land if the cost is less 
than the cost of producing the same crops 
by clearing more land. For this reason, 
the cheaper it is for farmers to clear new 
land, the lower the rental value of existing 
agricultural land. Yet clearing other land 
releases carbon, which undermines 
the carbon sequestration benefits of 
reforestation. An irony of using the rental 
value method is that, the cheaper it is for 
farmers to clear more land, the more likely 
they are going to respond to reforesting 
one hectare of cropland by clearing 
another, which would reduce—and could 
eliminate—net gains in carbon storage. For 
this reason, rental values should not be 
used to estimate the costs of gaining net 
carbon sequestration benefits by taking 
land out of production.
trees exist, for example, tracts of remnant natural 
forest, or root stocks of native trees.
We suggest that governments create programs to 
support farmer-assisted regeneration by specifically 
including regeneration in existing policy efforts: 
 ▪ Traditional agricultural loans. Integrate 
lines of concessional credit to restore trees on 
marginal lands (e.g., poor soils, slopes, riparian 
areas) into traditional loans.
 ▪ Farmer outgrower schemes. Embed 
tree restoration in outgrower schemes, which 
combine multiple restoration success factors in 
one package: they provide seeds and seedlings, 
technical assistance, financing, and champions 
or leadership.
 ▪ Tenure laws. Reform tenure and titling laws 
(as discussed in Chapter 35) to assure farmers 
that, if they regenerate trees, they will be able to 
benefit from them. 
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BOX 20-1 | Why Estimates of Reforestation Potential Tend to Be Too Optimistic (continued)
Perhaps worse, rental values also are 
limited by the ability and willingness 
of people to pay for food. When land is 
taken out of production, some consumers 
will not be able or willing to pay the 
resulting higher prices for food and food 
consumption will decline. In fact, the 
more price-sensitive is food consumption, 
the lower will be the agricultural rental 
value. Again, lower rental values do not 
necessarily reflect a lower cost of restoring 
forests while still meeting the same food 
demands but rather may reflect a larger 
reduction in food consumption.c 
In summary, while agricultural rental values 
do reflect the financial cost of restoring 
a particular hectare of land, they do not 
reflect the cost of sequestering carbon on 
a net basis or doing so while still supplying 
the same global quantity of food. 
Removing some land from production 
may sometimes lead, through higher food 
prices, to some desirable results, such 
as reduced consumption by the wealthy 
of ruminant meat or reduced food loss 
and waste. But because any such effects 
occur through generalized increases in 
food prices, those same higher prices will 
also reduce food consumption by the poor, 
and will probably do so disproportionately 
because the poor are less able to afford 
higher prices.d The higher prices will 
also encourage farmers to expand crop 
area. Taking good agricultural land out of 
production for the purpose of reforestation 
is not therefore generally either an 
equitable or effective strategy for reducing 
undesirable consumption.
Even when underlying models to some 
extent reflect these issues, their results can 
easily be taken out of context and therefore 
fail to explicitly convey the conditions 
necessary for reforestation. For example, 
Griscom et al. (2017) suggest that there is 
potential to reforest millions of hectares 
of grazing land. They cite two modeling 
studies to support the proposition that this 
reforestation would be possible without 
sacrificing food production. One of these 
studiese assumes that reforestation 
occurs only on abandoned agricultural 
land. Although this paper (using the 
IMAGE model) does not explain why 
abandoned land becomes available, the 
land apparently becomes available only 
between 2050 and 2100. In other IMAGE 
modeling papers concerning this period, 
the abandoned land becomes available 
as a result of assumptions about limited 
population growth and high rates of yield 
gains. The other modeling studyf estimates 
that the level of additional land-clearing 
could be reduced at carbon prices up to 
$100 per ton of carbon dioxide, in part by 
intensification of grazing systems, and 
in part by reductions in consumption of 
livestock products. This second study tries 
to estimate what would happen if the cost 
of climate change at different carbon prices 
were built into all food production and 
consumption decisions, so that farmers 
would be taxed to produce beef and other 
livestock products, people would pay those 
taxes when they consumed, farmers would 
also be rewarded for reforesting their 
land instead of producing food, and other 
farmers would be persuaded not to clear 
more forest in response because clearing 
would be taxed. Thus, the preconditions 
for reforestation potential in both studies 
are substantial. In one study, the condition 
is a net decline in agricultural land. In the 
other, stringent global policies are enacted 
to boost yields, protect existing forest, 
and discourage consumption of livestock 
products. 
In effect, these conditions represent one 
way in which a global economic model 
can simulate successful adoption of many 
of the recommendations of this report to 
protect natural areas and reduce demand 
for agricultural land. As such, these 
estimates only reaffirm that large-scale 
reforestation depends on successfully 
implementing the various menu items in 
this report. 
Notes and sources: 
a.  Examples of such efforts include Benítez et al. (2004) and a special paper prepared for the “Stern Report,” published in updated form as Grieg-Gran (2008). In Benítez et al. 
(2007), the authors excluded more productive cropland but estimated sequestration costs based on the return to other agricultural land. In van Kooten and Sohngen (2007), 
the authors reviewed a wide range of studies and analyses and, although they did not describe all the studies in depth, none of the studies were described as focusing on 
the cost of meeting alternative food supplies on other land and instead were described, at most, as focusing on the opportunity cost of land, which we read as involving the 
economic return to land for alternative uses at present prices. The studies we have been able to analyze that use economic models also often incorporate this error although 
sometimes not technically using rent but net agricultural return, which is a way of estimating rent. In Sathaye et al. (2011), for example, the agricultural value of a hectare 
of land is estimated (and very roughly) by the price of the crops that could be grown minus the costs. In Sohngen and Sedjo (2006), the price of agricultural land is fixed at 
its rental value, which also effectively means the price of a crop reflects (a) the costs of producing it, including by clearing more land, and (b) the willingness or ability of 
consumers to pay for it. Therefore, the cheaper the supply of new cropland, and the larger the consumer response to prices, the cheaper the price of crops, and the lower the 
opportunity cost of using land. Economic models can attempt to get at the carbon costs of equilibrium. At a fundamental level, even equilibrium models are estimating net 
agricultural returns to land. The reason land receives an economic return is only because the cost of producing food on that land is less than the cost of clearing new cropland, 
growing food on that land, and transporting that food to consumers, or is less than the price consumers are willing and able to pay.
b. That level of carbon dioxide equals 2.7 tons of carbon per hectare per year, which is a reasonable figure for much reforestation.
c.  Many economic models in fact estimate a large food reduction effect from diverting agricultural land to other uses, as discussed in our chapter on bioenergy.
d Regmi et al. (2001); Muhammad et al. (2011).
e. Strengers et al. (2008).
f. Havlík et al. (2014). 
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MENU ITEM: CONSERVE 
AND RESTORE 
PEATLANDS
CHAPTER 21
Only a small portion of the world’s agricultural land sits atop peat, 
but these areas have large impacts on climate change—contributing 
as much as 2 percent of total annual human-caused GHG emissions, 
according to our calculations. Given this disproportionate impact, 
a dedicated effort is needed to avoid any further conversion of 
peatlands to agriculture and to restore some of the world’s peatlands 
that have already been drained for crops or livestock. 
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typically supported dense rain forests.126 In recent 
decades, these forested peatlands have been subject 
to large-scale, continuous drainage and clear-
ing for agriculture and forestry. According to one 
analysis,127 of the 15.7 Mha of peatlands in Malaysia 
and Indonesian Sumatra and Kalimantan,128 only 
6 percent (1 Mha) remained in relatively pristine 
condition as of 2015, and only 40 percent remained 
in some kind of natural forest (including forests 
regrowing after full clearing due to forestry activi-
ties). In contrast, 50 percent had been converted to 
use for agriculture or forest plantations. Forested 
peatland area declined by 1.8 Mha between 2007 
and 2015 alone.129 
Based on our own mapping analysis, we estimate 
that 20 Mha of cropland, globally, is located on 
peat; we assume that almost all of this area is 
probably drained.130 FAO similarly estimates that 
18 Mha of peatlands are both drained and used for 
cropland, while 8 Mha are drained and used for 
pasture (Figure 21-1).131 
Climate assessments originally did not pay much 
attention to emissions generated by these drained 
peatlands, but massive fires in Southeast Asian 
peatlands in 1997, 2007, and 2015 have attracted 
increasing global attention to the issue. Climate 
change estimates began to incorporate peatland 
emissions from this region (Figure 21-2), and more 
recently they have included estimates of peatland 
emissions from other countries (Figure 21-3). 
Amazingly, these tiny fractions of global cropland 
(roughly 1 percent) and pasture (roughly 0.3 
percent) generate emissions typically estimated in 
the range of 1 gigaton of CO2e per year, or almost 
10 percent of annual emissions from agricultural 
production and associated land-use change.132 
We developed our own estimate to ensure use of 
the most up-to-date maps of cropland area, peat-
lands, and emission factors, and to enable a specific 
focus on peatlands in agricultural use.133 We esti-
mate ongoing annual emissions at a total of 1,103 
Mt CO2e, of which 863 Mt result from microbial 
decomposition and 240 Mt (annual average) from 
fire. These emissions amount to roughly 2 percent 
of all anthropogenic emissions from all sources, and 
roughly 9 percent of 2010 emissions related to agri-
culture. These emissions will continue for decades 
unless the peatlands are rewetted. 
The Challenge
According to one estimate, peatlands123—the most 
carbon-rich category of wetlands—occupy around 
450 Mha of land, or roughly 3 percent of the ice-
free terrestrial land surface, yet they store 450 to 
600 gigatons of carbon.124 This quantity is equal to 
between 60 and 80 percent of carbon in the atmo-
sphere (and around one-quarter of all the carbon 
stored in global soils). Peatlands form because they 
are located in landscapes that retain moisture and 
thus have almost permanently saturated soils. The 
water blocks the penetration of oxygen, which is 
needed by most bacteria to break down biomass 
and release the carbon in dead plant material back 
into the air. As a result, peatlands can build up large 
deposits of carbon, sometimes over tens of thou-
sands of years. Although grasslands and forests are 
generally believed to stabilize at maximum levels 
of soil carbon, peatlands, if undisturbed, tend to 
continue to build carbon in soils indefinitely. In the 
tropics, peatland carbon accumulation rates can 
reach 0.4 tons per hectare per year.125 
Growing crops on peatlands typically requires 
draining them so that oxygen can penetrate soils 
and reach plant roots. (Although plants release oxy-
gen when they photosynthesize, they need oxygen 
to metabolize sugars into energy just like animals, 
and this oxygen nearly always comes through the 
roots.) Drainage leads to a release of carbon to the 
atmosphere because the oxygen stimulates the 
activity of bacteria and other microorganisms that 
break down organic matter, and because dry peats 
are prone to fires, whether naturally occurring or 
set intentionally. The amount of carbon released 
and the propensity to lose carbon through fire 
depends on the depth of the peat, the incidence of 
drought in the area, and the depth of drainage (the 
deeper the drainage, the more peat that is exposed 
to microbial activities or that becomes dry enough 
to burn).
Although two-thirds of peatlands are in climates 
cold enough to be affected by permafrost, the deep-
est peat deposits occur in the 13 percent of global 
peatlands that are located in the tropics, where the 
combination of high, year-round plant produc-
tion and saturated soils leads to large annual peat 
deposits. The best documented, largest expanses of 
tropical peatlands occur in Southeast Asia, par-
ticularly Indonesia and Malaysia, where they have 
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Figure 21-1 |  FAO estimates that 26 million hectares of peatlands are drained and used for agriculture
Source: Biancalani and Avagyan (2014), Figure 2.2.
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Figure 21-2 | Greenhouse gas emissions from drained peatlands are ongoing in Indonesia and Malaysia
Source: WRI (2017a). 
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These estimates of emissions from peatlands may 
be too low if we are underestimating peatland area. 
Datasets are highly varied because global field 
mapping is limited, and satellite imagery provides 
only limited guidance. Researchers recently used 
a variety of methods to estimate where peatlands 
should form, backed by some reasonably successful 
ground validation, and estimated tropical peatlands 
at 170 Mha, roughly three times the predominant 
previous estimates.134 This study estimated much 
larger peatland areas in Latin America and Africa. 
Around the same time, a separate group of sci-
entists reported discovery of the world’s largest 
tropical peatland in the heart of the Congo rain 
forest in central Africa.135 They estimated that it 
stores 30 gigatons of carbon, equivalent to roughly 
20 years of U.S. fossil fuel emissions. Discoveries 
of more peatlands may lead to more estimates of 
drained peatlands and therefore higher estimates 
of existing emissions. These estimates show the 
potential for a much greater risk of additional emis-
sions from agricultural expansion in the future. To 
date, relative land abundance in both Latin America 
and Africa has reduced the need for investment in 
drainage of peatlands and other wetlands. But the 
history of Europe, the United States, and China sug-
gests that as countries develop they tend to drain 
much of their wetlands for agriculture. 
Figure 21-3 |  Southeast Asia accounts for the majority of peatland emissions 
The Opportunity
GHG emissions from peatlands will generally stop if 
peatlands are rewetted. Going further and restoring 
forests on naturally forested areas provides addi-
tional opportunities for sequestration. The precise 
techniques for rewetting vary by peatland, but they 
typically involve blocking drainage ditches and 
canals. In some situations, restoration may be more 
complex because roads or dams obstruct move-
ment of water or divert water to other uses. Because 
peatlands shrink in elevation when drained, one 
complication typically involves rewetting peatlands 
to just the right level and avoiding too much flood-
ing, which would prevent vegetation from regrow-
ing. Still, even imprecise rewetting can avoid the 
ongoing degradation of peat.136 
Globally, there are many relatively small-scale 
examples of successful peatland restoration proj-
ects. One project rewetted 36,000 ha in Belarus 
at a 10-year cost estimated at $5 million, or $140 
per hectare.137 A project in China has restored 
water to tens of thousands of hectares in the 2 Mha 
of drained peatlands on the Ruoergai (or Zoige) 
Plateau on the northeastern margin of the Qinghai-
Tibet Plateau. Another prominent example in the 
United States involved the government purchase 
and rewetting of tens of thousands of hectares of 
agricultural land in an area that occupied one-
quarter of Florida’s Everglades. After a protracted 
Note: Graph shows the top 10 countries associated with annual GHG emissions from drained peatlands.
Source: Biancalani and Avagyan (2014), Figure 2.5.
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lawsuit and political controversy, restoration began 
as a means of filtering out phosphorus pollution 
from the remaining agricultural lands before the 
pollution entered the remaining natural portions of 
the Everglades.138
Although many drained peatlands are in intensive 
and successful agricultural use, few areas would 
justify the associated GHG emissions if those 
emissions were properly valued. For example, one 
study estimated the value of palm oil at $600 per 
hectare per year on the most productive oil palm 
plantations139—and oil palm plantations on peat 
are typically less productive than those on nonpeat 
soils. But the value of avoiding the likely peatland 
emissions alone would be $2,750 per hectare per 
year at $50 per ton of CO2e,140 which is well below 
typical estimates of the carbon costs the world will 
need to pay to solve climate change.141 Because 
oil palm plantations need to be replanted at high 
cost roughly every 25 years, economically rational 
opportunities could exist in some situations to 
rewet peatlands in productive oil palm plantation 
areas at the natural end of their productive life. 
Probably the easier restoration opportunities, 
politically and economically, are to be found in the 
millions of hectares of drained peatlands that have 
some kind of combination of shrub-like vegetation 
or dispersed, small-scale agriculture. Although no 
detailed compilation exists, peatland researchers 
broadly agree that such lands exist.142 In the main 
islands of Indonesia, 45 percent of peatlands con-
verted to agriculture as of 2015 were not in planta-
tions but displayed the kind of dispersed cropland, 
shrubland, and cleared land that is characteristic of 
smallholder farming. Although there is no detailed 
analysis of the uses of such lands, the mapping used 
to identify them indicates that the overall farming 
intensity is relatively low (at least by comparison 
with plantations), and people do not typically live 
on these peatlands in large numbers. More drained 
peatland is probably included in areas that satellite 
images identify as shrublands or cleared lands.143 
One prominent peatland is a roughly 1 Mha area 
in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia, that the govern-
ment attempted to convert to rice production via 
the Mega Rice Project beginning in 1995. Due to 
poor yields and fires, rice production either never 
started or was abandoned. The area now exists 
largely as a drained, cleared, and degrading site. 
Established in 2008, the Indonesia-Australia 
Forest Carbon Partnership attempted to restore 
these peatlands, but it created a variety of local 
controversies as different communities negotiated 
the compensation or benefits they would receive for 
agreeing to restoration. Amid widespread frustra-
tion with the lack of progress, Australia abandoned 
the effort in 2014.144
Fortunately, Indonesian President Joko Widodo 
announced in 2016 a goal to restore 2 Mha of 
peatland by 2020 (Box 21-1). This announcement 
came after massive peatland fires in 2015 that, 
in addition to releasing carbon, caused 500,000 
people to be hospitalized. Although this effort is far 
from fully funded, Indonesia allocated $35 million 
to peatland restoration in 2017. By 2018, the Peat 
Restoration Agency reported having rewetted more 
than 100,000 ha of land, although the standard 
used involves rewetting only up to 40 centimeters 
below the surface, so some degradation of soils will 
continue to occur.145
Massive peatland fires in Russia in 2010 also led 
to an effort with Wetlands International to rewet 
abandoned peatlands, although its reach has so far 
been very modest.146 
Restoring peatlands in Southeast Asia and else-
where also could generate ongoing economic 
returns to offset some of the costs.147 For example, 
peatlands that naturally supported forests could 
likely accumulate an amount of carbon from 
reforestation at rates that could justify substantial 
carbon payments. Although it would forgo many 
biodiversity benefits, another option might involve 
use of rewetted peatlands for agricultural or forest 
products that could grow well under wet conditions. 
Some valuable woods, such as European black 
alder, grow naturally on peatlands. Some European 
wetland grasses, such as reed canary grass, grow at 
sufficient yields to contemplate their use for bio-
energy. (If produced as part of a strategy to restore 
peatlands, wetland grasses would generate large 
climate benefits, although more from the restora-
tion of peatland than from the provision of bio-
mass.) A German project demonstrated that reed 
fibers could produce fire-resistant boards, while 
cattail could produce excellent insulation materi-
als. Cultivation of sphagnum moss could produce a 
valuable additive for horticulture.148 Another study 
found that native Indonesian peatland plants could 
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produce a wide range of valuable products, includ-
ing a candlenut that the study found could even 
exceed the returns for oil palm.149 Taking advantage 
of these opportunities may require a coordinated 
set of investments to support their establishment 
or marketing, and few have been tested in the real 
world. But the fact that some plants can grow well 
even in undrained peatlands suggests that at least 
some economic opportunities might exist to help 
support their restoration. 
To estimate the potential benefits of peatland 
restoration, we estimate the GHG emission reduc-
tions that would result from restoring 25 percent, 
50 percent, and 75 percent of all drained peatlands 
globally. (The higher number would require some 
peatlands currently used productively for agrofor-
estry or forest plantations to be rewetted at the time 
they would otherwise need replanting.) Table 21-1 
summarizes the potential GHG emissions benefits 
of these three scenarios, which would close the 
overall GHG emissions gap by between 2 and 7 
percent. 
Recommended Strategies
Pursuing peatland conservation and restoration 
requires better data, resources, regulation, and 
political commitment.
Better peatlands data and mapping
As our discussion indicates, mapping of peatland 
extent is today based on rough estimates because 
peatlands often cannot be identified by satellite 
imagery. Mapping relies on national soil surveys, 
typically conducted for planning agricultural 
uses, which do not technically identify peatlands 
but rather identify soils that are characteristic of 
peatlands. But the quality and effort put into this 
type of soil mapping is uneven across the world, 
particularly in more remote areas. This information 
also does not convey the depth of peat, whether the 
peatland is presently cropped and drained, or the 
depth of the drainage. All this information is impor-
tant to ensure conservation of existing undrained 
peatlands and identify the optimal restoration 
opportunities. An international entity or entities 
will need to step forward and supply the necessary 
resources and coordination for development of 
quality and detailed global maps of peatland extent, 
depth, drainage status, and use.
Resources
First and foremost, restoration requires resources 
both to fund the physical restoration and, usually, 
to compensate in some way existing users of the 
land for their forgone uses. Ideally, this compensa-
tion could take the form of assistance to help boost 
yields of crops outside of peatlands, replacing the 
forgone food production. 
BOX 21-1 |  Indonesia’s commitment to 
peatland restoration
The 2015 fire season was the worst in Indonesia’s history, result-
ing in more than 500,000 people being treated for respiratory 
illnesses, and causing more than $16 billion in economic losses.a 
Analysts estimate that 2.1 Mha of land and forest burned, resulting 
in 1.6 Gt CO2e (more than Japan’s annual total emissions) being 
released from fires that year.b The fires occurred largely on drained 
peatlands converted to oil palm and timber plantations.
To prevent another fire disaster of this scale, President Joko 
Widodo announced at the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change Conference of the Parties (COP) 21 in Paris the establish-
ment of the Peat Restoration Agency (Badan Restorasi Gambut, or 
BRG), an agency mandated to restore 2 Mha of peatland by 2020.c 
The president established the BRG through Presidential Regulation 
No. 1/2016, which lays out a plan to coordinate and accelerate the 
recovery of Indonesia’s critical peatlands.
The BRG’s restoration efforts will prioritize seven provinces: Riau, 
Jambi, South Sumatra, Papua, and West, East, and Central Kali-
mantan. Out of Indonesia’s estimated 12.9 Mha of peatland, 6.7 Mha 
are degraded and have potential for restoration, while 6.2 Mha 
are intact with potential for stronger protection. The BRG’s first 
year focused on identifying and mapping the extent and depth of 
peat domes in four districts in Sumatra and Kalimantan, totaling 
an area of 644,000 ha. In 2017, the BRG began coordinating and 
implementing peatland restoration activities in the target districts. 
The agency is working to mobilize nongovernmental organiza-
tions, companies, civil society, and the development community to 
support its efforts.d 
Sources:
a. Lamb (2015).
b. Harris et al. (2015). 
c. Jong (2015).
d. Wardhana (2016).
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To date, peatland restoration projects have dem-
onstrated technical potential but have been carried 
out at small scales and in limited contexts. Yet they 
probably offer one of the least expensive carbon 
savings of any land-use option, particularly where 
drained peatlands are now little used. International 
financial entities aiming to support climate change 
mitigation, including the Green Climate Fund, the 
World Bank, and national development assistance 
agencies, should work together to develop a major 
global funding initiative on peatland restoration.
Regulation
There is little reason for governments of peat-rich 
countries or the world’s wealthier nations to pay 
to restore peatlands in one location if farmers can 
easily shift food production and drain peatlands 
elsewhere. Governments should therefore estab-
lish, and enforce, strong laws protecting peatlands 
from further drainage or conversion. Indonesia, 
for example, issued a regulation in 2016 placing 
a moratorium on clearing peatland until a zoning 
system for the protection of peatlands and cultiva-
tion in peatlands is in place. The moratorium also 
specified that degraded areas must be restored, 
although implementation is still at an early stage.150 
Governments should also consider laws that will 
not leave the continued use of drained peatlands 
as assured, regardless of their economic benefits. 
Although many of those who now benefit from 
drained peatlands have compelling social argu-
ments for some form of compensation for restora-
tion—preferably as other economic opportunities—
emissions from peatlands should not be immune 
SCENARIO ANNUAL GHG EMISSIONS FROM PEATLANDS (2010–50) (MT CO2E)
CHANGE IN SIZE OF GHG EMISSIONS 
GAP BETWEEN 2050 BASELINE AND 
2050 TARGET
Baseline 1,103
25 percent peatland restoration 827 -2%
50 percent peatland restoration 552 -5%
75 percent peatland restoration 276 -7%
Table 21-1 | Potential of peatland restoration to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
Sources: WRI analysis based on Yu et al. (2010); You et al. (2014); Hiraishi et al. (2014); Biancalani and Avagyan (2014); and van der Werf et al. (2017).
from government regulation any more than other 
sources of emissions. 
Political commitment
Even when drained peatlands are little used, experi-
ence indicates that someone is nearly always using 
them in ways that take advantage of the drainage. 
Even in the largely abandoned Mega Rice Project 
area of Indonesia, local people engage in some 
modest agriculture, and they have used the canals 
as a means of transportation (for boats or timber), 
which is easier than trying to move directly through 
typically saturated peat.151 Because peatland drain-
age typically requires networks of drainage ditches, 
restoration usually proceeds in a series of blocks 
(e.g., by blocking drainage ditches), affecting mul-
tiple people and sometimes multiple communities, 
and it is hard to get all to agree. Australia’s efforts 
to restore the peatlands of the Mega Rice Project 
faltered in large part because some groups of 
people objected to the compensation deals as they 
unfolded, and occasional negative press emerged 
based on these objections.
Restoring peatlands, like most other infrastructure 
projects, has high potential to arouse opposition 
from some parties, even if the benefits to the public 
are clear and the project has the support of the vast 
majority of those directly affected. Efforts to move 
forward must be sensitive to issues of equity and 
seek participation and consent but should respect 
majority support. Projects will not succeed with-
out a strong political commitment to see projects 
through.
WRI.org        280
ENDNOTES
1. FAO (2019a).
2. FAO (2019a).
3. Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012), Table 4.8.
4. GlobAgri-WRR model. 
5. To appreciate shifts in locations of agricultural land, an 
analysis must evaluate how small, specific areas of land 
change over time, and not simply calculate how the total 
agricultural land within a country changes over time. The 
shifts only became possible to analyze once satellites could 
track locations of all land-use changes over time.
6. Reprinted from Figure 11 of FAO (2012e).
7. Lindquist et al. (2012).
8. Aide et al. (2012) for Latin America; Lark et al. (2015) for U.S.
9. Kuemmerle et al. (2016).
10. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005); Grenyer et al. 
(2006); Searchinger, Estes, Thornton et al. (2015); Sitch et al. 
(2015); Wheeler et al. (2016).
11. Aide et al. (2012); Lark et al. (2015).
12. Gibson et al. (2011).
13. West et al. (2010).
14. Hirsch et al. (2004).
15. Aide et al. (2012). The shift in grazing land from dry land in 
Australia to Latin America is also a good example of this type 
of shift.
16. Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012).
17. GlobAgri-WRR model.
18. Van Ittersum et al. (2016). 
19. Van Ittersum et al. (2016).
20. Searchinger, Estes, Thornton et al. (2015). 
21. FAO (2019a).
22. Bruinsma (2009) predicts an increase in soybean production 
from 218 Mt in 2006 to 514 Mt in 2050, with a rise in yield from 
2.3 t/ha to 3.7 t/ha during that period, leading to an increase in 
harvested area to 141 Mha. Masuda and Goldsmith (2009) only 
look out to 2030 and project a “business as usual” scenario in 
2030 where 371 Mt of soybeans will be produced on 141 Mha of 
land. 
23. In Latin America, Brazil and Argentina are two of the three 
largest soybean producers in the world. Africa’s potential to 
produce soybeans is described alternatively in Gasparri et al. 
(2016) and Searchinger, Estes, Thornton et al. (2015). 
24. Soyatech (n.d.).
25. Oil World (2015).
26. UNCTAD (2015). 
27. UNCTAD (2015).
28. Pacheco (2012); Greenpeace (2012); Rainforest Foundation UK 
(2013). 
29. For example, see Rainforest Foundation Norway (2012). 
30. Corley (2009). Corley’s estimate is for palm oil for edible 
purposes and “traditional” nonedible purposes (which do 
not include biofuels). Rushing and Lee (2013) project up 
to an additional 15 Mha of palm oil plantation expansion 
globally from 2010 or 2012 level (the base year is unclear in 
the publication) to 2050. The implications of current (2015) 
low prices for palm oil remain to be seen. For instance, it 
could delay the timing of expansion until prices rise again. 
One should note that some oil palm clones are capable of 
yielding 11 metric tons per hectare (which is way above the 
current average 4–5 metric tons per hectare), so there is still 
an upside potential in palm oil yields (D. McLaughlin, personal 
communication, April 30, 2015). However, getting selected 
clones to become mainstream is not a foregone conclusion.
31. Laurance et al. (2014); Laurance et al. (2009); Edwards et al. 
(2014); Busch and Ferretti-Gallon (2017); Seymour and Busch 
(2016); Vera-Diaz et al. (2009); Fearnside (1982); Chomitz and 
Gray (1996).
32. Seymour and Busch (2016).
33. Laurance et al. (2009); Laurance et al. (2006). See also 
summary of articles in Searchinger, Estes, Thornton et al. 
(2015). 
34. Ahmed et al. (2014); Blake et al. (2007).
35 Laporte et al. (2007).
36. Laurance et al. (2014). 
37 Ali et al. (2015); Delgado et al. (1998); African Agricultural 
Development Company (2013); Gollin and Rogerson (2010).
38. Jouanjean (2013).
39. Vera-Diaz et al. (2009)
40. Laurance et al. (2014). 
41. Laurance et al. (2015).
        281Creating a Sustainable Food Future
42. Laurance et al. (2015).
43. AIIB (2016). 
44. Angelsen and Kaimowitz (2001); Ewer et al. (2009); Rudel 
(2009).
45. Searchinger (2012); Villoria et al. (2014); Hertel et al. (2014).
46. Dorward (2012).
47. If yield increases occur because of increases in other inputs, 
including chemicals, machinery, or labor, then these nonland 
costs are likely to increase. This issue is often confused in the 
literature because studies tend to model effects on land not 
from increases in yield alone but rather from increases in total 
factor productivity, which assumes increases in productivity 
of all inputs and therefore declines in costs of producing crops 
and, in turn, prices. See, for example, Hertel et al. (2014). 
48. Stevenson et al. (2013). 
49. Searchinger, Edwards, Mulligan et al. (2015); HLPE (2011); 
Dorward (2012); Filipski and Covarrubia (2010). 
50. Gallett (2010).
51. Hertel et al. (2014).
52. The same yield growth may not precisely influence costs of 
production in the same way in each country, so this statement 
is only true roughly and in general.
53. Estimates of these rates of conversion of grasslands to 
croplands vary but are all in millions of hectares. Lark et al. 
(2015); WWF (2016).  
54. Hoering (2013).
55. Van Ittersum et al. (2016); FAO (2002).
56. Butler (2013).
57. Rosenbarger et al. (2013). 
58. Mulyani and Jepson (2013).
59. Recio (2015).
60. Jackson (2015); Nepstad et al. (2014); Assunção et al. (2012); 
Gibbs et al. (2016).
61. Do Carmo (2017).  
62. Wormington (2016).
63. Cameron (2015).
64. Fagan et al. (2013).
65. Murdiyarso et al. (2011); Austin et al. (2012).
66. Palmer (2015).
67. Busch and Ferretti-Gallon (2017). See also Porter-Bolland et al. 
(2012). 
68. Seymour and Busch (2016).
69. Busch and Ferretti-Gallon (2017).
70. Blackman et al. (2017).
71. Busch and Ferretti-Gallon (2017).
72. This paragraph is based on Seymour and Busch (2016); see 
esp. Chap. 7 for a fuller discussion of how to stop tropical 
deforestation. See also Colchester et al. (2006).
73. See www.globalforestwatch.org. 
74. Seymour and Busch (2016).
75. See, for example, Frank et al. (2017). We do not necessarily 
endorse the specific findings of this paper, but it does provide 
one estimate of the likelihood that stopping land-use changes 
without sufficient, exogenous yield gains will result in an 
increase in food prices and food insecurity.
76. Data for the following paragraph come from Assunção et al. 
(2013).
77. Assunção et al. (2013).
78. Annual deforestation rates in Brazilian Amazon with data 
from INPE (Brazilian National Institute of Space Research) are 
summarized by Butler (2017). 
79. The Brazil story is summarized in Jackson (2015).
80. Jackson (2015).
81. Laurance et al. (2014).
82. Estes, Searchinger, Spiegel, et al. (2016). 
83. Climate Focus (2016); Donofrio et al. (2017).
84. Consumer Goods Forum (2014).
85. University of Cambridge, Institute for Sustainability Leadership 
(2019).
86. University of Cambridge, Institute for Sustainability Leadership 
(2019). The founding member banks are Barclays, Deutsche 
Bank, Lloyds Banking Group, Santander, Westpac, BNP Paribas, 
RBS, and UBS. 
87. Fabiani et al. (2010).
88. Gibbs et al. (2015). 
89. Gibbs et al. (2015).
WRI.org        282
90. Soy production in Brazil in 1991 was about 20 million metric 
tons. In 2005, it was about 56 million metric tons. In 2007, it 
was about 61 million metric tons. In 2011 and 2013, it was about 
75 million metric tons and 82 million metric tons, respectively. 
Data for 1991 through 2009 are from the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, as reported in Boucher et al. (2011). Data for 2011 
and 2013 are from USDA (2019).
91. Taylor and Streck (2018). 
92. Nepstad et al. (2014).
93. Boyd et al. (2018). 
94. Papers using this term in the bioenergy context include 
Gelfand et al. (2013); Nijsen et al. (2012); and Wicke et al. (2011).
95. Cai et al. (2011).
96. Borras et al. (2011); Baka and Bailis (2014).
97. Federici et al. (2015); Pan et al. (2011); Richter and Houghton 
(2011). 
98. For example, in Palm et al. (2013), an important and oft-cited 
book focusing on tropical land conversion, the approach 
recommended focuses on calculations of costs per hectare, 
not per ton of crop.
99. Nijbroek and Andelman (2016). 
100. Estes, Searchinger, Spiegel, et al. (2016). 
101. Koh and Ghazoul (2010). 
102. Imperata grasslands store less than 20 tons of carbon 
per hectare (tC/ha), compared to more than 100 tC/ha in 
secondary forests and more than 200 tC/ha in the primary 
forests of Sumatra and Kalimantan, Indonesia. Figures include 
both biomass and necromass (Fairhurst et al. 2010). 
103. Chapin et al. (2000).
104. Fairhurst and McLaughlin (2009).
105. This figure reflects the area classified as “grassland” by 
Sarvision’s radar-based satellite imagery of Kalimantan in 
2010. Unpublished analysis conducted by WRI.
106. Garrity et al. (1997).
107. One study estimates a need for 3 to 7 million hectares of 
additional oil palm plantations in Indonesia between 2010 
and 2020; for links and citations of these figures, see Gingold 
(2010). 
108. Maginnis et al. (2005). 
109. See, for example, Stern (2006); Nabuurs et al. (2007); Sathaye 
et al. (2011); and Sathaye et al. (2005).
110. Griscom et al. (2017).
111. Buckingham and Hanson (2015b).
112. Hua et al. (2016).
113. Siddique et al. (2008).
114. Jactel et al. (2017).
115. Hua et al. (2016). For example, bee diversity in plantations was 
5% of that of croplands overall except for eucalyptus. 
116. Hua et al. (2016).
117. These estimates of beef production come from Cardoso 
et al. (2016), which discusses the level of beef production 
per hectare on pastureland under different forms of 
management in the Cerrado. Although the Atlantic Forest 
is a separate region, we estimate that the beef production 
on sloped pasture in this region is similar to that of the 
lowest management in the Cerrado, based on personal 
communications with the authors.
118. See http://www.bonnchallenge.org/commitments. 
119. Hanson et al. (2015).
120. Searchinger et al. (2018). 
121. Searchinger et al. (2018).
122. Buckingham and Hanson (2015b). 
123. Global soil maps tend to map not peat but “organic soils,” 
which are soils with 12% or more soil organic matter. Our 
mapping of peatlands globally uses organic soils designations. 
124. Kolka et al. (2016). 
125. Kolka et al. (2016).
126. Morrogh-Bernard et al. (2003); Posa et al. (2011); Sunarto et al. 
(2012). 
127. Mietinnen et al. (2016). 
128. For all of Indonesia, and using its own definition, Indonesia’s 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry as of 2017 estimates 
24.14 Mha of peatland hydrological units on National Zoning of 
Peatland Ecosystems.
129. Mietinnen et al. (2016).
130. See full description of methodology for estimating both land 
areas on peatlands and emissions in note 139.
131. Biancalani and Avagyan (2014). 
132. IPCC (2014).
        283Creating a Sustainable Food Future
133. Our analysis used the global map of peatland regions from 
Yu et al. (2010) to calculate the area of cropland on peat 
soils, the SPAM maps of crop distribution (You et al. 2014), 
emission factors recommended by the IPCC in a special 
report on wetlands (Hiraishi et al. 2014), except that we used 
a single emission factor of 55 tCO2/ha/yr for both oil palm 
and acacia plantations based on work by scientists with 
Wetlands International for reasons described in Biancalani and 
Avagyan (2014). We also estimated annual average peatland 
fire emissions based on the Global Fire Emissions Database 
version 4 (van der Werf et al. 2017).
134. Gumbricht et al. (2017); Joosten et al. (2012). 
135. Dargie et al. (2017).
136. Joosten et al. (2012); Biancalani and Avagyan (2014); Rochefort 
and Andersen (2017); Bonn et al. (2016).
137. Biancalani and Avagyan (2014), Box 7.
138. Grunwald (2018). 
139. Abram et al. (2016).
140. This calculation is based on the emission rate of 15 tons of 
carbon per hectare per year for oil palm in peat based on the 
emission factors discussed in Biancalani and Avagyan (2014).
141. Cost estimates vary greatly, but $50 is still below the mean, 
undiscounted estimated mitigation cost in 2030 to hold 
warming to 2 degrees Celsius based on analysis by the IPCC. 
See Rogelj et al. (2018), Figure 2.26(a).
142. Joosten et al. (2012).
143. Mietinnen et al. (2016).
144. Davies (2015).
145. Gewin (2018).
146. Wetlands International (n.d.).
147. The examples in this paragraph are all summarized by FAO in 
Biancalani and Avagyan (2014).
148. Biancalani and Avagyan (2014).
149. Biancalani and Avagyan (2014).
150. See ANTARA News (2016) and Pickup (2017) for more details on 
Indonesia’s Government Regulation no. 57/2016. 
151. Nugraha and Jong (2017).
REFERENCES 
To find the References list, see page 500, or download here: www.SustainableFoodFuture.org.
PHOTO CREDITS 
Pg. 234 Mokhamad Edliadi/CIFOR, pg. 237 Kate Evans/CIFOR, pg. 238 Icaro Cooke Vieira/CIFOR, pg. 246 Kate Evans/CIFOR,  
pg. 255 Patrick Shepherd/CIFOR, pg. 258 PXhere.com, pg. 264 Ollivier Girard/CIFOR, pg. 272 Nanang Sujana/CIFOR.
WRI.org        284
        285Creating a Sustainable Food Future
COURSE 4  
Increase Fish Supply
The global wild fish catch reached a peak in the mid-1990s but it has since 
stagnated and may even have declined. Roughly one-third of marine fish 
stocks are now overfished, with another 60 percent fished at maximum 
sustainable levels. This course explores ways to improve wild fisheries 
management and raise the productivity and environmental performance 
of aquaculture to meet rising demand for fish.
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MENU ITEM:  
IMPROVE WILD 
FISHERIES  
MANAGEMENT
Fish are an important source of protein, especially for 
people in developing countries. Yet the annual amount of 
fish caught in the wild—particularly from the oceans—has 
stagnated and may have significantly declined since the 
1990s. Continued overfishing threatens future catch levels 
and improved management will be essential to allow fish 
stocks to rebound.
CHAPTER 22
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The Challenge
Fish, including finfish and shellfish,1 are a minor 
source of the global calorie supply, but they con-
tributed 17 percent of global animal-based protein 
for human consumption in 2010 (Figure 6-4).2 Fish 
are particularly important in developing countries, 
which consume more than 75 percent, and produce 
more than 80 percent, of global fish supply.3 Fish 
also contain important micronutrients―such as 
vitamin A, iron, and zinc―and long-chain omega-3 
fatty acids that are essential for maternal health and 
early childhood development but are often deficient 
in the diets of the poor.4 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO),5 the world produced 
171 million tons (Mt) of fish in 2016. Wild fisher-
ies produced 91 Mt, which provided 71 Mt of fish 
for people and 20 Mt for animal feed and other 
nonfood uses.6 The global fisheries catch has grown 
almost fivefold since 1950. Yet since the 1990s, the 
catch has at best stagnated. FAO data show such a 
stagnation with a slight increasing trend in inland 
fish landings offsetting a slight decline in marine 
fish landings (Figure 22-1).7 Research by Pauly and 
Zeller (2016) is even more pessimistic, conclud-
ing that FAO’s numbers underestimate both total 
marine fish catches and the rate of decline since the 
1990s. Using an approach called “catch reconstruc-
tion,” Pauly and Zeller estimate that the global 
marine fish catch peaked at 130 Mt in 1996 (nearly 
50 percent higher than FAO’s estimate for that 
year) and since then has declined at an average rate 
of 1.2 Mt per year, with serious implications for the 
future marine catch.8 
The percentage of marine fish stocks that are 
overfished is also near an all-time high. By 2015, 33 
percent of marine fish stocks were overfished, with 
another 60 percent fished at maximum sustainable 
levels, and only 7 percent fished at less than their 
full potential (Figure 22-2).9 
The tropics present particular challenges. Fish 
catches are greatest in the tropics—particularly in 
Southeast Asia.10 Climate change is also likely to 
have substantial future effects by reducing produc-
tivity and fish size, disturbing fish habitats, and 
changing species composition as fish move toward 
cooler waters.11
Figure 22-1 |  The wild fish catch has stagnated (or possibly declined) since the 1990s
Note: “Wild catch” includes finfish, mollusks, crustaceans, and other aquatic animals from marine and freshwater ecosystems. It excludes all aquaculture. It does not include 
catch reconstruction as in Pauly and Zeller (2016).
Source: FAO (2019b).
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Figure 22-2 |  The percentage of overfished stocks has risen over the past 40 years
Source: FAO (2018). 
The Opportunity
Reducing overfishing, which would prevent future 
declines and allow depleted stocks to recover, is 
the first important step toward a sustainable fish 
supply. The World Bank suggests that world fish-
ing effort12 needs to decline by 5 percent per year 
over a 10-year period, which would allow fisheries 
to rebuild to an ideal level over three decades.13 
Although this approach would likely reduce catches 
in the short term, it should lead to productive and 
sustainable wild fish catches over the long term—
possibly 10 Mt above 2012 levels.14 Another study 
has estimated that economically optimal global fish-
eries management could even lead to a sustainable 
annual fish catch 18 Mt above 2012 levels by 2050.15
Some recent experience supports this claim. 
Although fisheries in developed countries have also 
been overfished, fish stocks appear to be rebound-
ing along the coasts of a few developed countries 
such as Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and the 
United States.16 
The United States has made significant progress in 
reducing overfishing in recent decades. The Magnu-
son-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act, signed in 1976 and strengthened through sub-
sequent amendments, created a mandate to rebuild 
overfished stocks. Since 2000, 44 fish stocks have 
been rebuilt and, as of 2017, just 15 percent of U.S. 
stocks were overfished—the lowest percentage since 
assessments began.17 Overall U.S. fish catch, which 
peaked around 6 Mt in the late 1980s and dropped 
to just over 4 Mt in 2009, seems to be stabilizing 
around 5 Mt.18 Success has come about through a 
variety of measures, notably through strict enforce-
ment of annual catch limits—including use of catch 
share programs—and monitoring of fish stock health. 
In Kenya, a comanagement program between the 
Fisheries Department and traditional fisheries 
leaders led to a rebound of coastal coral reef 
fish populations and increased the profitability 
of fishing. Two management strategies—gear 
restriction (a ban on small-meshed beach seine 
nets, implemented between 2001 and 2004), 
and closing off areas of the sea from fishing 
(implemented between 2005 and 2009)—were 
responsible for these results. In areas where these 
management strategies were in place, catches per 
fisher per day rose by approximately 50 percent 
between 2000 and 2012, and fisher incomes 
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doubled during this period, all while maintaining 
overall catch levels. At landing sites near the 
Mombasa Marine National Park, a no-fishing area, 
the sizes of fish caught were higher (fetching higher 
prices). Catches also contained species of higher 
market value relative to the catches in areas farther 
from no-fishing areas.19 These positive changes 
occurred even in the wake of the 1997–98 El Niño 
event that caused widespread loss of coral cover 
in the fishing grounds, suggesting that (at least 
during the study period) the improved fisheries 
management practices were able to counter the 
effects of disturbances from climate change.20
We project fish consumption to rise 58 percent 
between 2010 and 2050,21 but the wild fish catch 
peaked at 94 Mt in the mid-1990s and has since 
stagnated or perhaps declined. For our 2050 
baseline scenario, we assume a 10 percent decrease 
in global wild fish catch between 2010 and 2050 
(an annual catch in 2050 that is 9 Mt below 2010 
levels). This baseline assumes a continuation of 
business as usual, with some stocks rebuilding and 
others continuing to decline due to overfishing.22 
We also use GlobAgri-WRR to model an improve-
ment scenario where wild fish catch—instead of 
declining between 2010 and 2050—stays constant 
at 2010 levels, a scenario where many, but not all, 
stocks have measures in place to stop overfishing 
and rebuild. The effect in GlobAgri-WRR of being 
able to harvest an additional 9 Mt of wild fish 
(relative to 2050 baseline) is to avoid the need for 
an additional 9 Mt of farmed fish, which reduces 
aquaculture’s total land demand in 2050 by 5 mil-
lion hectares (Mha), and closes the emissions gap 
by 0.6 percent (Table 22-1).23
Recommended Strategies
Strategies to curb overfishing and maintain harvests 
at sustainable levels are well documented in other 
studies.24 They focus on several key principles:
 ▪ Limiting fish catch (including bycatch) to a level 
that allows the population to reproduce
 ▪ Limiting the number of fishers to an economi-
cally sustainable level
 ▪ Protecting habitat
 ▪ Avoiding harvest during important breeding 
times or in important breeding areas25 
Tools to implement these strategies include estab-
lishing total allowable catches based on optimum 
sustainable yield, gear restrictions, seasonal limits, 
regulation or direct government management of 
key habitats, and closure of breeding areas. 
Widespread implementation of these strategies is 
difficult for various reasons—listed below—most of 
which are political and socioeconomic and based 
on the fact that wild fish are a public resource that 
individual fishers have incentives to exploit before 
others can do so:26 
Table 22-1 |  Global effects of 2050 fisheries improvement scenario on the food gap, land use, and the GHG mitigation gap
SCENARIO FOOD GAP, 
2010–50 (%)
GHG MITIGATION 
GAP (GT CO2E)
AQUACULTURE LAND USE 
(MILLION HA) 
Ponds Cropland for 
feed
Total
2010 N/A N/A 19 27 46
2050 BASELINE 56.5 11.1 40 52 92
Stable wild fish catches between 2010 and 
2050 (Coordinated Effort, Highly Ambitious, 
Breakthrough Technologies)
56.3 11.0 38 49 87
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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 ▪ Rebuilding a fishery or halting overfishing typi-
cally involves a decline in fishing activity and 
landings for some period of time. Consequently, 
fishers and others in the value chain can experi-
ence financial losses over the near to medium 
term. There is no compelling short-term eco-
nomic reward for acting sustainably. 
 ▪ There are economic winners and losers in ef-
forts to rebuild stocks, and the potential losers 
often wield enough power to thwart reform and 
fishery restoration efforts. 
 ▪ Many countries subsidize fishing in a variety of 
ways that lead to overfishing.27 Recent studies 
estimate global annual fisheries subsidies at 
$35 billion—equivalent to one-third of the value 
of global fisheries production.28 In total, the 
World Bank estimated that annual lost rev-
enues from mismanagement of global fisheries 
was $83 billion in 2012.29
 ▪ Because of global power imbalances, foreign 
fleets from richer countries often are able to 
obtain “fishery access agreements” to fish in the 
waters of poorer countries with weaker laws 
and enforcement capacity.30 
 ▪ Illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing is a 
widespread problem, particularly in developing 
countries. Worldwide, losses from illegal fishing 
and unreported fishing have been estimated at 
$10 billion and $23.5 billion per year, respec-
tively, representing an additional catch of be-
tween 11 Mt and 26 Mt that goes unmanaged.31
 ▪ Lack of data and lack of infrastructure and 
resources for monitoring and enforcement can 
be a barrier to active management. 
 ▪ Fishing is often a livelihood of last resort in 
many poor coastal communities, and small-
scale fishing continues to grow across the de-
veloping world. In addition, fishing has played 
an important cultural role in coastal areas for 
centuries. In the absence of alternative liveli-
hoods, governments can be hesitant to curtail 
local fishing operations out of social concerns, 
even in depleted coastal waters.   
In recent years, some developed countries have 
been able to overcome these challenges by limiting 
the number of fishers and using “catch shares.” 
These systems establish shares of fish that may be 
taken and allocate them among individual fishers. 
These fishers therefore acquire a long-term stake in 
the health of the fishery, and can often trade their 
shares. 
In the United States, progress in rebuilding fisher-
ies has resulted in part from shifting to systems 
of “catch shares” that reduce the “race to fish.”32 
Based on evidence from 39 commercial fisheries, 
researchers have credited these programs with 
making catch levels more predictable and stable, 
reducing the number of fishing boats, improving 
fishing crew safety, reducing bycatch, and promot-
ing other favorable environmental and economic 
outcomes.33 However, because catch share pro-
grams can facilitate industry consolidation and the 
marginalization of small-scale fishers,34 govern-
ments will need to address the social consequences 
of this consolidation.
In developing countries where oversight, rule of 
law, and monitoring arrangements are weaker, 
additional approaches are needed. In these gov-
ernance environments—as the Kenya example 
illustrates—community-based comanagement 
systems may prove more effective. Such systems 
combine territorial fishing rights and no-take 
reserves designed and supported by coastal fishing 
communities.35 
All told, overcoming the barriers listed above 
requires a set of complementary strategies, adapted 
to suit specific circumstances.36 For example, 
establishing resource rights and removing per-
verse subsidies can control access to fish resources 
at economically and biologically feasible levels. 
Adoption of sustainable procurement practices and 
certification systems by actors in fish supply chains 
could help create demand for sustainably sourced 
fish. Both these rights and markets strategies, in 
turn, could build support for governance reforms 
regarding fishing practices and marine spatial man-
agement. However, for these strategies to succeed, 
enabling conditions such as sound data and science, 
supply chain transparency, and law enforcement 
need to be in place.37 Advocacy, public pressure, 
technical and financial support, and outreach to 
major players in fish supply chains can all help put 
these enabling conditions in place and advance 
these strategies.
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MENU ITEM: IMPROVE 
PRODUCTIVITY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE OF 
AQUACULTURE
Despite stagnating or declining wild fish catches, world fish 
consumption has continued to increase as aquaculture has 
grown to meet global demand. This menu item involves 
increasing production of farmed fish relative to the amount of 
land, freshwater, feed, and energy used—while minimizing water 
pollution, fish diseases, and escapes.
CHAPTER 23
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Figure 23-1 | Nearly 90 percent of aquaculture production is in Asia
The Challenge
The aquaculture (fish farming)38 sector is diverse. 
Fish farming produces more than 300 species 
and occurs in nearly every country in the world.39 
Aquaculture is practiced in three different environ-
ments: In 2016, 63 percent of production was in 
freshwater (mostly in ponds on land), 28 percent 
in marine waters, and 9 percent in brackish water 
(coastal ponds).40 
Between 2011 and 2016, aquaculture production 
rose in every world region.41 In 2016, aquacul-
ture provided more than half of all fish people 
consumed—80 Mt—making it one of the world’s 
fastest-growing animal food-producing sectors.42 
Asia accounted for nearly 90 percent of global 
aquaculture production in 2016, and China alone 
accounted for more than 60 percent (Figure 23-1). 
In terms of percentage increase, sub-Saharan 
Africa had the fastest rate of growth—increasing 
production by nearly 50 percent between 2011 and 
2016—but because its baseline was low, the region 
contributed less than 1 percent of global aquacul-
ture production in 2016. 
Because the wild fisheries catch peaked years ago, 
virtually all of the future increase in world fish 
consumption will need to come from aquaculture. If 
global per capita fish availability is to meet pro-
jected demand under our 2050 baseline scenario, 
where wild fish supply declines by 10 percent, we 
estimate that aquaculture production would need 
to more than double between 2010 and 2050, rising 
from 60 Mt in 2010 to roughly 140 Mt in 2050 (Fig-
ure 23-2). Meeting this demand presents environ-
mental, production, and social challenges.43
Land-use change
In 2010, global aquaculture occupied an estimated 
19 Mha of land—an area the size of Syria—including 
13 Mha of inland (freshwater) areas and 6 Mha of 
coastal (brackish water) ponds. Aquaculture also 
indirectly used an additional 27 Mha that year—an 
area larger than the United Kingdom—to grow 
plant-based feeds.44 In total, aquaculture occupied 
about 1 percent of global agricultural land,45 and 
conversion of agricultural lands or natural eco-
systems to aquaculture contributes to the overall 
competition for land. 
2016 AQUACULTURE
PRODUCTION
 80 million tons
China
62%
Other
Asian
countries
20% 
India
7%
Americas 4% 
Europe 4% 
 Middle East and North Africa 2%
Sub-Saharan Africa 1%
Oceania <1%
Note: Data may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
Source: FAO (2019b).
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Figure 23-2 | Aquaculture production must continue to grow to meet world fish demand
Source: Historical data 1950–2016: FAO (2019b) and FAO (2018). Projections to 2050: calculated at WRI; assume 10% reduction in wild fish catch from 2010 levels by 2050, linear 
growth of aquaculture production of 2 Mt per year between 2010 and 2050.
Aquaculture’s impact on mangroves raises par-
ticular concerns. Mangroves are among the most 
productive ecosystems in the world, serving as 
nursery grounds for many fish and protecting coast-
lines. In the 1980s and 1990s, a largely unregulated 
boom in shrimp aquaculture led to clearing of 
significant areas of mangroves for aquaculture 
ponds.46 Conversion of mangroves to aquaculture 
has slowed since 2000, thanks to improvements in 
shrimp-farming practices and mangrove protection 
policies.47 Between 2000 and 2012, however, the 
world lost 192,000 hectares of mangroves, about 1 
percent of total global mangrove cover,48 with more 
than 100,000 hectares being lost in Southeast Asia 
alone. Richards and Freiss (2016) estimate that 30 
percent of the mangrove losses in Southeast Asia in 
this period were due to aquaculture expansion (fol-
lowed by clearing for rice [22 percent] and oil palm 
[16 percent]). Indonesia, in particular, witnessed 
major aquaculture expansion: of 60,000 hectares of 
mangroves lost, half were cleared for aquaculture.49 
It remains an ongoing challenge in some areas to 
reconcile plans for increasing aquaculture produc-
tion with mangrove protection.50
Greenhouse gas emissions 
In 2010, we estimate that aquaculture produc-
tion was responsible for greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions of 332 million tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (Mt CO2e)—less than 1 percent of total 
human emissions but 5 percent of emissions from 
agricultural production.51 Aquaculture’s emissions 
arise from on-farm energy use; feed production; 
transportation, processing, and packaging of pro-
duce; and disposal of wastes. Aquaculture’s largest 
energy demands tend to occur during production of 
fish and feeds.52 Untreated pond sediments can lead 
to methane emissions.53 A further source of emis-
sions is the conversion of land and coastal habitats 
for aquaculture development, both directly through 
conversion of carbon-rich ecosystems (such as 
mangroves, seagrass beds, and wetlands) and indi-
rectly by displacing croplands. 
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Additional environmental challenges
Aquaculture can trigger other environmental chal-
lenges, as well. First, the use of wild fish as feed 
ingredients can exacerbate pressure on marine 
ecosystems. The small, oily fish com monly har-
vested for aquaculture feed—such as anchovy—are 
near the bottom of the marine food chain. In 2016, 
15 Mt of wild fish (or nearly one-fifth of the marine 
catch) was converted to fishmeal and fish oil, most 
of which was consumed by aquaculture.54
Another challenge is water pollution. Discharges 
can contain excess nutrients from fish feed and 
waste, antibiotic drugs, other chemicals (e.g., 
pesticides, hormones, antifoulants), and inorganic 
fertilizers. In comparison to terrestrial livestock 
production, it is difficult to collect wastes from 
aquaculture production because they are rapidly 
dispersed into the surrounding water.55 Pollution 
associated with aquaculture can cause degradation 
of aquatic habitats and eutrophication of lakes or 
coastal zones, and can even directly threaten the 
aquaculture operation itself.56 
A third challenge is infectious disease, which has 
devastated shrimp production in parts of Asia. 
Early Mortality Syndrome (first noted in 2009) 
presents ongoing threats to the shrimp sector. 
Parasites, such as sea lice, have caused problems 
for salmon production, for example in Chile and 
Norway.57 Diseases and parasites can also be trans-
ferred from farmed to wild fish (and vice versa) in 
open production systems.58 
Another concern is that farm-raised fish can escape, 
or be intentionally released, from aquaculture facili-
ties and cause genetic contamination. Escaped fish 
can breed with, outcompete, or prey on native fish, 
altering ecosystem structure and composition.59 
Finally, food safety worries exist, too. These include 
the excessive use of antimicrobial products at fish 
farms, which can spread antimicrobial resistance in 
human pathogens (e.g., Salmonella). Another is the 
potential for farmed fish to contain high levels of 
chemical contaminants, such as persistent organic 
pollutants, pesticides, and heavy metals, which 
could be harmful to consumers.60
Social concerns associated with aquaculture  
Human nutrition. Farmed fish are generally as 
lean and protein-rich as chicken,61 but one concern 
of aquaculture is that farmed fish as a whole tend 
to have lower levels of long-chain omega-3 fatty 
acids than wild fish.62 Nutrient compo sition of 
fish depends on a number of factors including the 
species, whether the fish is wild or farmed, and the 
feeding methods.63 If fish are to continue to meet 
this valuable nutritional need, they will require an 
enhanced, alternative supply of complex oils. 
Availability and affordability of fish for 
human consumption. The use of wild fish for 
aquaculture feed is a complicated issue. On the one 
hand, it may reduce the amount of wild fish avail-
able for direct human consumption while it pro-
duces relatively large fish targeted at middle-class 
markets.64 As the vast majority of the small fish har-
vested for feed is of food-grade quality, aquaculture 
could reduce fish access for the poor. On the other 
hand, there is limited market demand for direct 
consumption of these small fish.65 Aquaculture can 
also benefit the poor if its output becomes cheap 
enough. For example, in Egypt and Bangladesh, 
strong recent growth of aquaculture production 
has pushed the prices of farmed fish below those of 
wild fish, making fish more broadly accessible to the 
poor.66
Input constraints and climate change
Land-use limitations are a key constraint on 
aquaculture growth. In Asia, for instance, little 
land is available for aquaculture (or any agricul-
tural) expansion.67 An important challenge will be 
for aquaculture to more than double production 
between 2010 and 2050 while minimizing land 
expansion.68 
In 2010, aquaculture consumed an estimated 201 
cubic kilometers (km3) of freshwater, accounting for 
approximately 2 percent of global agricultural water 
consumption.69 Freshwater inland aquaculture 
uses water to maintain pond levels, compensating 
for water lost through seepage, evaporation, and 
intentional discharge. More intensive systems use 
frequent water exchanges to aerate and filter ponds. 
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Production of plant-based fish feeds also consumes 
water.70 However, freshwater is becoming increas-
ingly scarce in many aquaculture-producing areas 
because of upstream dams and diversion of water 
for agriculture and urban uses.71
Feed could be another constraint. In 2016, at 
least 70 percent of aquaculture production used 
some form of feed, whether fresh feeds (e.g., crop 
wastes), feed mixed and processed on the farm, or 
commercially manufactured feed.72 Carnivorous 
species73—such as salmon, shrimp, and many other 
marine finfish—tend to rely on wild-caught fish (in 
the form of fish meal and fish oil in commercially 
manufactured feeds) to receive adequate protein 
and lipids in their diets.74 Conversely, roughly 80 
percent of aquaculture production in 2014 con-
sisted of omnivores, herbivores, and filter feeders 
that consume little to no fish-based ingredients.75 
Commercial feeds for omnivores and herbivores 
tend to contain cereals, oilseeds, and pulses, often 
in the form of meals and oils.76 The fact that the 
supply of fish meal and fish oil from wild sources 
is already near its historical highs and ecological 
limits represents a clear constraint on aquaculture 
produc tion growth, particularly of farmed carnivo-
rous fish.77 However, it will also be a challenge to 
ensure an adequate supply of plant-based proteins, 
oils, and carbohydrates for aquaculture feed as the 
sector grows, while minimizing the associated land 
and water-use impacts.78
Land, water, and feed are all likely to be adversely 
affected by climate change.79 Farms in deltas and 
coastal and marine areas are most immediately 
exposed to flooding, sea level rise, and extreme 
weather events. Increases in water temperature 
will likely increase the occurrence of harmful algal 
blooms, which reduce water quality and can render 
farmed fish unfit for human consumption.80 Ocean 
acidification also threatens the long-term viability 
of shellfish aquaculture.81 At the same time, climate 
change may also open up new production oppor-
tunities in certain areas and make aquaculture an 
adaptation strategy. In colder regions, warmer tem-
peratures may enable aquaculture, and in coastal 
land areas that become too saline for agriculture, 
aquaculture could become an important adaptation 
strategy (Chapter 15).82
The Opportunity
If annual aquaculture production were to increase 
from 60 Mt in 2010 to 140 Mt by 2050, as projected 
in our baseline food demand scenario, significant 
food security and development benefits could 
result. For example, this level of growth would 
boost annual fish protein supply to 19 Mt, or 6 Mt 
above 2010 levels.83 Such an increase would meet 
13 percent of the increase in global animal protein 
supply between 2010 and 2050 under our baseline 
scenario.84 It would boost income and employ-
ment, particularly in developing countries, where 
most aquaculture growth will occur.85 And the 
global value of farmed fish could increase from 
$120 billion in 2010 to $308 billion in 2050, with 
the number of people engaged in aquaculture for 
a living increasing from 100 million in 2010 to 176 
million by midcentury.86 
Even though aquaculture poses environmental 
challenges, it has potential advantages relative to 
most other animal-based foods. Because finfish 
live in an environment that supports their body 
weight, are cold-blooded, and excrete waste nitro-
gen directly as ammonia, they devote less energy 
to metabolism and bone structure than terrestrial 
animals.87 As a result, most farmed species convert 
feed into edible meat quite efficiently. As discussed 
in Chapter 6 on shifting diets, farmed finfish are 
similar in feed conversion efficiency to poultry, and 
much more efficient than beef and sheep (Figure 
6-5).88 Filter-feeding carp and mollusks are even 
more efficient producers of animal protein, as they 
require no human-managed feeds and can improve 
water quality by removing excess microalgae and 
nutrient pollution from lakes and coastal waters.89 
Furthermore, expansion of marine aquaculture 
could help alleviate the land constraint relative 
to other animal-based foods and their associated 
emissions from land-use change. 
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Per ton of edible protein, aquaculture species 
require between 0 ha (mollusks) and 16 ha (shrimp) 
of land per year, which is less than pork and 
chicken (both around 20 ha per year) and far less 
than beef (140 ha per year) (Figure 6-6).90 Aquacul-
ture also produces lower GHG emissions than rumi-
nant meats. Per ton of edible protein, farmed fish 
production emits around 30 tons of CO2e per year, 
which is similar to emissions from pork and chicken 
production, and again far less than emissions from 
beef production (more than 200 tons of CO2e per 
year). Another consideration is that, because the 
aquaculture sector is relatively young compared 
with terrestrial livestock sectors, there is great 
scope for technical innovation to further increase its 
resource efficiency.
Opportunities to sustainably intensify aquaculture 
production (Box 23-1), to reduce its environmental 
impacts, and to overcome basic production con-
straints exist in at least five interrelated areas:91 
Breeding and genetics 
To overcome land-use constraints, aquaculture 
needs to improve growth rates and conversion 
efficiencies. Fish bred for faster growth rates92 
could lead to more efficient use of land and sea 
area, water, feed, and labor.93 Fortunately, there 
are large opportunities to breed more efficient fish, 
as aquaculture lags far behind crop and livestock 
agriculture in the use of selective breeding; in 2010, 
less than 10 percent of world aquaculture produc-
tion was based on genetically improved stocks.94 
Because feed often accounts for 50 percent or more 
of all production costs, these efficiencies should also 
improve the economics of production.95 
Of the approximately 100 large-scale aquaculture 
breeding programs in the world in 2010, more than 
half were focused on just three species: Atlantic 
salmon, rainbow trout, and Nile tilapia. Less than 
10 percent focused on carp, which is by far the 
most abundant aquaculture species group.96 Selec-
tive breeding efforts could be expanded, aimed 
at countries and species with the highest levels of 
production (e.g., Chinese carps), and at areas of 
current low productivity yet high need for aqua-
culture growth (e.g., sub-Saharan Africa). Selec-
tive breeding also could reduce disease problems, 
enable increased use of plant-based ingredients in 
feed, and lead to the eventual development of truly 
domesticated fish that do not survive or breed in 
the wild, lessening problems of escapes.
Fish oil alternatives and other feed improvements 
Aquaculture continues to rely heavily on wild 
fish-derived fish meal and fish oil. However, since 
both are finite resources, the aquaculture industry 
cannot continue this reliance as it continues rapid 
growth into the future. The supply of fish meal and 
fish oil from wild sources is already at historical 
highs and is near ecological limits, which repre-
sents a clear constraint to aquaculture growth.97 
To continue its growth, the aquaculture industry 
will therefore need an alternative source of the 
key nutrients found in fish oil—omega-3 eicosa-
pentaenoic acid (EPA), and docosahexaenoic acid 
(DHA) (Box 23-2). Both EPA and DHA omega-3 
are required for optimal fish health and growth and 
are also important essential fatty acids for human 
nutrition.
BOX 23-1 |  Classifying aquaculture 
production systems by 
intensity
The aquaculture literature commonly classifies production 
systems by their level of intensity. Intensity of production 
runs along a spectrum from extensive (less than 1 ton of fish 
per hectare per year [t/ha/yr]) through semi-intensive (2–20 
t/ha/yr) and intensive (20–200 t/ha/yr) farms.a Yields from 
intensive cage, raceway, or recirculating systems can be 
higher still.b In general, according to Hall et al. (2007), levels of 
intensity can be summarized as follows:
 ▪ Extensive production requires a low level of control, relies 
on natural productivity and crop wastes as feed, and has 
relatively low operating costs.
 ▪ Semi-intensive production uses fertilizers and farm-made 
feed to boost fish yields, which requires a higher level of 
management control and involves higher operating costs.
 ▪ Intensive production requires the highest degree of man-
agement control, relies completely on off-farm inputs (e.g., 
high-quality feed, seed, and fertilizers), and uses more 
energy, leading to high operating costs.
Sources:
a. Bunting (2013).
b. Dugan et al. (2007).
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Microalgae (the origin of omega-3 fatty acids in 
fish oil) can provide a viable substitute for wild 
fish-based ingredients and use much less land and 
water than is required for plant-based oil crops.98 
Another possible plant-based substitute for fish oil 
is genetically engineered yeasts or oilseed plants 
(e.g., rapeseed) that produce omega-3 fatty acids.99 
However, further investments in research and 
development will be necessary to bring costs of 
these replacement ingredients below fish oil prices. 
Continued research is also necessary to further 
improve understanding of optimal omega-3 fatty 
acid nutritional efficiency of all important aqua-
culture species, while also minimizing waste and 
production costs. 
Disease control 
Disease outbreaks continue to constrain aqua-
culture production, especially in more intensive sys-
tems. New technologies will be essential to lessen 
risks from disease and reduce the need for antibi-
otics.100 Promising technologies include advanced 
diagnostics, vaccines, dietary supplements, and 
genetic improvements. Also helpful will be wider 
application of best management practices, such as 
reducing water exchange in ponds or tanks, reduc-
ing water seepage in ponds, improving feed and 
feeding practices, improving sanitation, and not 
stocking fish too densely in ponds or cages. 
Water recirculation and other pollution control
Recirculating water used in aquaculture can save 
water and allow the producer greater control over 
water temperature, oxygen levels, and other aspects 
of water quality. As a result, conditions improve 
for the farmed fish, allowing for better growth, 
lower disease levels, more predictable harvests, and 
higher levels of intensity. However, recirculation 
also adds to operating costs and energy use (and 
production-related GHG emissions).101 Water recir-
culation is not the only option for pollution control; 
other improved management practices, such as 
using settling ponds before releasing wastewater, 
can also reduce waste.
BOX 23-2 |  Microalgae are a promising 
alternative to fish oil in 
aquaculture feeds
Fish and the fish-derived product, fish oil, currently represent 
the main dietary source of long-chain omega-3 fatty acids for 
human nutrition. Omega-3 fatty acids generally refer to three 
fats, namely alpha-linolenic acid (ALA), eicosapentaenoic 
acid (EPA), and docosahexaenoic acid (DHA). Of these, EPA 
and DHA are the long-chain omega-3s, which are naturally 
present in fish, marine algae, krill, and human milk. They are 
associated with key human health benefits. Daily intake of 
at least 250 mg of EPA and DHA has been shown to benefit 
eye, brain, and heart health.a However, there are currently no 
large-scale alternatives to fish oil that are rich in both EPA 
and DHA omega-3 fatty acids, meaning that fully replacing 
fish oil in aquaculture feed with other animal or plant-
based oils would reduce the level of EPA and DHA omega-3 
and therefore the nutritional benefit of farmed fish to the 
consumer.b 
The omega-3 fatty acids EPA and DHA are naturally produced 
by algae in the natural marine food chain and gradually 
accumulated in larger fish. These larger fish are harvested 
for fish oil production, and fish oil therefore contains EPA and 
DHA omega-3 fatty acids. Fish oil alternatives are essentially 
based on utilizing the ability of microalgae to produce 
omega-3 fatty acids, either by direct production of microalgae 
or by transferring their biochemical capability (e.g., genes) 
to other organisms such as yeast or oilseed plants through 
genetic engineering. Although it remains to be seen which 
technologies ultimately prove to be economically viable, and 
socially acceptable, at large scale, it appears that several fish 
oil alternatives will be available on the market within the next 
few years.
One example of a promising fish oil alternative is an algal 
strain of Schizochytrium sp. that naturally produces both EPA 
and DHA omega-3 through fermentation. Using sugar as an 
energy source, the algae cells grow, multiply, and convert 
sugar into the omega-3 fatty acids EPA and DHA. A refining 
process then produces an algal oil rich in both EPA and DHA 
that can substitute for fish oil—as well as a by-product that 
can be used for animal feed or bioenergy. Evonik and DSM 
have founded a joint venture, Veramaris®, to commercialize 
this technology, which they say will be on the market in 2019 
and initially able to meet 15 percent of the salmon aquaculture 
industry’s demand for EPA and DHA.c
Sources:
a.  Zhang et al. (2018).
b.  Sprague et al. (2016).
c.  Van der Hoeven (2018); Veramaris (2018). 
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Expansion of marine-based systems 
Offshore marine aquaculture, which would avoid 
additional land-use change as well as problems of 
competition for space in coastal areas by locating 
farms in the open sea, is still in its infancy.102 One 
recent study found that the global physical potential 
for expanding marine aquaculture is vast—that 
marine aquaculture could fully supply farmed fish 
demand by 2050 even if only 1 percent of the suit-
able area in each coastal country were developed. 
However, the study did not assess important eco-
nomic or biodiversity-related constraints to expan-
sion of marine-based systems, suggesting that the 
true growth potential was still significant, but lower 
than the pure physical potential.103 
To better understand the efficacy of various strat-
egies to meet these challenges while boosting 
aquaculture production to 140 Mt by 2050, we use 
GlobAgri-WRR to build on lifecycle assessments 
performed by WorldFish and Kasetsart University. 
These assessments are reported in more detail in 
Mungkung et al. (2014) and Waite et al. (2014).104 
The analysis divides world aquaculture into 75 
major production systems, which accounted for 
more than 80 percent of total world aquaculture 
production in 2010. We integrated this analysis 
into the GlobAgri-WRR model and used the model 
to explore a 2050 baseline and three additional 
aquaculture production scenarios with the follow-
ing characteristics:
 ▪ Baseline. Aquaculture production rises to 
140 Mt in 2050. Proportions of fish species 
cultivated and production systems used (e.g., 
composition of feeds, intensity level of produc-
tion) remain unchanged between 2010 and 
2050. But increasing resource scarcity leads 
to market conditions that cause farmers to 
improve their production efficiency so that they 
produce each kg of fish with 10 percent less use 
of all major inputs (e.g., water, feed, energy, 
fertilizers). 
 ▪ Doubling efficiency gains (Coordinated 
Effort scenario). Between 2010 and 2050, 
farmers improve production efficiency by 20 
percent instead of 10 percent thanks to further 
improvements in fish breeding, feeds, and 
disease and pollution control.
 ▪ Accelerated intensification on land 
(Highly Ambitious scenario). Freshwater 
pond farming—the current dominant pro-
duction system around the world—becomes 
significantly more intensive as farmers invest 
in the technologies described in the preceding 
Table 23-1 |  Global effects of 2050 aquaculture improvement scenarios on the food gap, land use, and the GHG mitigation gap
SCENARIO FOOD GAP, 
2010–50 
(%)
GHG 
MITIGATION 
GAP (GT CO2E)
AQUACULTURAL LAND USE 
(MILLION HA) 
Ponds Cropland for feed Total
2010 N/A N/A 19 27 46
2050 BASELINE 56.5 11.1 40 52 92
Doubling efficiency gains (from 10% 
to 20% between 2010 and 2050) 
(Coordinated Effort)
56.3 11.0 36 49 85
Accelerated intensification on land 
(Highly Ambitious) 57.0 11.1 27 60 87
Doubling efficiency gains plus 
accelerated intensification on land 
(Breakthrough Technologies)
56.7 11.0 24 56 80
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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section. Fifty percent of all farms classified as 
“extensive” (Box 23-1) in 2010 shift to “semi-
intensive” by 2050, and 50 percent of “semi-
intensive” farms in 2010 shift to “intensive” by 
2050.
 ▪ Doubling efficiency gains plus acceler-
ated intensification on land (Breakthrough 
Technologies scenario). This scenario is a com-
bination of the two previous scenarios.
Table 23-1 shows the results from these scenarios. 
Under the 2050 baseline scenario, land under 
aquaculture ponds doubles between 2010 and 2050 
and cropland for aquaculture feeds also doubles 
because there is no additional potential to provide 
more feed from wild fish.
Doubling the increase in production efficiency from 
10 percent (under baseline) to 20 percent reduces 
total land demand by 7 Mha relative to the baseline 
scenario, closing the food gap by 0.4 percent and 
the GHG emissions gap by 0.8 percent.
The scenario of accelerated intensification on land 
leads to a trade-off among two types of land use. 
The switch to more intensive production systems 
by 2050 leads to a savings in 13 Mha of land under 
aquaculture ponds relative to baseline. However, 
since more intensive production systems tend to 
require more feeds—and we required all additional 
feeds to be crop-based rather than wild-fish-based—
the land savings from the reduced pond area are 
offset by an 8 Mha increase in cropland used to 
produce aquaculture feeds. This surprising result 
suggests that extensive ponds are essentially func-
tioning both as homes for the fish and as producers 
of algae for feed. GlobAgri-WRR also estimated 
that overall emissions (even with the reduced land 
overall relative to baseline) would actually increase 
by 19 Mt per year, due to the higher energy use in 
intensive ponds. 
The third scenario, which combines the doubled 
efficiency with the accelerated intensification on 
land, eases the trade-offs from the intensification-
only scenario. Under this third scenario, cropland 
use rises by only 4 Mha relative to baseline (instead 
of 8 Mha in the intensification-only scenario), while 
the use of land for ponds falls by 16 Mha relative to 
baseline (instead of 13 Mha in the intensification-
only scenario). Overall, emissions would decrease 
by 66 Mt per year relative to baseline, as the 
avoided land-use change offsets the higher energy 
use in intensive ponds.
Overall, we favor shifts toward more intensive 
ponds in part because land “saved” overall from 
pond expansion is likely to be more carbon-rich 
than the additional land required for feed crop 
expansion. This is because ponds must generally 
use wet, flatter lands. In addition, potential exists 
to reduce the land-use demands for feed either by 
further increasing crop yields or by further acceler-
ating efficiency gains (e.g., breeding fish to convert 
feed to flesh more efficiently or to grow faster and 
therefore increase output per hectare of pond). 
Connecting intensive ponds to renewable sources 
of energy could reduce production emissions from 
intensive aquaculture. 
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This analysis, and the broader life cycle assessment 
done by Mungkung et al. (2014) that examined 
additional aquaculture growth scenarios and other 
environmental factors, including water use and pol-
lution, illustrate a real challenge. Under a projected 
doubling in global aquaculture production between 
2010 and 2050, it will be hard enough to hold 
aquaculture’s environmental impacts to 2010 levels, 
let alone reduce them. Mungkung et al. (2014) also 
showed that intensification, while reducing aqua-
culture’s freshwater demand, would lead to a rise 
in water pollution unless accompanied by further 
technological advances. A deeper analysis of the 
trade-offs under scenarios of aquaculture growth, 
with more detailed data, is needed to provide 
insights at finer scales (e.g., national level). For 
example, Phillips et al. (2015) analyzed scenarios of 
Indonesian aquaculture growth to the year 2030. 
Their analysis underscored the challenges of meet-
ing projected fish demand while safeguarding high-
conservation-value ecosystems such as mangroves 
and wetlands, limiting freshwater use, and finding 
alternatives to wild-fish-based feed ingredients.
Recommended Strategies
If aquaculture is to more than double production, 
sustainably, between 2010 and 2050, the sector 
must increase its natural resource efficiency and 
reduce other environmental impacts, including fish 
diseases and escapes. Several strategies are neces-
sary to realize this potential.
Increase investment in technological innovation 
and transfer 
Technological advances by scientists, researchers, 
and innovative farmers—and widespread uptake 
of improved technologies—will be necessary to 
address the various land and feed constraints and 
to fully exploit the opportunities for aquaculture to 
grow efficiently and with minimal environmental 
impacts, as demonstrated by the salmon farming 
industry in Norway (Box 23-3). These advances 
could also help aquaculture adapt to a changing cli-
mate.105 While numerous initiatives are directed at 
technological innovation and transfer, their present 
scale is insufficient to achieve the necessary change 
by 2050. Because most aquaculture occurs in 
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developing countries, where production growth in 
coming decades is expected to be highest, initiatives 
should focus on helping small- and medium-scale 
producers in developing countries access and adopt 
improved technologies.106 In India, for example, 
small-scale shrimp farmers organized into “societ-
ies” that enabled them to access new technologies, 
services, and markets that otherwise might have 
been limited to large-scale farmers.107
National governments, development agencies, the 
aquaculture industry, international organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private 
foundations, and farmers all have a role to play. 
Because public budgetary resources are limited, 
innovative financing arrangements with the private 
sector, such as private equity investment, will be 
needed.108
Use spatial planning to optimize aquaculture siting 
Much of aquaculture growth to this point has 
been “organic” or “opportunistic” and led by a 
dynamic private sector.109 Resource and economic 
constraints, the potential for increased conflicts 
between resource users, and the need to boost 
production significantly in a short time mean that 
the locations of future aquaculture systems must be 
chosen more strategically. 
Spatial planning and zoning include processes and 
tools such as land-use planning, water-use plan-
ning, ecosystem modeling, marine spatial planning, 
integrated coastal zone management, and inte-
grated watershed management. These approaches 
can lessen the conflicts between a growing aquacul-
ture industry and other economic actors competing 
for the same resources, such as land, especially if 
done in a participatory way. Planning focused at the 
landscape and seascape level can also reduce cumu-
lative impacts caused by many farmers operating 
in the same area and help minimize risks associ-
ated with climate change. In Norway, for example, 
zoning laws ensure that salmon producers are not 
overly concentrated in one area, reducing disease 
risk and helping mitigate environmental impacts. 
BOX 23-3 |  Sustainability gains in 
Norway’s salmon farming 
industry
Norway, the world leader in salmon (Salmo salar) production, 
has made dramatic sustainability gains over the past 30 
years. The share of fishmeal and fish oil in salmon diets has 
been reduced by about two-thirds between 1990 and 2013, 
antibiotic use virtually eliminated, and fish escapes reduced 
from nearly 1 million in 2006 to roughly 143,000 in 2018.a 
Meanwhile, salmon production has grown from about 150,000 
tons in 1990 to 1.2 million tons in 2016.b
Technological improvements, stimulated by high levels of 
public and private investment in research and development, 
have been at the core of these improvements in productivity 
and environmental performance. Development of vaccines 
and disease control methods has greatly reduced the need 
for antibiotics.c Selective breeding and improved feeds 
have both led to greater production efficiency and reduced 
the reliance on wild fish for feed.d Industry consolidation 
and vertical integration has enabled companies to invest 
heavily in research and development, increasing production 
efficiency and driving down production costs. And public 
policies—including permitting, spatial planning and 
monitoring systems, as well as establishing protected areas 
for wild salmon—have helped stimulate and support these 
improvements.e
In the last few years, salmon farming has encountered an 
enhanced problem from sea lice, a parasite that thrives in 
confined salmon pens, kills or makes unmarketable large 
numbers of fish, and spreads to wild salmon, possibly 
reducing their numbers greatly. The lice problem has become 
sufficiently large that farmed salmon production fell between 
2015–16, both in Norway and globally.f Overall, parasites and 
disease present some of the biggest threats to continued 
aquaculture expansion.
Sources:
a.  Ytrestøyl et al. (2015); Taranger et al. (2014); WHO (2015);  
Directorate of Fisheries (2019).  
b. FAO (2019b).
c. WHO (2015).
d. Ytrestøyl et al. (2015).
e. Torgersen et al. (2010).
f. Castle (2017). 
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Spatial planning and zoning can also prevent aqua-
culture development in high-conservation-value 
areas, such as mangroves (as in Thailand) or wild 
salmon areas (as in Norway), and protect upstream 
areas essential to maintaining coastal water quality 
(as in the United States).
More national and subnational governments need 
to establish legal frameworks for spatial planning 
and zoning for aquaculture, create aquaculture 
development plans that link to wider development 
plans, and invest in monitoring and enforcement to 
ensure plan implementation. A number of initia-
tives are already in place that promote participation 
in aquaculture planning and take landscape- and 
seascape-level concerns into account,110 but addi-
tional effort is necessary.
Introduce policies to reward sustainable 
intensification 
Complementary policies, namely regulations, 
standards, taxes, subsidies, and market-based 
mechanisms, can encourage sustainable intensifi-
cation. For example, in Thailand, the government 
has provided shrimp farmers operating legally 
in aquaculture zones with access to free training, 
water supply, and wastewater treatment. The Thai 
government has also provided low-interest loans 
and tax exemptions to small-scale farmers, helping 
them adopt improved technology that increased 
productivity, reducing pressure to clear new land.111 
Similar policies have helped stimulate the growth 
and intensification of the catfish industry in Viet-
nam (Box 23-4). And in Denmark, stringent waste-
water standards have encouraged investment in 
recirculating aquaculture systems.112
Establish aquaculture monitoring systems 
Advances in satellite technology, digital mapping, 
ecological modeling, open data, and connectivity 
mean that global-level aquaculture monitoring and 
planning systems may now be possible. A global-
scale platform that integrates these technologies 
and builds on existing information-sharing efforts 
could help companies, governments, and civil 
society encourage and support sustainability in 
the aquaculture sector. Such a platform could 
combine national- or global-level map layers 
(e.g., on farm locations, land use and type, water 
quality, weather), georeferenced data (e.g., on fish 
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BOX 23-4 |  Technology and government 
support drive intensification of 
catfish farming in Vietnam 
In Vietnam’s upper Mekong Delta region, striped catfish 
(Pangasius hypophthalmus) production grew 20-fold between 
2000 and 2010, while catfish farming areas only roughly 
doubled, indicating a very rapid period of intensification. 
Catfish exports brought in $1.4 billion in foreign exchange 
in 2010.a This rapid production increase has led to the 
development of other sectors along the value chain, including 
hatchery production, fillet processing, and feed production. 
The catfish boom during the first decade of the 21st century 
created nearly 180,000 new jobs in the Mekong Delta, the 
majority of which are performed by rural women in the 
processing sector.b A recent life cycle analysis noted that 
pollution from catfish ponds was equal to or less than that of 
other food production sectors in the Mekong Delta, and that 
water quality had not degraded to a point where it threatened 
the viability of aquaculture production or compromised other 
downstream water uses.c
Technological improvements—including a breakthrough in 
artificial propagation of striped catfish in hatcheries around 
the year 2000, adoption of higher-quality pelleted feed, 
and improvements in pond farming techniques—combined 
to trigger the boom in catfish production. Supportive 
government policies, including research and extension 
programs, subsidized bank loans for producers and 
processors, and trade liberalization and promotion, have also 
helped to grow and support this export-oriented industry, 
and allow it to provide an affordable “white fish” substitute in 
Europe and the United States.d 
Going forward, the biggest short-term risk to the industry’s 
sustainability is the continued economic viability of farm 
operations if production costs (e.g., feed) rise. Protectionism 
in importing countries also poses a threat; wild fishing 
and aquaculture sectors in the United States and Europe 
have lobbied during the past 15 years to restrict imports 
of Vietnamese catfish.e In addition, the Vietnamese catfish 
industry will also need to secure sustainable supplies of feed 
and water, while continuing to limit disease outbreaks.f
Sources:
a. De Silva and Phuong (2011).
b. De Silva and Phuong (2011).
c. Bosma et al. (2009).
d. Phuong and Oanh (2010).
e. Little et al. (2012).
f. Phuong and Oanh (2010).
production and value, fish trade, environmental 
performance), and bottom-up crowdsourcing 
of information (e.g., photos or stories to report 
successes, best practices, or areas of concern). Many 
different users could benefit from information 
technologies: 
 ▪ Fish buyers could ensure that their purchases 
are from responsible suppliers, and producers 
and suppliers could use objective data to dem-
onstrate that their operations are sustainable. 
 ▪ Producers could access market information, 
as well as early warnings about water quality 
issues, disease outbreaks, and risks associated 
with natural disasters. 
 ▪ Producers could communicate success stories, 
access technical guidance, and network with 
other producers and technical assistance agen-
cies to improve operations. 
 ▪ Governments could use data on current facility 
locations and environmental and social factors 
to improve spatial planning, detect illegally 
sited operations, and target monitoring and law 
enforcement efforts. 
 ▪ NGOs and communities could report stories of 
improvements in productivity and social and 
environmental performance that could inspire 
actors in other areas. Conversely, they could 
monitor aquaculture operations in their area 
and raise an alarm if laws are being broken or 
resources are threatened. 
A globally applicable monitoring and planning sys-
tem could also help concerned citizens everywhere 
learn more about this dynamic, rapidly growing 
food production sector, helping to ease often polar-
ized debates around aquaculture and build coali-
tions in favor of sustainable aquaculture growth.
For more detail about this menu item, see  
“Improving Productivity and Environmental 
Performance of Aquaculture,” a working paper 
supporting this World Resources Report available  
at www.SustainableFoodFuture.org. 
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ENDNOTES
1. Throughout this report, “fish” refers to both finfish and shellfish. More 
precise definitions of these terms, and others used throughout this 
report, include finfish—a cold-blooded animal that lives in water, 
breathes with gills, and has fins and scales; shellfish—refers to both 
crustaceans and mollusks; crustacean—an animal belonging to the 
phylum Arthropoda that (usually) lives in water, has several pairs 
of legs, a body made up of sections, and is covered in a hard outer 
shell; shrimp—a decapod crustacean of the suborder Natantia; and 
mollusk—an animal belonging to the phylum Mollusca that has a soft 
unsegmented body without a backbone and usually lives in a shell 
(FAO 2008).
2. Authors’ calculations from FAO (2019a). In 2015, fish provided roughly 
3.2 billion people with 20% of their animal protein intake (FAO 2018).
3. Authors’ calculations from FAO (2019a). In 2013, 77% of the human 
food supply of fish was located outside of North America, Europe, 
Oceania, and other OECD countries, suggesting a similar percentage 
of world fish consumption in developing countries.
4. Allison (2011). 
5. Many figures in this report are based on statistics from the FAO Fish-
Stat global database of wild fisheries and aquaculture production 
(FAO 2019b) and the FAO’s State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 
(FAO 2018). However, the FAO fisheries and aquaculture production 
data rely on reports of member countries, and the quality of the data 
varies by country and may be subject to reporting bias. Many mem-
ber countries have been found to misreport fisheries landings, catch 
levels may be underreported as discussed in note 9, and collection of 
aquaculture data remains relatively new. See Kura et al. (2004) (An-
nex B); Campbell and Pauly (2013); CEA (2012); and Pauly and Zeller 
(2016) for further discussion of FAO fisheries and aquaculture data, 
limitations, and caveats. 
6. FAO (2018).
7. FAO (2019b). While the FAO capture fisheries data show a decline in 
marine fish catch since the 1990s, the data also show that the inland 
fish catch is still slightly rising. As with marine fisheries, inland 
fisheries are important to human protein consumption, especially for 
the poor. However, the slight increase in inland fish catch in the FAO 
data is probably a result of better reporting of actual catches rather 
than an increase in the amount of fish landed, and many believe that 
inland fisheries are in decline as well because of overfishing and 
aquatic ecosystem degradation (Welcomme 2011). 
8. Pauly and Zeller (2016) cited underestimates in the FAO FishStat data 
around small-scale (both commercial and subsistence) fisheries, 
recreational fisheries, discarded bycatch, and illegal or otherwise 
unreported catch—and estimated the extent of these missing com-
ponents to “reconstruct” true levels of marine fish catches.
9. FAO (2018). Data are from periodic FAO fish stock assessments. 
According to FAO (2018), overfished stocks produce lower yields than 
their biological and ecological potential, maximally sustainably fished 
stocks produce catches that are very near their maximum sustain-
able production, and underfished stocks are under relatively low fish-
ing pressure and have some potential to increase their production.
10. Watson and Tidd (2018).
11. Cheung et al. (2010, 2013).
12. As defined by the World Bank (2017d), fishing effort is a compos-
ite indicator of “the size and efficiency of the global fleet, usually 
measured in terms of the number of vessels, vessel tonnage, engine 
power, vessel length, gear, fishing methods, and technical efficiency.”
13. World Bank (2017d). 
14. World Bank (2017d).
15. Costello et al. (2016). 
16. Examples summarized in CEA (2012); and Worm et al. (2009).
17. NOAA (2018). 
18. FAO (2019b).
19. McClanahan and Abunge (2014); McClanahan (2010); McClanahan et 
al. (2008). 
20. McClanahan and Abunge (2014).
21. Authors’ calculations, assuming a 12% increase in per capita 
consumption between 2010 and 2050 due to growth in income and 
urbanization. This projection corresponds well to recent trends; fish 
demand and supply would match if wild fish supply were to fall by 
10% between 2010 and 2050 and aquaculture supply were to con-
tinue to expand at its recent rate of ~2 Mt per year during that period.
22. This 10% decline to 2050 is also in line with the “business as usual” 
fisheries management scenario in Costello et al. (2016) (Table S15).
23. GlobAgri-WRR model.
24. See, for example, Worm et al. (2009); CEA (2012); Melnychuk et al. 
(2016); and World Bank (2017d).
25. CEA (2012).
26. The following observations about these six factors are based on and 
more thoroughly examined in CEA (2012).
27. World Bank (2017d).
28. Sumaila et al. (2010, 2012, 2016).
29. World Bank (2017d).
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30. Worm et al. (2009).
31. Agnew et al. (2009). Some recent estimates of fish catch underre-
porting are even higher; Pauly and Zeller (2016) estimated that true 
marine fish catches could be 53% higher than those reported in FAO 
(2019b).
32. Birkenbach et al. (2017).
33. Grimm et al. (2012); Essington (2010); Brinson and Thunberg (2013); 
Birkenbach et al. (2017).
34. Spalding (2013); Costello et al. (2008). Although individual transfer-
able quota (ITQ) programs have reduced fishing effort and improved 
the economic efficiency of the fishing industry, these programs also 
have disadvantages (the following examples are summarized in Kura 
et al. 2004). As with other forms of catch limits, it can be difficult 
to determine the optimal sustainable yield level of a given fishery, 
leading to continued overexploitation. ITQs can give fishers incentive 
to discard smaller or lower-priced fish back into the sea to avoid 
counting these fish against the quota, again leading to continued 
overexploitation. There are also social and equity issues associated 
with ITQs. ITQs reduce the number of fishers and vessels in a fishery, 
leading to increased unemployment and vulnerability in fishing-
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COURSE 5  
Reduce Greenhouse Gas  
Emissions from 
Agricultural Production
Agricultural production is responsible for more greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions each year than land-use change but production-related 
emissions are traditionally regarded as harder to control. In general, our 
estimates of mitigation potential are more optimistic than the estimates of 
other researchers, partly because many analyses have not fully captured 
the opportunities for productivity gains and partly because we factor in 
promising potential for technological innovations. 
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Introduction
GHG emissions from agricultural production pro-
cesses alone (i.e., excluding emissions from con-
verting land to agricultural use) reach 9 gigatons 
(Gt) by 2050 in our baseline scenario, an increase 
from 6.8 Gt in 2010 (Figure C5-1). These produc-
tion emissions arise mainly from six sources: 
 ▪ “Enteric” methane emitted from the stomachs 
of cattle, buffalo, goats, and sheep (ruminants) 
 ▪ Manure produced by some ruminants, pigs, 
and chickens kept in confined animal facilities 
(large and small) 
 ▪ Unmanaged manure left on pasture and pad-
docks 
 ▪ Crop and pasture fertilization, particularly with 
nitrogen 
 ▪ Rice production
 ▪ Energy use in on-farm activities and in the pro-
duction of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer
A baseline emissions level of 9 Gt results in a 
GHG mitigation gap of 5 Gt relative to our target 
of 4 Gt of total emissions from agriculture, even 
if we assume that all net emissions from land-
use change, including peatland degradation, are 
eliminated or offset (as we contemplate in some 
scenarios). 
Our 2050 baseline already builds in many produc-
tivity gains, without which agricultural production 
emissions in 2050 would rise even further (Figure 
C5-1). Even with highly optimistic estimates of 
changes in demand discussed in Course 1 (e.g., 
reducing food loss and waste, shifting diets to less 
ruminant-based foods), annual production emis-
sions would still reach 7.2 Gt in 2050. Additional 
increases in livestock productivity analyzed in 
Chapter 11 would reduce production emissions to 
only about 7 Gt. 
To reach our target of total agricultural emissions 
of 4 Gt by 2050 (see Figure 2-6 in “Scope of the 
Challenge and Menu of Possible Solutions”), efforts 
to reduce agricultural production emissions will 
be essential. Many possible approaches would also 
reduce other environmental impacts of agriculture, 
including air and water pollution caused by manure 
and fertilizer. 
The following chapters explore menu items that 
could reduce agricultural production emissions by 
changing production processes. We find that mean-
ingful potential exists today and that innovation 
offers the possibility of much greater mitigation in 
the future. Achieving these innovations will require 
both public support for research and development 
and flexible regulations that provide incentives 
for farmers and the private sector to pursue cost-
effective solutions.
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Figure C5-1  |   Annual agricultural production emissions could reach 9 gigatons or more by 2050
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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MENU ITEM: REDUCE 
ENTERIC FERMENTATION 
THROUGH NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Methane produced by digestive processes in the stomachs of 
ruminants—mainly cattle, sheep, and goats—is the largest source 
of GHG emissions from livestock. Productivity improvements will 
reduce methane emissions, mainly because more milk and meat 
is produced per kilogram of feed, but additional measures will be 
needed to help offset growth in demand for ruminant meat. This 
chapter explores technological approaches to reducing enteric 
methane emissions.
CHAPTER 24
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The Challenge
Livestock generate roughly half of agricultural pro-
duction GHG emissions today (Figure 24-1), even 
when excluding the emissions resulting from feed 
production. In 2050, two-thirds of livestock emis-
sions, and more than one-third of total agricultural 
production emissions, will be methane generated 
by “enteric fermentation.” This methane, which 
exits mainly from the animal’s mouth, is produced 
by the natural breakdown of forages and other feed 
by anaerobic microorganisms (technically archaea) 
in the stomachs of ruminants—cattle, goats, sheep, 
and buffalo. 
Strategies to reduce enteric methane emissions, in 
addition to improving livestock productivity, rely 
on four approaches to manipulate the dominant 
microbiological communities in the rumen: using 
vaccines, selectively breeding animals that naturally 
Figure 24-1 |   Greenhouse gas emissions from 
agricultural production, 2010 and 2050
produce fewer emissions, incorporating special 
feeds or supplements into diets, and using com-
pounds that can be thought of as drugs. 
Governments have supported more research on this 
issue than on other sources of agricultural GHGs. 
Some dedicated scientific facilities are evaluat-
ing mitigation options. For example, at one New 
Zealand facility, scientists for years have systemati-
cally tested thousands of possible drugs or feed 
supplements. They start by adding compounds 
in small glass containers filled with rumen fluids. 
The most promising compounds are fed directly to 
animals temporarily housed in clear, tightly sealed 
glass chambers, which permit researchers to care-
fully measure the methane they release. The same 
chambers allow researchers to test different food 
additives, vaccines, and breeds to minimize meth-
ane emissions. 
Unfortunately, the vast majority of results have 
been disappointing, mainly because the archaea 
that produce methane have found ways to overcome 
whatever initially suppresses them.1 Although test-
ing of animals has shown that different individual 
animals at different times produce very different 
levels of methane,2 breeding has not yet produced 
animals that systematically generate below-average 
methane levels.3 Vaccines also have proven only 
modestly and temporarily effective.4 Although 
many feed compounds at first reduced methane 
emissions, most quickly lost their effectiveness. The 
digestion of cellulose results in a hydrogen gas that 
provides an energy source for microorganisms that 
can use it. As one paper summarized the problem, 
“The rumen microorganisms have the ability to 
adapt to foreign agents or changes in the feeding 
regimen and, therefore, short-term responses are 
not representative of the effect of a given mitigation 
compound or practice in real farm conditions.”5 
A few chemical compounds have provided persis-
tent benefits so far, such as bromoform and chloro-
form.6 These compounds are found in the red algae 
that make up some kinds of seaweed and explain 
why feeding experiments using small quantities of 
such seaweeds in feed, around 0.5 percent, have 
achieved greater than 50 percent reductions in 
methane emissions.7 Unfortunately, these com-
pounds are associated with important animal health 
or environmental concerns.8 As a result, scientists 
are divided on whether to continue investigating 
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seaweed, with researchers in New Zealand discon-
tinuing work while some researchers in Australia 
and the United States continue their studies. 
Separately, New Zealand researchers announced 
the identification of five promising compounds in 
2015,9 but peer-reviewed publications with results 
have yet to emerge. 
As alternatives to chemical or drug compounds, 
some feed supplements—including vegetable oils 
and nitrate—have shown limited effectiveness at 
reducing methane emissions without health or pro-
ductivity concerns.10 But the financial costs of these 
supplements are high relative to emissions avoided. 
One analysis estimated that the potential costs of 
mitigation using these supplements start at $100 
per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) and rise 
with higher levels of mitigation. The analysis fur-
ther estimated that even at a marginal cost of $300 
per ton, the potential mitigation from these feed 
supplements amounted to only a few percent of 
enteric emissions.11 We consider these approaches 
too expensive and their emissions-reduction ben-
efits too small to be worthy of inclusion in our menu 
for a sustainable food future. 
The Opportunity
Fortunately, since about 2015, at least one promis-
ing chemical feed additive has emerged. Multiple 
studies of cattle have shown that a small molecule, 
called 3-nitrooxypropan (3-NOP), generates 
sustained methane reductions of 30 percent or 
more in both cattle and sheep over at least several 
weeks.12 This additive appears to have a persistent 
effect because the compound interferes with part of 
the fundamental chemical reaction that produces 
methane in all archaea.13 The fundamental nature 
of this pathway may also reduce the rate at which 
archaea can mutate around it. On the basis of 
existing research, the chemical appears to have no 
adverse effects on animal health. 
There is also good evidence from 3-NOP and other 
studies so far that reducing methane harms nei-
ther animals nor their productivity. This testing 
alleviates concerns that cows might be harmed by 
a build-up of hydrogen in the rumen when it no lon-
ger binds with carbon to form methane.14 
3-NOP may also increase meat productivity, 
although the results to date have not demonstrated 
such gains clearly. Because ruminants lose up to 12 
percent of the gross energy in feed as a result of the 
rumen’s methane production,15 reduced methane 
production in theory has the potential to increase 
productivity or reduce the quantity of feed needed. 
Yet studies of 3-NOP in dairy cows have not found 
increased production of milk, and only some have 
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found increases in daily weight gain (and only in 
dairy cows, not beef cows). Research is still ongo-
ing, and DSM, the company that makes 3-NOP, 
is exploring the alternative route of maintaining 
output while reducing feed input.
Steps remain before 3-NOP can be broadly adopted. 
Researchers are still conducting experiments to 
obtain approval.16 DSM hopes to have 3-NOP avail-
able on the market by 2020, though problems could 
still emerge. Yet overall, the progress made so far 
increases confidence that researchers will ulti-
mately identify a cost-effective, safe, and effective 
compound. 
Mitigation Potential
Although the novelty of effective compounds makes 
any projections uncertain, our mitigation options 
are based on assumptions about using 3-NOP or a 
comparable compound. The principal limitation of 
3-NOP now is that it requires daily ingestion, and 
preferably frequently. In the leading study, it was 
mixed with feed in stall-fed dairy animals, which 
therefore ingest it throughout the day.
In our modeling, we assume that a feed compound 
will reduce emissions by 30 percent, which is the 
claim now being made by the producers of 3-NOP. 
We apply it in our first (Coordinated Effort) sce-
nario to half of animals that receive more than a 
small amount of concentrated feed, which would 
facilitate their ingestion of a compound. In our 
Highly Ambitious scenario, we apply these reduc-
tions to all animals receiving concentrated feed. 
Under our Breakthrough Technologies scenario, 
Table 24-1 |  Global effects of enteric fermentation reduction scenarios on greenhouse gas emissions from  
agricultural production
SCENARIO ENTERIC 
FERMENTATION 
EMISSIONS 
(MT CO2E)
TOTAL 
PRODUCTION 
EMISSIONS 
(MT CO2E)
PRODUCTION 
EMISSIONS GHG 
MITIGATION GAP 
(GT CO2E)
2010 2,260 6,769 —
No productivity gains after 2010 4,432 11,251 7.3(2.3)
2050 BASELINE 3,419 9,023 5.0
30% methane emissions reduction (animals receiving half of 
concentrated feeds) (Coordinated Effort) 3,126 8,730
4.7
(-0.3)
30% methane emissions reduction (all animals receiving 
concentrated feeds) (Highly Ambitious) 2,807 8,411
4.4
(-0.6)
30% methane emissions reduction 
(all ruminants) (Breakthrough Technologies) 2,393 7,997
4.0
(-1.0)
Notes: Numbers not summed correctly are due to rounding. Numbers shown in parentheses are changes relative to 2050 baseline.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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the feed compound and associated 30 percent 
emissions reduction is assumed to apply to all 
ruminants including those permanently grazed. 
We make this assumption only in that scenario 
because such an achievement would likely require 
additional technological innovation to develop ways 
of delivering 3-NOP or alternative compounds, such 
as long-lasting, slow-release additives (Table 24-1).
The three mitigation scenarios lead to a reduction 
of enteric fermentation emissions of between 9 per-
cent and 30 percent relative to our 2050 baseline. 
They would close between 6 percent and 20 percent 
of the production emissions GHG mitigation gap. 
Recommended Strategies
Governments first need to continue their support 
for developing compounds to reduce methane from 
enteric fermentation. Without such support, the 
opportunities are less likely to be realized. 
Researchers and corporations also need to know 
that if they develop a measure that provides cost-
effective mitigation, it will be used. It is possible 
that compounds like 3-NOP will eventually pay 
for themselves through reduced need for feed or 
increased productivity, but they also might not, and 
cost-effective mitigation benefits should be consid-
ered sufficient justification to require their use. 
We therefore recommend that governments provide 
incentives to the private sector by promising to 
require use of compounds if and when they prove to 
mitigate emissions at a reasonable cost. A first step 
could require use of such compounds as a condition 
of receiving farm subsidies. Because this recom-
mendation applies to several mitigation strategies, 
we elaborate more on it in the final chapter of this 
course. 
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MENU ITEM: REDUCE 
EMISSIONS THROUGH 
IMPROVED MANURE 
MANAGEMENT
The breakdown of manure by microorganisms under waterlogged 
conditions generates both methane and nitrous oxide emissions, 
which are powerful GHGs. Concentrated manure presents many 
other environmental challenges: it compromises water quality, 
contributes to local and regional air pollution, harbors pathogens, 
and generates noxious odors. This menu item focuses on ways 
to reduce GHG emissions from managed manure—but the 
same measures that reduce GHGs also tend to mitigate other 
environmental problems.
CHAPTER 25
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The Challenge
Livestock produce vast quantities of manure. 
Manure is “managed” when ruminants, pigs, or 
poultry are raised in confined settings and farm-
ers remove manure and dispose of it in some way. 
(The manure that cattle, sheep, and goats deposit 
on grasslands and paddocks is considered unman-
aged, and we address emissions from this source in 
the next menu item.) Manure begins to emit GHGs 
immediately after it is deposited in the barn where 
animals are kept,17 but the majority of emissions 
occur in the manure storage system. 
Dry and wet manure management systems
Some manure is managed in “dry systems,” in 
which farms allow the urine to partially dry where 
it falls before scraping and piling the manure. Dry 
systems are found in virtually all poultry facilities 
because low volumes of urine leave poultry manure 
naturally dry. In the case of cattle and pigs, partial 
saturation of pockets of manure by urine creates the 
kinds of low-oxygen, high-carbon conditions that, 
when present for a day or more, are ideal for the 
microorganisms that produce nitrous oxide. More 
permanently saturated pockets tend to generate 
methane. Although the majority of the world’s man-
aged manure is managed dry, dry manure produces 
roughly 40 percent of global manure management 
GHG emissions (using estimates generated by 
the Global Land Evaporation Amsterdam Model 
[GLEAM] developed by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations [FAO]),18 
mostly in the form of nitrous oxide. Dry systems 
also result in high losses of nitrogen in a variety 
of forms, which reduces the nutrient value of the 
manure and typically generates abundant ammo-
nia, an air pollutant. 
Roughly 60 percent of managed manure emissions 
occur in “wet systems,” in which farmers collect 
both feces and urine and sometimes add some 
water to flush manure into storage areas. These 
storage systems can take a variety of forms. When 
farmers use relatively small pits dug out of the 
earth, which they must empty several times a year, 
they are often called pits or slurries. When farm-
ers use much larger dug-out pits, they are called 
“lagoons.” These storage systems provide ideal 
conditions for archaea to generate methane. Per ton 
of manure, wet systems generate on the order of 20 
times more methane than dry-managed manure, 
according to guidance from the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and more recent 
studies.19 Dry systems produce far more nitrous 
oxide although they have lower total emissions. 
When and if farmers ultimately apply wet manure 
to cropland and pasture, the manure also generates 
emissions, but we count and discuss those emis-
sions as part of “soil fertilization,” which we address 
in Chapter 27.
Figure 25-1 |   Greenhouse gas emissions from 
agricultural production, 2010 and 2050
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Managed manure volumes and emissions
We estimate GHG emissions from managed manure 
at nearly 590 million tons (Mt) of CO2e in 2010. We 
project that these emissions will rise to 770 Mt CO2e 
in our 2050 baseline (Figure 25-1). Of this total, 
we estimate that roughly one-third is in the form 
of nitrous oxide and two-thirds is in the form of 
methane. 
Our estimates and projections are similar to those 
of other researchers. Perhaps because all global 
managed manure estimates use some form of 
guidance from the IPCC, seven of eight estimates 
recently summarized ranged only from 470 to 590 
Mt CO2e for recent years.20 In all studies, the esti-
mated emissions from methane are very similar.21 
Differences arise primarily in estimates of nitrous 
oxide emissions. There is also evidence from a 
meta-analysis of available field data that IPCC 
emission factors are too low, at least for dairy cows 
in developed countries, which would suggest higher 
total global emissions.22 
Although estimates are rough, estimates by FAO 
using the GLEAM model indicate that manure from 
pigs is responsible for half of all managed manure 
emissions, primarily through methane generated in 
wet systems. Dairy cows generate around one-third 
of all emissions, roughly evenly divided between 
methane and nitrous oxide. Beef operations pro-
duce roughly one-sixth of all GHGs, primarily 
through nitrous oxide, because their predominant 
manure management systems are dry. Poultry 
produce relatively low GHG emissions (although 
they tend to generate abundant ammonia) because 
their wastes are dry enough to inhibit production of 
nitrous oxide or methane. 
The critical question is what farmers can do to 
mitigate emissions from managed manure. More 
efficient production has only modest effects on man-
aged manure emissions, unlike most other sources 
of agricultural emissions. To date, global estimates of 
technical—let alone economic—mitigation potential 
tend to be modest. For example, one review estimated 
the potential at 100 Mt CO2e per year.23 Such a level 
would mitigate only around one-sixth to one-eighth 
of present estimates of emissions from managed 
manure. Although we are ultimately more hopeful, we 
too consider mitigating managed manure emissions 
to be challenging for three reasons:
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First, because most manure managed under dry 
systems generates relatively low emissions per 
kilogram of manure,24 any control technology must 
be fairly inexpensive if it is to be cost-effective.25
Second, one-third of managed manure emissions 
today take the form of nitrous oxide, which is 
harder to control than methane—and this share is 
likely to rise by 2050.26 Nitrous oxide emissions 
occur when manure is moist but not in liquid form 
and starts to occur as soon as wastes are deposited 
by the animal.27 We discuss below opportunities to 
use solid separation on pig and dairy farms, but, 
in dry beef operations and many smaller farms, 
the main strategy suggested in the literature is 
to reduce overfeeding of protein (and therefore 
nitrogen) to livestock. In some countries, farmers 
feed excess protein, so reductions are practicable. 
In advanced systems, feed can more closely match 
the specific amino acid needs of livestock.28 But 
in large parts of the developing world, livestock 
underconsume protein. Even where cows consume 
more nitrogen than they need, reducing protein in 
feed may result in more methane emissions from 
manure management through a complex and poorly 
understood microbial interaction.29 In addition, effi-
ciency gains in consumption of nitrogen by animals 
are mostly tied to the overall efficiency of feeding, 
and our baseline analysis already assumes substan-
tial increases in overall feeding efficiency.
Third, farmers cannot practically influence many of 
the factors that influence emissions. For example, 
emissions from stored manure can be much higher 
in warmer climates than cool climates.30 But strong 
economic factors influence where farmers raise 
animals, so it generally would be expensive, and 
socially and politically challenging, to shift livestock 
production to cooler areas just to reduce GHG emis-
sions. Managed manure emissions also increase the 
longer farmers store manure before spreading it on 
farm fields. But spreading manure more frequently 
would often mean fertilizing crops when they 
cannot use the nutrients and thus increasing water 
pollution and nitrous oxide emissions in the field. 
The Opportunity 
Despite these challenges, we see greater potential 
for mitigation if countries take reasonable steps to 
advance manure-management technologies. There 
appears to be abundant opportunity for innova-
tion. Even existing technologies appear capable of 
reducing emissions at a cost equal to only a small 
percentage of the price of meat and milk and at an 
acceptable cost per ton of emissions. 
In this section, we discuss the opportunities for con-
trolling managed manure emissions with a simple 
technology, solid separation, that can mitigate emis-
sions from wet and dry manure alike and can grow 
in complexity and levels of mitigation as required. 
We then consider some lessons from research into 
manure management at a North Carolina pig farm, 
which offer insight into the potential to develop truly 
sophisticated manure management systems. Finally, 
we discuss digesters, which have received much of 
the manure management focus. They have potential 
to improve manure management but also present 
risks if not properly managed.
Separating solids, liquids, and nutrients
Separating liquids from solids is a relatively simple 
measure to reduce emissions and improve manure 
management generally. Since the solid portions of 
manure are drier after separation, they are likely 
to emit somewhat less methane. The liquid por-
tion also causes fewer emissions because its lower 
carbon content gives microorganisms less to feed 
on and turn into methane.
Even without government incentives, a wide 
variety of systems already exist that can separate 
solids and, in the process, improve potential use of 
manure’s nutrients. The simplest systems use grav-
ity and a series of grates or ponds to let solids settle 
out. Many dairy farms in the United States use 
these systems. But mechanical systems can include 
screw presses or centrifuges that squeeze or whisk 
water out of solids and greatly increase the extent of 
the separation. Use of chemical “flocculents,” which 
cause small particles to bind together, can increase 
removal rates of solids to 75–90 percent or higher, 
and can remove nearly all the phosphorus. More 
advanced systems use a variety of techniques to 
strip out nitrogen and phosphorus.
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Separating liquids from solids also helps segregate 
nutrients; more nitrogen tends to remain with the 
liquid and more phosphorus stays with the solids. 
Two waste streams make it possible to better direct 
nitrogen and phosphorus to fields that need them. 
The phosphorus content of manure tends to be 
particularly high relative to local field needs, so 
concentrating and drying out phosphorus in solids 
makes it cheaper to transport the manure to fields 
that can benefit from it.31 
The degree of GHG mitigation that separation can 
achieve will probably vary according to the type of 
farm and the extent of the solid separation. Stud-
ies to date use modeling assumptions rather than 
real field data. One study of pig farms in China 
found that solid separation would reduce emissions 
by more than half compared to even a basic dry 
management system (which mixes manure with 
straw), mostly by reducing nitrous oxide emissions. 
If compared to storage of manure in a deep pit, 
solid separation systems would reduce emissions by 
two-thirds.32 
Achieving large reductions requires more than a 
low level of solid separation achieved by simple 
gravity-fed, grated systems. For example, a study of 
manure management changes on large dairy farms 
conducted for the California state government 
estimated only an 11 percent reduction in methane 
using solid separation.33 But this study assumed 
that only 15 percent more solids would be sepa-
rated, which would require only simple systems of 
solid separation.
One analysis of dairy farms in the United States 
estimated the cost of simple separation systems 
at only about $5–$6 per cow per year, with more 
advanced systems costing $50–$75 per cow per 
year.34 A cost of $75 per cow in the United States is 
roughly equivalent to only 1 cent per liter of milk,35 
and these systems can still potentially pay for 
themselves because they save other costs of manure 
management, including hauling costs, and because 
they enable more valuable use of nutrients.36 One 
analysis of dairy farms in Iowa found that farms 
using advanced solid separation actually had the 
lowest manure management costs.37 To indicate 
the potential, some dairy farms in Michigan and 
New York have installed a system that uses reverse 
osmosis to clean up effluent almost to drinking 
water standards for reuse. Although the system is 
expensive, the farm owners believe it will ultimately 
save them money, mainly by lowering hauling costs 
and making more valuable use of nutrients.38 
With good, daily solid separation, perhaps half or 
more of remaining emissions will result from the 
storage of solids, perhaps in equal parts methane 
and nitrous oxide.39 These emissions can be reduced 
by the use of chemical additives to inhibit nitrous 
oxide emissions, some of which have proven effective 
at least during composting.40 Other approaches that 
may improve performance and reduce costs include 
integrating systems into initial barn design and con-
struction that help separate urine, which is high in 
nitrogen, from feces, which are high in phosphorus.41
Although solid separation receives relatively little 
attention in the mitigation literature, it represents 
both a good technology for initial implementation 
and one that farmers are likely to improve over 
time. It has many characteristics that make it prom-
ising across multiple farms: 
 ▪ Because even simple separation can help to 
reduce emissions, solid separation is not an 
all-or-nothing strategy. Opportunities exist 
for incremental improvements, which in turn 
create opportunities for the kinds of small-scale 
innovations that tend to push down costs.
 ▪ Unlike some technologies, small farms should 
be able to employ solid separation because the 
technology should scale up or down according 
to the size of the farm and the costs will depend 
mainly on the quantity of manure.
 ▪ Solid separation is a pretreatment technology 
for almost all other likely advanced manure 
management techniques, whether designed to 
reduce emissions or other air and water pollu-
tion problems.
 ▪ Once systems are installed, farmers will have 
incentives to make them work well to reduce 
hauling costs and to increase the value of the 
use of nutrients.
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Mitigating manure managed as a liquid
Manure that is currently stored as a liquid in 
lagoons or smaller storage facilities presents the 
largest opportunities for mitigation because the 
manure provides a concentrated source of emis-
sions. Based on GLEAM data, wet manure gener-
ates 90 percent of pig farm emissions globally. 
Studies and experience with manure management 
systems for pig farms in the U.S. state of North 
Carolina illustrate the potential, given some 
financial encouragement (Box 25-1). In that state, 
roughly $15 million of research and development 
funding, distributed competitively, resulted in 
development of a sophisticated wastewater system 
that would virtually eliminate not just GHGs but all 
other forms of air and water pollution, odor, and 
disease risk. The system should add only around 2 
percent to the retail price of pork.42 These technolo-
gies emerged without the advantages of “learning 
by doing” or economies-of-scale production. They 
suggest that with more incentives, broader applica-
tion, and without the need to meet such stringent 
standards for other pollutants, variations in liquid 
manure technology would likely emerge at even 
lower costs. 
Digesters and covered storage
Advanced manure management has focused much 
of its attention on systems that “digest” manure, so 
these systems merit special attention here. One les-
son from substantial work to date is that digesters 
have promise for manure already managed in wet 
systems but are unlikely to reduce overall emissions 
from manure otherwise managed in dry systems. A 
second lesson is the critical importance of control-
ling leaks wherever digesters are used, whether 
low-technology digesters in poorer countries or 
higher-technology digesters in rich ones. 
Digesters typically confine liquid manure without 
oxygen to generate and capture methane, which 
is then often burned to provide heat or to make 
electricity. Digesters can be large and simple (e.g., 
lagoons covered with plastic tarps), large and 
more sophisticated (e.g., various forms of metal 
tanks), or small and simple (e.g., small clay or brick 
structures). In developed countries, where digesters 
are mostly large, the gas is typically used to run an 
electric turbine or cleaned of its many impurities 
and fed into a natural gas grid. These steps greatly 
raise the cost despite the energy they generate. For 
a 700-cow dairy operation in the United States, the 
overall costs of installation including the electricity-
generating turbine may be $4 million. Operating 
costs can be high—as much as the annualized cost 
of the installation.43 By contrast, household-level 
digesters in developing countries typically feed the 
gas back for use by the households, which is inex-
pensive and provides a cheaper, easier, and cleaner 
source of energy than wood or charcoal—even if the 
gas contains impurities that would fail the stan-
dards of most grid systems. The vast majority of the 
world’s digesters are in developing countries, with 7 
million in just five large Asian countries.44 
Digesters were generally developed not to reduce 
GHG emissions but to provide energy and to reduce 
odor and organisms that cause disease. Whether 
they reduce emissions depends on how much they 
leak and whether farmers would otherwise manage 
their manure wet or dry. With no leaks in either 
the digester or in transport and use of the gas, a 
digester and its ultimate use should eliminate all 
the methane and convert it to carbon dioxide, a 
much less potent GHG. But leaks raise concerns. 
The IPCC accounting guidance establishes a high, 
default emission factor for digesters of 10 percent 
of the methane-producing potential of the manure. 
In addition, the liquid “digestate” that comes out 
of the digester is itself stored in a covered form and 
continues to generate methane. Unless this diges-
tate is itself captured and its methane recovered, it 
can add leakage of an additional 10 percent or more 
of the total methane produced by the digester.45
In contrast to the IPCC standard leakage rates of 
10–20 percent from digesters, the IPCC estimate of 
methane emissions from manure stored in dry form 
is 4 percent. As a result, switching from dry storage 
to a leaky digester would increase methane emis-
sions (and the reduction in nitrous oxide emissions 
would typically not make up the difference).46 At 
typical leakage rates, even factoring in use of the 
energy to displace fossil fuels, switching from dry 
manure to wet manure managed by a digester is 
likely to increase emissions.47 
By contrast, the IPCC default emission factors for 
wet manure systems are much higher. The standard 
emission rate for a lagoon, typically a large earthen 
pond, is around 70 percent of the methane-pro-
ducing potential of the manure in the lagoon. The 
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Eastern North Carolina experienced 
massive growth in large-scale pork 
production in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
management of manure in large, open 
lagoons contributed to a wide array of local 
problems including obnoxious odors, air 
pollution, nitrogen enrichment, pathogens, 
and dangerous algal blooms in North 
Carolina’s principal estuary. Large fish kills 
occasionally occurred when lagoons broke 
or were flooded.a 
After legal action from the state 
government, the principal pork producer 
and pig purchaser in the state agreed 
to provide $15 million to fund research 
into “environmentally superior” manure 
management technologies under the 
supervision of North Carolina State 
University. It also agreed to implement 
any such technologies found to be 
economically feasible by the university. 
Reflecting the many other concerns about 
manure, the criteria for “environmentally 
superior” were stringent but unrelated 
to climate change: technologies must 
substantially eliminate all pathogens, threat 
of nutrient pollution, odor, and air pollution. 
The project’s conclusions in 2006 were 
in one sense a disappointment because 
the university found that no technologies 
qualified as economically feasible. Yet the 
economic analysis for the study assumed 
that pork facilities in North Carolina alone 
would implement these technologies, so 
anything more than trivial costs would 
put them at a competitive disadvantage 
with farms in other states. The study did 
not analyze whether requiring all pork 
producers in the United States to control 
their pollution would be economically 
advantageous. 
Review of the findings of that study 
indicates that even an extraordinarily 
sophisticated, tank-based manure 
management system would cost-effectively 
reduce GHG emissions without even 
factoring in the other pollution-reduction 
benefits. This system employed a series 
of tanks to separate pollutants, flocculent 
chemicals helped to achieve high levels 
of solid separation, and alternating tanks 
with and without oxygen drove out the 
nitrogen.b Although the system in effect 
employed the most advanced technologies 
of sewage waste management, we 
estimate from the project’s documents 
that the system would mitigate emissions 
at a cost of only $22 per ton of CO2e, while 
eliminating 99 percent of the methane 
emissions.c Costs for other manure 
management systems studied, ranging 
from simple covering of lagoons to more 
complex digesters, ranged from $12 to $55 
per ton of CO2e, excluding any GHG savings 
from fossil fuel use and any economic 
value of the solid material left over after 
digestion.d If judged in relation to the 
mitigation costs that will be involved in 
meeting global GHG emissions targets, 
these costs are not high. In fact, the GHG 
reduction could be considered free from a 
social perspective, although not to the pork 
producers, because of the large cobenefits 
from reduced water and air pollution, odor, 
and risk of disease. 
If all pork producers were required to 
implement these manure management 
measures, they would add most of the 
additional cost to the product price. 
However, the cost of the tank system for 
an average farm would represent 1.4 to 
2.5 percent of the average retail price of 
pork over the past six years in the United 
States. That cost is much smaller than the 
fluctuations in pork prices during this time.e 
BOX 25-1 |  The opportunities for improved manure management on North Carolina pig farms
Notes:
a. National Geographic (2014). 
b.  Oxygen tanks turn other forms of nitrogen into nitrate, and tanks without oxygen break down the nitrate into nitrogen gas.
c.  Costs for the treatment technology are from Vanotti et al. (2013) and are provided per pig in the form of SSLW/year (steady state live weight per year). Griffing et al. (2004) 
Table 50, estimated methane emissions at 21,353 kg/1,000 pigs of 45 kg weight average. At the most recent 100-year global warming potential (GWP) of 34, that translates into 
726 tons CO2e. Zering  et al. (2013) estimate costs of the “tank system” on a large pig farm in North Carolina at $158 per SSLW/year and costs for more typically sized farms 
ranging from $202 to $280 per SSLW/year. The unit dollars per 1,000 SSLW translates into dollars per 10 pigs of this weight. As a result, manure management systems capable 
of handling 100,000 SSLW are needed to address these emissions of 726 tons, which equals 100 x $158 or $15,800 per year. Assuming 99 percent abatement of methane, this 
calculation results in a cost estimate of $22 per ton and even assuming abatement of only 95 percent only increases that cost to $23 per ton.
d.  This figure uses the same method as above except it uses digester costs based on Zering et al. (2006) and updated by communication with Kelly Zering, November 3, 2016.
e.  USDA/ERS (2015b) averages annual prices from 2010–15.
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emission rate for a smaller “slurry tank” is around 
35 percent. As a result, switching from wet manure 
systems to digesters should reduce emissions, even 
if digesters have 10–20 percent leakage rates. 
Even so, the benefits are not certain. Digesters pro-
duce energy more efficiently if they combine manure 
with food waste, so this is a common practice. 
Because this food waste typically would generate 
less methane if left alone in a landfill—the combina-
tion of digesting manure and food waste will likely 
lead to higher overall methane emissions from even 
a moderately leaky digester.48 Fortunately, studies 
show that leakage rates from sophisticated digesters 
can be kept to a few percent.49 If those low leak-
age rates are achieved, digesters can achieve large 
mitigation benefits.50 
In developing countries, where the vast majority of 
the world’s digesters are located, the GHG benefits 
are especially contingent on controlling leaks. In 
typical, simple digesters, methane is likely to leak 
from the input and output components and from 
cracks in systems that are not well maintained.51 
Because the biogas is typically used directly by 
households, biogas production sometimes exceeds 
household needs and is deliberately vented to avoid 
harm to the digester. Studies in the south of Viet-
nam estimated these intentional releases at 34 per-
cent of the biogas (and therefore of the methane), 
while a study in the north of the country estimated 
intentional releases at only 7 percent. Because the 
alternative manure management system is likely to 
be dry storage, the potential for savings from the 
use of digesters in manure management alone is 
doubtful. 
Yet even in these systems, the potential for overall 
GHG savings exists if the biogas replaces coal or 
wood harvests as a source of energy or enables 
more efficient use of the manure as fertilizer. 
Factoring in these nonmanure benefits, one study 
estimated that even quite leaky digesters could 
reduce overall emissions on small farms in Asia.52 
Digesters also provide important cobenefits, 
including reduced disease-bearing organisms, 
improved water quality, and replacement of inef-
ficient indoor stoves—which reduces unhealthy 
indoor smoke and wood cutting. One Chinese 
study used scanning devices to detect household-
based digesters and observed lower leakage rates 
than those generally found in other Asian stud-
ies (although the study probably did not capture 
intentional venting).53 This finding suggests that 
inspection systems may be feasible and could help 
identify and reduce leakages. 
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Overall, the lesson is that digesters could provide a 
viable means of controlling manure management 
emissions—particularly using more sophisticated 
digesters to control wet manure—but only if they 
are properly managed to control leaks both from 
the digester itself and from the storage of the diges-
tate liquid that comes out of the digester. 
In addition to the leakage challenge, the large 
up-front costs of installing sophisticated digester 
systems tend to inhibit their use. The main costs 
relate either to the turbine and related components 
if the biogas is used to generate electricity, or to 
cleaning the biogas so that it can be used as natural 
gas in developed countries. A simpler alternative is 
to cover a lagoon or storage pit with an imperme-
able plastic cover and to capture the gas and burn 
it. Doing so converts methane to carbon dioxide, 
which has a much smaller warming potency. The 
cost is more modest in part because a cover helps 
reduce hauling costs by reducing the addition of 
rainwater. Cost-effectiveness also increases with 
larger operations.54 
Model Results: Mitigation Potential
Any effort to properly evaluate the costs of mitigat-
ing GHG emissions from manure must start with 
the enormous environmental and social problems 
presented by badly managed manure. Leaking 
storage systems contribute to groundwater pol-
lution and drinking water problems.55 In China, 
the world’s largest producer of pork, some 30–70 
percent of manure is discharged directly into water 
bodies without any treatment, creating the primary 
source of pollution that causes algal blooms and 
dead zones in the South China Sea.56 The south-
eastern United States experienced massive flooding 
during Hurricane Florence in September 2018, 
when at least 60 hog farm lagoons overflowed, 
releasing contaminated water into surrounding 
communities.57 Ammonia also contributes to seri-
ous air pollution problems.58 Manure carries dis-
ease-bearing organisms that pose health risks, and 
ammonia emissions often contribute substantially 
to small-particle air pollution, a major source of ill 
health in humans and animals. And large feedlots 
often cause major odor problems for surrounding 
communities, which can even be unhealthy. 
These concerns, not GHG emissions, have to date 
driven most efforts to improve manure manage-
ment. Health concerns and the need to mitigate 
the impacts of climate change together justify more 
vigorous action to manage manure effectively. 
We used GlobAgri-WRR to test three GHG 
emissions mitigation scenarios for managed 
manure (Table 25-1). Although the mix of farm 
systems changes between 2010 and 2050, our 2050 
baseline projection assumes that the share of each 
type of manure management system for each type 
of farm remains unchanged. Based on our analysis 
above, we believe that 90 percent reductions in 
methane are possible from wet manure systems. 
For dry manure pork production systems, the study 
of pig farms in China described earlier suggests that 
60 percent reductions in nitrous oxide emissions 
(but no change in methane emissions) are 
achievable with good solid separation.59 
Less research has been conducted into dry beef and 
dairy systems, so the evidence is not clear. How-
ever, dry systems tend to leave manure uncollected 
for long periods in feedlots, and there is evidence 
that collecting and distributing the manure more 
frequently can reduce nitrogen losses by 20–30 
percent.60 Although we do not expect large gains 
from animal dietary changes, we believe that 10 
percent reductions in nitrous oxide from feed 
changes are plausible. Based on these consider-
ations, we develop the following scenarios:
 ▪ In our first scenario, we assume mitigation of 
40 percent of the methane from manure that is 
managed in wet form.
 ▪ In a second scenario, we assume that all farms, 
including both wet and dry manure farms, 
reduce their total manure management emis-
sions by 20 percent. We include this scenario 
for perspective but consider it less realistic.
 ▪ In our most optimistic scenario, we assume 
80 percent reduction of emissions of methane 
from wet manure, 20 percent mitigation of 
methane emissions from dry manure, and 20 
percent mitigation of nitrous oxide emissions 
from all manure.
These scenarios reduce emissions from managed 
manure (relative to 2050 baseline) by 13 to 37 percent. 
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Table 25-1 |  Global effects of manure management scenarios on agricultural greenhouse gas emissions
SCENARIO MANURE 
MANAGEMENT 
EMISSIONS 
(MT CO2E)
TOTAL 
PRODUCTION 
EMISSIONS 
(MT CO2E) 
PRODUCTION 
EMISSIONS GHG 
MITIGATION GAP 
(GT CO2E)
2010 588 6,769 —
No productivity gains after 2010 972 11,251 7.3(2.2)
2050 BASELINE 770 9,023 5.0
40% reduction in methane emissions from wet manure  
(Coordinated Effort) 
673 
(–13%) 8,925
4.9
(-0.1)
20% reduction in manure management emissions across all farms 
(Illustrative, not included in any combined scenario)
617
( –20%) 8,869
4.9
(-0.2)
80% reduction in wet manure emissions, plus 20% reduction of all 
other manure management emissions (Highly Ambitious, Breakthrough 
Technologies)
489
(–37%) 8,742
4.7
(-0.3)
 
Notes: Numbers not summed correctly are due to rounding. Numbers shown in parentheses are changes relative to 2050 baseline.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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Recommended Strategies
We make a number of specific recommendations:
Build spatial databases of large concen-
trated livestock facilities. Information about 
manure management is remarkably rough because 
in most of the world there has been no effort to 
map and identify the types and levels of manure 
management systems used, even on large livestock 
operations. That not only frustrates analysis but 
also inhibits action. By contrast, Denmark not only 
tracks information on every substantial pig and 
dairy farm but tracks each animal as well. As a first 
step, governments need to develop reasonable data 
on each sizable livestock operation and its manure 
management system.
Adopt regulations immediately to require 
improved manure management on all new 
farms, as well as on all medium and large 
concentrated livestock farms that currently 
use wet manure management systems. New 
livestock farms can more easily incorporate at least 
basic solid separation into their design. Even in 
parts of developing countries without power, farms 
can use gravity systems to help separate solids and 
liquids. Standards should be extended to increasing 
numbers of existing farms over time. In this way, 
sounder manure management by 2050 should be 
feasible.
Many of the farms that manage manure in wet 
form are relatively large, commercial operations,61 
particularly pig farms. In the U.S. pork industry in 
2012, for example, just 13 percent of pig farms held 
2,000 or more pigs, but these farms held 87 percent 
of all pigs nationally.62 These farms should also be 
required to meet the standards for new operations. 
Based on the technology analysis in North Carolina, 
governments of wealthier countries should require 
that farms emit methane and other pollutants at no 
more than 10 percent of the rate of today’s standard 
facilities. To avoid placing facilities at a competitive 
disadvantage, regulations should be adopted at the 
national or regional level. Large food companies 
should also adopt standards to require proper 
manure management by their suppliers. 
Phase in regulation of all existing livestock 
operations with managed manure systems, 
focusing on livestock purchasers. One goal 
of any regulatory system should be to find the 
cheapest options for mitigation first, which allows 
technology to improve and become cheaper before 
addressing more expensive challenges. For manure 
management, this would likely entail imposing 
regulations on larger wholesale operations and 
requiring increasingly large percentages of their 
product over time to come from farms certified as 
meeting higher manure management standards. 
For example, in the United States in 2012, five 
large firms controlled 62 percent of the nation’s pig 
slaughtering capacity.63 To facilitate this ratchet-
ing up of standards, the government could issue 
certificates to farms that meet different standards of 
emissions per kilogram of meat or milk or, if easier, 
per animal. Wholesalers would then be required to 
hold certificates sufficient to demonstrate that they 
meet increasingly stringent targets of emissions 
per kilogram of meat or milk. Wholesalers would 
pass on the bulk of these costs to consumers and 
reimburse the costs borne by producers who meet 
manure management standards by purchasing cer-
tificates. Such a system would encourage improved 
management by those farms that could do so at the 
least cost. If such a system assigned more credit to 
farms that meet higher standards of performance, it 
could also create powerful incentives for innovation 
and improvement wherever cost-effective. 
Adopt competitive programs to encour-
age new technology. The challenge in manure 
management is often just to refine mechanical and 
chemical engineering approaches for handling 
manure. These are engineering challenges well 
suited to the capabilities of the private sector, 
which can build upon waste-treatment technologies 
already developed for industrial wastes and munici-
pal sewage. Governments can play a role by estab-
lishing competitive grants programs for private 
companies, based on criteria such as cost, environ-
mental performance, and promise of technological 
improvement.
Adopt inspection systems to monitor 
digester leaks. For manure management systems 
using digesters, particularly in developing coun-
tries, governments should require future use of 
digester technologies with lower leakage potential. 
In addition, governments should adopt inspection 
systems that use methane detectors to monitor 
leaks. 
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MENU ITEM: REDUCE 
EMISSIONS FROM 
MANURE LEFT ON 
PASTURE
Manure deposited by cattle, sheep, and goats on grazing 
lands or in paddocks can concentrate nitrogen in carbon-rich, 
saturated conditions that encourage the production of nitrous 
oxide by microorganisms. Manure consists of both feces and 
urine, and, in general, urine contains most of the nitrogen and 
generates nitrous oxide at a greater rate than feces. Reducing 
emissions from pasture manure is challenging because sources 
are diffuse; biological and chemical nitrification inhibitors hold 
the most promise.
CHAPTER 26
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The Challenge
According to standard emission factors used by 
the IPCC, nitrogen deposited in feces and urine 
turns into nitrous oxide roughly twice as fast as 
nitrogen in fertilizer. According to FAO (reported in 
FAOSTAT), these deposits, all from ruminants, are 
rising rapidly, contributing 800 Mt CO2e emissions 
in 2010 and 846 Mt CO2e in 2014. Our estimate, 
using GlobAgri-WRR, is substantially lower at 
446 Mt CO2e in 2010, and we project emissions 
of 653 Mt CO2e by 2050 (Figure 26-1). FAO bases 
its estimates on the number of animals, assuming 
the same emissions per animal, whereas GlobAgri-
WRR uses a method based on estimated nitrogen 
in excretions from different animals based on what 
they eat. Regardless of which source is used, these 
emissions are on a course to be substantial in 2050, 
and even our lower projection would contribute 
16 percent of the total allowable emissions from 
agriculture (4 Gt target) in 2050. 
As with enteric methane, one way to reduce emis-
sions from unmanaged manure is to improve 
efficiency; that is, to improve the output of product 
per animal and per kilogram of feed. Under our “no 
productivity gains after 2010” scenario, emissions 
from unmanaged manure would reach 871 Mt CO2e 
in 2050 (Figure C5-1), but our baseline estimates 
25 percent fewer emissions due to the efficiency 
gains built into our baseline. Our Course 2 scenario 
that involves a higher efficiency target for livestock 
(discussed in Chapter 11) could reduce these emis-
sions only modestly to 630 Mt in 2050. Even our 30 
percent reduction in ruminant meat consumption 
scenario (Chapter 6) would only reduce these emis-
sions to 524 Mt in 2050. Finding additional ways to 
reduce these emissions is therefore necessary.
The Opportunity
Other studies typically estimate little to no global 
potential to mitigate this source of diffuse emis-
sions.64 We are more optimistic, but our optimism 
rests on further development of some technologies 
that have shown good potential but are not yet 
ready for deployment. They focus on “inhibiting” 
the formation of nitrate. 
Livestock deposit nitrogen primarily in the form 
of urea (CH4N2O). Through biochemical processes 
mediated by bacteria and archaea in soils, urea is 
typically converted into ammonia (NH3), ammo-
nium (NH4+), and then nitrate (NO3-). Nitrous 
oxide (N2O) is primarily released by the bacteria 
that break down nitrate in waterlogged conditions, 
and, although the quantity is small, the warming 
effect is great because of the potent warming effect 
of nitrous oxide. Because nitrate is soluble in water 
and does not adhere to soils, it is also the primary 
form of nitrogen that runs off of fields or leaches 
into groundwater, causing water pollution. Inhibit-
ing the formation of nitrate in soils reduces both 
losses of nitrogen through water runoff and leach-
ing and emissions of nitrous oxide. 
Spreading nitrification inhibitors
One way to reduce these emissions involves spread-
ing chemicals that inhibit nitrification directly 
on pastureland. Most experiments have used 
dicyandiamide (DCD), the most commonly used 
inhibitor. A summary of six experiments using DCD 
on grazing land found reductions in nitrous oxide 
ranging from 17 percent to 88 percent.65 
Figure 26-1 |   Greenhouse gas emissions from 
agricultural production, 2010 and 2050
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Inhibitors do not persist in their effects, however, 
particularly under higher temperatures, so a one-
time application is not sufficient. In New Zealand, 
the practice has been to spread the inhibitor twice 
per year, each time shortly after animals are moved 
away from a field, when grass is grazed down and 
farmers can directly apply the inhibitors to the 
urine patches, which typically cover 20 percent 
of a field.66 One study in the warmer parts of New 
Zealand suggested that three applications per year 
would be needed to achieve high effectiveness there 
because of a higher breakdown rate. Although bac-
teria might be able to develop resistance to inhibi-
tors, no studies have yet shown this effect.67
The practicality of using inhibitors in this way also 
depends on the size of fields and on the effects 
of inhibitors on grass yields. Inhibitors are most 
likely to be practical and economical on farms such 
as dairy farms in New Zealand, where intensive, 
rotational grazing is practiced on generally well-
watered, highly managed fields, and where grazing 
is concentrated in relatively small areas. Research 
studies in New Zealand have typically found posi-
tive effects of inhibitors on grass yields from 15 to 
36 percent, although these studies are not necessar-
ily representative of real, commercial operations.68 
Other studies in both New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom have found no beneficial effect on pasture 
yield, which suggests variability in inhibitor perfor-
mance.69 Use of inhibitors is likely to be less practi-
cal on more extensively managed grazing lands, 
although these lands will receive less manure and 
therefore produce fewer emissions per hectare. 
Feeding nitrification inhibitors
An alternative approach to inhibiting nitrification 
involves feeding inhibitors directly to animals. A 
few studies have found that adding inhibitors to 
water or livestock feed provides effective reduction 
of both nitrous oxide emissions and nitrogen leach-
ing, and that most of the inhibitor passes through 
the animal in the urine.70 This method would be 
easier than pasture application and would probably 
require less inhibitor to be effective.71 However, 
the inhibitor would probably need to be ingested 
frequently, even daily, by the animals.
Feeding inhibitors through water or feed does raise 
health issues. Although toxicological studies of DCD 
have found very low toxicity,72 the lack of an agreed 
international safety standard caused New Zealand to 
suspend use of DCD in 2013 after trace levels were 
found in milk.73 One New Zealand study also found 
that DCD washed off into freshwater ecosystems, 
where it might affect natural nitrification rates.74 
These concerns need to be thoroughly researched for 
any nitrification inhibitor, although the low toxicity 
ratings of DCD so far suggest that it could satisfy 
these health and environmental concerns.
Breeding biological nitrification inhibition
A third opportunity involves breeding and selecting 
grasses that inhibit the conversion of ammonium 
to nitrate, which is the first step in the process of 
generating nitrous oxide. Many studies have now 
found extremely low rates of nitrous oxide forma-
tion in fields of Brachiaria humidicola, which is 
one variant of the African brachiaria grass family 
used extensively in Brazil.75 This “biological nitrifi-
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cation inhibition” appears to be due in small part to 
stronger root uptake of nitrogen but in larger part 
to a chemical exuded by the roots of the grass (bra-
chialactone), which blocks a key enzymatic pathway 
in the formation of nitrate. The production and exu-
dation of this chemical varies widely among plants, 
but it has been found at significant levels in another 
brachiaria species (Brachiaria decumbrens).76 It 
is also plausible, although not yet tested, that cattle 
consuming one of these grass species will excrete 
some of the chemical in their manure, which would 
also help to inhibit nitrous oxide production.
The results suggest in part that more widespread 
use of Brachiaria humidicola could reduce emis-
sions. But this species is useful only in tropical 
and subtropical areas. It constitutes only a small 
percentage of total brachiaria use in Latin America, 
and its preferential use compared to other species 
depends on many agronomic factors. For grazing 
purposes, the alternative is to breed this inhibitory 
effect into other grass species.
Mitigation Potential 
An important question for estimating mitigation 
potential is whether the present emission factors 
used by the IPCC are too high. The IPCC Tier 1 
sets an emission factor of 2 percent of nitrogen in 
manure turning into nitrous oxide, which is double 
the rate assumed for fertilizer and is based on older 
measurements in temperate countries. A variety of 
recent evidence suggests lower rates. Because emis-
sions require a high level of soil saturation, emis-
sions factors in hotter and drier climates, where 
urine patches dry out quickly, should be substan-
tially lower, which is the finding of several recent 
studies.77 Even in wetter, temperate countries, 
some studies are finding lower emission factors, for 
example in New Zealand and the United Kingdom.78 
Despite this evidence, there is a growing discrep-
ancy between field-level estimates of nitrous oxide 
emission rates, studies that use flux towers, and 
studies that use modeling based on patterns of 
nitrous oxide sensed in the atmosphere by satel-
lites.79 It is already difficult to reconcile IPCC 
emission factors with measured global nitrous 
oxide levels, and estimated emissions rates that 
are lower than IPCC figures—whether from pasture 
or cropland—would create larger inconsistencies. 
One likely explanation is that the rates vary greatly 
depending on a range of soil and temperature con-
ditions. There are also likely hotspots—areas that 
are more frequently saturated or that have the right 
acidity, which result in large releases of nitrous 
oxide.80
These differences could present an opportunity. 
Identifying hotspots would allow mitigation to 
focus on them. Mitigating nitrous oxide emissions 
from manure deposited on extensive grazing lands 
in arid regions would be difficult because urine 
patches will be spread over large areas, farmers do 
not provide daily feed supplements, and farmers 
do not use planted grasses. If evidence continues to 
confirm low emission rates from extensive grazing 
in more arid areas,81 mitigation in these areas could 
be ignored. Mitigation efforts could then focus on 
more intensive grazing systems in wetter areas. 
Overall, although promising technological 
approaches exist to mitigate nitrous oxide emis-
sions from grazing operations, they all are too little 
developed to allow refined estimates of mitigation 
potential. We exclude additional mitigation in our 
Coordinated Effort scenario because all progress 
relies on some degree of technological improve-
ment. We also assume that mitigation on arid 
grazing land will be economically or practically 
unfeasible because the emissions are too low to 
justify the expense of addressing them. We assume 
mitigation improvements on wetter grazing lands of 
20 percent and 40 percent in our Highly Ambitious 
and Breakthrough Technologies scenarios, respec-
tively. Finally, for illustrative purposes, we show 
one scenario with 60 percent mitigation on wetter 
grazing lands (Table 26-1). 
Recommended Strategies
Because solutions for this source of emissions are 
underdeveloped, research and regulatory incentives 
have to focus on ways to develop them. 
Increase research funding 
The most obvious recommendation is that govern-
ments and research agencies should substantially 
increase research funding into methods for reduc-
ing nitrification of nitrogen on pasturelands. Three 
initiatives are appropriate:
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 ▪ Research into development and uses 
of nitrification inhibitors. Virtually all 
published research on their use in pastures 
comes from a few small research groups in New 
Zealand. Other countries need to expand these 
efforts.
 ▪ Research into biological nitrification inhibition. Analysis of biological nitrifica-
tion inhibition is currently being undertaken 
by a small cooperative effort of four research 
institutions coordinated by the Japan Interna-
tional Research Center for Agricultural Scien-
tists and the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center. Not counting the salaries 
of participating researchers, the budget for 
their research is roughly $1 million per year.82 
A budget of tens of millions of dollars would 
be the minimum appropriate for this research 
given its level of importance and the many ways 
additional research could be performed.
 ▪ Research on agricultural emissions rates. As the discussion above indicates, it 
is likely that emissions rates of nitrous oxide 
vary greatly from one area to another and are 
concentrated in certain hotspots. Although 
some research shows these effects, it is not sys-
tematic. Field analyses have become cheaper, 
however, and can be combined with measures 
from tall towers and satellites. The world needs 
a comprehensive, international initiative to 
identify these hotspots and emissions rates.
Create private regulatory incentives 
Opportunities also exist to craft regulations that 
give incentives to industry to develop workable new 
technologies by guaranteeing them a market. For 
example, governments could promise to require use 
of nitrification inhibitors on an increasing percent-
age of farms if industry could demonstrate products 
or technologies that achieve a specified level of 
nitrous oxide reduction at a specified cost per ton of 
nitrous oxide saved. We elaborate on these regula-
tory opportunities at the end of this course. 
Table 26-1 |  Global effects of scenarios of emissions reductions from manure left on pasture on agricultural greenhouse 
gas emissions
SCENARIO NITROUS OXIDE EMISSIONS 
FROM PASTURE, RANGE, 
AND PADDOCK 
(MT CO2E)
TOTAL 
PRODUCTION 
EMISSIONS 
(MT CO2E) 
PRODUCTION 
EMISSIONS GHG 
MITIGATION GAP 
(GT CO2E)
2010 446 6,769 —
No productivity gains after 2010 871 11,251 7.3(2.2)
2050 BASELINE and Coordinated Effort 653 9,023 5.0
20% reduction of nitrogen left on wetter pastures  
(Highly Ambitious) 584 8,954
5.0
(-0.1)
40% reduction of nitrogen left on wetter pastures 
(Breakthrough Technologies) 515 8,884
4.9
(-0.1)
60% reduction of nitrogen left on wetter pastures  
(illustrative, not included in any combined scenario) 445 8,814
4.8
(-0.2)
 
Notes: Numbers not summed correctly are due to rounding. Numbers shown in parentheses are changes relative to 2050 baseline. Coordinated Effort scenario 
assumes no reduction in nitrous oxide emissions relative to levels projected in the 2050 baseline.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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MENU ITEM: REDUCE 
EMISSIONS FROM 
FERTILIZERS BY 
INCREASING NITROGEN 
USE EFFICIENCY
Less than half of the nitrogen added to crop fields is absorbed 
by crops and the remainder contributes to emissions and other 
forms of nitrogen pollution. This menu item involves increasing the 
efficiency of nitrogen use, in significant part by focusing on the 
composition of fertilizers themselves, to reduce both the quantity 
of fertilizer required and associated emissions.
CHAPTER 27
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The Challenge
Although fertilizing crops with nitrogen, phospho-
rus, and potassium—the major nutrients—is vital 
to achieving high crop and pasture yields, it also 
contributes substantially to GHG emissions. Using 
GlobAgri-WRR, we estimate fertilizer emissions in 
2010 at 1,289 Mt CO2e, of which 94 percent resulted 
from nitrogen use (Figure 27-1). Two-thirds of 
these nitrogen emissions were in the form of 
nitrous oxide emitted in crop fields from all forms 
of applied nitrogen; the other one-third came from 
the energy used in the manufacture and transporta-
tion of nitrogen fertilizer (Figure 27-2).83 (Because 
fertilizer production is so energy-intensive, and 
because more efficient nitrogen use would substan-
tially reduce these emissions, we discuss emissions 
from fertilizer manufacture both in this menu item 
and in our menu item focused on ways of reducing 
fossil energy use.) Synthetic fertilizer accounts for 
roughly half of all nitrogen fertilization,84 the other 
half comes from manure applied to crops (excluded 
from manure management calculations), the 
residues of nitrogen-fixing crops such as soybeans, 
nitrogen in rain, irrigation water and air dust; and 
even nitrogen fixed by freely associated microor-
ganisms in soil.
Fertilizer (mineral and organic) also contributes to 
a variety of other environmental challenges. These 
include small particulate smoke and smog (techni-
cally ground-level ozone), which are the leading air 
pollution problems for human health.85 Agricultural 
runoff is the principal cause of unsafe levels of 
nitrate in drinking water from wells or rivers in 
many areas in the world. When nitrogen runoff or 
leachate into rivers reaches coastal waters, it can 
contribute to algal blooms, some of which are toxic 
to fish and other sea life. Other algal blooms lead 
to hypoxia—a condition where coastal waters have 
little or no oxygen—also called “dead zones.” Both 
types of blooms have been increasing in size and 
frequency and now contaminate large portions of 
major water bodies such as the Gulf of Mexico, the 
Chesapeake Bay, and the China Sea during certain 
seasons. Figure 27-3 maps 762 overfertilized coastal 
waters around the globe.86 Phosphorus runoff also 
contributes to algal blooms and dead zones in lakes 
and rivers and in brackish coastal waters, which 
mix fresh and saltwater.87 One estimate suggested 
that alleviating the nitrogen contribution to envi-
ronmental problems would require reductions 
in nitrogen losses to the environment of roughly 
one-half.88 
Figure 27-1 |   Greenhouse gas emissions from 
agricultural production, 2010 and 2050
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Figure 27-2 | Approximately 94 percent of emissions from fertilizing soils are the result of nitrogen application
Figure 27-3 | More than 700 “dead zones” exist in the world’s coastal waters
Note: This chart excludes emissions from manure left on paddocks and pasture, discussed above, and differs from FAOSTAT estimates in part because GlobAgri-WRR is based on 
nitrogen estimates underlying Zhang et al. (2015b) and nitrogen availability in manure from a livestock management component based on Herrero et al. (2013).
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
Note: Eutrophic water occurs when water bodies are oversupplied with nutrients and support rich plant and algal growth. Hypoxic water occurs when abundant plants and algae 
die and decompose, consuming oxygen and depriving other aquatic life of oxygen.
Maps are for illustrative purposes and do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of WRI concerning the legal status of any country or territory, or concerning the 
delimitation of frontiers or boundaries.
Source: WRI (2013).
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Increasing food production implies a growing 
demand for fertilizer and higher associated emis-
sions and pollution. How much higher depends 
on how efficiently crops use nutrients. On a global 
basis, estimates of the efficiency with which crops 
absorb the nitrogen (from all sources) added to 
croplands range from only 42 to 47 percent.89 As 
Lassellatta et al. (2014) found, this nitrogen use 
efficiency (NUE)90 actually declined from around 
68 percent to 47 percent between 1961 and 1980 as 
farmers around the world adopted synthetic fertiliz-
ers, and it has remained roughly at that level since.91 
Put another way, more than half of the nitrogen 
applied to crops is lost to the environment.
Countries differ greatly in both their NUE (Figure 
27-4) and rates of nitrogen fertilizer application 
per hectare (Figure 27-5). Regions group into four 
broad categories. At one extreme, most countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa use little fertilizer, and 
whatever fertilizer they use is more fully absorbed 
by crops, leading to an average NUE of 72 percent 
and above.92 At the other extreme, China and 
India—which accounted for 80 percent of the global 
increase in total nitrogen use between 2000 and 
200993—generally overapply fertilizer and have 
NUEs of roughly 30 percent.94 In a third category, a 
few developed countries, such as the United States, 
Canada, and France, have NUEs approaching 70 
percent. In the fourth category is the rest of the 
world which has NUEs of around 50 percent.95 
Rising NUEs in some regions and for some crops 
inspire confidence that increases in NUE are both 
possible and practical. The Netherlands, for exam-
ple, cut back its nitrogen use from an astonishing 
level of around 600 kg per hectare in the late 1970s 
to around 300 kg in more recent years, mostly by 
exporting or processing some of the manure from 
the country’s dairy farms instead of spreading it 
excessively on farm fields.96 France, whose agricul-
ture is more focused on crops, applies fertilizer at 
only a little more than half the per-hectare rate of 
the Netherlands. Total fertilizer application rates 
per hectare in France have remained stable now for 
many years. Yet yields in France have increased, 
meaning that fertilizer use per ton of crop has 
decreased, and NUE has increased from roughly 30 
percent in the late 1970s to approximately 70 per-
cent in 2010.97 Nitrogen use efficiencies have also 
Figure 27-4 | The percentage of applied nitrogen that is absorbed by crops varies widely across the world
Note: Absorption rates greater than 100 percent mean crops are mining nitrogen from soils. Maps are for illustrative purposes and do not imply the expression of any opinion on 
the part of WRI concerning the legal status of any country or territory, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries.
Source: Zhang et al. (2015b). 
Percentage of nitrogen absorbed by crops
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been growing in the United States, from roughly 
60 percent in 1990 to around 70 percent in 2010, 
according to one study.98 
Despite these improvements, there are reasons not 
to be overly optimistic about potential reductions in 
nitrous oxide emissions from fertilizer use.
First, in Africa, nitrogen use efficiency is likely to 
decline. The region’s farmers today apply so little 
fertilizer that the annual removal of crops depletes 
the soils of nitrogen and phosphorus.99 As farmers 
in Africa apply more fertilizer, which is necessary to 
boost yields, plants will be less able to absorb all the 
nitrogen and nitrogen use efficiency will decline.
Second, although Zhang et al. (2015b) showed that 
nitrogen use efficiency has stopped declining in 
most countries, and has improved in some, it has 
yet to start improving in most countries.
Third, major agronomic reasons help to explain 
the wide differences in NUE among countries. One 
reason China’s NUE is so low is that it produces 
large quantities of rice and vegetables, which have 
low NUEs. Rice NUEs are low in part because the 
Figure 27-5 |  Total nitrogen fertilizer application is heavily concentrated in China, the United States, India, and Western Europe
Note: Maps are for illustrative purposes and do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of WRI concerning the legal status of any country or territory, or concerning 
the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries.
Source: Mueller et al. (2012).
flooding and drainage required for paddy rice leads 
to increased nitrogen loss, while fruit and vegetable 
NUEs are low probably because their high economic 
value makes it economical for farmers to apply 
more nitrogen even when it leads to only modest 
additional production. According to Zhang et al. 
(2015b), half of the difference between NUEs in 
China and the United States is explained by China’s 
crop mix.100 In addition, farmers in countries with 
greater rainfall variability and less rich soils will 
find it harder to use nitrogen efficiently because 
crops will not be able to fully absorb available nitro-
gen in bad rainfall years. These differences help to 
explain why countries with similar yields for the 
same crops have different NUEs.101
Even for farming regions such as the U.S. corn 
(maize) belt that have achieved large increases in 
NUE, those increases have still been insufficient to 
reduce nitrogen losses to the environment because 
nitrogen used for higher production exceeds 
the nitrogen saved through higher efficiency.102 
Despite increases in NUE since 2005, U.S. agri-
cultural nitrous oxide emissions have increased 
by 7 percent,103 and the corn belt remains a global 
Major cereals: Average (1997–2003) nitrogen fertilizer application rate (kg N/ha)
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hotspot for nitrous oxide.104 Over the same period, 
the region’s contribution of nitrogen to the major 
dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico has remained 
roughly constant.105
Overall, studies reveal no clear trend line in NUE 
across different crops and regions.106 For this rea-
son—although some increases in NUE would also 
be plausible—our baseline 2050 projection assumes 
that farmers in each region will produce each crop 
with the same NUE as today. As a result, we project 
an increase of 48 percent in the use of nitrogen 
fertilizer from 2010 to 2050, which is roughly in 
the middle of other prominent estimates.107 That 
increased use is likely to increase overall losses of 
nitrogen to the environment by roughly 50 per-
cent.108 We also project in our baseline that annual 
total emissions from fertilization will grow to 1,741 
Mt CO2e by 2050, an increase of 35 percent over 
2010 levels.109
The Opportunity
Strategies for improving NUE typically focus on 
fertilizer management by farmers and these well-
understood practices have an important role to 
play. But the scale of improvement required is so 
great that additional measures are necessary to 
exceed what farmers can achieve alone. We there-
fore focus also on measures to improve nitrogen 
fertilizer compounds themselves, as well as 
advances in breeding.
Better general agronomy and nutrient 
management 
The traditional focus of fertilizer management has 
been characterized by the International Fertilizer 
Institute as the “Four Rs”: the right source, at the 
right rate, at the right time, in the right place.110 In 
effect, this means applying fertilizer at a rate that 
does not exceed what crops can use at a time when 
they can use it. As an example of improved timing, 
many farmers in the United States and Europe have 
split their nitrogen load into two applications. The 
right place means applying nitrogen to a plant’s 
root zones. Some forms of nitrogen are injected into 
the soil to limit losses. 
Despite these opportunities, improved NUE in the 
United States is probably due mostly to general 
improvements in agronomy. Data from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture suggest that only 25 
percent of cropland is fertilized in line with the 
“Four Rs” recommendations,111 and that adoption of 
these recommended practices has not increased.112 
NUE improvements probably owe more to breeding 
crops with higher yields, which has simultaneously 
increased their nitrogen uptake efficiency.113 In 
addition, there has been an overall increase in man-
agement intensity, including weed and pest control, 
optimal seeding rates, and improved irrigation 
practices. These changes have led to greater yield 
stability, which increases NUE because there is a 
greater likelihood that the nitrogen farmers apply 
will be used by the growing crop. 
Manure management is also relevant because the 
concentration of livestock production today in 
many parts of the world leads to the “dumping” 
of excess fertilizer on nearby farm fields, much of 
which escapes to the environment. In Europe, the 
Nitrates Directive of 1991 has restricted the quan-
tity of manure nitrogen applied per hectare. Despite 
some implementation exceptions, the directive 
has played a significant role in the improvements 
in some European countries, such as the Nether-
lands and Denmark, which apply a large quantity 
of manure to crop fields. The limits have often 
required transport of excess manure to where it can 
be well used.114 
These experiences suggest that some techni-
cal potential exists everywhere to increase NUE 
without any major technological breakthroughs. 
The largest opportunities exist in China and India, 
where nitrogen overuse is high115 (Box 27-1).
The United States and Europe also have potential 
to increase their NUE through more sophisticated 
“precision” agriculture. Many farmers already use 
precision agriculture techniques, which allow them 
to deliver different quantities of nitrogen to differ-
ent portions of fields. Yet the information about 
precisely how much to deliver in different portions 
of fields is less developed. Researchers and industry 
are cooperating on some projects to develop more 
detailed and consistent data for analyzing how to 
adjust rates and application times in the corn belt, 
which should help to tailor recommendations more 
precisely.116 
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Alternative nitrogen fertilizer compounds
We project growth of more than 50 percent in the 
amount of crops that will need to be fertilized by 
2050. This means that even if changes in farming 
practices using existing technologies were able to 
improve NUE globally by about 50 percent over 
the same period—a large ambition—the world 
would still need to use roughly the same amount of 
fertilizer that it does today. Because even greater 
increases in NUE will be required to reduce nitrous 
oxide emissions and other forms of nitrogen pollu-
tion, we believe that technological advances are also 
needed. We believe that significant opportunities 
exist to increase the use of fertilizer additives that 
can control the release of nitrogen into the environ-
ment and develop this whole class of technologies 
further.
Appreciating the importance of such compounds 
requires an appreciation of how important timing is 
to the efficient use of nitrogen. Most nitrogen fertil-
izer is applied as ammonium or a form of nitrogen 
(such as urea or ammonia) that quickly converts 
to ammonium in soils. Ammonium is relatively 
immobile in soils, but microorganisms convert it 
easily into nitrate. It is nitrate that is highly soluble 
in water and easily runs off, and it is the breakdown 
of nitrate when soils are waterlogged that leads to 
emissions of nitrous oxide. 
If economics did not matter, farming could achieve 
high levels of nitrogen use efficiency by frequent 
applications of just enough fertilizer to feed crops 
for a few days. Crops generally need little nitrogen 
early in the growing season, large quantities of 
nitrogen at peak growth periods, and then little 
nitrogen thereafter.117 Chen et al. (2011) describe 
a series of experiments in China that combined 
detailed crop modeling of maize by region to 
determine the best crop varieties and planting 
dates, and the likely nitrogen needs of the crop over 
the course of its growth. Researchers then fertil-
ized the maize five times over the course of the year 
with the estimated quantities needed for that part 
of the growth cycle. The experiment doubled yields 
with no increase in nitrogen quantities and nearly 
eliminated nitrogen surplus. If farmers everywhere 
were willing and able to apply fertilizer many times 
during a cropping season and to devote equivalent 
scientific effort to estimating plant needs, they 
could probably achieve very high NUEs as well. 
BOX 27-1 |  Improving nitrogen 
management in China 
In 2011, farmers in China applied 51 percent more nitrogen 
to each hectare of maize than farmers in the United States, 
yet yields were 18 percent lower.a Most farmers in China 
could probably cut their nitrogen application rates without 
any negative effect on yields, and many farmers apply so 
much nitrogen that reducing rates would increase yields.b 
In addition, while the amount of manure produced in China 
increased fourfold from 1949 to 2005, the proportion applied 
to agricultural soils fell from almost all the manure to slightly 
more than half, which means that nutrients in this manure 
are being dumped elsewhere where they cannot be used.c 
A partnership of researchers from China and the United 
Kingdom has comprehensively investigated opportunities to 
reduce fertilizer use or better use manure while maintaining 
yields. In a summary, these researchers stated that by using 
simple nitrogen management practices, China could reduce 
fertilizer use—without altering yields—enough to reduce total 
Chinese GHG emissions by 2 percent.d 
A first level of progress can probably be achieved mainly by 
working closely with farmers to educate them about nitrogen 
management. A group of scientists in China undertook 
such an effort without substantial government support 
by developing a multiorganization collaboration of more 
than 1,000 researchers, working with extension agents and 
agribusiness to reach 21 million farmers managing 38 million 
hectares (Mha).e Their efforts increased yields on average by 
roughly 11 percent, and decreased nitrogen application by 
15–18 percent, depending on the crop. Despite an elaborate 
network of extension agents (people assigned to help 
farmers), China’s agricultural extension system is known to 
be ineffective, and this collaborative effort delivered more 
compelling results.
Notes and sources: 
a. Li et al. (2014).
b.  A national meta-analysis found that decreasing N input rate by 28 percent 
(national average) would on average slightly increase yields (Xia et al. 
2016), and a study in Shaanxi Province found that nitrogen use in maize 
and wheat could be reduced by 70 percent and 20 percent, respectively, 
without changing or only slightly decreasing yield (Zhang et al. 2015a). 
c. Li et al. (2014).
d. SAIN (2011).
e. Cui et al. (2018).
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Such a solution unfortunately is not practical, given 
that applying nitrogen so frequently is expensive. 
Without some cost-effective measures to keep 
nitrogen on the farm field until crops can absorb 
them, NUE improvements will be limited. And to 
the extent that soils hold nitrogen in the form of 
nitrate, some of that nitrate will probably be con-
verted to nitrous oxide after rainfall that saturates 
soils, even briefly.
Fortunately, compounds generally known as 
“enhanced efficiency fertilizers” (EEFs) can keep 
nitrogen in the soil available to crops longer by 
delaying the chemical progression to nitrous oxide. 
One approach involves coatings or other com-
pounds that protect the fertilizer from dissolving in 
water. Another is the use of urease inhibitors, which 
inhibit the conversion of urea fertilizer to ammonia. 
Although ammonia is not a GHG, it is a volatile gas 
that can be lost to the atmosphere, reducing NUE 
and contributing to air quality problems. As ammo-
nia is also an intermediate stage in the production 
of nitrate, these inhibitors can also reduce nitrous 
oxide emissions. The third group of compounds is 
nitrification inhibitors that slow the conversion of 
ammonium to nitrite, and from nitrite to nitrate. 
The International Fertilizer Institute lists seven 
patented nitrification inhibitors as of 2010.118 
All of these compounds can increase NUE and 
reduce nitrous oxide by delaying the conversion 
processes by which nitrogen is turned into the 
forms in which it easily escapes (ammonia and 
nitrate). Despite great variation in results from field 
to field and year to year—probably heavily influ-
enced by weather patterns—the great majority of 
studies have found, on average, substantial reduc-
tions in nitrogen losses to the environment when 
using any of the three types of compounds.119 
Metastudies have also found that nitrification 
inhibitors and polymer-coated fertilizers on average 
reduced nitrous oxide emissions by between 35 and 
40 percent.120 There are two main reasons to believe 
that controlled-release fertilizers can become still 
more effective. One is simply the lack of research. 
One report estimates that the entire global research 
and development budget of the fertilizer industry 
for all purposes is only around $100 million per 
year, equal to 0.1–0.2 percent of its revenue.121 By 
comparison, pharmaceutical companies and seed 
industries devote 10–20 percent of their revenues 
to research.122 Probably only a fraction of this 
fertilizer R&D spending goes into EEFs. As a result, 
little funding has been made available by fertilizer 
companies to pursue new, better, and cheaper EEFs 
or to demonstrate where existing products will 
work best. 
A second reason lies in the large variation in 
effectiveness of different compounds in different 
agronomic conditions.123 Although some variability 
is likely inevitable because of variable weather pat-
terns, compounds can respond differently to these 
patterns, as well as to different crops and soils. Bet-
ter understanding of this variability should enable 
more effective and efficient use of compounds that 
delay the conversion of nitrogen in other forms 
into nitrate. There is no reason that fertilizer 
compounds, with different types and quantities of 
EEF compounds, could not be tailored to different 
conditions.
Because of their potential to reduce nitrous oxide 
emissions, nitrification inhibitors are often included 
in studies that examine cost-effective steps for 
climate mitigation.124 For example, applying nitri-
fication inhibitors to average corn fields in the 
United States might have a gross cost of around 
$50 per ton of CO2e reduced.125 But the evidence is 
growing that these compounds can have substantial 
economic benefits that at a minimum greatly reduce 
the net costs. 
One potential source of economic savings is reduc-
ing nitrogen application while maintaining yields. 
Many studies do not test whether these compounds 
allow lower overall fertilizer use. Accordingly, one 
scientific review in 2009 concluded that there was 
no good evidence that inhibitors reduce the amount 
of fertilizer needed and therefore no good evidence 
that lower fertilizer costs offset the cost of the inhib-
itors.126 However, other studies have found that 
these kinds of compounds make it possible to apply 
substantially less nitrogen while maintaining or 
boosting yields.127 One such metastudy found that 
controlled-release fertilizers on average increased 
NUE by 13 percent.128 Based only on this reduced 
need for fertilizer, one European study estimated 
that reduced fertilizer application would in general 
fully offset the costs of inhibitors.129 
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Increases in yield are also possible. A recent meta-
analysis of nitrification inhibitors for farms apply-
ing nitrogen at recommended rates observed wide 
variability in yield effects but found average yield 
increases of 7.5 percent—with bigger increases in 
irrigated fields.130 Another meta-analysis found 
average yield increases of 9 percent for grains, 5 
percent for vegetables, and 14–15 percent for hays 
and straws.131 If these kinds of yield gains are real, 
using nitrification inhibitors should be profitable. 
For example, one study estimated an additional 
cost of only $26 per hectare for good U.S. corn 
fields, and a yield gain equal to $164 per hectare.132 
The potential to increase yield, however, probably 
depends on how much nitrogen farmers are already 
applying. Where they apply too much fertilizer, an 
inhibitor is less likely to boost yields, so the main 
potential savings are probably from reduced use of 
fertilizer. 
Given this potential for positive responses,  
McKinsey & Company has gone so far as to assume 
that these compounds save money overall, which 
leads to “negative costs” for reducing nitrous oxide 
through their use.133 Yet one global marketing com-
pany estimated sales of controlled-release fertilizers 
to be only around 2 percent of global sales of nitro-
gen fertilizers in 2012–14.134 If these compounds are 
profitable, then why do farmers use them so little?
Much of the explanation probably lies in the high 
variation and, therefore, uncertainty in the costs 
and benefits farmers will face.135 For example, while 
one recent meta-analysis found increased yields on 
cereal crops, another found increased yields only 
on forage and vegetable crops, but not cereals.136 
Given this uncertainty, compounds are marketed to 
those farmers who face the greatest threat of losing 
nitrogen before crops can use it—such as those who 
apply fertilizer for the next year’s crop in the fall, or 
those who farm on sandy soils. Despite the promise 
of this technology, increased use probably depends 
on regulations that not only directly require more 
use but also encourage development of information 
about when and where these compounds work best. 
Such a regulatory push is probably also necessary 
to persuade the fertilizer industry to explore the full 
potential development of these technologies.
Breeding opportunities
Chapter 12 discussed the promising option of 
deliberately breeding crops to utilize nitrogen more 
efficiently, as well as the increases in NUE that 
probably occur when breeding for increased yields 
alone. Taking a more radical step, and therefore 
with less chance of success, some breeders are 
trying to breed major grains to fix their own nitro-
gen.137 Although this effort has received some pub-
licity, the minimal literature on breeding to increase 
NUE—even at the level of discussion—suggests that 
research efforts are small. 
Biological nitrification inhibition (BNI) for crops, 
similar to that for pasture grasses discussed ear-
lier, provides another major opportunity. Just as 
researchers found that the Brachiaria humidicola 
grass exudes a chemical that inhibits nitrification, 
so they have found that each of the world’s major 
grains, including wheat, maize, rice, and sorghum, 
has either wild or cultivated varieties with some 
level of BNI. A research partnership is under way 
to increase the production of the natural inhibitor 
sorgoleone in sorghum, and a BNI sorghum will 
probably be available within five years.138 Research 
is also under way to transfer the chromosome 
region that controls BNI function from wild wheat 
strains into modern elite wheat varieties.139 
As these researchers point out, BNI has potential 
advantages over chemical additives because BNI 
would come as an integral part of the plant and 
require no additional labor. In addition, the biology 
of plants has evolved to exude these inhibitors pre-
cisely into the parts of soils where nitrogen builds 
up and to continue to do so as plants grow. As a 
result, they can potentially achieve more inhibition 
than chemical inhibitors, which to date can last no 
more than a few weeks. 
Improving balance among multiple nutrients
For most of the world’s farmers, fertilization 
focuses on the macronutrients nitrogen, phos-
phorus, and potassium and ignores additional 
nutrients that can be both deficient and important 
to crop growth, such as sulfur, calcium, iron, zinc, 
and nickel. Unfortunately, the needs for these 
micronutrients are poorly understood, and the 
quantity of micronutrients needed may depend on 
the availability of other micronutrients.140 Soil and 
root interactions are poorly understood, especially 
WRI.org        348
complex microbial influences. Greater knowledge 
would probably enable improved breeding of crops 
and increased “inoculation” of soils by spread-
ing microorganisms that help roots fix nutrients. 
Seed coatings with either micronutrients or one of 
the major nutrients have shown promise in some 
cases. In other situations, the best opportunity may 
involve directly spraying micronutrients onto the 
crops.
In all cases, more efficient fertilization has the 
potential to increase NUE and reduce emissions 
by leading to greater crop growth and more effi-
cient use of the principal, potentially polluting, 
macronutrients nitrogen and phosphorus. But this 
whole field of knowledge receives limited research 
funding. 
Estimating the opportunity
Although the evidence suggests that some improve-
ment in NUE and consequent reduced nitrous oxide 
emissions would be cheap or even profitable, there 
is no sound basis for estimating what level of NUE 
is economically achievable or cost-effective. Zhang 
et al. (2015b) developed global NUE targets for 
major crop categories, which would raise the global 
average efficiency for all crops from 42 percent to 
68 percent.141 The 68 percent target includes NUEs 
of 85 percent for soybeans, 60 percent for rice, 40 
percent for sugar crops and fruits and vegetables, 
and 70 percent for all other crops. In the GlobAgri-
WRR model, we developed four scenarios in which 
farms in each of the world’s regions close the gap 
between present performance and the goals of 
Zhang et al. (2015b) by 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 
percent, and 100 percent.
Table 27-1 shows the results. Although all NUE 
progress contributes to significant emissions 
reductions, only achieving a global average NUE 
of 71 percent—slightly above the target in Zhang et 
al. (2015b)—would keep fertilizer emissions close 
to their 2010 levels. An NUE of 71 percent would 
reduce 2050 emissions by more than 600 Mt, 
roughly a 35 percent reduction. Yet even under this 
most optimistic scenario, fertilizer emissions would 
still remain above 1.1 Gt per year in 2050—more 
than one-quarter of our target for total agricultural 
production emissions of 4 Gt per year. 
Table 27-1 | Global effects of scenarios of improved nitrogen use efficiency on agricultural greenhouse gas emissions
SCENARIO GLOBAL AVERAGE 
NITROGEN USE 
EFFICIENCY 
(PERCENT)
EMISSIONS 
FROM SOIL 
FERTILIZATIONa 
(MT CO2E)
TOTAL 
PRODUCTION 
EMISSIONS 
(MT CO2E) 
PRODUCTION 
EMISSIONS GHG 
MITIGATION GAP 
(GT CO2E)
2010 46 1,289 6,769 —
No productivity gains after 2010 1,758 11,251 7.3(2.2)
2050 BASELINE 48 1,741 9,023 5.0
25% NUE gap closure  
(Coordinated Effort) 56 1,459 8,741
4.7
(-0.3)
50% NUE gap closure  
(Highly Ambitious) 62 1,306 8,588
4.6
(-0.4)
75% NUE gap closure  
(Breakthrough Technologies) 67 1,205 8,487
4.5
(-0.5)
Meets high NUE targetb 71 1,130 8,412 4.4(-0.6)
Notes: 
a. “Emissions from soil fertilization” includes emissions from the energy used to produce and transport fertilizer.
b. Defined in Zhang et al. (2015b) as 70 percent for most crops, 85 percent for soybeans, 60 percent for rice, and 40 percent for sugar, fruits, and vegetables).
Numbers not summed correctly are due to rounding. Numbers shown in parentheses are changes relative to 2050 baseline.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model. 
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Nitrogen use efficiencies may play an even 
more prominent role in determining global 
GHG emissions than our model calculates. 
GlobAgri-WRR uses a “default” emission 
standard adopted by the IPCC, which assumes 
that nearly all nitrogen deliberately applied 
to cropland, and all fertilizer applied to 
grassland, generates the same quantity of 
nitrous oxide per kilogram of nitrogen. The 
percentage in Tier 1 calculations works out to 
1.45 percent of all nitrogen applied. As a result, 
10 percent more nitrogen applied to farm 
fields means 10 percent more nitrous oxide. 
There is also a higher, fixed IPCC Tier 1 rate 
of 2 percent for nitrogen excreted in manure 
and urine by grazing animals, and that too is 
the same on all fields. But estimating nitrous 
oxide emission rates is challenging because 
the bulk of a field’s emissions often will occur 
over only a few hours on one or a few days 
per year. The resulting data have enormous 
variation. In recent years, evidence has 
been growing that these estimates are too 
simple, which has important implications for 
mitigation strategies.
First, data are accumulating that emission 
rates likely overestimate emissions in 
drier regions, such as Australia and much 
of Africa,a but also likely underestimate 
emissions from wetter regions, at least on 
farms that use large quantities of nitrogen. 
Some of these underestimates may result 
from an underestimate of indirect emissions 
when nitrogen runs off into streams.b As 
soils around the world become increasingly 
saturated with nitrogen, emission rates may 
also increase.c These findings make intuitive 
sense because nitrous oxide should be 
higher where soils are more likely to become 
saturated and where there is more nitrogen 
available to the microorganisms that release 
nitrous oxide. 
Second, there is a good chance that nitrous 
oxide emissions will increase as yields grow 
because, even with constant NUE, higher 
yields mean a larger nitrogen surplus per 
hectare. To use a simple numerical example, 
if crops remove half of the applied nitrogen 
and the rest is surplus, then doubling the 
yield while maintaining the same NUE will 
double the surplus. Unfortunately, evidence 
is increasing that the greater the surplus 
of nitrogen, the higher the rate at which 
nitrogen turns into nitrous oxide. 
One meta-analysis of data from several 
studies indicated low nitrous oxide emissions 
at high rates of NUE but high exponential 
growth in emissions thereafter as NUE rates 
decline: emission rates could potentially 
approach 10 percent of all applied nitrogen 
rather than the 1 percent used by the IPCC.d 
Two other meta-analyses found a slower, 
but still exponential growth rate tied to 
application rates,e which should be generally 
correlated with surpluses. These results 
tally with several experimental field trials in 
different countries.f
These studies have several policy 
implications, and are cause for both optimism 
and pessimism:
 ▪ The studies suggest that nitrogen emis-
sion rates may vary significantly both 
from country to country and among 
types of farms within a country. Once 
scientists can define these conditions 
better, mitigation efforts can focus on the 
high-emission sources.
 ▪ The data suggest that the problem is 
more acute in wetter regions that use 
abundant fertilizer, such as North Amer-
ica, Europe, and China. Because of the 
technical sophistication of agriculture in 
these regions, they are better positioned 
to use advanced technology to apply ni-
trogen more efficiently.g The studies also 
suggest that increasing nitrogen use in 
Africa, which will result in declining NUE, 
might not result in nitrous oxide emis-
sions as high as the levels we estimate 
using IPCC default emission rates. 
 ▪ Global accounting rules may lead to a 
global underestimation of emissions. 
Under approved guidelines by the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, countries are allowed to 
use lower emission rates if they can 
document and justify them. As a result, 
countries with drier climates have an 
incentive to document their lower emis-
sions rates, while countries with higher 
actual emissions will lack this incentive 
and may instead adhere to IPCC methods 
that underestimate emissions. If science 
bears out these patterns, the IPCC should 
adjust its default emissions methods and 
countries should accept those changes.
 ▪ These data make increasing NUE even 
more important. On the one hand, as 
yields grow, just maintaining the same 
NUE means that surpluses of nitrogen per 
hectare will keep growing as yields in-
crease. To illustrate, an NUE of 50 percent 
means that 50 percent of applied nitrogen 
is surplus to crop requirements. As a 
result, fertilizing a hectare that yields 10 
tons of maize versus one that generates 
5 tons will result in twice the nitrogen 
surplus per hectare. If the emissions rate 
is always 1 percent, as we and the IPCC 
assume, then emissions double, but if the 
emissions rate were to jump from 1 to 2 
percent with the higher surplus, then the 
level of emissions would quadruple when 
the yield grows to 10 tons. 
 ▪ Overall, if nitrogen surpluses dictate the 
rate of nitrous oxide emissions, then inef-
ficient nitrogen use becomes even more 
harmful and highly efficient nitrogen use 
becomes even more beneficial.
BOX 27-2 |  Possible refinements of nitrous oxide emission rates from fertilizers and their 
significance for nitrogen use efficiency (NUE)
Sources: 
a. Hickman et al. (2014, 2015).
b. Turner et al. (2015).
c. Reay et al. (2012).
d. Van Groenigen et al. (2010).
e. Shcherbak et al. (2014); Hickman et al. (2015).
f.  Hickman et al. (2015); McSwiney and Robertson (2005).
g. Gerber et al. (2016).
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There are, however, several good reasons to believe 
these efficiencies underestimate the benefits of the 
measures we propose. 
 ▪ First, nitrification inhibitors might be able to 
reduce nitrous oxide even more than improve-
ments in average NUE by keeping nitrogen in 
the form of ammonium longer or perhaps at 
key times. Our analysis does not factor in ad-
ditional benefits beyond the increases in NUE.
 ▪ Second, our analysis uses the simplest IPCC 
emission factors for emissions of nitrous oxide 
from farm fields. This emission factor applies 
the same emission rate to each kilogram of 
nitrogen regardless of how large the amount of 
nitrogen surplus is on the field and regardless 
of the amount not used by crops (Box 27-1). If 
farms achieved the higher efficiencies proposed 
in our model scenarios, even though the quan-
tity of nitrogen used would still grow modestly 
compared to 2010, the surplus nitrogen not 
absorbed by crops would decline disproportion-
ately—by approximately 50 to 80 Mt according 
to one study.142 New science suggests that the 
emissions depend on the amount of this surplus 
nitrogen, as discussed in Box 27-2, and not the 
total amount of nitrogen. If correct, then emis-
sions in our mitigation scenarios could decline 
much further.
 ▪ Third, science increasingly suggests that 
present systems are underestimating various 
indirect sources of nitrous oxide, which do not 
result from the farm soil itself but from the 
nitrogen after it is lost from the soil. One paper 
suggests that the major sources of loss from the 
U.S. corn belt could be occurring in the many 
drainage systems for farm fields plus the tiny 
streams that receive water flowing from them 
or from leaching of farm water through the 
ground.143 Because large increases in NUE could 
disproportionately reduce these waterborne 
losses, they could also reduce nitrous oxide by 
more than we estimate. 
Overall, some improved management with exist-
ing technologies could lead to meaningful prog-
ress. Major progress seems possible with use of 
enhanced efficiency fertilizers, and truly impres-
sive progress may be possible with technological 
breakthroughs. 
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Recommended Strategies
The true scope of the nitrogen challenge by 2050 
indicates that large improvements in both practices 
and technology are required. Our four recommen-
dations reflect that challenge.
Establish flexible regulatory targets to push 
fertilizer companies to develop improved fertilizers
Our assessment is that nitrification inhibitors and 
related compounds hold great promise to increase 
NUE, boost yields, and reduce nitrogen runoff and 
nitrous oxide emissions in cost-effective ways. 
In some circumstances, farmers may experience 
increased profits. This potential exists on a variety 
of farms even with present technology, and the 
variability in performance suggests high potential 
both to make compounds better and cheaper and to 
target them where they are most effective. Yet this 
potential is going unrealized because compounds 
have variable and uncertain effects on different 
farms and crops, because farmer decisions do not 
need to reflect environmental costs, and because 
industry devotes too little research funding to 
inhibitor technology. A flexible regulatory approach 
therefore seems appropriate to encourage the 
industry to market more vigorously to the farms 
that would benefit the most with current inhibitor 
technologies, to improve understanding of opti-
mal uses over space and time, and to improve the 
technology. 
One approach is to mimic vehicle fuel efficiency 
standards, as elaborated in Kanter and Search-
inger (2018). In the United States, as a result of 
fuel efficiency standards in place since the 1970s, 
auto manufacturers are responsible for increasing 
the fuel efficiency of their fleets over time. This 
obligation created the incentive to design the most 
efficient cars for consumers, and to improve fuel-
efficiency technology over time.144 It also probably 
encouraged innovation in marketing. The need to 
sell small, more fuel-efficient cars to average out 
their fleet efficiencies gave auto manufacturers an 
incentive to improve them and target consumers 
most likely to appreciate such cars. 
A similar program might impose obligations on 
fertilizer companies to incorporate compounds into 
their mix of fertilizer sales to achieve increasing 
levels of nitrous oxide reductions over time. For 
example, a law might start with a requirement for 
15 percent of sales to incorporate EEFs and steadily 
increase the requirement to 30 percent in 15 years. 
An alternative could vary the quantity of EEFs sold 
based on their effectiveness. Companies would have 
to demonstrate quantities sold and likely reduc-
tions based on how farmers use their product. This 
approach would allow companies to choose the 
types of compounds they sell and to target com-
pounds where they would have the most impact. It 
would also encourage manufacturers to research 
where compounds would be most effective to sup-
port their sales efforts and give them incentives to 
improve their products and tailor them to different 
farming conditions.
To justify this kind of regulation, it is not necessary 
to downplay other nitrogen-reduction strategies. 
Nor do EEFs need to be effective for all farms or 
be used by all farmers. The evidence merely needs 
to show, as we believe it does, that EEFs have the 
technical and economic potential to play a larger 
part in a cost-effective nitrogen-management 
effort. Phasing in higher efficiency standards over 
time would allow companies to start by selling the 
least-expensive yet effective compounds to a small 
share of farms that existing science indicates would 
benefit the most. 
The fertilizer production industry is highly concen-
trated, but its distribution system relies heavily on 
independent retailers and distributors. However, 
the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) illustrates 
how to address this complexity. The RFS requires 
that increasing quantities of renewable fuels be 
blended with gasoline or diesel over time and in 
this way is similar to our proposal for steadily 
increasing percentages of EEFs. As with the fertil-
izer industry, the fuel distribution network can 
be complex. The RFS deals with this complexity 
by assigning responsibility for meeting blending 
requirements to refiners or importers of oil. A 
fertilizer program could imitate this approach by 
applying requirements to producers and importers 
of fertilizers. However, the RFS program awards 
credits to producers of renewable fuels. Producers 
and importers meet their obligations by acquiring 
these credits from other producers, from other 
actors who blend further down the fuel chain, or 
from a credit market, which ensures that standards 
are met overall even if a particular blender falls 
short.68 In this way, producers and importers of fuel 
do not have to produce renewable fuels themselves; 
WRI.org        352
they just need to make sure that someone along 
the supply chain is doing so, and in an amount that 
meets the percentage requirement of the producer 
or importer. In the same way, fertilizer manufac-
turers or importers could meet their obligations 
without producing EEFs themselves and without 
having to track their own fertilizers by assuring that 
sufficient quantities of EEFs are sold somewhere. 
India provides the closest example to date of this 
approach with its New Urea Policy, adopted in 
2015.145 It requires that fertilizer manufacturers 
coat all domestically produced urea with neem, 
a natural coating substance that delays nitrogen 
release over the course of the growing season. 
Any country or subnational government could move 
this process along by adopting this kind of regula-
tory standard. For example, the state of California 
has led climate change efforts in the United States 
and is a natural candidate for pioneering this 
approach. Large food companies could also encour-
age this process through their own purchasing stan-
dards. For example, Walmart announced in 2013 
that it would require its suppliers to submit plans 
to cut their nitrogen fertilizer use substantially.146 
Increasing use of advanced fertilizer compounds 
could play a valuable role in such plans.
Shift fertilizer subsidies into support for higher 
NUE 
A wide range of economic research supports the 
view, predicted by basic economic theory, that 
farmers’ fertilizer application rates reflect the ratio 
of fertilizer prices to crop prices in both developed 
and developing countries.147 The price ratio helps 
explain differences in application rates across coun-
tries.148 If subsidies artificially lower fertilizer prices 
to farmers, then farmers will use more fertilizer 
than they otherwise would. 
In Africa, where farmers currently use little fertil-
izer, the case for and against fertilizer subsidies 
is complex (and we evaluate these arguments in 
Chapter 36). But in Asia, the case seems clear that 
fertilizer subsidies should be phased out. Economic 
studies have found that fertilizer subsidies in Asia 
contributed to agricultural growth and poverty 
reduction in the early years of policy implementa-
tion but that their effect declined thereafter.149 Since 
the early years of subsidy programs, other efforts to 
raise agricultural productivity have had far greater 
impact. These efforts include agricultural R&D, 
roadbuilding, irrigation, and education. Reforms 
in tenure law and agricultural market liberalization 
have had even bigger effects.150 
The evidence is strong that farmers in both China 
and India overuse fertilizer.151 This overuse leads to 
particularly high emissions in China because much 
of the fertilizer in China is generated using energy 
from coal.152 Fertilizer subsidies in China reached 
$18 billion in 2010 through various mechanisms.153 
In a bold step forward, China decided in 2015 to 
phase out the principal subsidies by the end of 
2017, which had been artificially lowering prices for 
fertilizer manufacturers.154 
Nitrogen fertilizer subsidies remain high in many 
other Asian countries, including India, Bangla-
desh, and Indonesia.155 In India, fertilizer subsidies 
reduced domestic nitrogen prices to less than 
one-fifth of international prices from 2011 to 
2014.156 The annual cost of up to nearly $15 billion157 
constituted 5.6 percent of total government spend-
ing in 2011.158 For many years, fertilizer subsidies 
have been particularly distorting because they more 
generously supported nitrogen than other nutri-
ents, resulting in unbalanced fertilizer application. 
This structure has led to both reduced yields and 
highly inefficient use of nitrogen.159 
The challenge of reforming fertilizer subsidies 
is mainly socioeconomic and political. All Asian 
countries with high fertilizer subsidies have large 
numbers of small farmers whose economic condi-
tions are stressful and who benefit from fertilizer 
subsidies. Realistically, there is probably greater 
opportunity to reorient subsidies than to eliminate 
them.
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We therefore recommend shifting subsidies from 
fertilizer toward NUE. Governments could start by 
shifting subsidies toward fertilizers that include 
nitrification inhibitors or other delayed-release 
compounds. Governments also should develop 
incentives to shift to application techniques that 
apply fertilizer more frequently and in balanced 
amounts. 
Support critical research and development
Reaching long-term nitrogen management goals 
requires major innovations. Highly promising 
options include improved development and use of 
chemical EEFs and BNI. Less developed but also 
promising options include nitrogen-fixing cere-
als and crop breeding targeted to increase NUE. 
As we discuss in Chapter 12, funding for all these 
categories of research is minimal in relation to their 
importance and promise, and governments need to 
increase this funding.
At a more applied level, governments and the 
private sector need to pursue the kinds of detailed, 
site-specific agronomic analyses that can lead to 
more tailored application and use of fertilizers. The 
examples described above of researchers work-
ing with farmers in China or coming together to 
improve data in the U.S. corn belt illustrate the 
kinds of effort needed. 
Fund demonstration projects of advanced 
technologies
Governments already support agricultural con-
servation efforts through national conservation 
funding and international aid projects. Outside of 
Africa, where fertilizer application rates are sim-
ply too low, the focus of such efforts should be on 
advanced technologies, such as use of inhibitors, or 
highly site-specific application levels. One option 
governments should pursue involves performance-
based projects that reward producers, or fertilizer 
contractors, for achieving high levels of NUE. 
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MENU ITEM: ADOPT 
EMISSIONS-REDUCING 
RICE MANAGEMENT AND 
VARIETIES
Rice is one of the world’s most important staple crops, but its 
production is a potent source of GHG emissions, primarily in the 
form of methane generated by flooded or “paddy” rice. This menu 
item focuses on strategies to reduce the GHG emissions produced 
by rice-growing and the potential of these strategies to increase 
rice yields and save water. 
CHAPTER 28
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The Challenge
Rice is the largest staple crop for roughly half of 
the world’s population.160 Most rice is produced 
in flooded fields and, as in wetlands generally, 
flooding blocks oxygen penetration into the soil, 
which allows archaea that produce methane to 
thrive. Common estimates put paddy rice methane 
emissions at roughly 500 Mt CO2e per year,161 but 
adjusting for the IPCC’s more recent estimates of 
the potency (global warming potential) of methane 
increases those estimates to 800 Mt CO2e per year. 
In addition, paddy rice fields emit roughly 15 Mt 
CO2e in the form of nitrous oxide.162 The GlobAgri-
WRR model estimates methane emissions from 
rice in 2010 at 1,120 Mt CO2e,163 using the more 
advanced methods for estimating methane rice 
emissions (so-called Tier 2 methods).
In short, paddy rice methane contributed at least 
10 percent (and possibly more) of all global agricul-
ture-related emissions in 2010 and approximately 2 
percent of total human-generated GHG emissions. 
For most rice-growing countries in Southeast Asia, 
rice contributes around 50 percent of agricultural 
production GHG emissions and between 2.5 
percent and 20 percent or more of total national 
emissions.164
Because the amount of methane emitted by rice 
cultivation depends more on the area of irrigated 
paddy rice land under production than on the 
amount of rice produced, boosting yields provides 
one way to reduce emissions per unit of produc-
tion.165 In 2014, farmers harvested rice on 163 Mha 
worldwide, an area roughly half the size of India. 
Ninety percent of production was in Asia.166 Irri-
gated, flooded rice, which is responsible for the bulk 
of methane emissions, accounts for roughly half of 
total rice-growing area and 75 percent of the world’s 
rice production.167 Building on FAO projections, we 
project an increase in demand for rice of 32 percent 
between 2010 and 2050.168 Using FAO projections 
for rice yields in 2050, we estimate some modest 
growth in paddy rice area, which means emissions 
will rise by roughly 150 Mt to 1,266 Mt of CO2e in 
our baseline (Figure 28-1). 
Unfortunately, the impacts of climate change, 
although uncertain, could decrease rice yields and 
increase GHG emissions from production. Some 
estimates of higher temperature effects on rice 
yields are harsh, on the order of an 8–10 percent 
decline in yield for every 1 degree Celsius increase 
in local temperature.169 Millions of hectares of 
high-quality, low-lying rice lands in Asia could be 
affected by sea level rise, increasing the risks of 
salinity and flooding.170 In addition, higher concen-
trations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere may 
directly increase methane emissions by increasing 
the supply of carbon to the microorganisms that 
produce methane.171 Although the science is evolv-
ing, one study estimated that the combination of 
lower yields and rising methane emissions could 
double the emissions per unit of rice by 2100.172 
This threat of growing emissions creates a powerful 
need to reduce rice emissions in ways that boost—
or at least do not harm—yields and therefore hold 
down the need to expand rice-growing area.
Figure 28-1 |   Greenhouse gas emissions from 
agricultural production, 2010 and 2050
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The Opportunity
Four main strategies exist for mitigating GHG 
emissions from rice production: increase rice yields 
more rapidly, breed rice that produces less meth-
ane, improve management of rice straw, and reduce 
periods of flooding.
Increase yields more rapidly 
The first strategy is to increase rice yields fast 
enough to reduce the necessary amount of future 
rice-growing area. FAO projects yields of 5.3 tons 
per hectare per year in 2050, which would be 23 
percent higher than in 2010.173 This yield growth 
is equivalent to only half of the annual absolute 
growth rate from 1962 to 2006, and the lower pro-
jection reflects judgments by experts that rice has 
decreasing potential to grow at higher yields. But if 
rice yields could grow at 62 percent of the annual 
rate that was achieved from 1962 to 2006, and 
reach 5.5 tons per hectare per year, rice-growing 
area would not need to expand.174 An expert review 
on rice has found sufficiently high technical growth 
potential for rice yields to meet 2050 demand with-
out land expansion. Fischer et al. (2014) estimated 
that the global potential yield for rice is 7.4 tons per 
hectare per year, well beyond the yield necessary to 
hold rice area constant.175 Increasing yields beyond 
5.5 tons per hectare per year could lead to an actual 
decrease in rice area and future emissions.
Breed lower-methane rice
Scientists have long known that some rice variet-
ies emit less methane than others.176 One 2017 
paper showed that some high-yielding rice variet-
ies already in use generate roughly 10 percent less 
methane than the average rice variety.177 
More ambitiously, in 2015, a group of research-
ers reported developing a new breed of rice that 
generates only 10 percent or less of the methane 
emissions of normal rice under controlled condi-
tions in small pots during parts of the rice-growing 
seasons.178 The researchers had added a barley gene, 
which had the effect of transferring growth from 
roots to granules, resulting in higher (but starchier) 
yields and providing less feeding opportunities 
for methane-producing archaea in the roots. The 
results were promising, but there are also reasons 
for caution. This 90 percent reduction occurred 
only during early parts of the rice-growing season 
and therefore would not alter the methane emis-
sions that occur later. The researchers have added 
the gene to only one variety of rice so far. And field 
experiments would be necessary to determine both 
how well rice plants do with more limited root 
growth and how methane emissions react under 
broader, real-world field conditions. 
Minimal efforts are devoted to deliberately breeding 
low-methane rice varieties and encouraging their 
wider use. Overall, research results suggest that a 
deliberate effort to do so should be able to reduce 
methane emissions. 
Remove rice straw
Rice straw is the nongrain portion of rice plants. 
Methane emissions increase when farmers add 
fresh (noncomposted) rice straw to flooded fields, 
which increases the carbon available to produce 
methane, particularly if farmers do not plow the 
straw under before planting. Yet burning, a com-
mon alternative for rice straw in some regions, also 
creates methane and other GHGs as well as local 
air pollution. Strategies to reduce emissions include 
incorporating rice straw into fields well before the 
new production seasons start. Another option is 
to remove rice straw from fields to use for other 
productive purposes, such as growing mushrooms, 
generating energy, or creating biochar.179
Reduce flood periods
Various practices can reduce or interrupt periods of 
flooding. The longer rice remains flooded, the more 
methane-producing archaea grow, and the more 
methane they generate. Decreasing the duration of 
flooding therefore reduces methane production and 
emissions.180 The drawdown of water in rice paddies 
is accomplished by temporarily halting irrigation, 
allowing water levels to subside through evapo-
transpiration, percolation, and seepage. Interrupt-
ing flooding even with occasional drawdowns has a 
dual effect: it quickly drives down the population of 
methane-producing archaea, and it stimulates the 
breakdown of methane by bacteria. Although the 
reduction in methane emissions is not necessarily 
proportional to the duration of the drawdown, stud-
ies have found that almost any means of reducing 
or interrupting this flooding reduces methane 
emissions.181 Even reducing flooding during the off-
season—as many Chinese farmers do—can reduce 
emissions.
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Systems for reducing flooding and emissions during 
the crop-growing season fall into four categories:
 ▪ Dry seeding. Most paddy rice production in 
Asia follows the traditional pattern of trans-
planting seedlings grown in nursery areas into 
already flooded paddies. But direct seeding 
of rice into dry fields is spreading in Asia and 
probably now accounts for one-quarter of all 
rice production in the region.182 Farmers in 
the United States use direct seeding because 
it requires less labor.183 Direct seeding can be 
practiced in flooded fields (“wet seeding”) or 
by drilling seeds into dry fields (“dry seeding”). 
Wet seeding in flooded fields is unlikely to 
reduce methane emissions.184 But dry seed-
ing reduces emissions because it shortens the 
flooding period by roughly a month.185
 ▪ Single midseason water drawdown. Stud-
ies have shown that a single drawdown during 
the crop production season, sufficient to allow 
oxygen to penetrate the soils, substantially 
lowers GHG emissions. Typically, this kind of 
drawdown must occur for 5–10 days to gener-
ate methane benefits.186 Most farmers in China, 
Japan, and South Korea already practice this 
drawdown to increase yields.
 ▪ Alternate wetting and drying (AWD). 
This practice involves repeatedly flooding a 
farm field, typically to a water depth of around 
5 centimeters, allowing the field to dry until the 
upper soil layer starts to dry out (typically when 
the water level drops to around 15 centimeters 
below the soil surface), and then reflooding the 
field. This cycle can continue from 20 days after 
sowing until two weeks before flowering.187 This 
approach is also known as “controlled irriga-
tion” or “multiple irrigation,” depending on 
the country and the research context. Because 
each drying cycle sets back the generation of 
methane-producing bacteria, AWD achieves 
even larger reductions in methane emissions 
than a single drawdown. AWD can be practiced 
along a continuum of less to more frequent 
drawdowns. 
 ▪ Aerobic rice production. Like AWD, this 
system involves adding irrigation water only 
when needed. It avoids standing water, aim-
ing instead to keep soils moist. This system can 
drastically reduce—or nearly eliminate—meth-
ane production. In general, however, aerobic 
rice production has lower yields than rice 
produced through traditional methods or the 
three methods listed above. Still, as the case 
study below shows, some farmers in China are 
maintaining high yields by constructing raised 
beds and ditches, which limit standing water to 
furrows.
Effectiveness of reducing flood periods 
All reductions in flooding can reduce methane 
emissions. Various studies have found that dry 
seeding can lead to reductions in GHG emissions 
of 30 percent or more.188 IPCC guidance provides 
that a single drawdown will reduce emissions that 
would otherwise occur by 40 percent, and multiple 
drawdowns by 48 percent.189 However, these figures 
are global averages. Evidence from the U.S. state of 
Arkansas indicates that AWD could reduce emis-
sions by as much as 90 percent.190 There is also 
evidence that combining different water-saving 
approaches can have additive benefits for mitiga-
tion. For example, studies combining dry seeding 
with AWD have found emissions reductions of 90 
percent.191 
One concern is that while drawdowns decrease 
methane emissions, they tend to increase emissions 
of nitrous oxide, another powerful GHG. Nitrous 
oxide emissions are generally low in continuously 
flooded rice systems. However, under water-saving 
strategies, nitrous oxide emissions tend to increase 
because alternating periods when oxygen is and is 
not present in soils maximizes the opportunities for 
nitrous oxide production. In general, studies that 
have measured nitrous oxide emissions under dif-
ferent water management regimes have found that 
increases in nitrous oxide have substantially less cli-
mate significance than the reductions in methane as 
long as excessive nitrogen is not introduced through 
high doses of fertilizer.192 Reflecting this difference 
in impact, the IPCC guidelines do not account for 
increases in nitrous oxide emissions under water-
saving techniques, and below we have chosen to 
follow this convention in our consideration of these 
techniques’ GHG mitigation potential. 
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Significantly, one study using a more frequent 
sampling technique found very high emissions of 
nitrous oxide from three Indian rice farms that 
flooded their fields for only a few days at a time. 
The emissions were so high that the researchers 
suggested these brief flooding conditions could 
cause nitrous oxide emissions in excess of methane 
savings.193 Overall, the farms in this study that 
contributed the high nitrous oxide emissions were 
flooded for only a small portion of the growing sea-
son, and the study did not present any continuously 
flooded farms as a control. This type of wetting and 
drying, lasting for short periods, contrasts with 
standard AWD, which has much longer cycles and 
which therefore maintains flooding much longer. 
When analyzing this form of AWD in contrast 
with continuous flooding, researchers have found 
that nitrous oxide emissions increase a little but 
not enough to cancel out savings from reduced 
methane.194 The India study therefore does not cast 
doubts on the standard way of practicing AWD but 
it does raise concerns about whether such briefly 
flooded rice fields are common and whether all such 
fields contribute high nitrous oxide emissions. It 
therefore makes a case for efforts to replicate these 
findings on other farms and to analyze how many 
other farms may be flooded so briefly.
Because farmers do not directly benefit from reduc-
ing GHG emissions, emissions reductions alone do 
not motivate adoption of rice water management 
techniques. In contrast, many farmers directly ben-
efit from saving water, which provides a potential 
incentive to reduce flooding. Rice production uses 
around 40 percent of the world’s irrigation water,195 
and almost one-third of rice-growing areas face 
high levels of water stress.196 AWD and dry seed-
ing would lead to the largest reductions in water 
consumption because they involve the shortest 
inundation periods.
Yet current estimates of water savings are at the 
field level; they do not necessarily reflect water 
savings for a local area. Evidence suggests that most 
or perhaps nearly all of the water savings will result 
from reduced percolation,197 which implies that 
some of the irrigation water saved by an individual 
field would otherwise have recharged groundwater 
or been used further downstream.198 However, in 
periods when surface soils are allowed to dry out, 
evaporation from soils should decrease, which 
means that reduced flooding should also make 
some more water available at the system level. Fur-
ther analysis in each district is necessary to deter-
mine the extent to which field-level water savings 
translate into savings for the district or aquifer.
Evidence of the effect of these water manage-
ment practices on rice yields is mixed. Many early 
studies found yield declines from AWD.199 But as 
AWD becomes more widely practiced, studies in 
Asia typically found yield gains, including in the 
Philippines,200 Vietnam,201 and Bangladesh.202 
Studies in India have found yield gains from 
AWD when practiced as part of a broader rice 
production system known as the “System of Rice 
Intensification.”203 In China, an estimated 80 
percent of farmers perform a single midseason 
drawdown for 7–10 days because they have found 
that doing so increases crop yields. 
Determining the precise reason for these yield gains 
requires further investigation, but there are at least 
three possible explanations:204
 ▪ Better resistance to lodging (bending over) of 
stems, attributable to better anchoring of well-
developed roots or sturdier stems.
 ▪ More profuse early rice tillering (additional 
shoots), while midseason drawdowns suppress 
unproductive late tillering, which consumes the 
plant’s energy while producing few or no rice 
grains.
 ▪ Less susceptibility to disease in some cases 
(although some studies have found greater 
susceptibility to disease and weeds).
Recent studies in the United States have found 
that AWD has no effect on yields as long as soils 
retained an acceptable level of moisture at all times. 
Studies also indicate that yields could drop dra-
matically if soil was allowed to dry too much at any 
one time. U.S. yields are nearly universally high, 
indicating a persistently high quality of manage-
ment, which may help explain why changes in water 
management have not boosted yields. 
Unfortunately, just because some of these water 
management practices are possible does not mean 
they are feasible everywhere or all the time. For 
example, to be able to practice AWD, farmers 
realistically need a number of physical conditions 
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to be met. They require well-leveled fields to avoid 
pockets that dry excessively. They must also be able 
to manage their water reliably, which means they 
must be able to drain their fields effectively and 
then they must also have a reliable source of water 
to rewet their fields as soon as needed. But most 
rice-growing regions have distinct wet and dry sea-
sons. In the wet season, farmers may not be able to 
drain their fields adequately. In the dry season, only 
some irrigation systems can provide water reliably 
enough to encourage farmers to practice AWD. 
In a series of case studies, we highlight what is 
known and not known about the opportunities and 
challenges of using some form of water manage-
ment to reduce methane emissions during rice 
production. The case studies are drawn from key 
rice-producing areas in India, the Philippines, the 
United States, and China. 
INDIA
India produces more rice than any country but 
China, and the states of Tamil Nadu in the south 
and Punjab in the north illustrate the opportuni-
ties and challenges for water management. Rice is 
the dominant crop in both states. Small farmers 
(working less than 2 hectares [ha]) farm half of 
the land in Tamil Nadu and one-third in Punjab 
and constitute the majority of farmers. Farms of 2 
to 10 ha make up the majority of the remainder in 
both states. Both states also experience great water 
scarcity, withdrawing roughly 40 percent more 
water than rainfall replenishes each year. Farmers 
mine groundwater to meet their needs, and water 
tables are falling. In parts of Punjab, water tables 
have been falling by up to one meter per year, 
increasing pumping costs severalfold, and leading 
to contamination of soils with salt and wells with 
arsenic. Unable to conceive of an alternative solu-
tion, a recently released government plan proposed 
to reduce rice farming in Punjab by more than 40 
percent.205 
Researchers have performed at least a few studies 
of AWD or midseason drawdowns206 in each region 
and have found substantial GHG emission reduc-
tions, yield gains, and water savings at the farm 
level (Figure 28-2).207 Based on these water-saving 
and production benefits, government policy in both 
regions has promoted the System of Rice Intensi-
fication (SRI), which includes many practices of 
which one is, in effect, AWD. Although many farm-
ers in Tamil Nadu and Punjab have adopted some 
components of SRI, few have adopted some kind of 
midseason drawdown.
The technical potential to engage in AWD, or even 
one midseason drawdown, varies in both regions. 
Because of porous soils, drainage is possible even 
during the wet seasons. However, many farmers 
Figure 28-2  |  Midseason drawdown reduces greenhouse gas emissions from rice production in Punjab by one-third 
Note: Solid bars show average statewide emissions.  Error bars represent one standard deviation.
Source: Pathak et al. (2012). 
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rely exclusively on surface water irrigation net-
works, which are too unreliable in both regions to 
practice wetting and drying. Somewhat more than 
half the farmers in Tamil Nadu and most farmers in 
Punjab also pump groundwater.208 These farmers 
could therefore time their irrigations to perform 
AWD. Many farmers in Tamil Nadu also receive 
irrigation water from large earthen pits used to 
store water from the rainy season.209 The potential 
probably exists to time water deliveries from these 
pits to allow AWD, although designing such a sys-
tem would be more complicated than just turning 
pumps on and off. For many of these farms, addi-
tional leveling would also be necessary to ensure 
that drying the lower portions of fields does not 
lead to excessive drying of higher areas.
Dry seeding of rice is also starting to emerge as an 
alternative production system in Punjab, though 
it was practiced on only 5,000 ha in 2012.210 Some 
studies have found GHG benefits and large irriga-
tion savings at the field level.211 One study found 
modest declines or increases in yields depending 
on the variety of rice used,212 but follow-up stud-
ies found that these yield declines occurred where 
farmers did not follow recommended regimens of 
fertilizer and pesticide use. 
Despite the potential for many farmers to practice 
AWD, two factors greatly limit their incentive to do 
so. First, farmers currently enjoy essentially free 
water. Second, governments heavily subsidize the 
electricity used to run pumps in both states. Unless 
it is proven to increase yields substantially, farmers 
have little individual incentive to implement some 
form of water management.
PHILIPPINES
The Philippines ranks eighth in global annual rice 
production, with around 4.4 Mha in production in 
2010.213 It is also the world’s largest rice-importing 
country. Roughly 70 percent of the Philippines’ 
total rice area is irrigated, but it produces relatively 
low yields of around 3.3 t/ha.214 As in India, a few 
research studies in the country have found substan-
tial reductions of methane emissions from midsea-
son drawdowns, although there are no studies yet 
of AWD.215 Yet few rice farmers engage either in 
drawdowns or dry seeding. One limitation is physi-
cal. One rice-growing season in the Philippines 
occurs during periods of heavy rainfall, which are 
heavy enough to limit the potential of most farms to 
dry their fields unless they employ drainage systems 
that are not now common. It is possible that one 
midseason drawdown might be possible on some of 
these fields, but that requires further analysis. Dry-
season irrigation limitations are also important. 
Nationally, 86 percent of irrigation water comes 
from surface water irrigation, primarily rivers. The 
water supply is typically too unreliable for farmers 
to have confidence that they could replenish fields 
if they drain them. Two experiences, however, show 
some potential. 
Roughly one-quarter of all rice farms use pumps to 
access groundwater, typically those at the last stage 
of surface water irrigation systems, where water 
deliveries are most unreliable.216 These farmers can 
face high pumping costs. According to one study, 
half of all such farmers targeted by government 
initiatives to adopt AWD did so.217 An analysis of 
an initiative in Central Luzon that targeted farmers 
with pumps found no statistically significant impact 
on yields under AWD. It also found no change in 
labor costs, which also suggested no increase in 
weeding problems.218 This study also found that 
farmers employing AWD reduced their hours of 
irrigation by 38 percent219 (while other studies 
found water savings of 15–30 percent).220 
In general, these studies have confirmed farmers’ 
willingness to switch to AWD where the costs of 
pumping water are high but not where costs are 
low.221 Beyond physical limitations of surface-water 
irrigation schemes, farmers currently would also 
have little incentive to adopt AWD because they 
typically pay a fixed irrigation fee per hectare, 
usually about $50–$70 per season, and therefore 
have little financial incentive to use irrigation water 
judiciously. Creating incentives for AWD would 
thus require changing payment systems.
An irrigation project on the island of Bohol in the 
Visayas illustrates another potential model for 
some areas. In 2005 the National Irrigation Admin-
istration constructed a new dam with Japanese 
assistance to address declining and unreliable 
water supply. This new dam generated a far more 
reliable source of irrigation water; to optimize its 
use, the administration imposed an AWD irrigation 
schedule in 2006. Each farmer has irrigation water 
for three days, then none for the next 10 to 12 days. 
The project allowed farmers to cultivate in a man-
ner that resulted in overall yield increases of 11–13 
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percent, an increase of 16 percent in irrigated land, 
and two rice crops instead of one in some parts of 
the island.222 This project suggests how irrigation 
improvements could be tied to AWD for both GHG 
benefits and water savings.
UNITED STATES
The United States produces only 1.1 percent of the 
world’s paddy rice and harvests only around 0.6 
percent of the world’s rice area.223 Nevertheless, it 
has high yields of more than 8 tons per hectare and 
contributes 10 percent of internationally traded 
rice.224 Six states produce nearly all U.S. rice: 
Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Missouri, Mis-
sissippi, and Texas, with half of production from 
Arkansas alone. In both the southern United States 
and California, recent studies have confirmed large 
GHG reductions via AWD of 50 percent or more.225 
In California, a study found emissions reductions 
of 90 percent when AWD was combined with dry 
seeding.226 Rice farmers already mostly dry seed 
rice in Arkansas but not in California, where one 
study found nearly 50 percent reductions in meth-
ane emissions from dry seeding.227
In theory, AWD could prove attractive in both 
states because both suffer from severe water 
shortages and falling aquifer levels. One Arkansas 
study found increases in water use efficiency from 
AWD of 22 percent at the field level.228 However, in 
California, AWD could lead to higher rates of water 
loss into groundwater because soils are heavy clay, 
which allows little percolation when flooded but 
cracks when dried.
Growing season rainfall is sufficiently low in Arkan-
sas that farmers can dry their fields, and farmers 
are able to use pumps or on-farm reservoirs—filled 
in the winter—that provide sufficient and reliable 
water supplies. The main physical limitation in 
Arkansas is the size of fields. Unlike the small rice 
fields of Asia, single rice fields in the Arkansas are 
typically between 20 and 50 ha, with some much 
larger. Most are carefully leveled, which makes 
them promising for AWD. But because of their size, 
farmers usually divide fields into separate basins, 
separated by levees and weirs to control water 
heights and to allow water to move from one basin 
to another in a controlled fashion. To provide the 
level of water management for AWD, farmers would 
probably have to make adjustments to be able to 
deliver water separately to each separate part of the 
field.
Opportunities for AWD adoption are considerably 
lower in California. Because the state’s Mediter-
ranean climate generates little to no rainfall during 
the summer growing season, farmers rely on water 
deliveries from large, regionally managed water sys-
tems fed heavily by snowmelt and reliant on gravity. 
Farmers therefore do not have direct control over 
their water, and California’s irrigation systems are 
generally unable to supply water quickly enough 
to all farmers at the time it is needed. Dry seeding 
probably provides the best option for water saving. 
Since dry seeding can increase the need for weed 
control, additional incentives would probably be 
necessary to persuade farmers to adopt the practice.
The other main concern is potential impacts on 
yield. Unlike in other countries, there is no evidence 
from U.S. tests that AWD would increase yields, 
and some earlier studies suggested yield declines. 
Meanwhile, there is some risk of lower yields if 
farmers overdrain fields.229 The fact that Chinese 
and Japanese farms experience yield gains from at 
least one midseason drawdown but U.S. farmers do 
not presents a scientific puzzle. 
Overall, it would appear that most Arkansas farm-
ers, with reasonable adjustments, could implement 
AWD, while dry seeding should be an option for 
most California farmers. As in other countries, 
essentially free water limits their incentives to do 
so even while there might be collective benefits to 
farmers through water savings from broad adoption 
of these practices.
CHINA
Farmers in China harvest almost 20 percent of the 
world’s rice fields by area and produce almost 30 
percent of the world’s rice.230 The vast majority 
of China’s farmers practice at least one midsea-
son drawdown. Although most rice is grown on 
well-irrigated flatlands, much is still grown in hill 
environments, including two-thirds of Sichuan 
Province’s 3 Mha of rice. The hilly terrain limits 
yields, increasing GHG emissions per ton of rice. 
Although farmers have long practiced intermittent 
flooding to reduce water consumption—with the 
side benefit of reducing methane—farmers also tend 
to keep fields flooded in the winter to ensure that 
water is available in the spring, when droughts are 
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frequent. This maintenance of standing water in the 
winter increases emissions.
One new technique used in Sichuan relies on plastic 
covering as mulch. As shown in Figure 28-3, farmers 
construct a series of furrows and raised beds, cover 
the beds with long strips of thin plastic film 1.5 to 2 
meters wide, punch holes in the film, and transplant 
rice into the holes. Farmers maintain water in the 
furrow for approximately 1.5 months after trans-
planting seedlings but no water on the bed surface, 
and furrows themselves are drained for around 
two weeks in the middle of the season to inhibit 
late-emerging unproductive tillers, to remove toxic 
substances, and to improve root activity. 
Research has found that plastic film mulching 
reduces GHG emissions by maintaining higher 
oxygen content in the rice bed, thereby inhibiting 
methane-producing bacteria.231 Counting all sources 
of emissions, these studies suggest GHG emissions 
reductions of roughly 50 percent per hectare, and 
55–60 percent per ton of rice, and even more if 
farmers use nitrification inhibitors.232 Studies have 
also found yield and water benefits. In controlled 
comparison studies, plastic film mulching tends to 
improve yields by 5 to 20 percent, probably by rais-
ing temperatures.233 Scientists have reported water 
savings per hectare of 58–84 percent and increased 
water use efficiency of 70–106 percent when factor-
ing in the benefits of increased yields.234 Economic 
studies have also found economic benefits through 
decreased costs of fertilizer, pesticides, weeding, 
and yield gains.235
In lowland parts of Sichuan Province, the use of 
plastic does not boost rice yields because soils 
are warm enough that they do not benefit from 
the increased warming, but a similar cultivation 
method has been developed without the film. 
Called either “ridge-ditch cultivation” or “aerobic 
cultivation,”236 it too involves construction of raised 
beds and then maintenance of water in the fur-
rows but not on the bed surface. As with plastic 
film mulching, studies have found that ridge-ditch 
Figure 28-3  |  New rice-growing techniques in Sichuan Province use furrows, raised beds, and plastic covering as mulch
Image source: Jing Ma.
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cultivation significantly reduces methane emis-
sions from paddy fields.237 Studies also have found 
that this practice can enhance water use efficiency, 
improve topsoil temperature and soil aeration, 
reduce the amount of toxic substances, enhance 
soil microbial activities, and therefore promote soil 
nutrient transformation.238 By improving soil condi-
tions, ridge-ditch cultivation has also been mea-
sured to improve rice grain yields by 12.3 percent to 
45.8 percent in comparison with traditional cultiva-
tion systems.239
Despite the promising results, these practices occur 
in only a small fraction of suitable rice-growing 
areas in the province. One reason is that these 
practices require more intensive labor during rice 
transplanting. Purchasing the plastic film also adds 
to production costs. 
Model Results: Mitigation Potential 
We used GlobAgri-WRR to explore six rice mitiga-
tion scenarios plus a number of variants: 
 ▪ Mitigation scenario 1 includes rates of crop 
yield gains from 2010 to 2050 that are 20 
percent higher than projected by FAO, which 
reduces the area under cultivation and there-
fore methane emissions. Instead of projecting 
increases from a global average of 4.3 tons of 
rice per hectare in 2010 to 5.3 tons in 2050 in 
our baseline scenario, we project that yields will 
grow to reach 6.4 tons per hectare. This growth 
would reduce rice area by 27 Mha compared to 
the area in our baseline.
 ▪ Mitigation scenario 2 involves a 10 percent 
reduction in methane emissions from rice 
production “across the board” due to improved 
breeding.
 ▪ Mitigation scenario 3 involves adoption of 
water drawdowns. In our baseline, we estimate 
that 90 percent of irrigated rice farms in China, 
Korea, and Japan already employ a midsea-
son drawdown and 10 percent use continuous 
flooding, but we estimate that outside of these 
three countries, 90 percent of farms use con-
tinuous flooding. 
 □ In mitigation option 3a, we estimate that 
only 50 percent of farms outside of China, 
Korea, and Japan use continuous flood-
ing, 25 percent employ one midseason 
drawdown, and 25 percent employ multiple 
drawdowns. 
 □ In mitigation option 3b, we assume that 
90 percent of all irrigated farms outside 
of these three countries employ multiple 
drawdowns.
 ▪ Mitigation scenario 4 involves shifts in rice 
straw management so that rice straw is re-
moved or mulched in some manner outside of 
the growing season. In some areas with double 
or triple cropping, a new rice crop is planted 
within a few days of the last rice crop. In those 
situations, we assume farmers have no time to 
remove their rice straw. 
 □ In mitigation option 4a, we assume half of 
all farms that are not growing a new rice 
crop in such a short time switch to out-of-
season straw management. 
 □ In mitigation option 4b, 100 percent of all 
such farms employ out-of-season straw 
management.
 ▪ Mitigation scenario 5 combines options 3a and 
4a, simulating a combination of low water-level 
drawdowns and a low level of straw mitigation.
 ▪ Mitigation scenario 6 combines faster growth 
in yields to 6.4 tons per hectare per year, a 10 
percent across-the-board reduction in emis-
sions due to plant breeding, and our first-level 
improvements in water and straw management 
(options 1, 2, 3a, and 4a). 
Table 28-1 shows the results. Each of the mitigation 
options achieves substantial GHG emissions reduc-
tions relative to the baseline in 2050. Most options 
close the total GHG mitigation gap by between 1 
and 3 percent, but scenario 6—which also includes 
yield gains and thus avoids future land conversion 
and associated emissions—closes this gap even 
more. Scenario 6, which puts together different 
forms of mitigation at plausible levels, would cut 
rice-production emissions by nearly 40 percent, 
close the production emissions GHG mitigation gap 
by 10 percent, and close the total GHG mitigation 
gap by 7 percent.
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Table 28-1 | Global effects of scenarios of improved rice management on agricultural greenhouse gas emissions
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION METHANE 
EMISSIONS 
FROM RICE 
PRODUCTION 
(MT CO2E)
TOTAL 
PRODUCTION 
EMISSIONS 
(MT CO2E) 
PRODUCTION 
EMISSIONS GHG 
MITIGATION GAP 
(GT CO2E)
2010 1,120 6,769 —
No productivity gains after 2010 1,696 11,251 7.3(2.2)
2050 BASELINE 1,266 9,023 5.0
1: 20% yield gains
Global rice yields reach 6.4 tons/hectare 
instead of 5.3 tons/hectare in 2050  
(and 4.3 tons/hectare in 2010)
1,055 8,806 4.8(-0.2)
2: new low-methane rice 
breeds
10% across the board reduction in rice 
methane due to new breed varieties 1,139 8,896
4.9
(-0.1)
3a: 50% water management
In countries that do not already employ 
drawdowns, half switch to midseason 
drawdown(s) or AWD
1,111 8,869 4.9(-0.2)
3b: 90% water management
In countries that do not already employ 
drawdowns, 90% switch to midseason 
drawdowns or AWD
960 8,717 4.7(-0.3)
4a: 50% off-season straw 
management
Roughly half of all farms manage rice 
straw out of season in all seasons where 
that is possible
1,170 8,927 4.9(-0.1)
4b: 100% off-season straw 
management
All farms manage rice straw out of season 
in all seasons where that is possible 1,075 8,832
4.8
(-0.2)
5: 50% water management 
+ 50% off-season straw 
management (Coordinated 
Effort, Highly Ambitious)
Combination of scenarios 3a and 4a 1,032 8,789 4.8(-0.2)
6: Combined  
(Breakthrough Technologies) Combination of scenarios 1, 2, 3a, and 4a 774 8,526
4.5
(-0.5)
Notes: Numbers not summed correctly are due to rounding. Numbers shown in parentheses are changes relative to 2050 baseline.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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Recommended Strategies
From a purely technical perspective that ignores 
economic cost, available research suggests a high 
potential for mitigating GHG emissions from rice 
production. For example, although our case studies 
revealed a number of technical obstacles to employ-
ing midseason drawdowns on all farms, most 
farms could implement dry-seeding, many farms 
could implement water drawdowns today, and the 
obstacles facing other farms seem reasonable to 
overcome (such as the need for more level rice pad-
dies in India or for more field pipes for distributing 
irrigation water in Arkansas). Faster yield gains are 
technically feasible and could do much to mitigate 
emissions. The most speculative mitigation option 
involves breeding low-methane rice varieties. But 
lower-methane varieties already exist, and sci-
ence suggests real potential from more extensive 
breeding. 
The mitigation options all have significant potential 
to provide economic returns through higher yields 
and reduced water consumption, which provides 
benefits even if subsidies presently keep many 
farmers from realizing them, but these options also 
have unknown costs. The lack of detailed analyses 
of mitigation costs and benefits in specific rice-
producing areas makes our estimates somewhat 
speculative. Unfortunately, we are aware of no coor-
dinated national, let alone international, projects to 
mitigate emissions and to systematically improve 
our understanding of how to do so. 
Based on these assessments, we offer the following 
recommendations:
Development agencies and national govern-
ments should fund a coordinated series of 
rice emissions mitigation projects that focus 
on synergies with water savings and yield 
improvements. Among criteria, projects should 
be chosen because of their potential for synergies 
and to test synergistic mitigation options in a range 
of different rice-growing settings.
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Development agencies and national govern-
ments should similarly support coordinated 
technical support, research, and assessment 
of such projects through an international, 
collaborative technical team. Such an effort 
would help maximize impacts per dollar, assess 
results, and steadily improve technical understand-
ing of how to pursue rice mitigation over time. The 
team should incorporate experts with a range of 
expertise, including knowledge of rice emissions 
and plant breeding, hydrology, irrigation manage-
ment, and economics. The team should ensure that 
projects generate information not only on project 
design but also on yield, disease management, 
water conservation, and cost implications of various 
production options. 
Governments should reform water and 
energy subsidies that distort mitigation 
goals and structure incentives and rules 
to encourage mitigation. Farmers practicing 
improved water management techniques typically 
do so because they anticipate yield gains, reduced 
pumping costs, and—in the case of dry-seeding—
sometimes reduced labor costs. However, subsidies 
for water and energy distort these incentives. Sub-
sidies to small farmers can be provided in ways that 
do not encourage excess water use. At a minimum, 
in areas where rice farming is already threatened by 
insufficient water supplies, water allocation systems 
should reward farmers who use water more effi-
ciently by giving them priority access when water is 
short. 
Crop breeding institutions should prioritize 
breeding of low-methane crop varieties. As 
discussed in Chapter 12, breeding for environmen-
tal goals can complement the primary breeding goal 
of increasing yields—or at least maintaining yields 
in the face of climate change. This should involve 
immediate efforts to cross-breed low-methane 
varieties with those that produce the highest local 
yields. Governments and international aid agencies 
should support large-scale pilot efforts to explore 
new varieties that produce lower amounts of 
methane. 
International institutions should offer a 
prize for low-methane rice. The Green Climate 
Fund or another international funder should create 
a prize for a variety of rice that comes into wide-
spread usage and reduces methane emissions in 
real-world conditions by 50 percent or more.
 
For more detail about this menu item, see  
“Wetting and Drying: Opportunities and Challenges 
for Rice Management,” a working paper supporting 
this World Resources Report available at  
www.SustainableFoodFuture.org.
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MENU ITEM: INCREASE 
AGRICULTURAL ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY AND SHIFT 
TO NONFOSSIL ENERGY 
SOURCES
Agriculture uses energy to produce and transport inputs such as 
fertilizer and animal feeds, to heat and cool farm buildings, and 
to run on-farm vehicles and machinery. This menu item focuses 
on increasing energy efficiency in agriculture and shifting to low-
carbon energy sources to reduce emissions.
CHAPTER 29
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The Challenge
We estimate that total GHG emissions related to 
energy use in agriculture will be 1,642 Mt CO2e in 
2050 (Figure 29-1). Of these emissions, 1,062 Mt 
result from on-farm energy use, 408 Mt result from 
manufacturing and transporting nitrogen fertilizers, 
and 172 Mt result from manufacturing and trans-
porting all other inputs of nutrients and pesticides. 
(These total estimates of energy use emissions 
are somewhat higher than previous estimates in 
our Creating a Sustainable Food Future series240 
because they incorporate newer, higher estimates of 
on-farm energy use by FAO.)241 
Overall, these emissions are only about 9 percent 
higher than in 2010, but our estimate is based in 
part on difficult projections. As poorer countries 
develop, they are likely to adopt more mechaniza-
tion, and even developed countries may use more 
machinery than they do today. At the same time, 
there is likely to be some growth in efficiency of 
energy use, probably modest in tractors242 but 
higher in other applications. In our baseline sce-
nario, on-farm emissions stay the same because 
we assume that a 25 percent growth in energy use 
efficiency on farm cancels out a 25 percent growth 
in the level of energy use. The baseline also fac-
tors in a slightly smaller 23 percent increase in the 
energy efficiency of nitrogen production at fertilizer 
plants. This projection is based on a time lag that 
can be observed in the past: it takes 30 years for the 
average efficiency of all fertilizer plants to improve 
to the point where it matches the efficiency of the 
most efficient plants at the beginning of the 30-year 
period.243 Yet, even under these generally optimistic 
assumptions, emissions from agricultural energy 
use in 2050 would amount to 1.6 Gt, filling 40 
percent of our target budget for total agricultural 
production emissions (4 Gt CO2e). Efforts to reduce 
these emissions are necessary. 
The Opportunity
The opportunities to reduce emissions from energy 
use in agriculture mostly match the opportuni-
ties to reduce emissions from energy use in other 
economic sectors, which are the subject of many 
other studies.244 They center on energy efficiency 
measures and on shifts from fossil-based energy 
feedstocks to zero-emission feedstocks such as 
solar, wind, and—in some studies—nuclear power. 
Energy efficiency
One mitigation opportunity involves improvements 
in energy efficiency. Although we have found few 
studies of this potential in agriculture, one Indian 
study from 2013, for example, found potential to 
improve the energy efficiency of irrigation pumps 
by 40 percent.245 Another study of cassava drying 
found potential for doubling efficiency.246 More 
broadly, studies identify significant potential 
increases in energy efficiency in the aviation, mari-
time, and manufacturing sectors, and we doubt that 
agriculture is fundamentally different.247 Although 
little explored, potential for efficiency gains in 
agriculture is likely larger than we have assumed in 
our baseline.
Figure 29-1 |   Greenhouse gas emissions from 
agricultural production, 2010 and 2050
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Renewable energy sources 
Energy efficiency measures alone will not be 
sufficient to address climate change, and further 
mitigation will have to be achieved through shifts 
in energy supply. Electricity provides probably the 
easiest way to switch to low-carbon energy sources. 
Electricity accounts for approximately 40 percent 
of the roughly 1.2 Gt of baseline energy emissions 
in 2050 that result from on-farm energy use and 
manufacturing of inputs other than nitrogen fertil-
izers.248 Another 25 percent of emissions from on-
farm energy use and manufacturing involves direct 
on-farm use of coal for heat.249 To reduce these 
emissions, farms need to shift to solar heat supplies 
or to electricity powered by low-carbon sources, 
such as solar or wind. The challenges and opportu-
nities involved in energy shifts are likely to mirror 
those of shifting to low-carbon energy sources in 
other sectors. However, agriculture might enjoy an 
advantage in that farms generally have land avail-
able to generate their own solar or wind energy.
A greater challenge is the need to replace diesel 
fuel, which generates around one-third of agricul-
ture-related energy use emissions. Agriculture uses 
diesel fuel for tractors and other farm equipment, 
and for some heavy machinery used in mining 
phosphate and potash. Battery-powered equipment 
may be a partial solution, but some of these end 
uses require such concentrated power that they will 
be difficult to electrify. Some experts view them as 
primary targets for biofuels. Because the capacity to 
produce truly low-carbon biofuels is limited (Chap-
ter 7), we see less potential, although powering 
heavy equipment would be a good use of biofuels 
supplied by truly “additional” biomass. Another 
alternative might be the use of fuel cells powered 
by renewably generated hydrogen, or synthetic, 
carbon-based fuels made from renewable energy. 
However, the economical deployment of such fuels 
will require technological enhancement.250 
Nitrogen fertilizer manufacturing 
Dramatically reducing emissions from nitrogen 
fertilizer manufacturing presents a particular 
challenge. We estimate that the production process 
for fertilizer will emit 408 Mt CO2e in 2050, an 
increase from 359 Mt CO2e in 2010. Nitrogen fertil-
izer production generates high emissions because 
the Haber-Bosch process requires high tempera-
tures, high pressures, and therefore high energy 
levels to break the double nitrogen atom bond of 
nitrogen gas into nitrogen atoms that can be bound 
in various fertilizer compounds.
One opportunity involves making this process more 
efficient. Modern production facilities use 36 giga-
joules (GJ) of energy per ton of nitrogen fixed, but 
this is already roughly three times more efficient 
than the original Haber-Bosch method.251 Most 
of the improvement has been in the “upstream” 
supply of hydrogen and nitrogen to the synthesis 
process,252and further improvements seem plausi-
ble because different fertilizer manufacturing plants 
have different efficiencies. Plants with the lowest 
energy requirements are roughly 25 percent more 
efficient than the global average. 
China provides a special opportunity because it pro-
duces roughly one-quarter of the world’s fertilizer253 
but uses 15 percent more energy than the global 
average and 35 percent more than the most efficient 
plants.254 China also uses coal mined in ways that 
produce disproportionate emissions. One study 
estimated that China could reduce its emissions 
from nitrogen production by 30 percent just by 
moving to global average manufacturing standards 
for nitrogen.255 Our 2050 baseline already incorpo-
rates 23 percent reductions in the global average 
fertilizer manufacturing emissions rate, bringing 
energy use down from an average of 36.6 to 28.0 GJ 
per ton of nitrogen fertilizer, which is the standard 
for the most efficient plants today. The theoreti-
cal limit to the efficiency in modern production 
systems is 20 GJ per ton of nitrogen fertilizer, and 
we hypothesize that it might be possible to reduce 
energy use to 24 GJ in real conditions still using the 
Haber-Bosch method. 
In addition to efficiency measures, a wide variety 
of technologies will need to be deployed. The most 
straightforward opportunity involves a shift to 
producing fertilizer with electricity generated from 
solar or wind energy. The principal requirement 
would be to use solar or wind power to produce 
hydrogen, which is used in the production of 
ammonia. Hydrogen production in conventional 
ammonia plants accounts for approximately 85 
percent of the energy requirements for nitrogen 
fertilizer production.256 Given this heavy energy 
use to produce hydrogen, it might be practicable 
to retrofit existing ammonia production facilities 
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with “bolt-on” facilities for supplying hydrogen 
and ammonia.257 Long-established “electrolyzer” 
technologies exist to make hydrogen from electric-
ity, but their use to produce relatively cost-effective 
low-carbon hydrogen is impeded by the higher 
costs of low-carbon electricity, by inefficiencies in 
converting that electricity into hydrogen fuel, and 
by the costs of the electrolyzers themselves. Sub-
stantial research therefore focuses on improving 
efficiencies and reducing these costs, as well as on 
designing systems that can utilize cheap, intermit-
tent solar or wind power. None of the barriers seem 
insurmountable.258 In addition, research is ongoing 
into ways to use solar radiation directly to generate 
hydrogen without first generating electricity,259 and 
these approaches have the potential to be cheaper 
and more efficient. Two prototype solar fertilizer 
plants are being built in Australia.260
Mitigation Potential
As with crop yields and livestock systems, our base-
line factors in an increase in energy efficiency of 24 
percent per unit of agricultural output—sufficient to 
cancel out the effects of increased mechanization—
and this increase will already require significant 
effort. We therefore treat our baseline also as our 
Coordinated Effort scenario. 
Our Highly Ambitious scenario contemplates a 50 
percent reduction in emissions per unit of output, 
with the exception of nitrogen fertilizer production, 
where we project slightly lower efficiency gains 
of 45 percent, which represents the limits of the 
Haber-Bosch system.
Our Breakthrough Technologies scenario reduces 
emissions by 75 percent from the baseline level of 
efficiency and applies to emissions from all energy 
uses including production of nitrogen fertilizers. 
Such a significant reduction would require deploy-
ment of breakthrough technologies in both heavy 
machinery use and production of nitrogen from 
renewable sources of energy. 
Model results are shown in Table 29-1. Our Highly 
Ambitious and Breakthrough Technologies sce-
narios reduce the production emissions GHG 
mitigation gap by 8 to 18 percent and reduce energy 
emissions from nitrogen production and transpor-
tation by 14 to 67 percent. 
Recommended Strategies
For the most part, strategies for reducing energy 
emissions in agriculture are the same as those for 
reducing energy emissions more generally across 
all economic sectors. They involve measures that 
increase the price of fossil-based energy sources 
(e.g., carbon taxes, GHG cap-and-trade systems), 
measures that lower the price of zero-emissions 
sources (e.g., incentives to purchase equipment that 
generates or uses zero-emissions energy), and tech-
nical and financial support for research. Because 
these issues are large and the subject of a vast 
amount of academic literature, we do not discuss 
them further here. However, we offer three specific 
recommendations related to agriculture:
Integrate low-carbon energy sources into all 
government agricultural investment pro-
grams and projects. On-farm renewable energy 
programs already exist to encourage alternatives to 
fossil fuels. Opportunities include low-carbon tech-
nology systems for aquaculture,261 “passive solar” 
food storage,262 solar- and wind-powered irrigation 
pumps,263 and manure digesters.264 Efforts to reduce 
energy emissions from farms should be built into 
national government agriculture projects and inter-
national aid projects and should be a focus of dealings 
between larger food companies and their suppliers.
Invest in research into low-carbon fertil-
izer production and build pilot facilities. 
The world’s research agencies that are now fund-
ing energy innovations should invest heavily in 
research to develop production of nitrogen from 
renewable electricity. Much of that work could 
be linked to work now being done on developing 
hydrogen fuel produced by solar and wind power. 
Because these facilities will operate for two decades 
or more, moving the technologies forward quickly 
is necessary to avoid locking in highly polluting 
technologies for decades.
Apply carbon pricing or regulation to fertil-
izer. Governments should apply the same taxes or 
other regulations on emissions from manufactur-
ing facilities to fertilizer production. Europe has 
included fertilizer manufacturing in its emissions 
trading system. As in the case of aircraft manufac-
turers, in initial years fertilizer manufacturers may 
need to purchase offsets, but this approach would 
create incentives to engage in their own R&D and to 
shift toward low-carbon fertilizer production. 
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Table 29-1 | Global effects of scenarios of agricultural energy use reduction on agricultural greenhouse gas emissions
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION TOTAL 
EMISSIONS 
FROM ENERGY 
USE IN 
AGRICULTURE 
(MT CO2E)
PORTION 
OF ENERGY 
EMISSIONS 
FROM NITROGEN 
PRODUCTION AND 
TRANSPORTATION 
(MT CO2E)
TOTAL 
PRODUCTION 
EMISSIONS 
(MT CO2E) 
PRODUCTION 
EMISSIONS GHG 
MITIGATION GAP 
(GT CO2E)
2010 1,502 359 6,769 —
No productivity 
gains after 
2010
1,982 374a 11,251 7.3
(2.2)
2050 
BASELINE and 
Coordinated 
Effort
25% reduction in energy 
emissions per unit of 
agricultural output in 2050 
relative to 2010 but energy 
use for nitrogen fertilizer 
manufacturing reduced from 
36.6 to 28.0 GJ per ton. 
1,641 408 9,023 5.0
50% Energy 
Emissions 
Reduction 
(Highly 
Ambitious)
50% across the board 
emissions reductions per 
unit of agricultural output. 
For nitrogen, the reduction 
is 45%, which achieves the 
thermodynamic limit of the 
Haber-Bosch process.
1,280 349 8,661 4.7
(-0.4)
75% Energy 
Emissions 
Reduction 
(Breakthrough 
Technologies) 
75% reductions in energy 
emissions per unit of 
agricultural output across 
the board, including nitrogen 
production. 
762 134 8,143 4.1
(-0.9)
 
Notes: 
a. Emissions in the “no productivity gains” scenario are lower than our baseline scenario because lower livestock productivity leads to production of more manure, which partially 
substitutes for fertilizer.
Numbers not summed correctly are due to rounding. Numbers shown in parentheses are changes relative to 2050 baseline. Coordinated Effort scenario assumes no reduction in 
emissions from energy use relative to levels projected in the 2050 baseline. 
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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MENU ITEM: FOCUS ON 
REALISTIC OPTIONS TO 
SEQUESTER CARBON IN 
AGRICULTURAL SOILS
Some researchers are optimistic about the potential for 
large-scale sequestration of carbon in agricultural soils. 
Other researchers are more skeptical. This chapter analyzes 
both optimistic and more pessimistic claims and concludes 
that the realistic potential for sequestering carbon in 
agricultural soils is limited and that efforts should focus on 
sequestration as a cobenefit of boosting productivity, with a 
goal to stabilize soil carbon.
CHAPTER 30
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The Sequestration Debate
Many strategies for agricultural GHG mitigation 
have focused less on directly reducing agricultural 
emissions and more on offsetting them by seques-
tering more carbon in soils or trees on agricultural 
land.265 The 2007 integrated assessment of the 
IPCC, the so-called AR4, estimated that various 
forms of carbon sequestration on agricultural land 
provided 80–90 percent of the global technical 
and economic potential for agricultural emissions 
mitigation.266 The subsequent assessment, the AR5, 
in 2014 reproduced this figure.267 The analysis that 
went into this figure has remarkable staying power: 
a 2017 paper in Nature quantifying estimates of 
the mitigation potential for soils in agriculture is 
based on essentially the same modeling analysis 
that generated the AR4.268 Today, there is also a 
major international initiative with the stated goal 
of increasing global soil carbon by 4 percent per 
year, which would remove more than 4 Gt of carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere each year.269 
Some of these climate mitigation strategies focus 
on restoring agricultural land to forests or other 
natural vegetation. We explore these strategies 
in Chapter 20 and conclude that some important 
options exist to reforest both marginal and real-
istically unimprovable agricultural land, and that 
restoring drained peatlands should be a priority. 
Much larger-scale reforestation depends on—and 
must wait for—a high level of success in implement-
ing the strategies described in this report. 
The claim of large potential to store carbon in soils 
gained wide attention with publication of a paper in 
Science in 2004.270 As this paper argued, use of land 
for cropland has undoubtedly led to great carbon 
loss, which is probably on the order of 25 percent of 
the carbon within the top meter of soil.271 Loss rates, 
however, vary greatly and are probably due in part 
to management. At least some management prac-
tices can undoubtedly increase carbon in soils, such 
as adding manure, mulch, or more crop residues. 
There is also no doubt that many grasslands have 
lost carbon and could store more. 
Claims of achievable carbon sequestration rates 
per hectare vary,272 but, if all of the world’s agri-
cultural lands could sequester 0.5 tons of carbon 
per year, then the world could achieve something 
on the order of 2.5 Gt of carbon storage each year 
(roughly equal to 9 Gt of carbon dioxide, almost 20 
percent of annual anthropogenic emissions from all 
sources).273 Supporters of such soil carbon seques-
tration efforts also cite multiple cobenefits, such as 
aiding productivity and helping soils hold water and 
resist droughts, which would increase resilience to 
the rainfall variability likely to result from climate 
change. Many researchers have continued to make 
the case for large soil carbon sequestration poten-
tial using approaches that are, in effect, based on 
the physical potential of agricultural soils to store 
more carbon and the fact that a variety of practices 
can in theory increase soil carbon.274
In response to these claims, a number of other 
researchers have published articles expressing 
strong disagreement.275 Our analysis of these claims 
leads us generally to side with the doubters. We 
believe that the realistic potential for soil carbon 
sequestration is far more limited than has been 
claimed and that before soil carbon sequestration 
can be treated as an offset for other emissions, it 
needs to be used to stabilize current global soil 
carbon stocks. 
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The Challenge
There are only two ways to boost soil carbon. One is 
to add more carbon to soils, and the other is to lose 
less. Losing less primarily means trying to manage 
soils so that microorganisms are less effective at 
consuming carbon and respiring it back into the 
atmosphere. We agree with the observations of oth-
ers that carbon sequestration claims based on add-
ing more carbon have frequently double-counted 
carbon sources, and that there are serious scientific, 
technical, and economic doubts about the ability to 
manage soils to starve microorganisms.
Building soil carbon with manure, mulch, and crop 
residues 
Farmers can build soil carbon by cutting up parts of 
trees and shrubs and adding the mulch to soils, by 
adding manure, and by leaving more crop residues 
in the soil.276 Yet in each case, the primary effect is 
to divert carbon from some other storage location 
or use to storage in soil. Pruning and mulching trees 
only shifts carbon from above-ground to below-
ground storage—unless the trees were going to be 
pruned and burned. (As discussed in Chapter 7 on 
bioenergy, even though trees might eventually grow 
back, cutting down trees to use them for energy 
will increase carbon in the atmosphere for decades, 
and cutting wood to add to soils is likely to do so as 
well.)277 Cows produce a given quantity of manure, 
so using manure on one farm usually means using 
less in another place. Although some crop residues 
are burned, most that are not already left on the 
soils are used for animal feed or household energy, 
so their use as mulch has both economic and carbon 
costs because their replacement as fuel or feed also 
causes emissions.278 
Available carbon is finite, and any calculation of 
the sequestration benefits when carbon sources 
are used as a soil amendment in one location must 
count the costs of not using that carbon for another 
purpose or for soil amendment in another location. 
This calculation is typically ignored by the more 
optimistic carbon sequestration analyses. 
There are some sources of wasted or inefficiently 
used carbon, such as organic municipal waste now 
landfilled, that could be added to soils. In China 
much manure is discharged directly into streams,279 
so diverting this manure onto farm fields would 
avoid pollution and sequester additional carbon in 
soils. 
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Another potential source of soil carbon is crop resi-
dues that are currently burned. These arise in some 
cropping systems including sugarcane harvested by 
hand, rice straw in much of India, and many cereals 
in northeastern China.280 Crop residues are burned 
for a variety of reasons: to get rid of bulky wastes; 
to make it easier to harvest some crops, particu-
larly sugarcane; to control pests; and sometimes to 
improve the pH of soils. The need to burn residues 
can be reduced by mechanization and pesticide 
use. For example, in Brazil, the shift to mechanized 
harvesting of sugarcane has greatly reduced burn-
ing of sugarcane leaves and appears to contribute to 
higher soil carbon compared to burned systems.281 
The potential soil carbon gains from further 
residue incorporation are limited, however, if only 
because only around 10 percent of crop residues 
are burned.282 According to FAO estimates for 
2016, these residues globally amounted to only 
381 Mt of dry matter, which therefore probably 
contain 190 Mt of carbon. The amount of carbon in 
residues incorporated into soil probably depends 
heavily on availability of nitrogen, but may be 
around 10 percent in nitrogen-rich environments.283 
Therefore, elimination of all residue burning and 
incorporation of all residues into soils would result 
in soil absorption of only about 19 Mt of carbon, 
equivalent to roughly 70 Mt of carbon dioxide per 
year, or less than 1 percent of likely agricultural 
production emissions in 2050.
Even increasing these estimates severalfold would 
create soil carbon gains on cropland of only a small 
fraction of the more enthusiastic estimates. It 
would also require overcoming the many practical 
challenges faced by farmers who burn residues to 
control pests and reduce soil acidity, and who lack 
mechanized means to mulch residues. 
Crop residues are also commonly targeted as feed-
stocks for biofuels. We are sympathetic to the use of 
residues as a soil amendment primarily because of 
likely benefits for soil fertility, which include not just 
increased carbon content but other improved soil 
properties.284 Yet this use reduces the potential for 
biofuels even more than we analyze in Chapter 7. 
Overall, there is probably some potential to add 
otherwise underutilized organic material to soils, 
but the quantities are limited and there are real 
obstacles. 
Reducing carbon losses through changes in 
tillage practices 
In the normal course of farming, crop roots and 
residues left in the field help replenish carbon 
released into the atmosphere by soil microbes. 
Much hope has rested on “no-till” techniques that 
drill seeds into the ground without turning over 
the soil. Because the original plowing of grassland 
or of cut-over forests contributed to the loss of 
soil carbon, the plausible theory has been that 
reducing annual soil turnover should expose less 
of that soil carbon to decomposition by microbes. 
Many field studies initially appeared to support 
this view.285 But in 2007, a scientific debate broke 
out when some researchers pointed out that past 
studies focused only on shallow soil measurements, 
often the top 10–30 centimeters, and that studies 
measuring soils to a depth of a full meter showed 
no consistent pattern of change in soil carbon.286 In 
effect, analyses measuring carbon only at shallow 
depths ignored a variety of potential ways in which 
tillage could transfer more carbon deeper into the 
soil, so even if no-till practices increase carbon in 
the top layer of soil, that might be offset by reduced 
carbon at lower depths.287 Scientists defending 
no-till argued in return that the statistical vari-
ability in measuring soil carbon changes at depth 
blocked any solid conclusion that soil carbon gains 
had not occurred,288 but the proper inference is 
that we do not really know.289 A consensus appears 
to be emerging that results are highly variable. In 
some areas, no-till appears to have no effect on soil 
carbon, and in other areas it appears to have a small 
effect of perhaps 0.3–0.4 tons of carbon/hectare/
year (tC/ha/yr) (assuming continuous use).290 
No-till has probably been most widely adopted 
in Brazil where, in 2012, the practice reached 29 
Mha,291 roughly half of all cultivated land. High 
adoption rates in Brazil probably reflect the high 
risk of soil erosion due to intense storms and the 
discovery of some additional agronomic benefits; 
for example, reductions in soil acidity. Brazil also 
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widely cultivates glyphosate-resistant soybeans, 
so farmers can use glyphosate to control weeds 
without the need for tillage. No-till in Brazil tends 
to persist year after year. A number of studies have 
shown that the consistent practice of no-till—at 
least of recently cleared areas in the Cerrado—has 
maintained soil carbon levels comparable to those 
of soils under natural vegetation, while areas under 
conventional tillage have lost carbon.292 
Where no-till generates small carbon gains, it still 
faces many practical challenges. 
No-till agriculture is hard to maintain over 
time. Outside of Brazil, even where no-till is 
practiced, periodic plowing still commonly occurs 
to control weeds, deal with soil compaction or meet 
other agronomic needs.293 There are virtually no 
data about how many farms employ truly long-
term no-till, meaning no-till practiced for 10 or 20 
years, but the data show that continuous no-till 
even for 10 years is infrequent. For example, in one 
complicated analysis of Iowa using data from the 
1990s, the authors estimated that the probability of 
no-till persisting for even two consecutive years was 
only 8 percent, with the vast majority of farmers 
practicing no-till for a single year.294 A study by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture using more recent 
data estimated that only 13 percent of cropland in 
the Upper Mississippi River basin was in no-till for 
three consecutive years, the maximum period for 
which data could be assessed.295 Regular or even 
occasional plowing probably causes much or all of 
any soil carbon gains to be lost, although there is 
some uncertainty because the data are so limited.296 
Nitrous oxide emissions may increase. 
There is evidence that if practiced for only a few 
years, no-till may increase nitrous oxide emissions 
by temporarily saturating some portion of soils 
immediately after rainfall, leading to the low oxygen 
conditions that encourage nitrous oxide formation. 
This nitrous oxide can cancel out the benefits even 
of large carbon gains.297 However, there is also 
evidence that nitrous oxide emissions decline after 
10 years of continuous no-till on those limited areas 
that practice no-till that consistently. These con-
trasting results heighten the importance of whether 
no-till cultivation is practiced persistently.
No-till may reduce yields or increase costs. 
For many farms, no-till probably decreases yields 
although effects are variable. No-till appears to 
result in lower yields on average in wetter climates 
but to boost yields on average in some drier cli-
mates if combined with other practices.298 Again, 
a key point is that there is high variability, but the 
yield consequences of practicing no-till are obvi-
ously an obstacle to adoption in many areas. Projec-
tions of large potential global carbon gains do not 
address this issue. 
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 13 on soil and 
water conservation, there can be other challenges to 
adopting no-till, particularly in developing coun-
tries. They include the increased need for herbi-
cides, and sometimes additional labor. 
To put these numbers in perspective, if we assume 
that even one-third of the world’s croplands were 
cropped using no-till—a big assumption given 
adverse yield and other practicable challenges on 
much cropland—and if we further assume that no-
till is persistent on half of these croplands and that 
there are no offsetting nitrous oxide emissions—
more big assumptions— and that half of these lands 
sequester carbon at 0.4 tC/ha/yr while the others 
do not, then the total mitigation would be ~200 
MtCO2 per year globally. This level of mitigation 
would offset only around 2 percent of likely agricul-
tural production emissions in 2050, which would 
be a small contribution from such expansive efforts 
and given such optimistic assumptions.
Sequestering carbon on grazing land 
Early studies were optimistic about the potential 
to increase carbon on grazing land, often by reduc-
ing the number of grazing animals.299 Subsequent 
analyses have shown that the impact of improved 
rangeland management practices on soil carbon 
is highly complex, site-specific, and hard to pre-
dict.300 In some grasslands, reduced grazing leads 
to more soil carbon and in some places it leads to 
less. Stranger still, truly poor grazing practices that 
undermine grassland productivity may actually 
promote carbon sequestration in some savannas 
by favoring tree growth.301 Even in New Zealand, 
where grasslands are intensively managed and 
carefully studied, there is a high level of scientific 
uncertainty over the soil carbon effect of different 
management practices.302
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In some cases, the claimed gains from improved 
grassland management probably reflect the 
ongoing benefits of efforts to restore cropland to 
grazing land. For example, one paper with care-
ful grassland measurements in the southeastern 
United States, which has been cited for showing 
the potential gains of “improved management on 
grazing lands,” studied a site that had recently been 
converted from cropland to grassland.303 Newly 
established grasslands appear capable of building 
soil carbon quickly, and as Smith (2014) points 
out, may continue to gain carbon, although in 
declining amounts, for 100 years.304 However, like 
forests, they will eventually reach an equilibrium. 
Management appears capable of altering the rate 
at which they gain carbon, but the benefits that 
should be counted are only the increase in the rate, 
not the total gain, and this increased rate may not 
change the ultimate carbon stock the grassland will 
achieve. 
This long-term recovery of carbon stocks is just 
one of many issues to be considered when assess-
ing claims that improved grazing can result in 
“climate-neutral” beef, in which soil carbon gains 
would cancel out emissions from animals.305 Some 
studies of European grazing lands directly mea-
sured soil carbon, with some reporting these lands 
gaining carbon and others losing it.306 A recent 
large European research project used a form of air 
monitoring at 15 sites to measure carbon fluxes in 
and out of soil and vegetation and found net gains 
of 0.76 tC/ha/yr.307 That is a large figure, repre-
senting perhaps three-quarters of the common 
estimate of carbon sequestration by grasslands that 
have been newly reestablished on cropland. It was 
surprising because science has generally shown 
that long-established grasslands typically reach an 
equilibrium in which they stop gaining carbon.308 
Unfortunately, this argument does not prove that 
carbon gains were caused by the grazing operation 
and does not compare the consequences of graz-
ing to the counterfactual of not grazing. Part of the 
explanation may be that many of these grasslands 
are still recovering from previous plowing, so the 
gain would occur whether these lands were grazed 
or not.309 In subsequent papers, the European 
researchers and others explain the results using 
modeling; they attribute half of the carbon gain 
to reduced numbers of animals grazing—leaving 
more biomass to be returned to the soil—and half 
to climate change and the associated rise of carbon 
dioxide concentrations, which stimulated more 
plant growth.310 Yet if the carbon gains are the 
result of climate change, they would happen anyway 
and should not be attributed to grazing operations. 
In fact, assigning carbon gains to the grazing land 
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ignores the far greater levels of carbon the land 
would sequester if it were allowed to return to for-
est, which would be the fate of the vast majority of 
European grazing lands if they were not grazed.311 
In addition, moving toward less intensive grazing 
in Europe, even if it resulted in more carbon gains 
on European pasture lands, would probably lead 
to greater aggregate emissions globally if this shift 
resulted in reduced milk and meat production in 
Europe. Assuming the same level of global con-
sumption, these efforts would necessitate increased 
production of milk and meat in regions where farm-
ing is less efficient (i.e., lower output and higher 
emissions per hectare), and would therefore likely 
trigger pastureland expansion in those regions. 
We believe that a paper312 claiming potential for 
“carbon-neutral” beef in the United States using 
only grazing land suffers from similar limitations. 
The authors estimated that carbon-neutral beef 
would require twice as much land per cow as the 
standard alternative using some feedlots, but they 
did not count the GHG emissions that would occur 
as more forests and savannas globally are converted 
to pasture. Even in an ideal situation of globally 
reduced agricultural land area, more grazing land 
would reduce the potential to sequester carbon 
through reforestation.
For reasons we discuss below, we believe that car-
bon gains on grazing land are possible but that early 
estimates of high potential cannot be justified.
Need for additional soil nitrogen 
In 2011, Kirkby et al. pointed out that lack of nitro-
gen presents a major challenge to efforts to seques-
ter carbon.313 Soil organic matter is sequestered 
over the long term through microbial activity that 
requires 1 ton of nitrogen for roughly every 11 tons 
of carbon. By contrast, plant material on average 
has only 1 ton of nitrogen for every 100 tons of car-
bon. To sequester more carbon therefore requires 
more nitrogen, which Kirkby et al. (2011) calculated 
at around 80 kg of additional nitrogen for each ton 
of carbon. This additional nitrogen must be surplus 
to the amount used by plants. 
In a 2017 comment, a number of other academics 
argued that this need for nitrogen made carbon 
sequestration an unrealistic climate mitigation 
strategy in light of both the practical challenges and 
environmental concerns associated with the addi-
tional nitrogen.314 They calculated that achieving 
the goal of sequestering 1.2 Gt of carbon per year 
established by the 4 per 1000 Initiative315 would 
require a 75 percent increase in the global applica-
tion of nitrogen. 
A number of academics known as champions for 
soil carbon sequestration wrote a response that 
only partially disagreed.316 They did not challenge 
the need for vast amounts of nutrients to build soil 
carbon, and they agreed that trying to supply these 
nutrients through synthetic fertilizer would be too 
expensive and environmentally unwise. But they 
argued that regions with surplus nitrogen and other 
nutrients could supply the nutrients needed for soil 
carbon sequestration.
One major implication of this argument is that soil 
carbon sequestration at scale, sufficient to mitigate 
climate change, is enormously challenging at this 
time in sub-Saharan Africa. Much of the region is 
nutrient-deficient and is still far from being able to 
provide enough nitrogen even to grow crops. Build-
ing soil carbon would require nutrient additions 
that are high enough both to fully feed crops and 
to leave a surplus of nutrients to build soil carbon. 
This limitation does not undercut the importance 
of boosting soil carbon as part of the larger effort to 
improve yields and resilience in the region, but it 
does suggest that building soil carbon in this region 
to levels that would significantly affect carbon con-
centrations in the atmosphere is not feasible. 
It remains highly uncertain how much even areas 
with nutrient surpluses could build soil carbon 
at scale without additional nitrogen applications. 
Nitrogen is released by soils or applied as fertil-
izer at particular times and in particular molecular 
forms. Microbes that turn plant carbon into stable 
carbon in humus probably cannot always take 
immediate advantage of all of this available nitro-
gen before it is lost from the field. A compelling 
study found that, if nitrogen is not available when 
carbon is added, soil microbes would break down 
existing soil organic matter in order to access the 
nitrogen embedded with it that would allow the 
microbes to feed on the new carbon source. This 
process would lead to a loss of soil carbon overall.317 
To build soil carbon by adding crop residues or 
other carbon sources (i.e., without deliberately add-
ing more nitrogen), this study suggests that nitro-
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gen from earlier fertilization must be freely avail-
able in soils or that it must be present in reasonable 
quantities as part of the added carbon material (as 
it is in manure or the residues of legumes).  
The need for additional nutrients is a fundamen-
tal challenge to sequestering soil carbon and has 
received far less attention in the literature than it 
deserves. At the very least, it limits the capacity to 
sequester additional carbon in soils without the 
additional expense and the risk of further pollution 
(including GHG emissions) from additions of more 
nitrogen to the agricultural system. 
Carbon gains or reduced losses? 
Another important factor that is little discussed is 
the reasonable probability that the world is actually 
losing soil carbon today. The main goal (and likely 
effect) of efforts to sequester soil carbon may be to 
avoid further losses rather than to generate gains. 
One issue is that many of the studies claiming soil 
carbon benefits from different practices do not 
differentiate between actual soil carbon gains and 
reduced losses.318 There are many technical reasons, 
including the availability of nitrogen, why it might 
be easier to reduce losses than to build additional 
carbon. 
Current fluxes in agricultural soil carbon vary 
by region. For example, there are claims of rela-
tively modest soil carbon gains overall in China,319 
conflicting estimates of soil carbon in the United 
States,320 and estimates of soil carbon loss in 
Europe.321 In general, global nitrogen studies 
provide the main reason to believe that carbon 
stocks on cropland are decreasing globally. Because 
nitrogen is needed to store carbon in soils, a loss 
of nitrogen from croplands implies that soils are 
losing carbon. Today, global studies that attempt 
to account for all inputs and outputs of nitrogen 
estimate that soils are losing tens of millions of tons 
of nitrogen.322 In other words, even after account-
ing for all nitrogen that is applied to croplands, the 
amount of nitrogen that is removed by crops or lost 
to air or water indicates that, on balance, there is a 
net loss of nitrogen from soils. Although uncertain, 
if one estimate of nitrogen loss from croplands 
producing cereals is correct, then global soil carbon 
losses from these crops alone would account for 2.5 
Gt of CO2 emissions per year.323 
Ton for ton, reducing the global loss of carbon is 
just as important for mitigating climate change as 
increasing global sinks, but standard global climate 
assessments do not assume any ongoing soil carbon 
losses on existing cropland, aside from peatlands. 
Because of the uncertainty, our model does not 
assume such losses either.324 However, if these 
nitrogen budgeting studies are correct, then our 
projected emissions—and the projections of other 
modelers—are too optimistic. Additional manage-
ment practices will be needed just to maintain soil 
carbon levels and reduce emissions to bring them 
into line with current projections.
Complexity of the soil carbon issue 
Despite the complexity of the issues presented, our 
discussion still fails to communicate the full degree 
of uncertainty about nearly all features of soil 
carbon. 
Accuracy of soil carbon measurements. 
Whether analyses are based on accurate measure-
ments is itself a major issue. Today, it is commonly 
agreed that soil carbon measurements need to be 
taken at a depth of a full meter and adjusted to take 
account of the different density of soils at different 
depths to generate proper carbon content measure-
ments. But vast quantities of soil data have not been 
collected in accordance with these practices. As a 
result, some meta-analyses exclude much data and 
end up relying on limited sources and still need 
to adjust for some inadequacies.325 Many others 
simply rely on data measured to limited depth.326 
Another big issue, rarely explicitly addressed, is 
how to define soil carbon. Much plant residue 
remains, at least for some time, in small pieces that 
will decompose as microbes turn it into more stable 
material. If some of this material is measured as 
soil carbon, there can be the appearance of large 
gains. At least one study that carefully considered 
this issue had to exclude much global soil carbon 
data because they not been gathered in ways that 
excluded larger residue particles.327 
In addition, determining soil carbon changes over 
a few years is challenging because the amount of 
change is small by comparison with the total stock 
of carbon in the soil. Soils are heterogeneous and 
tillage practices can result in different surface 
configurations. Even when measurements are taken 
by scientists renowned for their care, different 
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measurement techniques can result in dramatically 
different estimates.328 
Accumulation and retention of soil carbon. 
The processes that affect accumulation and reten-
tion of carbon in soil are also enormously complex. 
In 2013, a large group of prominent soil scien-
tists published an article, “The Knowns, Known 
Unknowns and Unknowns of Sequestration of Soil 
Organic Carbon,” whose dominant lesson was the 
scope of the known unknowns.329 Although add-
ing carbon and nitrogen are inherently critical to 
building soil carbon, in some cases each is known 
to decrease soil carbon by “priming” microorgan-
isms to become more active and consume more of 
the previously stored carbon. As summarized in 
this study, it generally appears that soil carbon can 
more easily be sequestered in clay soils, but some 
studies show no correlation. Soil erosion could 
have a large effect on the global storage of carbon, 
but, because eroded soils may bury carbon else-
where, researchers disagree about whether erosion, 
on average, leads to more or less carbon storage 
globally. 
In addition to all the other challenges discussed 
above, these complexities suggest that carbon gains 
are likely to be site-specific. Most conclusions to 
date carry with them a significant level of uncer-
tainty, and carrying out a strategy to boost soil 
carbon will be hard to implement and harder still to 
verify. 
Summary of the Challenge
Since a prominent 2004 Science paper,330 research-
ers estimating soil carbon sequestration potential 
have continued to emphasize the simple fact that 
many of the world’s agricultural soils can techni-
cally store more carbon than they do today and that 
practices exist to enhance their carbon levels.331 
We believe that analysis is too simple because the 
ability of soils to store carbon is only one factor and 
generally not the principal limiting factor of seques-
tering more carbon in soils. (Banks have additional 
shelf space to store more money, and there are 
“practices” for making money, but that does not 
mean it is easy for the world to become richer.) The 
technical capacity of soils to store more carbon does 
not by itself resolve the technical, practical, and 
economic challenges of getting the carbon into the 
soil and keeping it there. 
At best, studies estimating large soil carbon gains 
focus on technical potential, which is itself complex, 
and do not deal with the practical and economic 
challenges. To summarize, these challenges include 
the differential yield effects; the need to count only 
additional carbon and biomass (or to count only net 
gains if diverting this biomass from another use); 
the need for more nitrogen; the multiple practical 
challenges facing farmers who try to change tillage, 
crop rotations, and manure- and residue-man-
agement practices; and the fact that even short-
term gains can quickly be lost through changes in 
management due to changing markets and farm 
conditions. 
The Opportunity
Despite the challenges and uncertainties, it is 
obvious that some types of farming tend to result in 
more soil carbon than others (even if only because 
they lead to smaller losses) and that increased soil 
organic carbon has important agronomic benefits 
in addition to mitigating climate change. In many 
systems, it will be worthwhile to continue to push 
no-till farming forward to help reduce soil erosion 
and improve water retention. Except in rice sys-
tems, where retaining rice straw increases methane, 
it makes sense to try to retain on the land those 
crop residues that are currently burned or removed. 
Doing so would necessitate replacing crop residues 
used as livestock feeds with more nutritious fod-
ders, which would benefit livestock production 
where farmers are able to generate those fodders 
(although that may require some additional land).
On the whole, however, we believe that the realis-
tic potential to sequester carbon is to be found in 
approaches such as those described below that can 
plausibly generate economic gains independently 
and that do not sacrifice carbon storage in another 
location. 
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Boost crop and pasture productivity 
Measures that increase cropland and pasture pro-
ductivity (Course 2) have the potential to help build 
soil carbon. Increasing yields will also increase crop 
residues and root growth, which can contribute 
to boosting or maintaining soil carbon. Efforts to 
boost crop yields are responsible for the soil carbon 
gains on cropland in China (at least in the top soil 
layers) as discussed above, and they have either 
modestly boosted or reduced the losses of soil 
organic carbon in the United States. 
The same is true for grazing land. In Brazil, for 
example, there is consistent evidence that soil car-
bon is higher under productively managed pasture 
than degraded pasture.332 China has made extensive 
efforts to restore the productivity of overgrazed 
land and, although the performance is variable, 
the evidence is strong that many grazing lands 
have simultaneously sequestered more carbon.333 
There is some evidence that introducing legumes 
into grasslands can increase soil carbon through 
root effects to levels beyond those achievable with 
improvements in fertilization.334 A new meta-
analysis found small gains from largely unspecified 
“improved grazing” practices on existing grazing 
land.335
A more recent global modeling study suggests 
that optimizing grazing globally has the technical 
potential to sequester the equivalent of up to 0.6 Gt 
of carbon dioxide per year336—around 40 percent 
of the IPCC’s 2007 estimate of carbon sequestra-
tion economic potential on grazing land.337 Because 
achieving this potential would require improve-
ments in grazing practices on billions of hectares of 
land, including the introduction of legumes (which 
presents problems because legumes are often selec-
tively grazed by animals), it should be used mainly 
as a theoretical estimate. Yet it does highlight that 
increasing productivity can increase soil carbon.  
Agroforestry
Agroforestry, discussed in more depth in Chapter 
13, may provide a means of boosting soil carbon 
by increasing carbon uptake. Unlike annual crops, 
trees can grow year-round and therefore take 
advantage even of the drier season. They can also 
often tap into groundwater that annual crops can-
not reach. Although farmers commonly clear trees 
to provide more light for their annual crops, trees 
can sometimes boost productivity. In tropical areas, 
shade from trees can be less of a problem than in 
temperate systems because sunlight is abundant, 
some crops need some shading, trees can increase 
humidity or add nutrients, and some trees lose their 
leaves during the growing seasons of some crops.
Trees, of course, also store carbon in vegetation. 
Although this chapter has focused on soil carbon 
because we deal elsewhere with reforesting agricul-
tural land, agroforestry can provide opportunities 
to build vegetative carbon without reducing food 
production. 
Despite potential benefits, we believe the practical 
potential of agroforestry at this time is too uncer-
tain to estimate. Agroforestry can refer broadly to 
any form of agriculture incorporating the cultiva-
tion and conservation of trees. It can include any 
form of tree-based crops, such as rubber or cocoa. 
Growth in the agroforestry sector is obviously lim-
ited by demand for the outputs and, although con-
verting annual crops to tree crops would sequester 
carbon, the annual crops would need to be replaced 
by cultivation elsewhere.
In some analyses, the term agroforestry is applied 
to any trees found on farms. Using this broad 
definition, one recent study estimated that growth 
of trees on farms globally sequestered an average 
of 0.75 Gt CO2e each year between 2000 and 2010, 
predominantly on parcels of land that are mixed 
combinations of forest and agriculture.338 Findings 
like this must be considered in the light of numer-
ous data and mapping challenges. We believe that 
this paper is probably counting as agroforestry what 
is primarily reforestation of abandoned agricultural 
land.339 
The potential true net carbon gains from agrofor-
estry are those that result from incorporating trees 
and shrubs into existing productive systems with-
out loss of yield, such as productive silvopastoral 
systems discussed in Chapter 11, and park systems 
in the Sahel in Chapter 13. Agricultural landscapes 
also often include land that is producing little or no 
food, such as some (but not all) field borders. Some 
studies focusing on such opportunities have esti-
mated meaningful opportunities for carbon gains.340 
As we discuss in Chapter 13, much of the true 
technical potential to expand agroforestry remains 
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unclear and unexplored but we believe it has more 
potential than realized today.
Possibility for new scientific breakthroughs 
Driving much of the interest in soil carbon is the 
basic fact that microbial decomposition of organic 
materials in soils and dead vegetation returns tens 
of gigatons of carbon to the atmosphere each year, 
while the amount of this carbon that is instead 
retained in soils varies greatly from one location 
to another. If changed land-management practices 
could retain even a small fraction of the carbon that 
microbes are now respiring, then the climate-mit-
igation impact could be significant. The conditions 
that influence the level of carbon retention turn out 
to be far more complex than thought only a decade 
ago. They depend significantly on soil structure and 
on a variety of biological and ecosystem condi-
tions.341 In forests, for example, research has shown 
that the presence or absence of one group of fungi 
has a major effect on levels of carbon storage.342 
New research could generate new mechanisms for 
increasing carbon storage. One research initia-
tive, for instance, aims to breed plants whose roots 
produce more suberin, an organic compound highly 
resistant to breakdown.343 The potential importance 
of soil carbon storage warrants research into the 
fundamental science of soil carbon storage and 
creative ways of increasing it.
Recommended Strategies
The challenges and uncertainties involved in boost-
ing soil carbon do not imply a complete lack of 
opportunities to improve soil management, but the 
uncertainties are too high to project how much. We 
also believe the best evidence indicates that agri-
cultural soils are losing carbon today—with total 
losses exceeding even the losses from peatlands, 
which are commonly counted as agricultural emis-
sions. However, losses form nonpeatland soils are 
too uncertain to be reflected in our 2050 baseline. 
Although new science may change this impres-
sion in the future, we believe that the reasonable 
goal in the short and medium term should be to 
maintain global soil carbon. We therefore believe 
that improvements are necessary, but we count 
them only as maintaining global soil carbon, and 
we assume that such improvements occur in our 
baseline and all our mitigation scenarios. 
The effort that societies can and will put into solv-
ing the food and climate challenge is not unlimited, 
and it should focus on the most promising options. 
In the case of carbon storage, we know that defor-
estation and other land-use changes are obvious 
targets. We could reduce gigatons of emissions by 
avoiding conversion of forests and other native 
landscapes and producing the food we need on 
existing agricultural land. Only 26 Mha of drained 
peatlands generate more than a gigaton of emis-
sions, and we know those emissions can be stopped 
by rewetting the land. Based on these and the other 
promising opportunities we identify in this report, 
we do not believe that carbon sequestration in soils 
should receive much effort for climate mitigation 
purposes alone.
Instead, we believe that such efforts should follow 
a no-regrets strategy that focuses on boosting soil 
carbon either as a cobenefit of other actions taken 
for different purposes or when boosting soil carbon 
is critical to meeting other objectives. Such efforts 
include improving cropland and grazing land 
productivity, and appropriate development of agro-
forestry. No-till potentially offers other benefits, 
including yield gains in dry climates, reduced soil 
erosion, and other beneficial soil properties when 
practiced over the long-term. Where it is practicable 
to achieve truly continuous no-till beyond 10 years, 
reductions in nitrous oxide and yield advantages 
also appear achievable. Alternative animal feeds to 
replace crop residues will benefit livestock produc-
tivity, and any emissions reductions or soil carbon 
gains would be additional.344 
In Chapter 13, we also highlight the urgent need to 
rebuild degraded soils in sub-Saharan Africa. This 
task does not represent an easy source of climate 
benefits—it is hard—but improving soils will be 
critical if Africa is to feed itself, reduce poverty, and 
reduce clearing of forests and savannas. Overall, 
we believe there are many potential opportunities 
for such synergies, and they should be the focus of 
efforts to sequester more carbon in soils. 
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THE NEED FOR FLEXIBLE 
REGULATIONS
Among the many menu items discussed in Course 5, some 
common themes stand out. They include the need for greater 
production efficiencies and for innovation in technology and 
management systems. Another theme is the need for government 
regulations that require improved performance while allowing 
flexibility in implementation.
CHAPTER 31
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Why Regulations? 
If there is no regulation—financial or otherwise—
the world treats agricultural production emissions 
as though they are without cost. Farmers and 
agricultural companies have economic incentives to 
increase productivity, which will often have a side 
effect of reducing emissions, and many measures to 
reduce emissions will have other economic benefits, 
such as health benefits from reduced air pollution. 
Yet measures needed to solve climate change will 
not always be profitable to farmers, particularly 
when they involve technologies that are not fully 
developed. 
Part of the need for regulation is to spur technologi-
cal advances. In critical areas, our analysis shows 
that promising potential innovations exist to reduce 
emissions, including ruminant feed additives, new 
techniques for manure management, and differ-
ent fertilizer compounds. Most of these options 
may—at least initially—involve additional costs, but 
they appear to be cost-effective relative to climate 
change mitigation strategies in other sectors. Many 
options would have large collateral benefits, such 
as reducing the water pollution, air pollution, and 
disease-bearing organisms associated with excess 
use of nutrients or poorly controlled livestock 
waste. Many might eventually more than pay for 
themselves as technologies evolve, including addi-
tives for enteric methane or nitrification inhibitors. 
Yet these technologies do not seem likely to evolve 
absent either strong incentives or some form of 
regulation designed to advance their development 
and deployment.
Regulatory requirements have advantages over 
purely incentive-based approaches because they 
encourage farms, like businesses generally, to find 
the cheapest ways of meeting new requirements. 
Voluntary incentives alone do not establish a level 
playing field, and first movers—those who act early 
to reduce environmental effects on their own—may 
suffer a competitive disadvantage when govern-
ments then subsidize efforts by those who chose to 
wait before acting. Regulations can also encourage 
the spread of cost-effective mitigation methods that 
farmers might otherwise ignore.
Subsidized regulations 
Regulations can be advantageous even if govern-
ments choose to absorb much or all of the cost. In 
most of the world, regulation of agriculture has 
been limited either because of the political power 
of the agricultural community or a concern about 
economic impacts on farmers. Who pays the costs 
of environmental controls, however, is a separate 
question from whether to use regulations to encour-
age those controls. If governments reimburse the 
average costs of compliance, for example, farms 
could even make money if they find cheaper meth-
ods to meet the regulation. Over time, the costs 
should then come down.
Flexible regulations 
Intelligent regulations can encourage innovation. 
In our discussion of new nitrogen fertilizer com-
pounds, we suggest phasing in requirements for 
fertilizer companies to increase the market share 
of new compounds that increase fertilizer use 
efficiency (and thus reduce nitrous oxide emissions 
and nitrogen runoff). Preferably, such regulations 
would reward compounds that are more effective 
than others. This kind of approach would both 
allow and encourage companies to develop better 
and less expensive fertilizer compounds, gather the 
information to identify which farmers could most 
benefit from them, and market the better com-
pounds to those farmers. 
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Shifting regulations to industry where feasible 
One reason our recommendation for nitrogen 
fertilizer improvement could be effective is that the 
responsibility for regulatory compliance would rest 
with large entities. Such entities can better assem-
ble the resources to push technologies forward and 
can spread the costs. Such entities can also select 
the most promising opportunities for improve-
ment, such as those farms most likely to benefit 
from enhanced efficiency fertilizers, increasing 
the benefits of flexibility. For similar reasons, we 
recommend that requirements to improve manure 
management be applied to large pork businesses 
that control much of the pork production in the 
United States. 
Creating future markets 
Technologies have yet to be developed to con-
trol some types of emissions. In other cases, the 
technology has not yet been sufficiently proven 
to be effective and economical, as in the case, for 
example, with methane-inhibiting compounds 
for ruminant stomachs and inhibitors to control 
nitrous oxide from urine that can be fed to cattle. In 
these situations, governments can create incentives 
for industry to develop these techniques by com-
mitting in advance to require their use if they prove 
cost-effective. Innovative companies would invest 
in these new technologies to capture market share 
or otherwise gain a comparative advantage over 
competitors. For example, governments could com-
mit to requiring use of a technology if and whenever 
its cost per ton of CO2e mitigation reaches $25 or 
less. (Such costs should be a net cost, accounting 
for yield gains and other economic benefits.) Such 
promises would assure companies that they will 
have markets if they develop mitigation techniques 
that work.
Overall, our review of options to mitigate GHG 
emissions from agricultural production suggests 
some promising ways forward. Given the enor-
mous challenge of reducing annual agricultural 
production emissions to 4 Gt by 2050 and the need 
for innovation, the key is to guarantee markets 
for those who develop or evolve better and more 
cost-effective mitigation techniques. We believe 
that flexible regulations—sometimes with com-
pensation—realistically need to be a part of such 
approaches. 
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126. Robertson and Vitousek (2009).
127. According to Robertson and Vitousek (2009), “Agronomic 
evidence that any nitrification inhibitor consistently increases 
NUE is lacking.”
128. Abalos et al. (2014, 2016).
129. Trenkel (2010), citing Gutser (2006), estimated nitrification 
inhibitors would cost 8 to 20 euros per hectare but reduce 
fertilizer application needs with a savings of 13 to 21 euros per 
hectare.
130. Abalos et al. (2014).
131. Qiao et al. (2015).
132. Qiao et al. (2015) reviews a number of studies and justly finds 
farmers seek to apply nitrogen in the spring.
133. McKinsey & Co. (2009), 188.
134. MarketsAndMarkets (2015) estimated global sales of controlled 
release fertilizers at $2.2 billion in 2014, out of worldwide nitro-
gen sales (for 2012) of $99 billion (MarketsAndMarkets 2017). 
135. For example, Trenkel (2010) gives a difference in materials 
costs for polymer coating of urea as five times the cost of urea 
alone. However, other compounds may be in the range of $15 
to $25 per hectare.
136. Qiao et al. (2015); Yang et al. (2016).
137. Marino (2017).
138. Subbarao et al. (2017, 2013).
139. Subbarao et al. (2017, 2013).
140. Bindraban et al. (2015); Dimkpa and Bindraban (2016).
141. The authors in Zhang et al. (2015b) established a goal of limit-
ing nitrogen losses to the environment from cropland to 50 Mt. 
Although GlobAgri-WRR uses the Zhang et al. (2015b) nitrogen 
model, it adjusts future food needs to meet a larger population, 
makes more precise calculations by crop type and location. It 
also uses lower estimates for nitrogen in manure applied to 
crops based on the underlying analysis presented in Herrero 
et al. (2013). Because of this, under the GlobAgri-WRR scenario 
that achieves the Zhang et al. (2015b) NUE target, global NUE 
actually rises to 71 percent in 2050.
142. Zhang et al. (2015b).
143. Turner et al. (2015).
144. Bento et al. (2015).
145. Padhee (2018).
146. Ellis (2014).
147. See papers discussed in Jayne and Rashid (2013) finding that 
African farmers tend to apply fertilizer at rational rates given 
prices. For China, see Zhou et al. (2010).
148. Zhang et al. (2015b). 
149. Fan et al. (2007); Morris et al. (2007). 
150. Fan et al. (2007).
151. Mueller et al. (2012); Zhang et al. (2015b). 
152. Yuxuan (2014).
153. Li et al. (2014). 
154. Personal communication, Jikun Huang, April 2017. These results 
are expressed in Huang et al. (2017). 
155. Huang et al. (2017).
156. Huang et al. (2017), Figure 5.5.
157. Huang et al. (2017), Table 5.1. 
158. Huang et al. (2017).
159. As one example of the differential subsidies, the prices of 
nitrogen rose by only 16 percent from 2000–2001 to 2013–14, 
while the price of phosphorus rose 250 percent from 2009–10 
to 2013–14 and the price of MOP rose 355 percent in the same 
period (Huang et al. 2017, 152).
160. Authors’ calculations from FAO (2019a). In 2011, countries with 
a total population of 3.75 billion reported rice consumption 
in excess of 500 calories per day—in each case substantially 
more than any other single food. The world population in 2011 
was 7 billion.
161. Roughly 500 Mt are the estimates both of the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), which can be 
found at FAO (2019a), and of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), at EPA (2012). The EPA estimate uses outdated 
estimates of the global warming potential of methane. 
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162. These estimates are generated by GlobAgri-WRR using esti-
mated nitrous oxide emission rates for rice by the IPCC.
163. GlobAgri-WRR estimates of rice emissions are based on 
a model of rice emissions down to the subnational level 
published by Yan et al. (2009) using IPCC Tier 2 methods for 
estimating rice. However, the originally published paper used 
estimates of midseason drawdowns from a report for the 
Asian Development Bank. We believe these estimates are 
accurate for China (Li et al. 2002), Japan, and Korea. Together, 
these three countries accounted in 2014 for 33 Mha, roughly 20 
percent of global rice paddy area (authors’ calculations based 
on FAO 2019a). However, the view among agricultural research-
ers is that few farmers perform midseason drainage in most 
other countries, which account for the remaining 80 percent of 
global rice paddy area. Adjusting the model in Yan et al. (2009) 
to reflect our rough estimate of 10 percent midseason drainage 
rates in other countries raises the estimate of global methane 
emissions to roughly 600 Mt of CO₂e. When we further adjust 
these figures for a global warming potential for methane of 34, 
as recommended by the most recent integrated assessment 
by the IPCC, rather than the 21 used by FAO and the EPA, emis-
sions rise to roughly 1.1 Gt. 
164. Emissions from rice in five major rice-producing countries 
of Southeast Asia as reported in the most recent national 
communication to the UNFCCC as of September, 2016.  The per-
centage of total emissions in Indonesia is low due to very high 
emissions from deforestation, whereas the high percentage 
of the total in Myanmar is due to generally low emissions from 
nonagricultural sectors.
Country Total GHG 
emissions 
from rice 
(Gt CO2e)
Percentage 
from total
Percentage 
from 
agriculture 
sector
Indonesia 34,861 2.5 46.2
Myanmar 5,511 28.4 43.5
Philippines 16,437 13.0 44.4
Thailand 29,940 10.6 57.5
Vietnam 37,101 24.8 57.5
165. As yields grow, so will the production of rice straw, and 
methane emissions can increase with the incorporation of 
rice straw into the soil. If rice straw is burned in the field, that 
will also emit nitrous oxide and methane. However, the actual 
amount of GHG emissions depends on how the rice straw is 
managed. If it is removed and used, there is no increase in 
methane. Because it is difficult to predict future management 
of rice straw, we do not factor in this possible effect of yield 
increases.
166. FAO (2019a). 
167. Fischer et al. (2016).
168. GlobAgri-WRR model, based on Alexandratos and Bruinsma 
(2012) with adjustments.
169. That estimate is based on an empirical correlation between 
rice yields and nighttime temperature obtained in Peng et 
al. (2004), a long-term field experiment in the Philippines. 
Zhang, Tang, et al. (2013) also showed a correlation, though the 
amount differs by breed. 
170. Nguyen (2005).
171. Ziska et al. (2009).
172. van Groenigen et al. (2013). 
173. Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012); FAO (2019a). Global rice 
yields in 2010 were 4.3 t/ha.
174. Authors’ calculations based on necessary rice yield growth to 
5.5 t/ha by 2050 to accommodate a 28 percent increase in rice 
consumption between 2010 and 2050 with no land expansion. 
Necessary annual yield growth would be 30 kg/ha/yr between 
2010 and 2050, or 62 percent of growth between 1962 and 
2006 (48.4 kg/ha/yr).
175. Fischer et al. (2014), Table 4.6.
176. Gogoi et al. (2008). 
177. Jiang et al. (2017).
178. Su et al. (2015).
179. Biochar is a high-quality charcoal that can be made from crop 
residues. It can help store carbon in soils and, in some soils, 
increase fertility.
180. Setyanto et al. (2000).
181. IPCC (2006). 
182. Gathala et al. (2011).
183. Gathala et al. (2011).
184. Wassmann et al. (2000). The early stages of directed seeding 
rice require a very shallow floodwater cover, so that initial 
emission rates under direct seeding are typically low. However, 
the plants take longer to grow in the field, increasing flood du-
ration. (Young rice plants grown in a nursery are also flooded 
but typically occupy only 15–20 percent of the rice area; see 
IRRI 2007.) 
185. Pittelkow et al. (2014).
186. Itoh et al. (2011).
187. Siopongco et al. (2013).
188. Joshi et al. (2013), Table 3.
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189. IPCC (2006).
190. Linquist et al. (2014). 
191. Joshi et al. (2013).
192. Sander et al. (2014); Tariq et al. (2017); Oo et al. (2018). 
193. Kritee et al. (2018). 
194. Yan and Akiyama (2008). 
195. Global Commission on the Economy and Climate (2014). 
196. According to Gassert et al. (2013), 29 percent of the world’s rice 
is grown in areas facing high to extremely high levels of water 
stress.
197. Li et al. (2014); Bouman et al. (2007).
198. Hafeez et al. (2008). 
199. Bouman and Tuong (2001).
200. Rejesus et al. (2011).
201. Lampayan (2013).
202. Kürschner et al. (2010).
203. Water Technology Centre (2009); World Bank (2006). 
204. Siopongco et al. (2013).
205. Committee for Formulation of Agriculture Policy for Punjab 
State (2013).
206. Rajkishore et al. (2013); Pathak et al. (2013); Rajkishore and 
Sunitha (2013); Bhatia et al. (2013).
207. World Bank (2006).
208. Central Water Commission (2010); Department of Agriculture, 
Punjab (2012).
209. Government of Tamil Nadu (2009).
210. Chauhan et al. (2012).
211. Mahajan et al. (2013).
212. Mahajan et al. (2013).
213. FAO (2019a). 
214. Pinoy Rice Knowledge Bank (2014).
215. Sander et al. (2014). Studies include the following:
Study
 
Location
 
Methane
Emissions under 
continuous 
flooding
Relative 
emissions under 
single drawdown
kg/ha/season
[kg/ha/day]
Percent
Corton 
et al. 
(2000) 
 
Maligaya, 
Nueva 
Ecija
89 [0.91] 57.1
75 [0.73] 63.0
348 [3.75] 92.5
272 [3.23] 55.1
Wass-
mann 
et al. 
(2000) 
Los 
Baños, 
Laguna
251 [2.51] 17.9
10 [0.10] 80.0
35 [0.35] 31.4
Bronson 
et al. 
(1997) 
Los 
Baños, 
Laguna
17.3 [0.20] 38.5
371 [4.36] 57.2
216. Dawe (2005); Hafeez et al. (2008). A study of one irrigation 
system in Central Luzon, showed that 10,000 farms (about 20 
percent of the area under rice) had a pump density of at least 
one pump per 10 ha.
217. Mariano et al. (2012).
218. Rejesus et al. (2011).
219. Rejesus et al. (2011).
220. Belder et al. (2004); Lampayan et al. (2009); Tabbal et al. 
(2002). 
221. Sibayan et al. (2010); Rejesus et al. (2011).
222. Rejesus et al. (2013). 
223. Authors’ calculations from FAO (2019a).
224. USDA (2014b).
225. Linquist et al. (2014).
226. This is based on work by Linquist et al. (2014).
227. Pittelkow et al. (2014).
228. Linquist et al. (2014).
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229. Linquist et al. (2014); California Rice Research Board (2014).
230. Authors’ calculations from FAO (2019a).
231. Zhang et al. (2013b, 2013c); Liu, Zhang, Ji, et al. (2013); Zhang 
and Li (2003).
232. Zhang et al. (2013c).
233. Fan et al. (2005); Li et al. (2007);  Liu et al. (2003);  Zeng (2012). 
234. Li et al. (2004);  Li et al. (2007). 
235. Adhya et al. (2014) include an estimate of plastic film costs of 
750 RMB, but savings in pesticides and fertilizer input of  
657 RMB, plus labor savings of 2,700 RMB. Zeng and Liu (2012) 
found similar savings.
236. Wei et al. (2000); Wang et al. (2002). 
237. Cai et al. (2000).
238. Wei et al. (2000); Wang et al. (2002, 2012). 
239. Wang (2008). 
240. See Adhya et al. (2014), which relied on earlier FAO estimates.
241. FAO (2019a). 
242. On the relatively pessimistic side, one study found only 
around a 6 percent increase in energy efficiency of tractors in 
the United States from 1979 to 2009 (Grillo et al. 2014), and a 
European Commission analysis shows little gain in the energy 
efficiency of freight transport from 1995 to 2010 (European 
Commission 2016, 128, Figure 31). On the optimistic side, the 
European Union is also projecting a 44 percent increase in 
the efficiency of heavy-duty vehicles between 2010 and 2050 
(European Commission 2016, 131). 
243. IFA (2009). 
244. See, e.g., IEA (2015a);  Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project 
(2015); and New Climate Economy (2016).
245. Saini (2013). 
246. CCAFS (2016).
247. IEA (2015a); IEA (2016a); UNIDO (2010).
248. FAO (2011f). FAO’s breakdown for direct energy use in agricul-
ture in 2010 is as follows. We use this information while adding 
information on energy use in aquaculture from WorldFish and 
Kasetsart University (Mungkung et al. 2014).
FAO Breakdown of Direct Farm Energy Use in Agriculture in 2010
Gas-diesel oil 357,532
Motor gasoline 18,172
Natural gas (including LNG) 22,924
Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 8,007
Fuel oil 5,723
Coal 97,982
Electricity 325,517
Total energy 835,857
249. See previous endnote.
250. IEA (2015a);  U.S. DoE (n.d.). 
251. Patil et al. (2016).
252. Patil et al. (2016).
253. FAO (2019a). 
254. Zhang et al. (2013c). 
255. Zhang et al. (2013c).
256. Michalsky et al. (2012).
257. Pfromm (2017).
258. U.S. Drive Partnership (2017); Pfromm (2017).
259. Chowdhury et al. (2018); Nakamura et al. (2015). 
260. Service (2018).
261. University of Toronto (n.d.).
262. Rolex Awards for Enterprise (2005).
263. Upadhyay (2014); Enciso and Mecke (2004).
264. EPA (2017).
265. Seeberg-Elverfeldt and Tapio-Biström (2010); Smith et al. 
(2007).
WRI.org        398
266. Smith et al. (2007). Carbon storage represents 89 percent of 
the total mitigation estimated economically feasible; a few 
percent, however, was focused not on new sequestration but 
on reducing the loss of carbon in wetland soils by restoring 
the wetlands. 
267. In Figure 11.13 of the most recent IPCC assessment, Smith et 
al. (2014) essentially reproduce the mitigation estimates from 
the 2007 assessment. In Figure 11.14, the chapter then adds 
bar charts showing more recent assessments—grouped into 
agriculture and forestry—and including mitigation through 
demand reductions. But this chart identifies mitigation poten-
tial only in broad categories, such as forestry or agriculture, 
and does not identify the types of agricultural mitigation. It 
therefore does not modify the impression from Figure 11.13.
268. Paustian et al. (2016) cited Smith et al. (2008), which was the 
peer-review paper that presented the modeling analysis that 
went into the 2007 IPCC report. 
269. Van Groenigen et al. (2017).
270. Lal (2004). 
271. Although there are great variations in soil carbon losses, this 
figure seems a reasonable estimate based on meta-analyses 
as summarized in the supplement of Searchinger et al. (2018a).
272. See examples provided in Chambers et al. (2016).
273. See Minasny et al. (2017) for articulation of this goal.
274. See Chambers et al. (2016); Minasny et al. (2017); de Moraes et 
al. (2017);  Lal et al. (2018), and many other papers summarized 
in Stockman et al. (2013). 
275. See, e.g., Powlson et al. (2016); Powlson et al. (2014); van Groe-
nigen et al. (2017). 
276. Poulton et al. (2018).
277. Transferring carbon from trees to soils by itself is inefficient. 
Most of the carbon will decompose and be released back into 
the atmosphere as carbon dioxide, and while the precise levels 
will vary, only on the order of 10–20 percent of the carbon is 
likely to remain in a more stable form in the soil (Liska et al. 
2014). The initial result is likely to be a substantial carbon debt. 
If the tree regrows, it will eventually pay off the carbon debt 
after many years, but if a middle-age tree were used, there is 
actually a further net loss of carbon sequestration for probably 
10 years or more because the newly planted tree would grow 
more slowly and therefore sequester less carbon per year than 
the original tree if left in place.
278. Powlson et al. (2011a); McCarthy et al. (2011).
279. Strokal et al. (2016).
280. Cassou (2018).
281. Pinheiro et al. (2010); Cerri et al. (2010).
282. IPCC (2006) (Chapter 4, Section 4A.2.1.1) estimates 10 percent of 
residues as burned as the best estimate for developing coun-
tries. The FAO also assumes that burning of crop residues is 10 
percent of crop residue; http://fenixservices.fao.org/faostat/
static/documents/GB/GB_e.pdf. 
283. Liska et al. (2014).
284. Powlson et al. (2011b).
285. See papers cited in Paustian et al. (2017) and Chambers et al. 
(2016).
286. Baker et al. (2007). This paper was quickly followed by another 
important paper, Blanco-Canqui and Lal (2008). 
287. Powlson et al. (2014) provides an excellent summary of the 
literature. Other good papers include Powlson et al. 2012) and 
Luo et al. (2010).
288. Kravchenko and Robertson (2011).
289. Kravchenko and Robertson (2011) argued that if we analyze 
each layer of the soil profile separately, we can find statistical-
ly meaningful estimates of soil carbon gain in the upper profile 
and no statistically meaningful signal below. If there were 
strong biochemical reasons to believe changes would only 
occur in the upper profile, this argument would be persuasive. 
But if you think there are biochemical reasons that changes 
would occur within the entire top meter, then the higher 
carbon content in the top layer is not meaningful by itself. 
290. Powlson et al. (2014). 
291. De Freitas and Landers (2014).
292. Selenobaldo et al. (2016);  Zotarelli et al. (2012); Boddey et al. 
(2010).
293. Powlson et al. (2014), summarizing studies.
294. Kurkalova and Tran (2017).  Another study with similar findings 
is Hill (2001).
295. Wade et al. (2015). 
296. Powlson et al. (2014) cite a variety of studies showing losses of 
the carbon gain. One study from 2007, however, found the data 
to be variable (Conant et al. 2007).
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297. Six et al. (2004) performed a meta-analysis and found that 
nitrous oxide increased enough to more than cancel out soil 
carbon gains unless no-till was practiced for more than six 
years—even using large estimates of soil carbon gains. Van 
Kessel et al. (2013) found the same to be true for no-till in drier 
climates for 10 years but found no increase in nitrous oxide in 
wetter climates and reductions after 10 years of continuous 
no-till. 
298. Pittelkow et al. (2015).
299. Conant et al. (2001).
300. McCarthy et al. (2011); Derner and Schuman (2007). For ex-
ample, Badini et al. (2007)—a study of grazing intensities in the 
western Sahel on drier, low-carbon lands—found no response 
in carbon content to grazing intensity. 
301. Asner and Archer (2010); Giller et al. (2009). 
302. Whitehead et al. (2018).
303. Franzluebbers and Stuedemann (2009) tracked 12 years of car-
bon sequestration on a pasture under different test manage-
ment in the southeastern United States. They found that light 
grazing had a higher rate of carbon sequestration than no 
grazing, which had a higher rate than heavy grazing. Their pa-
per was cited in Chambers et al. (2016) as a study that helped 
find the potential for carbon sequestration “for improved man-
agement on grazing lands.” Yet, as their paper states, the study 
covered the period 1994–2005, and the site had been restored 
to grassland from cropland only in 1991. This paper is therefore 
truly exploring how management affects rates of soil carbon 
sequestration during the restoration process; it is not proof of 
soil carbon sequestration potential of mature grassland. Smith 
(2014) warns of the same potential miscommunication in a 
paper of which Smith was himself a coauthor. That paper, by 
Senapati et al. (2014), concluded, “The results clearly indicate 
temperate sown grasslands to be a carbon sink under grazing 
management,” without communicating in this sentence that 
the carbon gains measured were of a site resown with grass 
seed only four years earlier.
304. Smith (2014).
305. Soussana et al. (2014); Schulze et al. (2009).
306. These “eddy covariance” studies are summarized in Soussana 
et al. (2014, 78).
307. Soussana et al. (2014).
308. IPCC (2014).
309. Smith (2014).
310. Chang et al. (2016).
311. To confirm this understanding, WRI underlaid maps of Euro-
pean grazing land with estimated natural vegetation using the 
LPJmL vegetation model and found that more than 80 percent 
of grazing land would naturally be left forest if undisturbed.
312. Stanley et al. (2018). 
313. Kirkby et al. (2011). 
314. Van Groenigen et al. (2017).
315. This initiative is the 4 per 1000 Initiative (https://www.4p1000.org/ 
—last accessed December 30, 2018), which aims to increase 
global soil carbon by 4 percent per year. 
316. Soussana et al. (2017).
317. Kirkby et al. (2016).
318. For example, in the meta-analysis finding small carbon gains 
from residue retention discussed above, Powlson et al. (2011b)), 
many of the benefits credited were from reduced losses (email 
from David Powlson to Tim Searchinger, July 26, 2018).
319. Zhao et al. (2018), based on national soil surveys in top 20 
centimeters, calculated a net gain of 140 kgC/ha/yr.
320. West et al. (2010) estimate small soil carbon gains while 
Liska estimates soil carbon losses in the Upper Midwest. The 
Liska analysis for Upper Midwest Soil Carbon is given in the 
presentation “Biofuels from Crop Residue: Soil Organic Carbon 
and Climate Impacts in the US and India” at Indo-US Workshop 
on Addressing the Nexus of Food, Energy, and Water, April 
19–21, 2017, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India, but it is 
based on the same modeling presented in Liska et al. (2014).
321. Smith and Falloon (2005).
322. Ladha et al. (2016)—a recent global nitrogen budget for cere-
als—estimated losses of nitrogen from soils globally from ce-
reals at 61 Mt per year. Liu et al. (2010) also found global losses 
of nitrogen of 11.5 Mt per year. The Ladha paper estimates 
higher losses in large part because it estimated higher rates 
of biological nitrogen uptake by plants and therefore higher 
global loadings of nitrogen.
323. According to Kirkby et al. (2014), global average ratios of 
carbon to nitrogen in humified soils is roughly 11:1. Multiplying 
61 Mt of nitrogen loss estimated by Ladha et al. (2016) by 11 to 
obtain carbon and then by 3.67 to convert carbon to carbon 
dioxide equals 2,462 million tons of carbon dioxide.
324. We use the word “essentially” because to the extent these 
carbon losses are occurring on recently converted cropland 
(e.g., last 20 years), their losses of carbon could be implicitly 
counted as emissions from land-use change, but this is a very 
small percentage of total global cropland.
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325. See, e.g., Powlson et al. (2016).
326. See, e.g., Zhao et al. (2018).
327. Kirkby et al. (2011).
328. Abraha et al. (2016).
329. Stockman et al. (2013).
330. Lal (2004).
331. For a more recent study, see Zomer et al. (2017).
332. Braz et al. (2013).
333. Kemp and Michalk (2011); Wang et al. (2011).
334. Poeplau et al. (2018).
335. Conant et. al. (2017) found carbon sequestration rates for 
improved, on-going grazing of 0.28 tC/ha/yr.
336. Gerber et al. (2013).
337. IPCC (2007).
338. Zomer et al. (2016).
339. One reason for some skepticism is that global cropland maps 
generated in different ways vary greatly and all are known to 
have many errors (Fritz et al. 2010). Zomer et al. (2016) used 
GLC, one of the global maps, which identifies cropland on 
around 2.2 billion hectares, which is roughly 600 million more 
than identified by FAO and nearly all other studies. This map 
therefore captures substantial land that is not truly in crop-
ping use but is part of the farming landscape. A breakdown 
in the paper also showed that the carbon gains occurred 
overwhelmingly on land estimated to have more than 50 tC/
ha, which means a high level of tree cover. Satellite maps are 
particularly prone to erroneously estimating cropland in such 
mixed environments. More specifically, by examining changes 
on the same land between 2000 and 2010, and focusing on 
such areas of high forest, the paper could quite possibly be 
identifying not growth of trees on cropland but reversion of 
agricultural land to forest, which occurs at high rates globally 
even as other lands are cleared. They may also just be captur-
ing a thickening of tree cover on nonagricultural land. 
340. Henry et al. (2009).
341. Schmidt et al. (2011).
342. Treseder and Holden (2013).
343. Salk Institute (n.d.).
344. For example, Bryan et al. (2011) found that many farmers 
would achieve net economic gains by leaving 50 percent to 75 
percent of their residues on soils to boost yields, even if that 
required them to buy napier grass to replace their crop residue 
as feed for their cows, assuming they also had access to fertil-
izer. Tui et al. (2015) found a chance for profitability in shifting 
crop residues to soils in Zimbabwe if farmers could produce 
mucuna, a forage legume, to replace the residues.
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The Complete Menu: 
Creating a Sustainable 
Food Future
The analysis of individual menu items in Courses 1–5 estimates how much 
each item could help the world close our three gaps to meet targets for 
increasing food production, minimizing expansion of agricultural land area, 
and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In this section, we use the 
GlobAgri-WRR model to examine several plausible (or at least possible) 
combinations of menu items for closing these gaps and achieving a 
sustainable food future.
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COMBINING MENU 
ITEMS: THREE 
INCREASING LEVELS OF 
GLOBAL AMBITION
In this chapter, we describe and, where possible, quantify the level 
of effort required in each menu item to realize each of our three 
combined scenarios: the Coordinated Effort, Highly Ambitious, and 
Breakthrough Technologies scenarios.
CHAPTER 32
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Modeling efforts often categorize each component 
action (what we call “menu items” in this report), 
into three levels of ambition: “low, medium, and 
high” or “conservative, moderate, and aggressive.” 
Each level is determined by expert judgment, 
degree of change relative to current or projected 
status, cost,1 or other criteria. Modelers then 
aggregate the “low ambition” components into a 
combined “conservative” scenario, the “medium 
ambition” components into a combined “moderate” 
scenario, and the “high ambition” components into 
a combined “aggressive” scenario.
The “Coordinated Effort,” “Highly 
Ambitious,” and “Breakthrough 
Technologies” Scenarios
We also aggregate our menu items into three levels 
of ambition, but we follow a different approach in 
combining them. We do not automatically aggre-
gate all the low-ambition menu item scenarios into 
one “low” scenario and so on. The lower, medium, 
and higher scenarios of each individual menu item 
require different kinds of changes in behavior, 
different scales of government effort, and different 
levels of technological innovation. The changes 
required, for example, to obtain different levels 
of land use or GHG savings by shifting diets dif-
fer from the changes required to achieve different 
levels of reduction in emissions from fertilizer. 
To establish three scenarios with changes in each 
menu item that are conceptually consistent, we 
therefore apply the following principles as scenarios 
advance in ambition:
 ▪ Coordinated Effort scenario. For each 
component menu item, this aggregate scenario 
involves levels of progress that we are confident 
the world could achieve with a strong, coordi-
nated, global commitment to action. Changes 
would come at limited economic cost (or even 
economic gains) and without the need for any 
fundamental breakthroughs in technology. 
Success would depend primarily on political 
will. The level of commitment required in the 
Coordinated Effort scenario would mean that 
the world’s governments would need to muster 
financial resources and, in many situations, 
overcome political and logistical obstacles. 
Coordination is necessary in part to share tech-
nological knowledge and scientific understand-
ing—such as reasonable progress in manure 
management—and also to implement globally 
consistent policies to ensure that progress in 
one country does not simply shift unsustain-
able practices to another. For example, effec-
tive forest and savanna protection in one set 
of countries could result in land- clearing for 
agriculture in other countries if the latter do 
not impose similar forest and savanna protec-
tion. Reductions in demand for meat in one 
country could lower meat prices and increase 
meat consumption in another if the latter does 
not have similar initiatives to reduce demand 
for meat. We do assume continued progress 
in and support for some technologies that are 
already developing, such as commercialization 
of some promising drugs or feed additives that 
lower enteric methane emissions and further 
improvements in plant-based meat substitutes, 
but we do not assume any fundamental techno-
logical breakthroughs. 
 ▪ Highly Ambitious scenario. This scenario 
includes the menu items from the Coordinated 
Effort scenario and extends them by choosing 
a level of achievement that is based on techni-
cal achievability but is less concerned with cost 
or practicability. In some situations, this level 
of achievement will require existing technol-
ogy to advance beyond current performance, 
but it will not require true technological break-
throughs. Some of these measures might be 
costly in economic terms and would require 
government support or regulatory action, but 
they should be technically feasible.  
 ▪ Breakthrough Technologies scenario. 
This scenario includes all menu items in the 
Coordinated Effort and Highly Ambitious 
scenarios plus additional levels of achievement 
that could be realized only with technological 
breakthroughs that improve both performance 
and cost effectiveness. We consider technologi-
cal breakthroughs only in fields where science 
has shown significant progress.  
To illustrate the thinking behind our categorization, 
consider the menu item regarding fertility rates. 
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Our Coordinated Effort scenario includes popula-
tion growth in sub-Saharan Africa that follows the 
“low fertility” projection of the United Nations. 
That projection assumes reductions in total fertility 
rates that are 0.5 children per woman lower in each 
country in each year than in the baseline “medium 
fertility” scenario. Achieving this reduction in 
fertility rates would require major new political and 
social efforts to improve access to education for 
girls, improve children’s health care, and provide 
access to family planning. Although ambitious 
politically, these measures involve social invest-
ments that would be valuable for many political, 
social, and moral reasons independent of food 
security and sustainability concerns. In that sense, 
such measures would pay for themselves regardless 
of their effects on food security and the environ-
ment. We conclude they would be achieved if the 
world directed appropriate attention and ambition 
to these efforts. 
For our Highly Ambitious scenario, we choose a 
reduction in fertility rates to replacement levels by 
2050 because we consider such efforts to be socially 
and technologically achievable with even higher 
investments in health and education and in light of 
the speed of change that has occurred in some other 
countries. However, our Breakthrough Technolo-
gies scenario includes no more ambitious target 
because we are aware of no breakthrough technolo-
gies that would further reduce fertility rates—and 
in any case, replacement level fertility would have 
already been achieved and no further reductions 
would be necessary.   
As another illustration, consider reducing methane 
emissions from ruminants. Our Coordinated Effort 
scenario assumes that a feed additive becomes 
commercially available at low cost that can reduce 
enteric methane by 30 percent from cattle, and 
that this additive is provided to most cattle that are 
fed from a central location at least every day. That 
level of application equates to roughly half of all 
dairy cattle and roughly one-quarter of beef cattle.2 
This effort would require modest improvements 
to a feed additive that is already invented and an 
ambitious—but entirely feasible—strategy to induce 
farmers worldwide to give that additive to their 
animals where practicable. Our Highly Ambitious 
scenario extends this 30 percent emissions reduc-
tion to two-thirds of all beef cattle that are at times 
fed concentrated feed or cut-and-carry grass, and to 
all dairy cattle and one-sixth of all sheep and goats. 
Such an achievement would require either some 
additional technological innovation for long-lasting, 
slow-release additives—which we do not consider 
rises to the level of a major breakthrough technol-
ogy—or some more active, and likely expensive, 
practice involving feeding grazing animals. In the 
Breakthrough Technologies scenario, we extend 
the 30 percent methane emissions reduction to all 
ruminants, including goats and sheep, which we 
consider impractical without greater technological 
innovation.   
Our food loss and waste and fertilizer manage-
ment menu items illustrate our judgment about 
breakthrough technologies. We regard a 50 percent 
reduction in global food loss and waste as appro-
priate only for our Breakthrough Technologies 
scenario because such a high level of reduction 
would probably require innovative, simple, and 
inexpensive technologies that enable foods to be 
stored for far longer without spoilage. Similarly, 
in our “reduce nitrogen emissions from fertilizer” 
menu item, the shift to producing ammonia fertil-
izer using solar energy sources occurs only in the 
Breakthrough Technologies scenario. We believe 
that technological breakthroughs are necessary 
before these levels of reductions become practical 
and economical, but we also believe that promising 
technological options exist that make this scenario 
feasible.
For most of the menu items in Courses 1–5, one 
could hypothesize innovations that achieve far 
greater closure of gaps than those we incorporate 
even in the Breakthrough Technologies scenario; 
for example, food additives for ruminants that 
eliminate nearly all methane emissions, crop yield 
gains that easily produce three times as much 
food on the same land, or plant-based steak that is 
indistinguishable from the best Argentinian filet. A 
few of these technologies might become realities, 
and we consider research to realize these innova-
tions important, but for now we consider them too 
speculative to meet our criteria. Including them in 
our scenarios could lead to unrealistic expectations 
or misplaced “bets” on necessary actions over the 
coming 5–10 years to get the world on a path to a 
sustainable food future. 
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As these examples illustrate, the level of ambition 
selected for each menu item in each of the three 
combined scenarios ultimately reflects our educated 
guess as to how hard it will be to achieve. Other 
researchers may reasonably disagree with our 
choices. The purpose of this exercise is to illustrate 
the kinds of combinations of menu items that could 
close the three gaps.
Table 32-1 shows the level of ambition we adopted 
for each menu item in each of the three combined 
scenarios. More detailed discussion of the rationale 
behind each level of ambition is provided in each of 
the relevant menu item chapters of this report.
Summary of the Baseline and Combined Scenarios
Table 32-1 |  Summary of the GlobAgri-WRR 2050 baseline projection and three combined scenarios
 
MENU ITEM 2050 
BASELINE
COORDINATED 
EFFORT
HIGHLY 
AMBITIOUS
BREAKTHROUGH 
TECHNOLOGIES
COMMENT
DEMAND-SIDE SOLUTIONS
Course 1. Reduce growth in food demand 
Reduce food 
loss and waste
Rate of food 
loss and waste 
(24% of calories 
globally) 
maintained in 
each country and 
food type
10% reduction in 
rate of food loss 
and waste
25% reduction 
in rate of food 
loss and waste 
50% reduction in 
rate of food loss and 
waste
The Coordinated Effort seems 
plausible because the United 
Kingdom reduced its food loss 
and waste by 14% between 
2007 and 2012. A 25% reduction 
seems possible as an outer limit, 
but a 50% reduction seems 
unlikely without breakthroughs in 
technology (e.g., improved storage 
systems or technology that 
prevents spoilage for longer).
Shift to 
healthier 
and more 
sustainable 
diets
88% increase 
in demand for 
ruminant meat 
between 2010 
and 2050 as 
incomes grow 
across the 
developing world
Ruminant meat 
demand increases 
only 69% above 
2010 levels, and 
calories shift to 
pulses and soy.  
This represents 
a 10% reduction 
in ruminant meat 
demand relative 
to baseline.
Ruminant 
meat demand 
increases only 
32% above 
2010 levels, 
and calories 
shift to pulses 
and soy.  This 
represents a 
30% reduction 
in ruminant 
meat demand 
relative to 
baseline.
Same as Highly 
Ambitious
We do not include reductions in 
total consumption of animal-based 
foods in the combination scenarios 
because our baseline scenario 
(based on FAO projections) 
is arguably conservative in 
projecting “business-as-usual” 
demand for these foods. But U.S. 
and European experience shows 
that large reductions in beef 
demand are possible. A global 
30% reduction in ruminant meat 
demand (relative to 2050 baseline) 
would require reductions of more 
than 20% in Europe, 40% in North 
America and Russia, and 60% in 
Brazil relative to 2010 levels, which 
we consider highly ambitious.  
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Table 32-1 |  Summary of the GlobAgri-WRR 2050 baseline projection and three combined scenarios (continued)
MENU ITEM 2050 
BASELINE
COORDINATED 
EFFORT
HIGHLY 
AMBITIOUS
BREAKTHROUGH 
TECHNOLOGIES
COMMENT
Avoid 
competition 
from bioenergy 
for food crops 
and land
Crop-based 
biofuels 
maintained 
at 2010 share 
of global 
transportation 
fuel (2.5%)
Both food and 
energy crop-
based biofuels 
phased out
Same as 
Coordinated 
Effort
Same as Coordinated 
Effort
Our analysis shows no 
environmental or food security 
benefits from these biofuels, 
so phasing them out is solely a 
political question rather than an 
economic or technical question.
Achieve 
replacement-
level fertility 
rates
UN medium 
fertility estimate; 
global population 
9.8 billion in 2050
UN low fertility 
estimate in sub-
Saharan Africa; 
global population 
9.5 billion in 2050
Sub-Saharan 
Africa fertility 
drops to 
replacement 
level by 
2050; global 
population 9.3 
billion in 2050
Same as Highly 
Ambitious
Although the UN “low fertility” 
estimate is plausible, each new UN 
population projection since 2012 
has revised sub-Saharan Africa’s 
population in 2050 upward since 
the region’s fertility rates have not 
dropped as rapidly as previously 
projected. Evidence from other 
countries of rapid drops in fertility 
rates nevertheless suggests that the 
Highly Ambitious scenario is possible.
SUPPLY-SIDE SOLUTIONS
Course 2. Increase food production on existing agricultural land 
Increase 
livestock 
and pasture 
productivity
62% growth 
in beef output 
per hectare of 
pastureland, 
53% growth in 
dairy output per 
hectare, and 
71% growth in 
sheep and goat 
meat output per 
hectare 
Same as baseline Productivity 
growth is 
25% faster, 
resulting in 
67% growth in 
beef output per 
hectare, 58% 
growth in dairy 
output per 
hectare, and 
76% growth in 
sheep and goat 
meat output 
per hectare
Same as Highly 
Ambitious
Because the baseline projection 
already includes faster efficiency 
gains than in the past 50 years, 
we maintain the baseline in the 
Coordinated Effort scenario. 
However, because pure technical 
potential is probably higher, 
we increase this level in Highly 
Ambitious scenario. Although 
improved breeding is critical 
to all progress, we foresee no 
breakthrough technologies. 
Plant existing 
cropland more 
frequently
5% increase 
in cropping 
intensity 
between 2010 
and 2050 (to 
89%)
10% increase in 
cropping intensity 
between 2010 and 
2050 (to 93%)
Same as 
Coordinated 
Effort
Same as Coordinated 
Effort
Extremely limited information 
on potential to increase double-
cropping or reduce fallow 
periods— particularly without 
irrigation expansion—bars any 
confident predictions. But modest 
FAO prediction in the baseline 
leads us to estimate some higher 
potential in Coordinated Effort 
scenario.
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MENU ITEM 2050 
BASELINE
COORDINATED 
EFFORT
HIGHLY 
AMBITIOUS
BREAKTHROUGH 
TECHNOLOGIES
COMMENT
Improve crop 
breeding to 
boost yields 
48% increase 
in crop yields 
above 2010 
levels (similar to 
average linear 
rates of yield 
growth from 1962 
to 2006) 
Same as baseline Crop yields 
rise to 56% 
above 2010 
levels (20% 
improvement 
over baseline 
growth rate) 
Crop yields rise 
to 69% above 
2010 levels (50% 
improvement over 
baseline growth 
rate)
Because baseline yields assume 
faster growth rates than recent 
decades, we believe they already 
require a large-scale, global 
coordinated effort. But technical 
potential to boost yields could 
allow a faster growth rate in the 
Highly Ambitious scenario, and 
new molecular biology methods 
suggest capacity for breakthrough 
technologies with adequate 
research effort.
Improve soil 
and water 
management
Adapt to 
climate change
Course 3. Protect and restore natural ecosystems and limit agricultural land-shifting
Link 
productivity 
gains with 
protection 
of natural 
ecosystems
Linkage prevents 
most shifting of 
locations of
agricultural land
encouraged by 
yield gains
Same as baseline Same as 
baseline
Same as baseline Viewed globally, helping farmers 
to boost yields (Course 2) while 
at the same time avoiding gross 
agricultural land expansion is 
a necessary and cost-effective 
strategy to stabilize the climate. 
Since yield gains are realized 
in Course 2, this linkage to 
ecosystem protection is a 
political rather than a technical or 
economic challenge and belongs 
in all scenarios.
Limit inevitable 
cropland 
expansion 
to lands 
with lower 
environmental 
opportunity 
costs
Inevitable land 
expansion
is limited such 
that carbon 
effects are 
offset by the 
next menu item 
(reforestation)
Same as baseline Same as 
baseline
Same as baseline Avoided conversion of forests 
and other natural ecosystems is 
embedded in the actions to reduce 
demand (Course 1) and increase 
crop and livestock production on 
existing agricultural land (Course 
2).
Reforest 
abandoned,
unproductive,
and liberated
agricultural 
lands
Reforestation 
of lands with 
little agricultural 
potential offsets 
carbon effects 
of inevitable 
shifting of 
locations of 
agricultural land
Same as baseline Same as 
baseline
80 Mha of liberated 
land fully reforested 
(to achieve 4 Gt 
CO2e/year target)
585 Mha of 
liberated land 
fully reforested to 
offset all remaining 
agricultural 
production 
emissions
Because of the ambitious nature 
of our strategies to liberate 
agricultural lands, we are reluctant 
to place too much emphasis 
on potential for large-scale 
reforestation. We therefore 
show two scopes of potential 
carbon sequestration gains 
from reestablishment of natural 
vegetation on liberated land in 
our Breakthrough Technologies 
scenario, which are shown as 
annual emissions offsets over a 
40-year period. 
Table 32-1 |  Summary of the GlobAgri-WRR 2050 baseline projection and three combined scenarios (continued)
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MENU ITEM 2050 
BASELINE
COORDINATED 
EFFORT
HIGHLY 
AMBITIOUS
BREAKTHROUGH 
TECHNOLOGIES
COMMENT
Conserve 
and restore 
peatlands
Annual peatland 
emissions stay 
constant at 1.1 Gt 
CO2e between 
2010 and 2050
50% reduction in 
annual peatland 
emissions
75% reduction 
in annual 
peatland 
emissions
Same as Highly 
Ambitious
Although politically challenging, 
high levels of peatland restoration 
are probably an economically 
rational mitigation option. 
Technical potential suggests the 
possibility of increased hectares 
in the Highly Ambitious scenario, 
but some drained peatlands are 
in such intensive agricultural use 
or disrupted by changes in water 
flows that restoration of these 
peatlands is unfeasible.
Course 4. Increase fish supply 
Improve wild 
fisheries 
management
10% decline in 
wild fish catch 
between 2010 
and 2050
Wild fish catch 
stabilized at 2010 
level by 2050
Same as 
Coordinated 
Effort
Same as Coordinated 
Effort
Strategies to curb overfishing are 
well documented, and literature 
suggests that optimal fisheries 
management could even lead to 
increases in annual wild fish catch 
above 2010 levels, but overfishing 
remains near historical highs. 
Coordinated effort would be 
necessary just to maintain 2010 
catch levels, and since optimal 
management in all major fishing 
countries seems overly optimistic, 
we decline to include scenarios of 
increases.
Improve 
productivity 
and 
environmental 
performance of 
aquaculture
10% increase 
in aquaculture 
production 
efficiencies 
between 2010 
and 2050 across 
the board
50% of extensive 
pond production 
switches to 
semi-intensive 
production, 
and 50% of 
semi-intensive 
switches to 
intensive 
Same as 
Coordinated 
Effort, plus 
20% increase 
in aquaculture 
production 
efficiencies 
between 2010 
and 2050 
across the 
board
Same as Highly 
Ambitious
Shifts to more intensive production 
are technically possible although 
costs and feasibility will vary by 
location. Aquaculture is a young 
industry and additional efficiency 
gains (relative to terrestrial 
animals) seem possible. 
Table 32-1 |  Summary of the GlobAgri-WRR 2050 baseline projection and three combined scenarios (continued)
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MENU ITEM 2050 
BASELINE
COORDINATED 
EFFORT
HIGHLY 
AMBITIOUS
BREAKTHROUGH 
TECHNOLOGIES
COMMENT
Course 5. Reduce GHG emissions from agricultural production 
Reduce enteric 
fermentation 
through new 
technologies
Enteric methane 
emissions of 3.4 
Gt CO2e in 2050 
(51% above 2010 
level)
30% emissions 
reduction from 
half of dairy 
cows, and one-
quarter of beef 
cattle—leading to 
a 9% reduction 
in methane 
emissions from 
ruminants (38% 
growth above 
2010 level)
30% emissions 
reduction 
from all dairy 
cows, half of 
beef cattle, 
and one-sixth 
of sheep—
leading to an 
18% methane 
emissions 
reduction from 
ruminants 
(24% growth 
above 2010 
level)
30% methane 
emissions reduction 
from all ruminants, 
including those 
permanently grazed 
(6% growth above 
2010 level)
Recent progress in feed additives 
suggests the potential for 30% 
reductions but only in cattle 
that can be easily fed additives 
daily, and possibly, many times. 
However, the technical potential 
exists to extend to all cattle 
through daily feeding. No credible 
science, however, suggests higher 
potential with additives free of 
other major environmental or 
health limitations.
Reduce 
emissions 
through 
improved 
manure 
management 
Manure 
management 
emissions of 770 
Mt CO2e in 2050 
(31% above 2010 
level)
40% reduction 
of methane 
emissions from 
wet manure (14% 
growth above 
2010 level)
80% reduction 
of methane 
emissions from 
wet manure 
plus 20% 
reduction of all 
other manure 
management 
emissions 
(17% reduction 
below 2010 
level)
Same as Highly 
Ambitious
Digesters can greatly reduce 
emissions from wet manure 
compared to baseline if carefully 
implemented, and solid separation 
can probably reduce nitrous 
oxide emissions generally, 
although efforts must reach vast 
numbers of farms.  Although other 
technologies may emerge, they are 
too speculative to include here.
Reduce 
emissions from  
manure left on 
pasture
Emissions from 
manure left on 
pasture of 653 
Mt CO2e in 2050 
(46% above 2010 
level)
Same as baseline 20% reduction 
of nitrogen left 
on pastures 
for nonarid 
systems (31% 
growth above 
2010 level)
40% reduction of 
nitrogen left on 
pastures for nonarid 
systems (15% 
growth above 2010 
level)
Most promising technologies 
involve nitrification inhibitors 
either spread on intensively grazed 
farms or consumed by animals. 
Because the technology is not 
so advanced, we include them 
only in the two more aggressive 
scenarios yet at modest levels of 
progress.  
Reduce 
emissions from 
fertilizers by 
increasing 
nitrogen use 
efficiency
Nitrogen use 
efficiency grows 
from 46% in 2010 
to 48% in 2050
57% nitrogen 
use efficiency 
due to a range 
of management 
measures
61% nitrogen 
use efficiency 
due to a 
range of 
management 
measures
67% nitrogen 
use efficiency 
due to a range 
of management 
measures plus new 
technologies
Coordinated Effort assumes better 
general management while Highly 
Ambitious and Breakthrough 
Technologies assume different 
levels of progress on changing 
nitrogen compounds (including 
inhibitors), and possibly in crop 
breeding to enhance efficiency.  
Table 32-1 |  Summary of the GlobAgri-WRR 2050 baseline projection and three combined scenarios (continued)
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Table 32-1 |  Summary of the GlobAgri-WRR 2050 baseline projection and three combined scenarios (continued)
MENU ITEM 2050 
BASELINE
COORDINATED 
EFFORT
HIGHLY 
AMBITIOUS
BREAKTHROUGH 
TECHNOLOGIES
COMMENT
Adopt 
emissions-
reducing rice 
management 
and breeds
Rice methane 
of 1.3 Gt CO2e in 
2050 (13% above 
2010 level)
10% reduction in 
rice methane (17% 
below 2010 level) 
thanks to new 
water
management 
practices and
new rice breeds
Same as 
Coordinated 
Effort
Same as Highly 
Ambitious, plus 
20% faster rate of 
rice yield gain (31% 
reduction of rice 
methane below 2010 
level)
 
Alternate wetting and drying 
(AWD) and straw management are 
proven technologies but require 
major efforts for implementation, 
probably including improvements 
in many irrigation systems. 
Science shows some rice varieties 
have lower methane emissions 
and new breeds have potentially 
lower emissions. High crop yields 
in some locations also suggest 
potential for higher yields if full 
breeding potential is utilized.
Increase 
agricultural 
energy 
efficiency and 
shift to non-
fossil energy 
sources
25% decrease in 
energy emissions 
per unit of 
agricultural 
output between 
2010 and 2050
Same as baseline 50% decrease 
in energy 
emissions 
per unit of 
agricultural 
output 
between 2010 
and 2050
75% decrease in 
energy emissions 
per unit of 
agricultural output 
between 2010 and 
2050
Because baseline incorporates 
increases in energy efficiency, 
we consider that it already 
requires coordinated effort. 
Highly Ambitious effort could 
further reduce emissions through 
incorporation of renewable 
energy. The Breakthrough 
Technologies scenario 
requires new technologies for 
nitrogen synthesis in fertilizer 
manufacturing.
Focus on 
realistic 
options to 
sequester 
carbon in 
agricultural 
soils
Soil carbon gains 
sufficient to 
assure no
net loss of soil 
carbon globally 
and contribute to 
yield gains
Same as baseline Same as 
baseline 
Same as baseline The most promising opportunity 
for soil carbon gains are those 
that would result from increased 
productivity, and thus are already 
built into our baseline and Course 
2. Because of the scientific 
uncertainty, we do not rely on 
additional soil carbon gains for 
offsetting ongoing agricultural 
production emissions.
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A TALE OF THREE  
GAPS, REVISITED
In this chapter, we quantify the contribution of each of the 
combined scenarios to reducing the food gap, the land gap, and 
the GHG mitigation gap.
CHAPTER 33
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Table 32-1 summarizes the components of each 
combined scenario. The “waterfall charts” in this 
chapter show the role played by the various menu 
items (and courses) in each combined scenario. 
Because the quantitative effects of menu items to 
some extent depend on or affect others, simply add-
ing the effects of each individual menu item would 
not correctly calculate the effect of any combina-
tion of menu items. We therefore employ a form of 
mathematical averaging to estimate the distinct role 
of each item in a combined menu.3
As discussed in Chapter 2, we define the food gap 
as the entire gap between crop calories produced in 
2010 and those required to feed everyone in 2050 
under the baseline scenario. This definition of the 
gap allows us to focus on demand-side measures that 
can reduce the size of the gap and thereby assist in 
closing the land and GHG mitigation gaps. Narrow-
ing the food gap also provides greater assurance that 
the world will produce enough food to feed everyone 
nutritiously and at a price they can afford.  
In the case of land use and GHG mitigation, the 
gaps represent the difference between our expected 
area of agricultural land and level of agriculture-
related emissions in 2050 under a “business-
as-usual” scenario (our 2050 baseline) and the 
targets for a sustainable food future; that is, net 
zero agricultural land expansion and agricultural 
emissions at or below 4 gigatons carbon dioxide 
equivalent (Gt CO2e) per year. See Chapter 2 in 
“Scope of the Challenge and Menu of Possible 
Solutions” for a full explanation of the food, land, 
and GHG mitigation gaps.
Understanding Our Baseline Scenario
It is important to repeat that our business-as-usual 
baseline scenario already assumes significant prog-
ress in agricultural productivity, based on projec-
tions by the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) and our own effort to 
project gains in livestock and pasture productivity. 
Agricultural productivity gains built in to the 2050 
baseline close more than 80 percent of the land gap 
and roughly two-thirds of the GHG mitigation gap 
that would occur if no productivity gains occurred 
after 2010 (Figure 33-1). All the combined scenarios 
therefore focus on additional productivity gains 
beyond our baseline, as well as other menu items 
that reduce demand for agricultural products or 
that further reduce GHG emissions.
Figure 33-1 |  Improvements in crop and livestock productivity already built in to the 2050 baseline close most of the land 
and GHG mitigation gaps that would otherwise exist without any productivity gains after 2010
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model. 
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Table 33-1 summarizes the results of the three 
combined scenarios in terms of their contribution 
to closing the food, land, and GHG mitigation gaps 
and their effects on absolute changes in agricultural 
land area and GHG emissions by 2050. For refer-
ence, the table also summarizes the results of our 
baseline scenario (business-as-usual with built-in 
productivity gains) and the “no productivity gains 
after 2010” scenario, in which we assume no change 
in crop yields or pasture and livestock productivity 
beyond 2010 levels.
A caveat on the contribution of individual  
menu items 
Within the combined scenarios, the contribution to 
closing gaps made by individual menu items does 
not illustrate the potential gains relative to effort 
(e.g., cost of menu item implementation) because 
the size of the contribution of each menu item 
inherently reflects the scale at which that menu 
item is defined. For example, we define our menu 
item “reduce food loss and waste” as a single global-
scale percentage reduction in all sources of loss or 
waste of all plant- and animal-based foods. That 
definition results in enormous land savings globally 
but requires changes by millions of farms, food pro-
cessors, and retailers, as well as by billions of con-
sumers all over the world. The contribution would 
appear much smaller if we had instead defined 100 
or 1,000 separate menu items for reducing food 
loss and waste differentiated by region, food type, 
and stage in the food supply chain. Such an analysis 
was not possible due to lack of reliable information 
about potential reductions at these more granular 
scales. 
By contrast, our menu item “achieve replacement-
level fertility rates” is defined at the regional level. 
We focus on the benefit of reducing fertility rates in 
sub-Saharan Africa alone, since all other regions are 
projected to have fertility rates at or below replace-
ment level by 2050. The population of sub-Saharan 
Africa will account for less than one-quarter of the 
world’s projected 2050 population, but we present 
Table 33-1 |  Global effects of combined 2050 scenarios on the three gaps
SCENARIO FOOD 
GAP, 
2010–
50 (%)
CHANGE IN AGRICULTURAL 
AREA, 2010–50 (MHA)
ANNUAL GHG EMISSIONS, 2050 (GT CO2E) GHG 
MITIGATION 
GAP  
(GT CO2E)Pasture-land
Cropland Total Agricultural 
production
Land-use 
changea
Peatlands Total
No productivity 
gains after 2010
62 2,199 1,066 3,265 11.3 25.8 1.1 38.2 34.2
2050 Baseline 56 401 192 593 9.0 4.9 1.1 15.1 11.1
Coordinated Effort 43 128 4 132 7.4 1.1 0.6 9.1 5.1
Highly Ambitious 35 -390 -180 -570 5.5 0.0b 0.3 5.8 1.8
Breakthrough 
Technologies
29 -446 -355 -801 4.4 0.0b 0.3 4.6 0.6
Notes: Numbers may not sum correctly due to rounding.
a. Does not include peatland emissions.
b.  Under the Highly Ambitious and Breakthrough Technologies combined scenarios, total agricultural area declines between 2010 and 2050. In order to keep estimates of 
associated emissions reductions conservative, here we do not credit any negative land-use change emissions as offsets against agricultural production emissions. We discuss 
the need to reforest “liberated” agricultural lands to offset agricultural production emissions in Chapter 20.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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in these tables the contribution of changes in sub-
Saharan Africa’s fertility rates to reducing the three 
gaps at the global level. The effects therefore appear 
comparatively small. Similarly, improvements 
in aquaculture appear to make modest contribu-
tions to closing the global gaps, but this is because 
farmed fish are likely to occupy “only” 40 million 
hectares (Mha) of ponds and make up roughly 1 
percent of all calories consumed in 2050. Because 
we do not believe that sufficient reliable informa-
tion exists to make quantitative economic estimates 
of future menu item costs, there is no obvious data-
backed way to evaluate savings relative to scope of 
effort. 
Effects of the Combined Scenarios on 
the Food Gap
All of our three combined scenarios make a 
meaningful contribution to closing the food gap 
because each one has significant effects on demand 
for agricultural products (Figures 33-2a–c). 
The demand-side menu items reduce the chal-
lenge of producing more food (as measured by 
crop calories) from the 56 percent increase needed 
between 2010 and 2050 in our baseline scenario to 
increases of 43 percent, 35 percent, and 29 percent, 
Figure 33-2a |  The combined scenarios reduce the size of the food gap by reducing growth in demand  
(Coordinated Effort scenario)
Note: Includes all crops intended for direct human consumption, animal feed, industrial uses, seeds, and biofuels.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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respectively. Viewed another way, the Breakthrough 
Technologies scenario reduces the size of the food 
gap by nearly half.
The biggest potential reductions in the food gap 
result from reductions in food loss and waste. 
Reductions in ruminant meat consumption do not 
significantly reduce the food gap (technically, a 
crop calorie gap) in this analysis because ruminants 
consume relatively few crops; however, this menu 
item is of far greater importance in closing the land 
and GHG mitigation gaps.  
In the Coordinated Effort scenario, the phasing out 
of crop-based biofuels makes a significant contribu-
tion to closing the food gap. However, this estimate 
is contingent on the assumption in our baseline 
scenario that there will be no further growth in the 
share of crop-based biofuels in the transportation 
fuel mix, despite current public policy goals that 
seek to greatly expand this share. The assumption is 
likely optimistic. Changing public policies to phase 
out crop-based bioenergy production and avoid 
future expansion of land-based bioenergy produc-
tion should be recognized as critical to closing the 
food gap.
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Figure 33-2b |  The combined scenarios reduce the size of the food gap by reducing growth in demand  
(Highly Ambitious scenario)
Note: Includes all crops intended for direct human consumption, animal feed, industrial uses, seeds, and biofuels.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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Figure 33-2c |  The combined scenarios reduce the size of the food gap by reducing growth in demand  
(Breakthrough Technologies scenario)
Note: Includes all crops intended for direct human consumption, animal feed, industrial uses, seeds, and biofuels.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
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Effects of the Combined Scenarios on 
the Land Gap
All three scenarios have large consequences for 
closing the land gap (Figures 33-3a–c). In the 
Coordinated Effort scenario, cropland area remains 
relatively constant between 2010 and 2050, but 
pasture area still expands by 128 Mha. The Highly 
Ambitious and Breakthrough Technologies sce-
narios completely close the 593 Mha land gap and 
potentially make hundreds of millions of hectares 
available for other uses or for reforestation, which 
we discuss further below.  
As discussed in Course 3 (Protect and Restore 
Natural Ecosystems and Limit Agricultural Land-
Shifting), slower demand growth and increased 
productivity do not guarantee the full potential 
benefits of avoided agricultural land expansion for 
protecting biodiversity and storing carbon. These 
changes, by themselves, do not prevent shifts in 
locations of agricultural land between and within 
regions and countries. Yield growth can even trig-
ger further agricultural land expansion as farm-
ing becomes more profitable in some regions. To 
achieve reductions in agricultural land area and 
the associated environmental benefits, additional 
policies are necessary to reduce shifts in locations 
of agricultural land, avoid conversion of the most 
valuable and carbon-rich lands, and actively restore 
lands that will be abandoned as a result of some 
inevitable shifts in location of agriculture.
Figure 33-3a |  Two of the three combined scenarios could more than close the land gap and liberate land for reforestation 
(Coordinated Effort scenario)
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model. 
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Figure 33-3b |  Two of the three combined scenarios could more than close the land gap and liberate land for reforestation 
(Highly Ambitious scenario) 
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model. 
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Figure 33-3c |  Two of the three combined scenarios could more than close the land gap and liberate land for reforestation 
(Breakthrough Technologies scenario)
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model. 
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Effects of the Combined Scenarios on 
the Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Gap
Under all three combined scenarios, the most 
difficult gap to close completely is the gap in GHG 
mitigation (Figures 33-4a–c), because it is difficult 
to reduce annual agricultural production emissions 
to the 4 Gt CO2e target while providing enough 
food for everyone in 2050. Measures taken in the 
Coordinated Effort scenario would still leave total 
emissions from agriculture and land-use change 
at 9.1 Gt of CO2e per year by 2050, more than 5 
Gt above our 4 Gt target. The Highly Ambitious 
scenario reduces emissions to 5.8 Gt per year. Only 
the Breakthrough Technologies scenario, result-
ing in annual emissions of 4.6 Gt, gets close to the 
target. The implication is that it is easier to hypoth-
esize scenarios that eliminate net land-use change 
than scenarios that eliminate production emissions. 
Reaching the 4 Gt goal would require major tech-
nological advances as well as full reforestation on at 
least 80 Mha of liberated agricultural land.
The Potential of Reforestation and 
Savanna Restoration to Further Reduce 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Two of our three combined scenarios result in a net 
reduction in agricultural land area between 2010 
and 2050—a total of 570 Mha in the Highly Ambi-
tious scenario and roughly 800 Mha in the Break-
through Technologies scenario. These reductions 
could be used to sequester carbon by reforesting 
land and restoring savannas by midcentury. The 
resulting carbon sequestration could count as nega-
tive emissions.
Although GlobAgri-WRR can estimate the potential 
GHG emissions reductions from reforestation and 
savanna restoration, we are concerned about fully 
crediting these potential gains for two reasons. 
First, we believe that some shifting in the location 
of agricultural land (between and within regions 
and countries) is inevitable, and that such shifts will 
result in net positive amounts of GHG emissions, 
so some active reforestation of net abandoned 
land will be necessary just to offset the emissions 
from this agricultural land-shifting. Second, some 
amount of the “liberated” agricultural land under 
these three scenarios will likely be needed to 
accommodate projected expansion of urban areas 
and forest plantations.
Because of these caveats, in Figure 33-4c (Break-
through Technologies scenario), we show first the 
potential for ecosystem restoration to achieve our 
4 Gt CO2e target, which would require restoring 
at least 80 Mha to natural vegetation and would 
generate an annual average of 0.6 Gt of negative 
emissions for 40 years.4
A variety of analyses have also suggested that 
to meet the more ambitious 1.5 degree warm-
ing target enshrined in the Paris Agreement, the 
world will need to use the land sector to achieve 
negative emissions.5 Typically, these scenarios do 
not require the elimination of nitrous oxide and 
methane emissions from agriculture, but they do 
require uses of land either for reforestation or some 
other mechanism for negative emissions—either 
to offset remaining emissions from other sectors 
(e.g., energy) or to reduce carbon dioxide levels 
after “overshooting” temperature targets. To reach 
a target of net-zero emissions in the land sec-
tor, restoration of natural vegetation on at least 
585 Mha would be necessary, which would be 73 
percent of the 801 Mha potentially liberated by our 
Breakthrough Technologies scenario.6 Thus we also 
show the potential to achieve net-zero emissions in 
Figure 33-4c (Breakthrough Technologies scenario) 
through restoring at least 585 Mha.
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Figure 33-4a |  Only the Breakthrough Technologies scenario comes close to closing the greenhouse gas mitigation gap; 
reforestation and peatland restoration would be necessary to meet the target of 4 gigatons per year 
(Coordinated Effort scenario)
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Figure 33-4b |  Only the Breakthrough Technologies scenario comes close to closing the greenhouse gas mitigation gap; 
reforestation and peatland restoration would be necessary to meet the target of 4 gigatons per year 
(Highly Ambitious scenario) 
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Note: Solid areas represent agricultural production emissions. Hatched areas represent emissions from land-use change.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model.
Figure 33-4c |  Only the Breakthrough Technologies scenario comes close to closing the greenhouse gas mitigation gap; 
reforestation and peatland restoration would be necessary to meet the target of 4 gigatons per year 
(Breakthrough Technologies scenario)
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INSIGHTS FROM THE 
MENU COMBINATIONS
We believe that plausible paths exist toward closing the food, 
land, and GHG mitigation gaps and reaching our targets for 
world food production, agricultural land use, and emissions. 
This chapter presents several insights that flow from our 
analysis of the three scenarios. Realizing the potential of these 
scenarios will require strong political and social commitments.
CHAPTER 34
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Truly closing the GHG mitigation and land gaps 
would require taking all reasonable actions globally 
that we know of today, which will entail changes on 
billions of hectares of land, implemented by tens of 
millions of farmers. Fortunately, even though we do 
not know enough to generate true economic esti-
mates, all of the actions contemplated can plausibly 
be expected to impose only modest costs or even 
lead to economic benefits, as discussed throughout 
Courses 1–5.
Achieving Even Our Coordinated Effort 
Scenario Requires Reversing a Wide 
Range of Current Trends
On the demand side, we rely on large reductions in 
ruminant meat consumption, relative to the 2050 
baseline. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, many 
modelers project even larger global increases in 
consumption of animal-based foods than we do in 
our baseline. To take another example, our 2050 
baseline assumes no increase in the share of biofu-
els in transportation—even though global policy is 
encouraging a fourfold increase. Current bioenergy 
strategies, if fully realized, could require harvesting 
levels of biomass equal to all the world’s presently 
harvested crops, crop residues, wood, and forages 
consumed by livestock. And although we rely on 
large reductions in food loss and waste to close 
the three gaps, most food loss and waste reduction 
efforts are still in their infancy. 
On the production side, the Coordinated Effort 
scenario requires faster rates of crop yield growth 
than historical rates (going back to the 1960s), but 
we have shown that recent yield trend lines (start-
ing from the 1980s) are slower than those in our 
baseline, and far from the additional yield gains 
required. Ruminant meat and milk yield gains for 
the Coordinated Effort scenario require massive 
increases in output per hectare of grazing land—far 
greater than the output gains projected by extend-
ing a linear trend line from the 1960s. 
Four Categories of Menu Items Are 
Particularly Important at the Global 
Level 
All menu items are needed to have any hope of 
achieving the 4 Gt per year emissions target. In 
focusing on the relative role of different actions, 
however, we emphasize four particularly important 
types of menu items:
 ▪ Boost agricultural productivity. With-
out the productivity gains already built into 
our baseline, agricultural land would expand 
by more than 3 billion hectares and emis-
sions would rise to 38 Gt CO2e/year, including 
emissions from land-use change. Productivity 
gains already in our baseline are responsible 
for closing two-thirds of the GHG mitigation 
gap and more than 80 percent of the land gap 
that would exist if there were no productivity 
gains at all between 2010 and 2050. Additional 
productivity gains play a relatively smaller role 
than built-in productivity gains in reducing the 
gaps defined by our baseline. But, when we add 
in the additional productivity gains required to 
meet our 4 Gt target, the role of productivity 
gains grows to 72 percent.7 
 ▪ Shift diets away from ruminant meat. 
Reducing ruminant meat consumption by 30 
percent globally, relative to the 2050 base-
line, reduces emissions by more than 5 Gt and 
reduces agricultural land demand by more than 
500 Mha. Assuming the yield gains in our base-
line, this change alone nearly eliminates net 
land-use change on a global basis. We believe 
this menu item is particularly promising be-
cause relatively few people eat large quantities 
of ruminant meat, there are highly attractive al-
ternatives to ruminant meat, and people in the 
United States and Europe have already reduced 
per capita beef consumption by one-third from 
peak levels in the 1970s.  
        431Creating a Sustainable Food Future
 ▪ Reduce food loss and waste. Globally 
reducing the rate of food loss and waste by 10, 
25, or 50 percent would contribute significantly 
to closing all three gaps. However, we caution 
that while there are abundant options, there is 
little precedent for achieving such large-scale 
reductions. In particular, as countries’ econo-
mies develop, waste near the consumption side 
of the food supply chain tends to grow even as 
food loss near the production side decreases. 
The overall share of food produced that is lost 
or wasted tends to stay at similar levels al-
though the sources of the loss and waste shift 
downstream.
 ▪ Restore peatlands and reforest liber-ated agricultural lands. These menu items 
are essential to reach GHG mitigation targets. 
Because peatland emissions of more than 1 Gt 
CO2e per year result from only 26 Mha, half of 
which has limited agricultural use, peatland 
restoration provides a highly promising mitiga-
tion opportunity. In addition, to achieve the 4 
Gt target for 40 years, reforestation of at least 
80 Mha of liberated agricultural land will be 
necessary, and additional reforestation will 
likely be necessary to compensate for emissions 
that result from shifting of locations of agri-
cultural land between and within regions and 
countries. 
Achieving Technological Innovations
Even our Coordinated Effort scenario requires 
measures such as further refinement of additives to 
reduce enteric methane emissions from livestock, 
new forms of manure management, and accelerated 
energy conservation steps. However, none of our 
scenarios require innovations for which scientists 
have not already shown a promising path.
Agricultural production emissions are the hard-
est to reduce, but technological innovations could 
make significant reductions possible. One reason 
why production emissions may appear harder to 
reduce than emissions from land-use change is 
that there is less of a track record of production 
emissions reductions. The measures in our more 
ambitious scenarios can actually reduce agricultural 
land area, and we have some confidence in these 
results because the world has a long track record 
of increasing crop and pasture yields. Past yield 
gains reflect vast and expensive commitments by 
farmers, governments, and agriculture-related 
industries. By contrast, conscious efforts to reduce 
production emissions—except as a by-product of 
yield gains—have been miniscule. There is no track 
record of mitigation of production emissions that 
we can build into our baseline or our mitigation sce-
narios. Yet the reality is that we do not know what 
the world could achieve. For example, even in our 
Breakthrough Techologies scenario, we assume no 
more than a 30 percent reduction in enteric meth-
ane emissions through use of feed additives, and 
only a 10 percent reduction in methane emissions 
achieved by new rice varieties. With strong research 
efforts, larger reductions might become possible.
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ENDNOTES
1. Some analyses regarding agriculture, land use, and climate 
change attempt to rank greenhouse gas mitigation potential 
into categories of low, medium, and high based on US$ per ton 
of emissions reduction and then develop combined scenarios 
based on cost. Economic estimates of agricultural mitiga-
tion potential tend to be low, in part because they focus on a 
small set of mitigation targets and in part because the ability 
to provide cost estimates for mitigation is highly limited.  The 
data on costs of agricultural production today are rough, the 
distribution of these costs across different farms in different 
regions is even rougher, the knowledge of mitigation costs is 
limited, and for most practices that are not common today or 
that depend on new technology, quantitative cost estimates 
can become quite speculative. Therefore, we do not use cost 
to distinguish our low, medium, and high scenarios.
2. In 2050, we estimate that 77 percent of beef cattle (including 
buffalo) will be raised in mixed or urban production systems. 
Unlike dairy cow herds, which require milking every day, many 
farm animals in mixed systems lack direct human manage-
ment every day. We estimate that roughly one-third of these 
bovines will have daily human feeding and could therefore 
be given a daily feed supplement. For milk production, we 
estimate that 86 percent of production will be in mixed or 
urban systems, and we perhaps conservatively estimate that 
50 percent of all dairy cattle will be fed such an additive.
3. Simply summing each individual menu item in combined 
scenarios does not correctly estimate the effect of implement-
ing all menu items together because the interactions among 
menu items reduce the effect of each menu item modeled 
separately. To scale the effect of each menu item, we used the 
following four-step process:  (1) add up individual menu items’ 
contributions as analyzed in Courses 1–5 to generate a “sum 
of the individual modeled results”; (2) use GlobAgri-WRR to 
estimate the reductions for each scenario; (3) estimate a ratio 
by dividing the result in step 2 by the result in step 3, which  
always produces a fraction less than 1; and (4) multiply the 
result in step 1 by the ratio in step 3. In effect, we downscale 
each individual menu item so that the sum of menu items 
equals the combined effect of implementing multiple menu 
items at the same time.  
 
Because the GlobAgri-WRR model does not model emissions 
from existing peatland loss, we treated peatland emissions 
separately. GlobAgri-WRR, however, does account for new 
peatland conversions, so the effect of menu items in reducing 
new peatland conversions is counted as the effect of those 
menu items. For example, if reductions in waste lead to less 
growth in palm oil production, GlobAgri-WRR will project fewer 
emissions from additional peatland conversions to produce 
palm oil. 
4. The GlobAgri-WRR model estimates that fully restoring 801 
Mha would sequester 6.3 Gt CO2e per year over 40 years. 
Therefore, to offset at least 0.6 Gt CO2e per year and achieve 
the 4 Gt target would require restoring at least roughly 10 
percent of that land, or 80 Mha. This calculation assumes that 
these carbon levels (approximating that of natural vegetation) 
could be achieved in 40 years. Many forests will continue 
growing and sequestering carbon over 40 years, but our 
estimates of carbon stocks for areas in natural vegetation do 
not assume restoration to pristine carbon stocks. Instead they 
are based on estimates of natural vegetation in turn based on 
measured carbon stocks of types of vegetation for these types 
and locations of ecosystems, and the great majority of the 
world’s forests are already highly disturbed (Erb et al. 2017). 
5. Rogelj et al. (2018), 60, Figure 2.26.
6. The GlobAgri-WRR model estimates that fully restoring 801 
Mha would sequester 6.3 Gt CO2e per year over 40 years. 
Therefore, to offset at least 4.6 Gt CO2e per year and achieve a 
target of 0 Gt would require restoring at least roughly 73 per-
cent of that land, or 585 Mha. See note 4 above for additional 
details on assumptions of carbon stocks in natural vegetation.
7. GlobAgri-WRR model.
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Cross-Cutting Policies for a 
Sustainable Food Future
The menu items for a sustainable food future described earlier in this 
report focus heavily on technical opportunities and solutions to help drive 
implementation. But menu items cannot be implemented in isolation, 
and they are all subject to (or need) a variety of cross-cutting public and 
private policies. Chapters 35–37 discuss policies relating to farm structure, 
productivity, and poverty reduction; agricultural emissions mitigation and 
climate funding; and agricultural research and development.
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FARM STRUCTURES, LARGE 
LAND ACQUISITIONS, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
AND CONTRACTUAL 
ARRANGEMENTS
Is there a conflict between the goals of increasing global food 
production and providing livelihood opportunities for the world’s 
hundreds of millions of poor farmers and workers? Do large land 
acquisitions help or hinder these goals? Can the world sufficiently 
boost yields on smallholder farms or should large farms replace small 
farms? And if the world continues to support small farmers, what farm 
structures and property rights rules should policymakers support? 
CHAPTER 35
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One of the challenges to answering these ques-
tions is the lack of a sound, quantitative definition 
for “small farms.” Farm sizes and productivity per 
hectare (ha) vary greatly from one part of the world 
to another. Building on a 2008 landmark World 
Bank report,1 this chapter addresses these often-
contentious questions.
Large versus Small Farms 
Public justification for consolidation of smallholder 
farmland is rooted in a perception among many 
analysts that large farms are more successful than 
small farms.2 For example, although small farmers 
remain more numerous in Brazil, medium-sized 
and large farms dominate agricultural production, 
and their numbers and share of production and 
production value in the country have increased in 
recent years.3 Brazil’s large farms can be regarded 
as a model to replicate elsewhere. Small farms face 
many obstacles to improving their productivity:4 
 ▪ Financial institutions face higher transaction 
costs when dealing with many small farms 
rather than one large farm, making access to 
capital more expensive for small farmers.
 ▪ Poverty traps arise when subsistence farmers 
must sell critical assets to survive periods of 
hardship, which undermines their future pro-
duction or productivity gains.
 ▪ Smallholders face challenges in meeting qual-
ity, sanitary, and/or environmental standards 
or other demands made by large purchasers 
such as supermarket chains. 
In 1998, the economist Paul Collier attracted great 
attention when he argued that small farmers in 
Africa were unsuited to cope with “investment, 
marketing chains, and regulation [of food quality],” 
and called for the gradual replacement of “peasant 
farms” with larger commercial farms.5 In addition 
to pointing to the agricultural achievements of 
countries like Brazil, Collier pointed out that subsis-
tence peasant farming is arduous and that farmers 
readily abandon subsistence farms when alternative 
job opportunities present themselves. To African 
governments faced with a history of poor agricul-
tural production and limited resources, contracting 
with large-scale investors who will come in and 
upgrade agriculture therefore seems attractive.
In some countries, analysis supports the pure 
production advantages of larger farms. Yields of 
Brazilian maize and Chilean wheat, for example, 
have been significantly higher on large farms.6 In 
Indonesia and Malaysia, large oil palm plantations 
have far higher yields than oil palms grown on most 
smallholder farms.7 
However, Collier’s argument touched off several 
counterarguments by agricultural economists: 
 ▪ In China and India, comparatively small farm-
ers have led agricultural improvements. Ac-
cording to data from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), in 
India, farms smaller than 5 ha account for 70 
percent of all farm area, and farms smaller 
than 10 ha account for 87 percent.8 One 2011 
study estimated the average farm size in China 
at 0.6 ha, and in India at 1.2 ha.9 Yet, in both 
countries, small farms achieve yields at least as 
high as those of large farms.10 In both coun-
tries, fertilizer use is high.11 Based on Indian 
agricultural census data, the 2011 study found 
that small farmers actually used twice as much 
fertilizer as large farms per hectare, as well as 
more irrigation and high-yielding seeds. These 
findings reflect an intense effort on the part of 
small farmers to produce high yields, although 
there are environmental implications. Strong 
efforts by governments to support small farm-
ers through credit programs, extension, and 
input subsidies played a major role in these 
developments.12
 ▪ In Africa, several studies have found that farms 
become less productive per hectare as they get 
bigger.13 The typical explanation is that small 
farmers put in greater effort per unit of land. 
Because of the consistency of this finding, the 
main academic debate around this phenom-
enon has focused on whether it is explained by 
poor data, by failure to include very large farms 
in the analysis, or by some uncontrolled factor, 
such as soil quality. But a recent review of stud-
ies on this issue confirms that larger farm size 
generally does lead to lower yields per hectare.14 
 ▪ Improvements on small farms contribute more 
to poverty reduction than improvements on 
larger farms—at least absent concerted govern-
ment efforts to transfer income from overall 
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economic improvement. As one analysis notes, 
“Smallholdings are typically operated by poor 
people who use a great deal of labor, both from 
their own households and from their equally 
poor or poorer neighbors. Moreover, when 
small-farm households spend their incomes, 
they tend to spend them on locally produced 
goods and services, thereby stimulating the 
rural nonfarm economy and creating additional 
jobs.”15 
Yet the evidence in support of smaller farms in 
Africa has tended to exclude the largest farms. 
Studies showing higher productivity on small farms 
have typically focused on farms up to 10 ha.16 There 
is some evidence of a “U-shaped curve” with pro-
ductivities rising again on the largest farms.17 
In addition, even if small farms are often more pro-
ductive per hectare, studies around the world tend 
to find that larger farms are often more productive 
per day of work.18 As a result, larger farms tend to 
have equal or lower costs of production per ton of 
crop.19 
Good data are necessary to determine public policy 
but analyzing data on agricultural productivity is 
complicated. Some of the data on which research-
ers must rely are more than a decade old because 
national studies are expensive. The World Bank 
and FAO, both important sources of data, tend to 
analyze farm sizes and their characteristics on a 
rotating basis among different countries over many 
years. Although studies tend to group farms by 
area, area is a highly imperfect way of determining 
large and small farms. The size of farms as mea-
sured in hectares may not properly convey size from 
the standpoint of output or true scale of operation 
because agricultural lands have widely varying 
productivity. For example, “small farms” in graz-
ing areas will often be larger than “medium-sized 
farms” in quality croplands. 
Using the most recent available data—even though 
some national data may be more than a decade 
old—the best estimate placed the total number of 
farms around the world at 570 million.20 Of these, 
farms smaller than 2 ha account for 80 percent of 
the total number, while they occupy only 12 percent 
of global agricultural land.21 In surveys of 14 African 
countries in 2000, 85 percent of farms were smaller 
than 2 ha.22
Choosing any single size threshold to measure small 
and medium-sized farms is an imperfect approach, 
but the data suggest a few general developments:
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 ▪ In most developed countries, farms are becom-
ing larger.23 This trend reflects the increasing 
role of mechanization, reduced labor require-
ments, and increasing opportunities for work-
ers off-farm.
 ▪ In Africa and Asia, average farm sizes (mea-
sured by both mean and median) tend to 
become smaller over time because the number 
of farm households is increasing, meaning 
that small farms are divided into smaller and 
smaller units.24 
 ▪ Although small farms are increasing in number, 
their average size is shrinking, and they do not 
appear to be increasing their share of farm area. 
In some countries small farms appear to be 
losing land to medium-sized or large farms. For 
example, one paper analyzing farms in Ghana 
between 1992 and 2012 found that even though 
the number of farms smaller than 5 ha grew 
by 37 percent, the percentage of farmland they 
occupied declined by 12 percent.25 Meanwhile 
farms from 20 to 100 ha grew to occupy an 
additional 11 percent of the country’s farmland. 
In Zambia, just between 2008 and 2014, the 
number of farms smaller than 5 ha grew sig-
nificantly, but the percentage of farmland they 
occupied declined by 15 percent. By contrast, 
farms with 10 to 100 ha occupied an additional 
10 percent of the country’s land. A 2016 study 
in China also found that, while small farms 
continue to dominate, there is a growing class 
of medium-sized and larger farms.26
The growing share of agricultural land held by 
medium-sized and larger farms may reflect a num-
ber of increasing economic opportunities that are 
not available to small farms.27 As new technology 
requires more expensive seeds, fertilizers, machin-
ery, and pesticides, challenges in raising capital 
become more important. Some small farms can-
not take advantage of large machinery, even if it is 
affordable.28 As supermarkets become a larger part 
of the retail process and wish to deal with larger 
suppliers, and as quality and sanitary standards 
rise for high-value crops, small farms face more 
obstacles in accessing these markets.29
Beyond national food production goals, there is also 
a question of which strategies are best for helping 
small farmers, particularly because small farms 
are often too small to support their owners with 
adequate income. One recent study found that even 
if African and Asian small farms took advantage 
of opportunities for technological innovation, they 
could not escape poverty, although they could 
somewhat boost incomes and food security.30 
Another study found that in Kenya it was very 
difficult for mixed crop/livestock farms smaller 
than 0.4 ha to satisfy farmers’ income and food 
needs.31 The implication is that to escape poverty, 
small farms will generally need better market access 
and opportunities for off-farm incomes. One study 
across seven countries in Africa found that those 
two factors were strongly correlated with the food 
security of small farmers.32
Overall, the evidence suggests that small farms 
can be productive if governments support their 
development, and that strongly pushing their 
purchase by or consolidation into large farms has 
not been an effective strategy. At the same time, 
powerful forces do encourage eventual economies 
of scale in agriculture, particularly at higher levels 
of development. In addition, small farms in many 
countries are on a trajectory to becoming too small 
to provide more than supplemental income for 
their owners. Even strong advocates of smallholder 
farming therefore view appropriate public invest-
ments in small farms as part of a strategy to help 
people to transition out of small farming. “This is a 
paradox of early development: the need for agricul-
tural development to allow people to move out of 
agriculture.”33 
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Recommended Policies Regarding Farm Sizes 
The literature overall has a number of policy 
implications, the essence of which is to let the 
market play out—neither favoring large or small 
farms, nor blocking farms from reaching their 
appropriate size:
 ▪ In general, governments should not force small 
farms to consolidate or encourage large farms 
to take over small farms, as neither approach 
is likely to accelerate agricultural production 
or benefit the poor. Not only is the evidence 
of higher yields from even very large farms 
limited, there is even less evidence that push-
ing or forcing consolidation raises productiv-
ity. Oil palm plantations may be an exception, 
where large farms outperform small farms, but, 
at this time, clearing land for oil palm planta-
tions contributes to large-scale deforestation 
and often has adverse consequences for indig-
enous people. The place of palm oil production 
in a sustainable food future will involve more 
protection of the rights of indigenous popula-
tions and targeting new production in the least 
environmentally harmful areas (as discussed in 
the next section).
 ▪ Even so, agricultural policy should support 
farms as they become more commercially 
oriented and increase their labor productivity. 
The aim of policy should be both to support 
productivity gains and allow farms to become 
more viable and not fight these developments 
as they occur. Policy should support these 
trends even though they might eventually result 
in less demand for agricultural labor. However, 
a fair and stable economic and social transi-
tion will depend on growth in other parts of the 
economy, particularly in the urban sector.
 ▪ Allowing farms to acquire smaller farms or to 
rent land—so long as transactions take place 
through market forces and are not pushed by 
governments—is a useful part of the economic 
growth process. As summarized by the World 
Bank study, the evidence generally supports 
the view that such transactions support rural 
incomes and often make it easier for small 
farmers to acquire land.34 By contrast, restric-
tions on land sales “tend to drive transactions 
underground and undermine access to formal 
credit without addressing the underlying asym-
metries of power, information, and access to 
insurance.”35 This World Bank study appropri-
ately recommends safety nets and even land 
taxes to achieve equity goals rather than restric-
tions on sales. 
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 Large Land Acquisitions  
(“Land Grabbing”) 
In Madagascar in 2008, the government entered 
into a deal with the Daewoo Corporation to lease 
more than 1 million hectares (Mha) of land for 99 
years at a minimal price. Although the deal was suf-
ficiently unpopular that it led to the collapse of the 
government and eventual cancellation of the deal,36 
deals such as this one attracted world attention and 
led researchers to study what was going on. “Land 
grabbing” is complex, with important regional 
differences, and some concerns turned out to be 
unfounded. However, a picture does emerge that 
many governments have not been following neutral 
policies regarding farm size. Instead, they have 
been favoring large acquisitions that often do not 
compensate local people for what they are losing 
and do not lead to significant productivity gains. 
This process has also tended to involve clearing of 
at least quasi-natural habitats. 
Comprehensive analysis of recent, large-scale land 
acquisitions is difficult. Governments do not dis-
close the details of most deals, and many countries 
lack clear land registries that could reveal what is 
going on.37 Despite these limitations, researchers 
have begun to tabulate large-scale land acquisi-
tions and several themes have emerged from recent 
studies. 
Concluded acquisitions are large but smaller than 
the original proposals
A World Bank study in 2011 found evidence of 
large-scale farmland deals, in various stages of 
development, amounting to 56.6 Mha—roughly the 
size of Kenya—just between October 1, 2008, and 
August 31, 2009. 
More than two-thirds of these deals were located 
in Africa.38 A 2013 study based primarily on analy-
sis by GRAIN, a nonprofit organization, reported 
between 33 Mha and 82 Mha of large-scale land 
acquisitions between 2002 and 2013 conducted 
by foreign entities only. The wide range in the 
estimates of area of acquisitions reflects the level 
of deal completion, and roughly one-third of the 
verified deals were in Africa.39 
Table 35-1 | Concluded and intended transnational agricultural deals, 2000–2016 
REGION  FOOD 
CROPS 
(MHA) 
 NONFOOD 
CROPS 
(MHA) 
MULTIPLE 
USE CROPS 
(MHA)a
 TOTAL 
(MHA) 
TOTAL 
(PERCENT 
OF WORLD)
Africa 1.5 / 4.0 7.7 / 0.9 8.2 / 5.7 17.3 / 10.6 47 / 70
Asia 0.2 / 1.8 1.8 / 0.6 3.5 / 1.9 5.5 / 4.3 15 / 28
Latin America & Caribbean 1.1 / 0.0 1.2 / 0.0 3.0 / 0.2 5.3 / 0.2 15 / 1
Europe (Eastern & Northern) 0.4 / 0.0 1.0 / 0.0 4.6 / 0.1 6.0 / 0.1 17 / 0
Oceania 0.1 / 0.0 0.2 / 0.0 2.1 / 0.0 2.3 / 0.0 6 / 0
Subtotal (all regions with information) 3.3 / 5.8 11.8 / 1.6 21.5 / 7.8 36.5 / 15.2 100  / 100
No information 7.4 / 3.1
Total (all transnational agriculture deals) 44.0 / 18.3
Notes: Concluded deals are shown in red, intended deals in black. Numbers may not sum correctly due to rounding.
a. “Multiple use crops” includes crops designated as “flex-crops” or “multiple use” in the Land Matrix database.
Source: Land Matrix n.d. Data shown as of 2016. 
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More recent updates show that many of these large 
proposed or announced deals have been scuttled 
and new dealmaking has slowed since 2012, but 
the total area of completed deals remains large. 
GRAIN’s 2016 update of international land deals 
identifies 491 large agricultural land deals com-
pleted since 2006, extending over 30 Mha in 78 
countries.40 Similar results can be drawn from Land 
Matrix data, an ongoing collaborative project of two 
major research institutions and two international 
aid agencies.41 By mid-2016, Land Matrix estimated 
that international investors completed deals to 
acquire or lease for the long-term 44 Mha of land 
between 2000 and 2016. As of 2016, these investors 
were at some stage of agreement to acquire another 
18 Mha (Table 35-1).42 
Land Matrix and other researchers have had to 
rely heavily on reports from others, and the area 
estimates are a combination of intended size, 
contract size, and final operations size. Some more 
detailed analysis suggests that these data may 
overstate what has actually occurred to date, at least 
in Africa.43 For example, one research team put 
together a list of deals reported by Land Matrix and 
others and then conducted field research to try to 
verify those deals and assess their experience.44 Of 
6 Mha of potential Chinese deals reported by others 
from 1987 to 2014, the team ultimately found only 
240,000 ha that were actually acquired.45 Discrep-
ancies emerged regarding financial sizes of transac-
tions, too. A Chinese deal for rice fields in Nigeria 
reported as involving 2 billion U.S. dollars turned 
out to involve 2 billion Nigerian naira, equivalent to 
only about $17 million.
Although it is possible that the total area of land 
acquisitions has been overestimated, the reality 
remains that very large land acquisitions have 
been occurring, generally in the form of long-term 
leases. One more detailed study found that 2.4 Mha 
of land had been allocated to foreign acquisitions 
through some kind of legal agreement between 
2004 and 2014 in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Tanzania 
alone, of which 1.4 Mha had resulted in actual 
leases.46 Although some land had not been leased, 
the authors found that for those transactions they 
could track, the leases mostly reflected the original 
memoranda of agreement, and that additional 
leases might continue to occur where lands subject 
to the agreement had not yet been leased. In 2012, 
a government-commissioned report of the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) estimates 
that roughly 2,642 land deals totaling 1.1 Mha had 
been granted as foreign land-based investments, 
comprising roughly 5 percent of the national 
territory.47 
The main reason many proposed deals fall through 
appears to be the difficulty of actually implementing 
them. Many of the original announcements were for 
much larger deals, and while public opposition has 
scuttled some—such as the large Daewoo proposal 
in Madagascar—many others collapse not because 
of governmental concerns but because they did 
not prove cost-effective, or because the investor 
ultimately lacked the capital required.48 Because 
countries continue to try to enter into large land 
acquisitions, even if many are unsuccessful, the 
relative merits of these schemes remain an impor-
tant area of policy inquiry. 
Large-scale land acquisitions are made by a wide 
range of international purchasers and locally 
connected wealthy buyers
Although much press attention has focused on 
acquisitions by quasi-state entities, including sover-
eign wealth funds, private companies and investors 
also appear to be major players.49 The latter include 
both domestic and international actors, though 
their roles vary by country. For example, a 2014 
study found that companies from the United States 
and Europe have played the lead role in Ghana and 
Tanzania, while companies from India have played 
the lead role in Ethiopia.50 In-country investors are 
playing a major role, too.51 For example, national 
individuals and companies are acquiring land or 
associating themselves with major international 
land deals in Africa.52 The Land Matrix database 
has inventoried about 602 large-scale domestic 
transactions covering 17.3 Mha53—but such domes-
tic deals are greatly undercounted because infor-
mation on domestic contracts is difficult to track. 
These land acquisitions spanned low- and middle-
income countries (for which data were compiled) 
on all continents. While it is difficult to determine 
the exact location of completed deals, about half of 
them were likely in Africa. 
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National and local governments are playing a 
facilitating role, and international institutions may 
be playing an indirect supportive role
Even when investors are private, “the active role of 
governments in consumer and host countries . . . 
has also been instrumental in facilitating large-scale 
land acquisitions by providing financial, technical, 
and administrative support to investors; providing 
regulatory frameworks conducive to investment; 
and, in the case of host-country governments, 
assisting in land acquisition.”54 In Indonesia, oil 
palm development has occurred on lands originally 
zoned as part of the national forest estate, which are 
in effect reclassified by the national government on 
application, and all plantations require a series of 
permits from the regional land-use authorities.55 
In Africa, land is typically state-owned, even if 
ownership includes some recognition of “customary 
rights,” and large-scale acquisitions nearly always 
involve a government player. Many governments 
have adopted policies to encourage these acquisi-
tions. Under Tanzania’s Kilimo Kwanza (Agricul-
ture First) policy, the government aims to increase 
land available for large-scale land acquisitions to 20 
percent of present village lands.56 Ethiopia’s Growth 
and Transformation plan also calls for devoting mil-
lions of hectares to large-scale commercial agri-
culture, and the national government has played 
an active role in directly contracting with foreign 
investors in the Gambella region.57
By contrast with this supportive role, in a sepa-
rate report, WRI reviewed government processes 
for recognizing rights to community lands in 15 
countries and found them to be lengthy, filled 
with obstacles, and leading almost always to only 
a partial grant of rights at best.58 For example, “In 
Chile, indigenous communities are not eligible 
for the procedure unless they possess a specified 
historic document. And in Uganda, communities 
must incorporate themselves into an association, 
elect officers, and write a constitution.” The study 
found that procedures were unclear and that any 
disputes about lands or boundaries could easily halt 
the process. In all but one example, governments 
imposed “arbitrary caps” on the areas transferred, 
and, governments “retain the right to allocate over-
lapping concessions to high-value natural resources 
such as timber, and communities only had rights 
to exercise full free, prior, and informed consent 
to these transactions in 2 out of the 19 surveyed 
procedures.” Although the study recognized that 
estimates are rough, it estimated that half of all 
land globally is community land but that only 10 
percent is recognized as belonging to communities 
and 8 percent is designated for community use.
International institutions have played little role in 
directly supporting these large land acquisitions, 
but they may be doing so indirectly and sometimes 
unintentionally. For example, international institu-
tions have been supporting specific agricultural 
improvement corridors in Tanzania and Mozam-
bique. Even if their goals are to support small-scale 
farmers, large-scale acquisitions have also been 
occurring along these corridors.59 
Although acquisitions are occurring on many 
continents, they mainly affect rural populations in 
Africa and Southeast Asia
Large-scale land acquisitions are occurring across 
the world. For example, of proposed international 
agricultural deals as of mid-2016, Land Matrix 
shows almost 50 percent in Africa, 17 percent in 
Eastern and Northern Europe, 15 percent in Asia, 15 
percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 6 
percent in Oceania (Table 35-1).60 Yet these acquisi-
tions appear to have quite different characteristics. 
For example, many of the well-publicized purchases 
in Australia have been of large preexisting ranch-
es.61 In the former Soviet Union, acquisitions have 
occurred at a large scale but appear primarily to 
have been takeovers of large areas of farmland 
abandoned after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in areas with low populations. By contrast, acquisi-
tions of land in Indonesia and Cambodia to produce 
palm oil or rubber, and acquisitions in Africa for 
agricultural uses, often occur in areas with substan-
tial customary use by rural populations.62 
Acquisitions have responded to effects of increased 
food demand, increased biofuel demand, farm price 
changes, and expectations for exports
Large-scale acquisitions accelerated after 2005 
when crop prices started to rise; in 2008 and 2011, 
prices reached levels four times higher than they 
had been in 2005. As crop prices stopped rising, 
acquisition activity appears to have slowed as well.63 
Even though land acquisitions have occurred on 
extremely favorable terms—and sometimes with 
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no purchase price at all—these projects still require 
substantial investment and risk. Expectations of 
future high crop prices therefore play a major role. 
Although investments are sometimes blamed on 
“speculation,” this term adds little to understanding 
the land-acquisition phenomenon. All land acqui-
sitions are speculative in that they bet on future 
economic returns.
Although some entities have defended land leases 
as ways of boosting local food supplies, the evidence 
overall suggests that acquisitions which have gone 
through are focused on exports of nonfood crops, 
such as rubber or cotton, or of cash food crops, such 
as palm oil.64 Even those few projects focused on 
staple food crops appear to be focused on exports.65 
Much of the land rush in 2006–10, especially in 
Africa, focused on the production of sugarcane or 
jatropha intended to supply the European biofu-
els market.66 Technical problems with growing 
jatropha reduced the prospects of those projects, 
and substantial political doubt about the future 
of European biofuel policies also appears to have 
reduced acquisition interest. However, as Table 
35-1 indicates, at least 44 percent of foreign Afri-
can acquisitions tracked by Land Matrix involved 
nonfood crops as of 2016, and the vast majority of 
the rest could serve multiple purposes.
In much of the world, acquisitions involve natural 
and seminatural landscapes that are valuable for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services
The primary focus of research into “land grabs” has 
been the social effects on rural populations, but 
effects on natural habitats are also significant. Most 
large land acquisitions do not appear to be occur-
ring on farmland that is being intensively cropped 
by small-scale farmers. Although information on 
this point is mostly piecemeal, it appears that, in 
countries dominated by small-scale farming, land 
acquisitions target more natural habitats—includ-
ing forests, savannas, and wetlands—and long-term 
fallow land. These are the types of land that are 
mostly managed on a community basis. The large 
acquisitions of existing farmland occur primarily in 
locations where farms are already large, as in the 
former Soviet Union. 
In the Lao PDR, for example, a government-com-
missioned report found that 37 percent of large-
scale land acquisitions involved forest land, and 
that 45 percent involved what the report categorizes 
as “unstocked forest and ray,” which are areas of 
bush and forests created by shifting cultivation 
practices.67 Three-quarters of the acquired forest 
land also fell under legal categories intended for 
protection.68 In Paraguay, large land acquisitions 
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are associated with the clearing of the biologically 
diverse Chaco forest.69 In the Yala Swamp of Kenya, 
where the Yala River drains into Africa’s largest 
lake, foreign investment led to large-scale clearing 
and drainage of a swamp rich with hippos, croco-
diles, and leopards, and where local people used 
to fish, hunt game, harvest papyrus, grow veg-
etables, and graze cattle.70 The Tana Delta, another 
wildlife-rich area of wetlands near the Kenyan coast 
similarly used by local people, is the subject of a 
large-scale, although highly contested, plan to grow 
sugarcane for ethanol.71 In the Gambella region of 
Ethiopia, farming operations instigated by both 
Saudi and Indian investors have converted thou-
sands of hectares of wetlands, used by local people 
to gather honey, hunt, and fish. Biofuel planta-
tions in Zambia were established mainly on native 
Miombo woodland.72 In Ghana, scholars found 
that biofuel developments were converting “large 
areas of secondary forest and rehabilitating fallow 
lands.”73 
Not all of these lands are pristine.74 Much of the 
Miombo woodland in Zambia is land that has been 
cropped and has regrown woodland over time. One 
study concluded “that for every 1,000 ha of jatropha 
grown on smallholders’ fields in the study site, an 
estimated 310 ha of mature forest and 196 ha of fal-
low land were cleared.”75 Similarly, in Indonesia, oil 
palm plantations were displacing not only primary 
forests but secondary forests, and often mixed land-
scapes of fallow, shrubs and grass, and cropland 
used by smallholders for rubber, pineapple, and 
maize.76 Even in these disturbed landscapes, one 
can reasonably infer that lands cleared previously 
stored substantial quantities of carbon—or were 
rebuilding carbon—and provided other ecosystem 
services. 
Analysis has shown that social and equity effects 
of land acquisitions differ among regions
Large acquisitions of preexisting large farms have 
occurred in the former Soviet Union and Australia. 
Although there has been some controversy about 
these acquisitions—including concerns about cor-
ruption and foreign ownership,77 respectively—little 
scholarship has focused on local social conse-
quences. The farms were generally large, support-
ing few farmers, and in the former Soviet Union 
many had fallen into disuse. There was little reason 
to believe that these acquisitions would displace 
farmers; rather, they had a large potential to boost 
overall production and the farm economy. 
In contrast, both scholarship and press reports 
of impacts in Africa tend to find displacement, 
inequity, broken promises, and strong hints of 
corruption or self-dealing.78 A summary of biofuel 
developments in Ghana by the Centre de recherche 
forestière internationale (Center for International 
Forestry Research, CIFOR) is illustrative of the 
conclusions: 
Large contiguous areas of suitable land were 
easily obtained by foreign companies through 
direct negotiations with Traditional Authori-
ties, often through opaque, nonparticipatory 
and partially documented negotiations pur-
portedly locking up large tracts of land for 
periods of up to 50 years. In this context, many 
affected households were forced to relinquish 
their land without any form of compensation 
or guarantees of future returns. Many land-
losing households consequently experienced a 
marked decline in livelihood quality as a result 
of reduced incomes, increased food insecurity, 
and loss of access to vital forest products.79 
In what may be the most socially advantageous 
case of biofuel investments identified by CIFOR, 
researchers found that a Tanzanian project followed 
“negotiations [which] were considered acceptable 
by affected communities” and produced “a number 
of early benefits,” including “waged employment, 
full-time employees receiving considerably more 
than the minimum wage, water supply points, 
support for funeral costs.” By 2009, however, an 
economic downturn had left wages “unpaid for long 
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periods and promises to improve the school and 
hospital left unfulfilled.” The authors concluded, 
“With approximately half of household landhold-
ings converted in the process, this case represents 
an unacceptably high risk for communities.”80
There are also clearly examples in which direct 
employees of new plantations reported improved 
or more consistent incomes, as one group of 
employees reported in Ghana.81 However, even in 
that situation, CIFOR found greater returns both 
to land and labor from alternative, local uses, and 
concluded that “employment [on plantations] 
would compare far less favorably if the value of 
other displaced crops and forest products were 
considered.”82 
In Indonesia and Malaysia, researchers have found 
at least somewhat more mixed results: 
Some communities did enjoy economic and 
social benefits from oil palm plantations such 
as more stable and reliable income, road access, 
[and] better healthcare services. In Kubu 
Raya, some communities benefited both from 
employment opportunities and from sales of 
smallholder oil palm harvests. In Kubu Raya 
and Boven Digoel sites, some indigenous com-
munities and migrants developed good inter-
ethnic relations, although this was not the case 
in Manokwari. Other communities experienced 
increasing restrictions on traditional land-use 
rights and outright land losses. . . . Conflicts 
over land between indigenous communities and 
oil palm companies were observed in all three 
sites.83
Similarly, in a series of case studies about oil 
palm in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia, researchers at the Stockholm Environ-
mental Institute found the consequences for local 
communities “were mixed, and that the espoused 
benefits for communities were not materializing as 
hoped.”84 It also found that “delivery of benefits at 
the local level was often highly skewed, with already 
marginalized groups being further disadvantaged, 
thus increasing inequity, societal fragmentation 
and social tensions.”85 Many communities have also 
found that oil palm developments led to serious 
problems with local water pollution and flooding.86 
Indonesian law illustrates why transactions are 
likely to be unfair despite the fact that those seeking 
to build oil palm plantations must generally agree 
to a deal with local communities. To build a planta-
tion, owners must first obtain permits, often first 
from the national government, to release land from 
status as national forest, and later from regional 
land authorities. These permits in effect give com-
panies at least a temporary monopoly to buy rights 
to agricultural development. Only after obtaining a 
series of permits do companies negotiate with local 
communities, which therefore are not able to seek 
the best deal available from a choice of companies 
but must either agree or not agree to oil palm 
development with a single potential purchaser. 
Not surprisingly, although land for oil palm prob-
ably has a value of $4,000–$10,000 per hectare,87 
compensation for local communities rarely if ever 
approaches this level.88 
By contrast, Tanzanian law applies a number of 
restrictions to acquisitions that would appear to 
mandate far more local potential for the interests of 
existing land users. But CIFOR found that 
the checks and balances in the law worked con-
trary to their intended purpose due to several 
factors. Both central and district governments 
are faced with strong incentives not only to 
generate revenues, but also to create conditions 
for enhanced economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Investment in the agricultural sector, 
which employs the majority of rural Tanzani-
ans, is viewed as a promising pathway towards 
achieving these goals. Three factors exemplify 
the bias towards investors: land leases in 
excess of legal limits for the biofuel sector; the 
approval of flawed environmental assessments; 
and, ultimately, the overstatement of benefits of 
investments by politicians (including the Presi-
dent), which bolsters support from government 
officials and extinguishes critical debate on 
costs and benefits among villagers and local 
representatives.89
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Recommended Policies for Land Acquisitions
Despite generally negative social and environ-
mental assessments of the surge in large-scale 
land acquisitions, many critics have focused on 
procedural reforms.90 One recommended reform is 
stronger recognition of customary rights, which we 
discuss below. These suggested procedural reforms 
for approving large-scale acquisitions typically 
highlight the following elements: 
 ▪ Substantial consultations with affected com-
munities
 ▪ Assurance of “informed consent” or true ap-
proval by a majority of local land users before 
deals go through
 ▪ More detailed contracts that specify the obliga-
tions of the investors
 ▪ Measures and procedures to oversee and assure 
enforcement of investor commitments
 ▪ Assurance of compensation for a wider array 
of customary uses and rights that recognize the 
real economic returns different people are now 
obtaining from them 
We endorse these reforms. We also note that 
informed consent does not mean that every single 
user must consent. Assembling large-scale opera-
tions could involve high transaction costs even 
where benefits to all could be large, particularly if 
single holdouts can block the deal and demand a 
premium before others can benefit. This consider-
ation explains why developed countries typically 
have procedures for government to seize land for 
eminent domain, but that ensure proper compensa-
tion. Informed consent instead requires rules that 
allow democratic decision-making by the commu-
nity, with fair and transparent rules of thumb for 
compensation for the many different preexisting 
uses. Unfortunately, the evidence as marshaled by 
the reports we cite in this chapter is strong that 
these procedures are not widely or strictly followed. 
Although these procedural reforms are worthy, 
the more fundamental questions are where, when, 
and under what conditions large land acquisitions 
should be encouraged or allowed because they 
benefit a country and its people and contribute to a 
sustainable food future. 
When acquisitions involve large preexisting farms 
already converted to cropland, those acquisitions 
are less likely to displace and harm workers and 
natural habitats, and more likely to lead to valuable 
improvements in agricultural production. Some 
acquisitions in the former Soviet Union, Brazil, and 
Australia are more likely to fit these criteria, but, 
if benefits are to be realized, land purchasers must 
have the investment capital they claim to have and 
procedures must be in place to avoid corruption 
and political favoritism. In many land purchases, 
these conditions have not been met.
In general, other types of acquisitions rarely pass 
our criteria for a sustainable food future, such as 
ecosystem protection or climate change mitiga-
tion.91 Large-scale land acquisitions tend to occur 
in forests, wetlands, or other natural or seminatural 
habitats. Although some governments and private 
companies have claimed they are merely acquiring 
“underutilized land” or “abandoned agricultural 
land,” the evidence suggests that these lands typi-
cally hold more carbon and are more environmen-
tally valuable than claimed, and that the labeling 
of land as “underutilized” or “abandoned” is an 
unjustified disparagement of secondary forests 
and savannas. Even when some of these areas are 
“degraded” from their purely natural state, they are 
typically being used by the poor and marginalized 
groups that rely on wetlands, grasslands, and trees 
(which in some locations may be common-pool 
resources) to diversify their livelihoods and increase 
their resilience to droughts and other shocks. 
To truly support a sustainable food future, such 
acquisitions would have to meet one of two addi-
tional criteria: they occur on lands with relatively 
low environmental opportunity costs, including 
land for which the carbon costs per likely ton of 
crop are significantly lower than the global average; 
and they occur in countries where crop expansion is 
inevitable and are based on land-use plans consis-
tent with the country’s climate change mitigation 
obligations.
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Cooperative, Contract, and  
Magnet Farming 
What tools and contracting procedures can poli-
cymakers provide to help millions of smallholder 
farmers cope with the disadvantages presented by 
their size? What is necessary to help these farm-
ers gain access to credit, buy inputs at low costs, 
acquire necessary technical understanding, and 
market their products at advantageous prices? 
Traditional tools involve three kinds of contractual 
mechanisms: 
 ▪ Farmer cooperatives, through which farmers 
collectively own and run distribution facilities 
and input suppliers 
 ▪ Contract farming, in which farmers agree to 
produce specific crops for future delivery at a 
set price and often receive assistance to do so
 ▪ Magnet farms, which typically involve contract 
farming around a central, large farm
Although these three mechanisms differ in detail, 
each involves an operational entity that works with 
smallholder farmers to increase access to inputs, 
expertise, and credit, and/or to process and distrib-
ute the final product.92
As countries’ economies develop, and markets 
become increasingly long-distance and anony-
mous, these mechanisms are likely to become more 
important. Farmers working in these systems enjoy 
the benefits of branding,93 gain expertise, spread 
risk, share costs of inputs and machinery, and 
access more remunerative and specialized markets. 
Yet cooperatives, contract farming, and outsource 
farming by magnet farms also have costs. In the 
case of contract and outsource farming, larger farm-
ing enterprises may develop local monopoly power 
over purchases, and farmers can become particu-
larly vulnerable to them once they have invested 
in the production systems needed to grow special-
ized crops.94 In the case of cooperatives, there are 
administrative costs and risks that cooperatives will 
be managed unfairly. There is also the risk that a 
single cooperative may not prove to be as efficient 
at supplying farm inputs or marketing crops and 
livestock products as a competitive, private market 
of multiple businesses. 
Contract farming is also vulnerable to cheating, 
either by the contractor or by the farmer. The core 
of contract farming is an agreement for farmers 
to provide and companies to purchase a quantity 
of a commodity at a predetermined price (or price 
range), at a specified time. For certain kinds of 
agricultural products, such as a highly processed 
tree crop, the contract may need to apply over 
several years to justify the upfront costs for either 
farmers or purchasers. By the time of the promised 
sale, changes in growing conditions worldwide or 
consumer preferences may have led to dramatically 
higher or lower crop prices, providing strong incen-
tives either for a farmer to try to sell to someone 
else at a higher price or a company to try to avoid 
purchasing—perhaps by falsely claiming quality 
limitations—if market prices are lower. Overall, 
policing contracts is costly, and some products are 
harder to police than others. 
The benefits of contract farming are hard to prove 
conclusively because there are many reasons why 
farmers who already have other advantages—
whether these be better lands, better locations, or 
better training—are also more likely to be contract 
farmers.95 There is evidence—gleaned from subtle 
statistical analysis—that studies of contract farming 
are subject to a publication bias in which studies 
that show benefits are more likely to be published.96 
Even so, and while the evidence can be conflicting, 
meta-analyses of studies generally find that contract 
farmers in developing countries tend to make more 
money than noncontract farmers and that contract 
farms tend to have higher productivity.97 
The combined weight of the evidence and many 
studies indicate that contract farming should be 
able to provide valuable benefits, but there are 
several important caveats. 
First, because of the mix of benefits and costs, these 
systems tend to evolve primarily for foods of higher 
market value.98 For example, companies may pay a 
premium for vegetables or other high-value crops 
(e.g., cocoa, vanilla) of the right quality, or milk 
or poultry that meets the right sanitary standards 
and is reliably delivered year-round. If the quality 
cannot be assured through relatively quick and easy 
inspection, as with sanitary standards, for example, 
contract farming can provide a solution. Companies 
may also have special technical advantages—such 
as particular vegetable varieties, breeds of chicken, 
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or feed formulations—which they can exploit only 
by maintaining some production control, particu-
larly if goods are hard to store. Cooperatives may 
also evolve in similar circumstances, for example, 
to market milk because of the need for an assured 
buyer shortly after milk is produced. There are 
examples of contract farming for staple crops, such 
as rice, that seem to have economic benefits, but 
contract farming is less common for such crops, 
and there are also findings that efforts by aid agen-
cies to promote contract farming for staple crops 
can make the costs of farming too high.99
Second, studies consistently find variability in 
results from different contract farming arrange-
ments even where they tend to find benefits on 
average. The details therefore matter.
Third, the challenges of meeting the demands of 
contractors tend to favor somewhat larger farms (at 
least, the larger of small farms), and relatively few 
farmers tend to benefit from these arrangements. 
Today, fewer than 5 percent of smallholder farm-
ers typically participate in some form of contract 
farming.100
Recommendations for Contract Farms
In general, the literature implies that governments 
can support smallholder productivity and liveli-
hoods by supporting strategies that allow farmers 
to take advantage of these different contractual 
arrangements. We offer a few suggestions for poli-
cies to increase the benefits and reduce the costs.
Focus more development efforts on high-value crops 
Agricultural development assistance to smaller 
farmers should be directed more toward high-value 
crops that carry a premium for quality because the 
benefits of collective action are more likely to apply 
to such crops. Many of these kinds of crops also 
tend to improve with heavier investments of labor. 
In general, our modeling analysis also projects 
larger growth in demand for these crops than for 
staple crops. Even farmers engaged in subsistence 
agriculture can raise cash crops to boost income, 
diversify production, and increase assets that may 
also be used to build staple crop production.
Provide basic social security 
Because hunger is such a core risk, subsistence 
farmers are highly risk-averse and will often 
produce staples even if production of an alternative 
crop would on average provide more income and 
thus greater food security. For the same reason, 
farmers will typically avoid specializing in the most 
promising agricultural option unless the expected 
rate of return is extremely high relative to the 
increased risk. Government programs that provide 
an alternative form of income or food guarantee 
could therefore help farmers take more risks and 
make more profitable investments, such as growing 
crops likely to earn a higher return. Brazil’s Bolsa 
Família program and Mexico’s Oportunidades 
program, for example, provide small guaranteed 
incomes to the poor if they send their children to 
school, and both have had considerable success in 
alleviating hunger and poverty.101 Research on the 
agricultural effects of these types of social secu-
rity programs is limited, but it suggests that they 
allow farmers to focus more of their production 
on higher-value crops.102 Both Brazil and Mexico 
are middle-income countries, and many countries 
in Africa probably cannot afford such extensive 
programs, but moving in this direction as soon as 
possible may also be a way to stimulate agricultural 
growth.
Ensure fair contracts and try to enforce them 
A first step is to help ensure fair contracts up front, 
and small farmers would benefit from legal and 
marketing advice. The risk of cheating by either 
party poses a major barrier to mutually beneficial 
contract farming so efforts to make cheating harder 
are important. Such efforts can take advantage of 
improved remote and ground sensors and spatial 
tools to confirm production, which would increase 
the confidence level of companies. They should also 
enable faster and fairer arbitration and enforce-
ment procedures, increasing farmers’ confidence. 
Civil society organizations might provide these 
services. Governments should consider laws to 
facilitate such arrangements, including basic codes 
of conduct to help protect against abuses. 
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Build on sustainability commitments 
Many major private food companies have commit-
ted to reducing deforestation and GHG emissions 
and improving the income of farmers in their 
supply chains. Deeper involvement with farmers 
through contract farming provides one opportunity 
for embedding these commitments further up sup-
ply chains and building longer-term relationships 
between companies and their producers.
Land Rights for Sustainable 
Intensification 
Large-scale land acquisitions can occur in much of 
the world because traditional users of land gener-
ally lack full and protected property rights. In some 
parts of the world, neither smallholder farmers’ 
rights nor common rights to community land are 
officially recorded in written form. In addition to 
increasing vulnerability to seizure of land by others, 
this lack of clear, full title—according to standard 
economic theory—undermines both the ability of 
farmers to borrow money and their desire to invest 
in long-term improvements because farmers may 
not be able to reap future benefits of their invest-
ments. Weak property rights therefore encourage 
short-term exploitation of land rather than longer-
term stewardship. The resulting sustainability 
concerns have led international institutions and 
nongovernmental organizations to advocate secure 
land rights.
Property rights
Determining the best and most appropriate kinds of 
rights regime has proved challenging. The standard 
treatment of land rights in Western countries recog-
nizes something similar to total rights of dominion 
over a parcel of land, subject to regulation but 
including the right to buy and sell and typically to 
exclude all, or nearly all, other uses. These rights 
are typically recognized in written documents 
recorded in government registries. International 
institutions have sought to mimic these types of 
property rights in countries without such systems, 
and many governments have made efforts in this 
direction.
These efforts have had some success but also 
many problematic results. From an equity stand-
point, efforts to recognize rights in this way have 
sometimes led to failures to recognize a range of 
traditional rights on common lands, ranging from 
hunting, wood gathering, and grazing to glean-
ing. By definition, if a piece of land has long been 
subject to overlapping rights but the new property 
rights system is oriented toward recognizing single 
ownership, then some people who have previously 
used the land will lose their rights (with or without 
compensation). 
The process of recognizing rights has also provided 
an opportunity for political favoritism and unfair-
ness. As the World Bank wrote in 2008, “Land poli-
cies were often adopted less to increase efficiency 
than to further interests of dominant groups.”103 In 
many contexts, granting recognition of individual 
property rights to people without experience of 
private land ownership and without establishing 
communal regulation has allowed elites to buy up 
rights and assemble vast complexes of land.104 
The effect of individual property rights on agricul-
tural productivity is complex. In theory, title should 
give farmers greater incentive to improve farms 
and greater means to borrow funds to do so. The 
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ability to sell or rent land should make it easier for 
land to be transferred to more productive farmers. 
In studies of land reform effects in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, and Asia, researchers have found 
productivity gains to be significant.105 
But in studies of land reforms in Africa, research-
ers have generally found no particular gain, a 
result for which they have offered two possible 
explanations.106 One is that customary land rights 
have been sufficiently secure that providing land 
titles has not provided much additional security—
although there is evidence that customary land 
rights are generally not sufficient to use as collateral 
to obtain a loan.107 The other explanation, in effect, 
is that while secure land rights are very helpful 
in promoting productivity investments, they are 
not by themselves sufficient, and the myriad other 
obstacles facing farmers in Africa have blocked 
improvement. Among these obstacles are poor soil 
quality; inadequate transportation, electricity, and 
financial infrastructure; weak marketing infrastruc-
ture and networks; and poverty traps. 
As one critic has written about Africa, “In practice, 
many of the land policy reforms and titling pro-
grams of the 1970s and early 1980s failed to achieve 
the expected increase in agricultural investment 
and productivity, did not facilitate the use of land as 
collateral for small farmers, and often encouraged 
speculation in land by outsiders, thus displacing the 
very people—the local users of the land—who were 
supposed to acquire increased security through 
titling. The programs frequently exacerbated con-
flicts by ignoring overlapping and multiple rights 
and uses of land and led to or reinforced patterns 
of unequal access to land based on gender, age, 
ethnicity, and class.”108
Customary rights
During the past decade, researchers, international 
agencies, and governments have learned from these 
lessons and begun to emphasize the recognition 
of customary rights. These are the complex rights 
recognized by many communities in much of the 
world (including Africa) to land uses that may 
accommodate both overlapping rights to the same 
piece of property and the process within a com-
munity of allocating rights. A number of African 
countries have taken steps to recognize customary 
rights, but the strength of measures varies. For 
example, Mozambique has recognized customary 
rights in general but still retains national ownership 
rights that may supersede the communal rights. 
As one study concluded, “A greater challenge to 
customary rights in Africa is not tenure conversion 
per se, but the fact that customary arrangements 
lack adequate constitutional and legal recognition 
in many countries.”109
Customary rights, however, are not always com-
pletely fair. They may recognize the authority of 
local chiefs in the allocation of land, but deci-
sions by the chief may be inequitable or may fail 
to prevent unbalanced deals with large investors 
seeking land. A study by CIFOR found that many of 
the large and inequitable land deals in Mozambique 
and Tanzania were the work of local chiefs, who 
directly received money as an incentive.110
Translating customary tenure rules into formal 
property rules also can institutionalize the inequal-
ity of women. For example, in southwest Ghana, 
women’s ownership of land is customarily dis-
couraged, and women often obtain land only by 
the license of their husbands.111 One study by the 
World Bank concluded that in sub-Saharan Africa, 
“the vast majority of women, who are the primary 
subsistence producers, are locked out of landowner-
ship by customary laws.”112 Sometimes customary 
laws do recognize substantial rights for women, 
but they are hard to translate into property rights 
based on Western principles. For example, women 
in northern and eastern Uganda have many tradi-
tional land-use rights, but when sales transactions 
occur through the legal system, those rights are 
often lost.113 Moves to recognize customary rights 
need, at a minimum, to recognize these rights. More 
broadly, recognition of customary rights should be 
seen as an opportunity to change those rights to 
increase fairness and broaden access to resources in 
ways that will simultaneously benefit productivity.
The development economics literature generally 
agrees that “(1) property rights need not always 
confer full ownership and be individual—they can, 
and should be, individual, common, or public, 
depending on the circumstances and (2) most 
important for sustainable development is that 
property rights are deemed secure.”114 
Beyond the challenge of determining the best 
system of rights, the sheer process of recording 
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property rights has often proved to be expensive 
because it requires drawing precise property lines 
and settling potential disputes. That process has 
led some studies to question whether such efforts 
are always or even usually worth the cost. Modern 
information technology, however, seems capable 
of reducing this challenge. For example, Rwanda 
completed a national registration program of 10.3 
million parcels in less than five years at a cost of 
$10 per parcel using aerial photographs and recti-
fied satellite imagery.115 Ethiopia implemented a 
similar program. Both countries used this process 
to improve women’s rights by legally recognizing 
women’s inheritance rights, elevating secondary 
rights so that they are equal to those of men, and 
allowing the joint registration of spousal land 
rights. Studies have found that Ethiopia’s reform 
led to improvements in agricultural productivity.116
In addition to influencing equity and productivity, 
tenure arrangements have implications for forests 
and agricultural conservation. In some contexts, 
traditional property systems may discourage agri-
cultural conservation practices. For example, the 
long-established principle of acquisitive prescrip-
tion, common in Latin America, allows landowners 
who clear forests to obtain ownership and thereby 
encourages deforestation. In Africa, rights to use 
trees may be divided among those with the right to 
collect fruit and those with the right to cut the tree 
for timber, which in some cases may be the govern-
ment.117 This split in rights can reduce incentives for 
farmers to plant and care for trees. In many parts 
of Africa, members of the community may have the 
right to graze cattle on residues after the harvest, 
reducing incentives to return the carbon in residues 
to the soil.
Better recognition of the rights of indigenous users 
can help protect forests, however. Researchers have 
found that indigenous reserves in Brazil have been 
far more effective at preserving forests than other 
land ownership arrangements—although this may 
result in part from restrictions on deforestation 
built into the establishment of those reserves.118 
Overall, in Brazil, Bolivia, and Colombia, defor-
estation rates inside indigenous forest lands with 
secure tenure have been one-half to one-third those 
outside indigenous lands.119 But many local people 
will also be attracted to the potential revenue from 
agricultural conversion, as long as the price is fair 
and other measures to boost their incomes are lack-
ing. Recognizing land rights may help but will not 
always be an adequate measure to protect natural 
ecosystems from conversion to agriculture.
Recommendations for Land Rights
Despite the complexity of tenure issues, we offer a 
few general recommendations based on literature 
and our own conclusions:
 ▪ Governments should recognize and secure the 
rights of those who have used land (and water) 
under both formal and customary arrange-
ments to protect against large-scale seizures by 
governments themselves and to provide suf-
ficient security for farmers to obtain credit.
 ▪ Governments should use modern information 
technology to expedite the identification and 
recording of land boundaries and issuance of 
associated documentation. They can move the 
process along quickly by segregating parcels 
that are subjects of dispute (for subsequent 
resolution) from those that are not.
 ▪ Governments should eliminate rules that allow 
individuals to secure property by clearing for-
ests and other natural landscapes.
 ▪ Where land ownership in the form of individual 
plots has a strong tradition, as in much of Asia 
and long-settled parts of Latin America, moving 
toward property rights systems similar to those 
of Western countries can work.
 ▪ Processes to formalize customary rights, be-
cause of their high potential to disadvantage 
those who are less powerful or whose rights are 
more transient, should specify rules and employ 
oversight systems to assure fair treatment.
 ▪ Where customary rights systems exist that 
recognize physical overlapping land uses, the 
systematizing process is also an opportunity 
to address fundamental unfairness, as in the 
treatment of women’s rights, and to develop 
alternatives to traditional rules that impede 
productivity gains.
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CARBON-PRICING 
STRATEGIES AND 
FINANCING OF CLIMATE-
SMART AGRICULTURE 
Voluntary actions alone will likely not achieve climate goals. 
Economists generally favor pricing strategies that attempt 
to internalize climate costs, such as carbon taxes and cap-
and-trade systems. Some policies would use carbon “offsets” 
to fund agricultural mitigation. We find that broad pricing 
strategies are likely impractical but that opportunities exist to 
apply them selectively as part of flexible regulations. Finding 
a limited role for offsets, we discuss reforming agricultural 
subsidies and increasing access to climate finance.  
CHAPTER 36
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Carbon-Pricing Strategies 
No one knows the precise changes in manage-
ment or land uses that each farm should undertake 
to most cost-effectively boost production while 
reducing GHG emissions immediately today, let 
alone over time. In the same way, no one knows 
the precise mix of technologies most cost-effective 
for reducing emissions from factories and power 
plants. For these reasons, economists and most 
environmental organizations favor policies that 
target outcomes—by imposing costs or caps on 
emissions or possibly rewarding sequestration—
rather than laws that mandate particular technolo-
gies or practices. Outcome-oriented approaches 
offer more certainty about the level of emissions 
that will ultimately be achieved and should be more 
cost-efficient because farmers and other emitters 
are given the flexibility to choose the most cost-
effective ways of reducing emissions at any given 
time. But are such approaches politically or practi-
cally feasible for agriculture?
Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems
Governments can impose costs flexibly on emitters 
by imposing a tax on each ton of emissions, typi-
cally called a “carbon tax.” They can also create a 
“cap-and-trade” system. In a cap-and-trade system, 
the government imposes a cap, or limit, on the total 
amount of allowable carbon dioxide equivalent 
emissions and allocates emissions “allowances,” 
representing shares of the cap, to emissions sources 
that have been designated as entities under the 
cap. Cap-and-trade systems can allocate allow-
ances at different parts of the supply chain, and 
participating entities can trade emissions with each 
other as long as total emissions from all entities 
remain under the cap. If applied in agriculture, 
for example, farms (or whatever entity is allocated 
allowances) that emitted more than their allowance 
would have to purchase more allowances from oth-
ers, while farms that reduced their emissions below 
their allowance could sell credits for extra emis-
sions reductions to others.120 
Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems can create 
incentives that work their way through agricultural 
and food supply chains. For example, science and 
technology companies that develop more efficient 
fertilizers or feed additives to reduce ruminant 
methane would find a market for these innovations 
because farmers would pay for inputs that help 
them avoid taxes or the need to purchase allow-
ances. Consumers would also have incentives to 
switch to lower-carbon foods, because the costs 
of high-carbon foods, such as beef, would rise to 
reflect their carbon costs. In such systems, markets 
can identify the most cost-effective sources of emis-
sions reductions on their own. 
These mechanisms can be implemented without 
imposing additional net costs on farmers or food 
consumers. For example, governments could 
refund farmers using taxes raised downstream 
from the food sector or by using funds from selling 
allowances. Such systems would work if those who 
reduced emissions ultimately received more of the 
economic benefits than those who did not, and if 
those advantages were proportionate to the reduc-
tions. Governments could also design either a tax 
or a cap-and-trade system to protect the interests 
of small farmers, including those who today gener-
ate high emissions relative to their production. The 
key need is to structure such a system to focus on 
improvements from a baseline, for example, by 
allocating carbon allowances to farmers who match 
their existing emissions levels. As small farms prob-
ably have some of the best opportunities to reduce 
emissions per ton of crop, meat, or milk, such pric-
ing mechanisms could even favor them. 
Despite their theoretical advantages, these pricing 
approaches face significant technical challenges in 
the agriculture and land-use sectors. In the energy 
sector, emissions generally track the amount of 
carbon in coal, oil, or natural gas. As a result, 
emissions are relatively easy to estimate per fuel 
type and form, so pricing the carbon in these fuels 
is a reliable proxy for emissions. In the agriculture 
sector, however, the quantity of emissions resulting 
from different farm practices can vary greatly. It is 
not practical to measure most agricultural emis-
sions directly (such as the nitrous oxide released 
when using fertilizers or ruminant methane). Even 
if it were, monitoring millions of farmers globally 
would present enormous challenges in practice. 
Many mitigation options are relatively subtle—such 
as improving the efficiency of feed use for cattle—
and it would be difficult to monitor how emissions 
change because of changes in management.  
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Land use also presents measurement and veri-
fication challenges, long acknowledged by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC).121 Many natural factors, such as variations 
in rainfall and temperature, greatly influence how 
much carbon a forest or savanna adds or loses. As 
a result, holding landowners directly accountable 
for increases in land-use related carbon emissions 
that they cannot control may be unfair. Imposing 
penalties on owners for losing forests, for example, 
would raise questions about what to do and how to 
know when forest clearing results from natural fires 
or fires set by others. Monitoring carbon through 
remote sensing is not yet practical at the individual 
landowner level.122 
Introducing carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems 
likely faces even more significant political chal-
lenges than applying such approaches to other 
sectors of the economy. Neither agriculture nor for-
estry is part of Europe’s emissions trading system, 
which applies only to large manufacturing sites and 
power plants. When the U.S. House of Representa-
tives passed a bill to create an emissions trading 
system in 2009 (that ultimately was not introduced 
in the Senate and did not become law), the bill did 
not impose obligations to reduce emissions from 
agriculture or land use. In 2008, New Zealand 
established an emissions trading system123 that was 
originally intended to apply both to agriculture and 
conversion of forests into agricultural use, begin-
ning in 2015.124 But the government suspended the 
law’s application to agricultural production as the 
start date approached and replaced it with report-
ing obligations only—although the government did 
retain limitations on conversion of forests. 
More selective pricing strategies
Given the technical and political challenges of these 
carbon-pricing strategies, agriculture may not be 
subjected to the same carbon-pricing mechanisms 
used in the energy and manufacturing sectors. 
However, the advantages in efficiency and flexibil-
ity afforded by pricing strategies should motivate 
governments to explore alternative, more limited 
variations. For example, although New Zealand’s 
emissions trading system is not focusing on agri-
cultural production emissions, it still requires those 
who cut down forests established before 1990 to 
have offsets for those emissions.125 It might also be 
possible to tax the production of forest products, 
and to do so differentially based on the type of 
forest those products come from to influence the 
location, method, and quantity of wood products 
that are produced.
Creative pricing approaches could also apply to 
features of agricultural production that are measur-
able. For example, governments in countries where 
farmers have opportunities to apply fertilizer more 
efficiently could impose a tax on fertilizer that does 
not incorporate a nitrification inhibitor or time-
release mechanism. The tax level would be based on 
the likely additional releases of emissions expected 
from use of conventional versus improved fertilizer. 
Different forms of manure management could also 
be taxed separately. Whether used to help set the 
level of a carbon tax or simply to monitor emis-
sions more carefully, scientists need to develop 
useful proxy indicators to estimate emission levels 
and how emissions change with various mitigation 
practices. Taxes on high-emissions foods, discussed 
in Chapter 6 on shifting diets, represent another 
option. 
In an ideal world, governments should impose taxes 
that reflect the costs of pollution, but political feasi-
bility will depend in part on confidence in the tech-
nical feasibility and cost of mitigation options. Just 
as enhanced forest protection in Brazil was accom-
panied by increased confidence in the potential to 
intensify production on existing agricultural land, 
some method of taxing beef production that gener-
ates high levels of methane emissions becomes 
more plausible if scientists can demonstrate to 
farmers that safe, effective, and reasonably priced 
additives are available to limit methane generation 
from cow digestion. 
Overall, given the complexities of the world’s agri-
culture and land-use system and the scope of the 
climate challenge, it appears that taxing emissions 
would be the most efficient and effective approach 
to reducing them. Governments should explore 
selective application of this approach wherever 
practicable.
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Carbon Offsets 
Much of the interest in applying emissions trading 
systems to agriculture has focused on agriculture 
as a supplier of offsets to capped sectors. Energy 
users, for example, would pay farmers to reduce 
their emissions, creating credits that they could use 
to offset or cancel out their own emissions at less 
cost than any actions they could take in their own 
operations.126 Similarly, some nongovernmental 
organizations and foundations have hoped that 
offsets could fund agricultural improvements by 
small farmers in developing countries, particularly 
through incentivizing measures that add soil carbon 
and improve soil fertility.127
To date, European companies capped under an 
emissions trading system have been able to pay 
farmers in developing countries for a limited 
number of mitigation measures under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).128 The Canadian 
province of Alberta also established a system that 
allowed extensive use of offsets.129 Interest in this 
approach in richer countries has been political as 
well as technical: trading systems could provide 
financial reasons for agricultural interests to sup-
port climate change efforts and reduce compliance 
costs for factories and power plants. In Alberta, for 
example, offsets have generated more reductions 
than those achieved by factories and power plants 
reducing their own emissions.
Despite these hopes, there are serious limitations 
and challenges to the use of offsets. The most obvi-
ous is that offset systems by themselves do not gen-
erate net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduc-
tions from agriculture. The emissions reductions in 
agriculture are credited to the energy sector, which 
then reduces its emissions less than it would have 
done without the purchase of an offset. For years, 
climate mitigation policies have paid little attention 
to the need to reduce agricultural emissions. Given 
delays in taking action on climate change, it is now 
clear that by 2050, in addition to massive reduc-
tions in energy-generated emissions, agricultural 
emissions must also be significantly reduced to help 
stabilize the climate. This means that selling agri-
cultural offsets to the energy sector can play at most 
a transitional role, perhaps stimulating progress 
in the agricultural sector. Large-scale agricultural 
mitigation is needed just as it is for other carbon-
intensive sectors.
Beyond this need to limit both agricultural and 
energy sector emissions, other practical challenges 
limit the use of offsets:
Additionality 
A critical requirement for offsets is “additionality,” 
which is proof that a mitigation measure would 
not have occurred anyway but rather results from 
the payment of the mitigation credit. To establish 
additionality, the CDM requires an analysis that the 
measure would not otherwise be economical and 
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customary. But there is debate as to whether most 
CDM projects truly meet the additionality test.130 
One problem is that the more economical a mitiga-
tion measure—and therefore the more desirable 
and likely to be successful—the less likely it is to be 
additional. The additionality problem is so chal-
lenging to apply robustly in practice that many 
researchers and some policymakers have called for 
abolishing offsets altogether, thereby avoiding the 
additionality problem, and replacing offsets with an 
alternative mechanism that rewards countries for 
holding emissions below a projected baseline.131 
Baseline 
Related to additionality is the question of what 
baseline to use to assess mitigation. Should an off-
set require reductions from recent historical emis-
sions, or recognize that emissions are likely to grow 
without additional effort (e.g., to improve livestock 
feeding efficiency or nitrogen use efficiency from 
fertilizers)? Although such improvements offer the 
best short-term options for reducing emissions 
while meeting growing food needs, it can seem odd 
to award offsets to farms for absolute increases in 
emissions (even though they are smaller increases 
than would occur under “business as usual” growth) 
and to use those activities to justify reduced mitiga-
tion by factories and power plants.
Administration 
Developing offset agreements with millions of 
farmers is a major administrative challenge, as is 
monitoring the results. Solutions probably require 
a large “aggregator,” which pays farmers for prac-
tices and then assesses progress over large areas 
using indirect means. But monitoring and payment 
require some entity to manage the process and 
probably assume much of the risk.
Leakage and permanence
When any activities claim mitigation, an impor-
tant question is whether the activity truly reduces 
total emissions or just transfers emissions to other 
sources. For example, if some farmers plant forests 
on some of their land or reduce fertilizer use in 
ways that reduce yield, other farms may then clear 
more forest to meet demand for food. Efforts to 
estimate these effects are challenging and present 
large conceptual problems. For example, should 
carbon offsets reward producers if an economic 
model estimates that the amount of land-use change 
elsewhere to replace the food is less because higher 
prices cause people to consume less food?132 Leak-
age is an issue for all emissions mitigation activities, 
but the likelihood of leakage is even greater when 
mitigation actions are counted at an individual farm 
level rather than at the national level. In addition, 
when the estimated reductions are sold as an offset 
to a purchaser, which can then increase emissions 
or avoid reductions itself, the consequences are even 
worse. Permanence is also an issue. Forms of mitiga-
tion that involve carbon sequestration might not 
store carbon over the long term.
Certainty and discounting 
Accurately estimating emissions reductions in the 
agriculture sector is more challenging than in the 
energy sector. As a consequence, agriculture-based 
offsets are sometimes discounted relative to energy-
based ones (e.g., of two tons of estimated reduction, 
only one ton can be traded). Such discounts reduce 
the financial incentives for agriculture-related 
offsets.
Small farmers 
Participating in offset programs presents particular 
challenges for small farmers. Precisely because 
they are small, the amount of mitigation potentially 
available from any one farm is modest, although 
many of the transaction costs will remain. Small 
farmers also face timing and flexibility issues. For 
example, many offset projects only pay based on 
success, or after several years of operation. But 
many small farmers lack access to the capital neces-
sary for up-front investments and cannot absorb 
the risk of failure. They also reasonably fear the 
multiyear commitments required by project design-
ers, as those commitments reduce opportunities 
to adjust to changing personal, weather, or market 
realities.133
Because of these obstacles—and above all because 
the agricultural sector itself must achieve significant 
emissions reductions in addition to other sectors—
agriculture-generated GHG emissions offsets have 
only a limited and short-term role to play in achiev-
ing a sustainable food future. 
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Funding Climate-Smart Agriculture 
Agriculture is a major sector of the global economy, 
so is not surprising that estimates of the investment 
needed to maintain and improve it, as well as to 
address climate challenges, involve enormous sums 
of money. The private sector will likely provide the 
bulk of these funds. The great majority of those 
private investors will be farmers, who are primarily 
investing to replace and improve their own farm 
equipment, animals, farm roads, and irrigation 
and drainage systems. FAO estimates the total 
accumulated investment by farmers around the 
world at more than $5 trillion.134 Despite assessing 
only 76 countries because of limited data, the FAO 
estimates that private investment per year of nearly 
$170 billion dwarfs public investments (Figure 
36-1).135 
The dominance of farmers in agricultural invest-
ment makes clear that a core role of government is 
to facilitate and guide their investments by internal-
izing environmental costs and establishing sound 
Figure 36-1 | Farmers’ investments in agriculture are much higher than public investments 
Note: Data on country-level sources of investment in agriculture vary among low- and middle-income countries. The number of countries covered by these data varies from 
36 for foreign direct investment to 76 for on-farm investment in agricultural capital and government investment. See Appendix 1 in Lowder et al. (2012) for more detail on the 
country-level data included in this chart. Although the data are not comprehensive, they are sufficient to indicate that private on-farm investment far outweighs any other source 
of investment.
Source: Lowder et al. (2012), Figure 2.
policies regarding tenure, land acquisitions, and 
cooperation or contracting. For example, in sub-
Saharan Africa, much of the agricultural stagnation 
between 1980 and 2005 is attributed to an annual 
decline of roughly 0.6 percent of agriculture’s 
capital stock compared to increases in all other 
regions of 0.7 percent more.136 This decline was 
probably due to poor government policies, includ-
ing policies that sought to tax agriculture to pay for 
industrialization.137 
Nonetheless, there is still a need for government 
financial resources to support necessary infrastruc-
ture, research, and assistance to small farmers if 
they are to escape or avoid poverty traps. Classic 
poverty traps force farmers to sell off necessary 
assets in times of hardship or to avoid reasonable 
investments in productivity improvements because 
of an inability to cope with almost any level of risk. 
In the case of mitigating GHG emissions, such 
assistance to farmers is both advisable and fair. So 
where should these funds come from?  
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Figure 36-2 |  The world’s leading agricultural producers provided nearly $600 billion in  
public funding to support farms in 2015 
Note: OECD assessment of 51 countries excluding India.
Source: Searchinger et al. (2018b), based on analysis of OECD (2016) data.
Redirecting subsidies
Government policies today already provide major 
financial support to agriculture. According to 
estimates by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the 51 top 
countries in total agricultural production (excluding 
countries in South Asia, which the OECD data do 
not address) provided nearly $600 billion in farm 
support in 2015 (Figure 36-2).138 This figure was 
equivalent to roughly 19 percent of total global agri-
cultural production.139 This level of support suggests 
that it would be difficult to obtain substantially 
higher levels of support from governments. Yet 
these funds, as a whole, are doing little to support 
the kinds of improvements outlined in this report. 
Half of this total support takes the form of “mar-
ket price supports,” which are any kind of market 
barriers that raise prices to consumers. Examples 
include import limits, tariffs, or systems that limit 
production by farmers to increase prices. If these 
barriers benefit some group of farmers in a country, 
they do so at the expense not only of consumers but 
also of farmers in other countries. In fact, because 
these supports are more prevalent in higher-income 
countries, they offer little market protection for the 
world’s poor overall. From a global perspective, 
reducing or redirecting the costs of these market 
interventions would reduce prices and benefit 
consumers. 
The other half of farm support, about $300 billion, 
flows directly from governments, mostly through 
direct expenditures or tax credits. About $167 billion 
takes the form of direct payment to farmers for 
current or past production. This funding will only 
spur productivity to the extent that farmers decide 
to use these funds to boost investment rather than 
income, so it is an inherently diffuse way of boost-
ing productivity. Another $14 billion is for input 
subsidies, which have modest benefits and often lead 
to environmentally damaging results (as discussed 
in the next section, on fertilizer subsidies). Approxi-
mately $46 billion supports infrastructure, includ-
ing irrigation. These funds have probably boosted 
production in various ways. Finally, $74 billion is 
spent on research or technical assistance, conserva-
tion payments, or health and safety inspection. 
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This analysis indicates a real opportunity to redirect 
farm support toward the needs identified in this 
report. Redirecting market price supports would be 
most difficult administratively because these market 
barriers raise costs to consumers—and so are real 
costs—but generally do not create a pot of money 
that governments could transfer to other purposes. 
Both Europe and the United States, however, have 
experience in reducing these kinds of market bar-
riers in return for increases in direct government 
subsidies. Subsidies could then be targeted more at 
the strategies and approaches necessary to close the 
food, land, and GHG mitigation gaps and achieve a 
sustainable food future. 
Redirecting the $181 billion per year in direct 
payments to farmers—$167 billion for produc-
tion and $14 billion for input subsidies—toward 
the priorities identified in this report provides the 
easiest administrative opportunity to achieve these 
objectives. 
In recent decades, governments have been steadily 
reducing the extent to which their subsidies dis-
tort trade, in part because of trade negotiations. 
The most offensive subsidies from the perspective 
of trade are subsidies that pay farmers more as 
they produce more of a particular crop, known as 
“coupled payments.” Researchers have estimated 
that coupled payments are often environmentally 
damaging because they encourage overuse of farm 
chemicals. However, their true impacts on land use 
and GHG emissions have rarely been estimated and 
are probably variable and complicated because of 
their effects on where crops are produced.
In the United States, there has been a major shift 
from direct price guarantees to “crop insurance.” 
But crop insurance is highly subsidized and insures 
not merely against losses from bad weather but also 
against low prices. In effect, it serves as a revenue 
guarantee that is tied to the amount a farmer 
produces, and therefore has more similarities to 
than differences with traditional price guarantee 
programs.140
The United States has also seen modest movement 
toward imposing some kind of environmental 
criteria on farming as a condition of payments. 
Since 1985, farmers have been required to imple-
ment plans to reduce soil erosion and avoid drain-
ing wetlands, although enforcement has never been 
strong.141 There is evidence that these requirements 
have had some effect although probably a modest 
one.142
Europe has done a little more to shift its agri-
cultural funding toward conservation goals. The 
bulk of the Common Agricultural Policy’s direct 
payments are now tied to conservation compli-
ance, which involves two types of mandates. The 
first requires that farmers comply with applicable 
environmental and food safety laws that are 
already mandatory, such as an EU-wide directive 
on nitrogen use. This mandate also requires that 
farms comply with authorization requirements on 
irrigation use where they exist. The second mandate 
requires farmers to comply with Standards of Good 
Agricultural and Environmental Condition, which 
are set forth in general language at the European 
level and which member states are supposed to 
make more specific. For example, the standards 
protect against soil erosion, protect soil organic 
matter, and recommend the protection of impor-
tant “landscape features” to provide some buffering 
of streams and hedgerows. 
Unfortunately, the requirements are vague at the 
European level, and often minimally applied by 
national governments. For example, the United 
Kingdom protects streams, but it requires mainte-
nance of only a one-meter buffer from the top bank 
of a stream. Ecologists recommend much larger 
buffers to effectively filter out pollutants or provide 
shade. In 15 of the 28 EU countries, the only soil 
carbon requirement is not to burn crop stubble. 
Europe also requires that 30 percent of total 
agricultural funding, or almost 13 billion euros per 
year, go only to farmers who meet three additional 
environmental requirements, but these criteria also 
are very modest.143
Probably the most important reform has been to 
direct roughly one-quarter of total agricultural 
support to rural development, which includes 
roughly 19 billion euros per year for conservation.144 
Approximately half was directed toward projects 
viewed as enhancing ecosystems or climate, and 
a small number of projects have truly focused on 
climate mitigation.145 
China has also substantially changed its agricultural 
policies in the past few years. It has phased out its 
direct subsidies for fertilizer, which were as high 
        463Creating a Sustainable Food Future
as $21 billion in 2011.146 It has also made hundreds 
of millions of dollars per year available for pilot 
projects to subsidize more efficient use of fertilizer 
and for agricultural research focused on environ-
mental objectives.147 China also devotes roughly $7 
billion per year in funding to rehabilitate grasslands 
and restore forests on poor-quality agricultural 
land. These funds have done much to reduce soil 
erosion and have stored some carbon, although the 
focus on plantation forests, typically of a single spe-
cies, has meant few gains and possibly even losses 
in biodiversity.148 China also boosted agricultural 
research and development (R&D) spending heavily 
to roughly $12 billion per year between 2013 and 
2016, more than doubling spending from 2006 to 
2009. Even so, these funds represent only a modest 
share of China’s total support for agriculture, which 
averaged $255 billion from 2014 to 2016 and was 
skewed heavily toward import barriers. 
Agricultural subsidies are much lower in Africa and 
most of Latin America. One reason for Africa’s poor 
agricultural development from 1960 to 2005 was 
low government investment combined with taxa-
tion or export restrictions designed to keep crop 
prices artificially low.149 In 2003, the heads of state 
of most countries in the African Union pledged to 
increase the share of agriculture in government 
spending to 10 percent. An analysis by the Inter-
national Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in 
2013 found that eight countries had met the target, 
and others had increased their spending, but that 
the overall goal had not yet been met.150
Overall, redirecting agricultural support provides a 
major opportunity for financing some of the needs 
identified in this report. Of course, all reforms of 
this kind are politically challenging. Even if agricul-
ture would benefit overall, individual farmers who 
lose direct financial subsidies or market protections 
are likely to oppose such reforms. One prerequisite 
for these reforms will be increasing attention paid 
to farm programs by individuals and public officials 
who care most about climate change, biodiversity, 
and global poverty. These parties have an important 
stake in structuring farm support programs, though 
the connection is often not sufficiently recognized. 
Another opportunity may exist, however, by focus-
ing on the linkages between agricultural produc-
tivity gains and climate protection. Even if some 
individuals would benefit by being allowed to clear 
more land, most farmers can benefit from programs 
that increase their productivity. So long as such 
programs are tied to protection of natural areas, 
they will contribute to a sustainable food future.
Reforming and redirecting fertilizer subsidies 
The benefits and costs of fertilizer subsidies are 
particularly important questions for decision-mak-
ers allocating government spending because they 
can account for a large percentage of government 
support to agriculture. Fertilizer subsidies have 
been particularly large in Asia and in many parts 
of Africa, where fertilizer subsidies have consumed 
much of the government funding devoted to agri-
culture in recent years.151 What is their proper role 
in a sustainable food future?
In Asia, the nonpolitical answer seems clear: fertil-
izer subsidies should be phased out. As Chapter 27 
on reducing emissions from fertilizer use showed, 
farmers in both China and India overuse nitrog-
enous fertilizer (excess applications have little to 
no yield effects). Excess applications not only result 
in farmers spending more money than necessary 
but also cause high GHG emissions, particularly 
because much of the fertilizer in China is manu-
factured using power generated from emissions-
intensive coal.152 Studies have found that fertilizer 
subsidies contributed to agricultural growth and 
poverty reduction in the early years of introducing 
fertilizer but had little impact thereafter.153 After 
the early years, fertilizer subsidies have contributed 
far less to raising agricultural productivity than 
other types of funding such as agricultural R&D, 
roadbuilding, irrigation, and education. Reforms in 
tenure and agricultural market liberalization have 
also had large effects.154 
Subsidies encourage overuse of fertilizer. In China, 
one study estimated that fertilizer subsidies of all 
kinds—including many provided to manufactur-
ers—reached $18 billion in 2010155 although, as 
mentioned in the previous section, China has 
recently phased out fertilizer subsidies. A wide 
range of economic research supports the view, 
predicted by economic theory, that farmers’ appli-
cation rates of fertilizer reflect the ratio of fertilizer 
prices to crop prices.156 If subsidies artificially lower 
the prices farmers pay for fertilizer, then farmers 
will use more fertilizer. This principle appears to 
hold true across countries, at least for cereals.157 
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In India, fertilizer subsidies have been especially 
distorting because they have been applied more 
heavily to nitrogen than to other nutrients, result-
ing in an inefficient balance of fertilizer applica-
tion.158 Reforms have tried to reduce support for 
some but not all nitrogen fertilizers, but the initial 
efforts may have had the opposite effect and led to 
more imbalanced nutrient application and higher 
costs.159 By 2015, subsidy costs had reached $11.6 
billion per year, roughly five times higher than 15 
years earlier.160 Although policymakers intend fertil-
izer subsidies to spur food production and to help 
small farmers, the evidence is strong that fertilizer 
subsidies are an economically and environmentally 
costly way of achieving these goals. There is also 
widespread evidence in China that average appli-
cations of synthetic fertilizers per hectare exceed 
efficient levels and could be reduced substantially 
with negligible impact on yields.161 
In Africa, by contrast, fertilizer use is extremely 
low—around 9–10 kilograms per hectare on average 
in 2013, compared with an average of 150 kg/ha in 
Asia.162 A World Bank publication in 2007163 sum-
marized the reasons for such low application rates, 
which still apply:
 ▪ Fertilizer prices are high in Africa compared 
to the rest of the world, which results in high 
prices of fertilizer relative to crop prices, a key 
determinant of how much fertilizer farmers 
use.164 
 ▪ Exceptionally high year-to-year variation in 
fertilizer production and prices makes annual 
investments in fertilizer by African farmers 
risky compared to investments by farmers in 
other regions. 
 ▪ The physical responses of crops to fertilizer are 
relatively poor, due in part to rainfall variability 
and in part to poor soil quality.165
 ▪ A variety of market imperfections, including 
poor access to credit for small farmers, make all 
agricultural investments challenging. 
In efforts to overcome the market challenges, fertil-
izer subsidies in Africa were widely implemented 
from the 1960s through the 1980s. After that time, 
most countries phased them out or greatly reduced 
them in response to large balance of payments 
deficits and absence of foreign exchange reserves. 
Strong concerns expressed by the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other inter-
national donors also played a significant role. These 
financial institutions worried about the cost of sub-
sidies to governments, the challenges of targeting 
subsidies only to those who most needed them, and 
adverse effects on the development of private-sector 
fertilizer systems.166 
However, the experience of Malawi helped change 
perceptions of what could be achieved by fertil-
izer subsidies.167 Between the 1970s and the 1990s, 
Malawi went from producing a large food surplus to 
a large deficit. Three-quarters of the country’s rural 
households experienced food shortages four to five 
months of the year and, in 2001–2 and 2004–5, 
Malawi faced severe hunger, exacerbated by an 
influx of refugees from civil war in Mozambique. In 
2005, the country announced a subsidy program 
to provide 26 kg of fertilizer and 5 kg of improved 
seed to 2.5 million farmers. The program that year 
contributed to a 15–22 percent increase in maize 
production, restoring the national production 
surplus. Maize yields continued to grow in the next 
several years, and the program received consider-
able public attention.168 
This apparent success in Malawi encouraged other 
African countries to reinstitute extensive subsidy 
programs.169 As of 2013, subsidies supported 
roughly 40 percent of fertilizer use in sub-Saharan 
Africa.170 
Faced with the Malawi example, international 
institutions and aid agencies to some extent 
modified their views, but they recommended that 
governments direct their efforts toward “smart” 
subsidies:171
 ▪ Subsidies should be structured to avoid displac-
ing existing commercial sales, which means 
they should be tailored to support farmers who 
would not otherwise use fertilizer.
 ▪ Subsidies should encourage development of 
private markets, for example, by the use of 
coupons that can be used to purchase fertilizer 
from any supplier, rather than through govern-
ment distribution channels.
 ▪ Subsidies should be temporary. 
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Nonetheless, economists have done much analysis 
of fertilizer subsidy programs and have expressed a 
high level of skepticism about their merits based on 
several considerations:
 ▪ Due to the difficulty of targeting fertilizer sub-
sidies only to farmers who would not otherwise 
use fertilizers, several studies have found that 
farmers use much of the money not to increase 
fertilizer use but to purchase fertilizer they 
would have bought anyway. One reason is that 
even programs based on vouchers distributed 
to the poor may result in poor farmers selling 
the vouchers to better-off farmers.172
 ▪ One study showed that the quantities of fertil-
izer imported by the government to be sold 
in subsidized form was much larger than the 
quantity ultimately purchased by farmers in 
subsidized form, indicating that one-quarter 
to one-half of subsidized fertilizer was actually 
diverted to intermediaries before being sold to 
farmers.173
 ▪ Due to political favoritism, corruption, or 
simply the difficulty of truly targeting pro-
grams, many of the funds have supported 
wealthier farmers and have not been targeted 
at those who are most vulnerable.174 In Zambia, 
one study found that the 73 percent of farms 
cultivating less than 2 ha, with 78 percent of 
those smallholders in poverty, received only 
45 percent of the subsidies. Farms of 10–20 ha 
were significantly more likely to receive fertil-
izer subsidies.175 
At least some of the fertilizer subsidy programs 
have not worked to encourage the emergence of pri-
vate fertilizer distributors and retailers and there-
fore have had negative impacts on the development 
of the private sector and competition.176
Moreover, more recent studies of Malawi’s experi-
ence have started to shed some doubt on initial 
claims that the subsidy program boosted produc-
tion. Some researchers have pointed out that 
official estimated growth in maize yields in Malawi 
appeared inconsistent with farm-level studies and 
other data, and there was little evidence of declines 
either in rural poverty or in maize prices after the 
new subsidy program, both of which should have 
declined if production had increased.177 Weather 
also played a large role. Maize yields that reached 
roughly 2 tons per hectare per year from 2007 to 
2009 fell back to roughly 1.5 tons in 2010–12 even 
with continuation of the subsidy program. At least 
one study, however, has found small positive effects 
on agricultural wages.178 
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Ultimately, the biggest issue remains cost. In 2011, 
10 African countries spent $1.05 billion on input 
subsidies, mostly fertilizer, which represented 29 
percent of their collective public expenditures on 
agriculture.179 In 2004–5, Zambia devoted one-
third of its entire public budget to fertilizer subsi-
dies.180 In Malawi, the cost reached 60 percent of 
the entire national budget in a peak year. As FAO 
noted, fertilizer subsidies “are too costly and, as 
such, unsustainable in the long-term.”181
Recommendations
A key question is what alternative policies exist 
for judiciously boosting fertilizer use. One set 
of options involves efforts to make fertilizer less 
expensive because evidence shows that farmers 
in Africa, as elsewhere, respond to lower fertilizer 
prices.182 Reasons for high fertilizer costs identified 
by the World Bank include the small market (which 
inhibits economies of scale), lack of access to credit 
by importers, high transportation and handling 
costs, excessive differentiation of fertilizer products, 
and poor dealer networks.183 Policies to boost fertil-
izer use could address these challenges through 
several measures:
Encourage private fertilizer markets 
Public policies have often contributed to the high 
cost of fertilizer through measures that restrict or 
tax fertilizer imports, limit credit, or use govern-
ment agencies to control fertilizer sales, all of 
which tend to lead to high prices.184 A first set of 
advisable measures is therefore to eliminate these 
barriers and encourage private fertilizer markets. 
Kenya successfully boosted fertilizer use largely by 
avoiding government competition and eliminat-
ing import and price controls. Between 1993 and 
2007 fertilizer use doubled, despite the elimination 
of subsidies.185 Between 2002 and 2009, fertilizer 
use in Kenya averaged almost 30 kg per hectare,186 
fertilizer applied to maize rose from 84 kg/ha to 111 
kg/ha, and maize yields increased by 18 percent. In 
the more productive areas of western Kenya, fertil-
izer use now rivals that of Asia and Latin America.187
Reduce transportation costs 
High transport costs appear to be the single most 
important factor explaining high fertilizer prices in 
much of Africa.188 High costs start with inefficient 
ports and then quickly rise with distance from port. 
Kenya’s port of Mombasa is the primary port in 
Eastern Africa, and fertilizer is roughly 20 percent 
less expensive in Mombasa than in western Kenya 
and roughly half the price it is in Malawi.189 Road 
improvements are therefore valuable.190 Although 
roads are also expensive, the International Fertil-
izer Development Center has argued that substan-
tial fertilizer price reductions could be achieved 
in parts of Africa by changing port management 
systems, arranging two-way truck transport, and 
incorporating some feasible improvements in 
rail management.191 Major improvements in road 
infrastructure in Ethiopia from 1997 to 2011 appear 
to have played a substantial role in increasing fertil-
izer use and boosting yields.192
Increase the yield benefits of adding more 
fertilizer 
A third set of measures increases the yield effects 
of adding more fertilizer. Researchers have demon-
strated that farmers’ decisions to use little fertilizer 
are often rational in light of the low crop response. 
For example, in good farmland in western Kenya, 
the response of maize to fertilizer is high, and 
farmers use high levels of fertilizer.193 But in other 
parts of Kenya and most of sub-Saharan Africa, 
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crop responses are low, and thus farmers use little 
fertilizer.194 As one study emphasizes, “The evidence 
from agronomic and soil science disciplines indi-
cates that increasingly continuous cultivation, asso-
ciated soil degradation, low soil organic matter, and 
soil acidity problems will lock a growing proportion 
of African farmers into low crop response rates to 
fertilizer use.”195 
Unfortunately, as we discuss in Chapter 13 on soil 
and water management, no one has developed a 
silver bullet for improving soil fertility or otherwise 
facilitating the use of fertilizer. Options include 
everything from agroforestry and other measures 
to improve levels of soil carbon (organic matter), to 
improved credit access, crop breeding, irrigation, 
and pest control.196 Many African governments have 
developed agricultural investment lists in reports 
prepared with the African Union as part of the 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme. But there is no simple, proven list of 
alternative investments.
In this context, fertilizer subsidies will remain 
attractive to governments. Even when misused, 
funds do go directly to large numbers of farmers. 
In Kenya, despite its success in increasing fertilizer 
use without the use of subsidies, the government 
reinstituted subsidies in 2008–9 in response to ris-
ing global fertilizer prices at the time and political 
upheaval following contested election results. These 
subsidies have continued.197 Although the research 
arguments against fertilizer subsidies are strong 
overall, the case against fertilizer subsidies rests 
on proof that funds can be better spent elsewhere. 
Researchers could strengthen their case by costing 
out specific, alternative agricultural investment 
strategies and likely results. 
Earning Dedicated Climate Funding
At the international climate conference in Copen-
hagen in 2009, developed countries pledged to pro-
vide $100 billion per year in assistance to develop-
ing countries, both to adapt to climate change and 
to mitigate GHG emissions. This funding has been 
slow to materialize, and the economic downturn in 
much of the developed world that started in 2008 
did not help. To date, developed countries are not 
on track to meet their goal.198 But they have begun 
to raise their funding commitments, some of which 
they will distribute directly and some of which will 
pass through the Green Climate Fund (GCF). As of 
September 2017, the latter had received funding of 
roughly $10 billion in total for all climate-related 
work, not merely agriculture.199 The GCF has 
adopted policies to allocate roughly half to adapta-
tion and half to mitigation. 
Before countries or the GCF distribute large sums 
of money for mitigation, they demand clear plans 
showing how funds will be spent and estimates of 
what will be achieved. Agriculture will probably find 
itself at a disadvantage compared to other sec-
tors. It is much easier to estimate the GHG emis-
sions savings from a project to replace a coal-fired 
power plant with a wind power system than it is to 
estimate the savings from efforts to improve the 
livestock sector. And it is easier to guarantee con-
struction of the wind farm than to guarantee those 
livestock improvements. Focusing on energy alone, 
however, ignores the largest source of emissions for 
many developing countries.200 
The best way for agriculture to claim a reasonable 
share of climate funding for mitigation will be to 
generate highly specific mitigation plans that are 
persuasive, detailed enough to guide implementa-
tion, and measurable enough to be monitored. 
Throughout this report, we have highlighted ways 
to meet these criteria when addressing particular 
sources of emissions.
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STRENGTHENING 
RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
This report has consistently emphasized the need for additional 
research to overcome the many obstacles to achieving a 
sustainable food future. It has also stressed adequate funding 
to pursue research into the most promising leads. Meeting 
these needs will require increasing the quantity of funding well 
beyond what is currently available, putting more effort into the 
direct application of research, and pursuing critical technological 
breakthroughs.
CHAPTER 37
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Funding for Research and Development 
in General 
The period since 2001 has witnessed some modest 
growth in agricultural R&D funding. Global public 
research spending grew from $26.1 billion in 2001 
to $31.7 billion in 2008,201 the last year for which 
we can obtain truly comprehensive information. 
Spending on public and nonprofit R&D grew mod-
estly in 30 of 39 countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
for which data are available. The increase between 
2001 and 2014 was roughly 30 percent (from about 
$800 million to $1.06 million).202 However, growth 
has been uneven and spending in many food-
insecure regions remains inadequate. Roughly half 
of the total agricultural R&D growth from 2001 to 
2008 occurred in China and India. 
Private sector research has also experienced growth. 
Total private food sector R&D reached $20 billion 
globally in 2010,203and in the United States and 
Europe the private sector has taken over the incre-
mental improvement and production of many seeds. 
But globally, only $3.7 billion of these private R&D 
funds were directed at crop breeding.204 Abundant evi-
dence indicates that agricultural R&D generally pays 
off, with estimates commonly in the range of annual 
returns of 40 percent.205 China and Brazil, recent 
global leaders in agricultural R&D, saw their agricul-
tural productivity between 1979 and 2009 increase by 
136 percent and 176 percent, respectively.206 
With agricultural research underfunded in general, 
and agricultural research related to climate mitiga-
tion barely funded at all, the world is unlikely to 
solve the challenge of achieving a sustainable food 
future without a large increase in R&D. Viewed 
more optimistically, the current low levels of 
research suggest that new investment has a good 
potential to produce high returns. 
A reasonable initial goal would be to raise agricul-
tural R&D in low- and middle-income countries 
from the current 0.5 percent to 1.0 percent of their 
agricultural output production value. This would 
involve an increase of roughly $15 billion per year. 
The burden of this growth should be shared by 
high-income countries. The growth should occur 
in ways designed to guarantee continuity, devel-
opment of infrastructure, and advancement of 
partnerships that allow low- and middle-income 
countries to benefit from newer breeding methods. 
Funding the “D” in R&D 
Many strategies for boosting agricultural produc-
tion while reducing GHG emissions require detailed 
technical assessments of farm practices, land-use 
characteristics, and infrastructure in a given area. 
These assessments must be continually updated 
and improved over time. Such analyses involve 
science and engineering, not basic research, and 
are therefore analogous to the “development” por-
tion of “research and development.” At this time, 
however, no entities appear responsible for these 
assessments, nor are governments funding them at 
the level of detail required. 
For example, our assessment of flooded rice farm-
ing (in Chapter 28) found that various strategies 
for reducing or interrupting the periods of flood-
ing could dramatically reduce emissions, reduce 
on-farm water use, and potentially boost yields—at 
least modestly—for most farms. Yet rice farmers 
cannot practically implement improved manage-
ment practices unless they can control their water 
enough to drain and fill fields when needed. The 
capacity of farmers to do so varies by irrigation 
district and farming system. Mitigating GHG 
emissions from rice therefore requires reasonably 
detailed engineering assessments, irrigation district 
by irrigation district. Yet to our knowledge no entity 
is responsible or funded for this task. 
Similarly, as we described in Chapter 11 on sustain-
able intensification of livestock farming, several 
global studies have shown that beef and dairy 
systems around the world can greatly reduce their 
GHG emissions through more efficient feeding and 
grazing practices, reduced mortality, and improved 
fertility of pastureland. Yet actually encouraging 
these changes at the local level requires detailed 
understanding of the type and location of beef and 
dairy operations, how feeds are used, how feeds 
are produced, how cows are managed, and the 
economic and technical options for improvements. 
This information can form the basis for changes 
in infrastructure and new financial incentives to 
encourage improvements, but such innovations 
must be tailored to the locale and farm type. 
These are just two examples of the type of detailed 
planning efforts that must occur to take advantage 
of technical opportunities to boost production and 
reduce emissions. Reducing land-use change emis-
sions, improving the efficiency of fertilizer uptake 
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by crops, and improving the water- and land-use 
efficiency of aquaculture all require these kinds 
of detailed assessments to animate coordinated 
efforts. And, as planning moves forward, specific 
needs for new technologies are likely to become 
clear—such as a lack of knowledge of soils in a 
particular location or the lack of an appropriate 
grass or legume variety necessary to implement 
a promising grazing system. When a company 
develops a new product, a university develops a new 
educational initiative, or a health service addresses 
a particular public health challenge, they require 
coordinated planning efforts, technical assess-
ments, and specific studies to address revealed 
information gaps. Mitigating agricultural emissions 
while boosting production will require the same 
type of coordinated effort. 
Technical planning efforts may focus on a whole 
country or on a portion of a country. Based on our 
assessment of what is needed for detailed decisions 
on spending and other policies, technical plans 
should share the following characteristics:  
 ▪ Start with detailed assessments of representa-
tive farm types sufficient to assess farm perfor-
mance and opportunities.
 ▪ Include information about farms and land use 
that is both disaggregated to the local level and 
aggregated to the provincial and national levels.
 ▪ Assess land use and recent patterns of land-use 
changes using more detailed and reliable meth-
ods that can typically be undertaken at global 
levels.207
 ▪ Estimate GHG emissions using methods that are 
detailed enough to assess how they would change 
under promising changes in management.  
 ▪ Include mechanisms for assessing the econom-
ics of these management changes, including 
benefits and costs to farmers and other actors.
 ▪ Organize information in easily accessible and 
understandable formats that allow analysis of 
improvement scenarios.
 ▪ Host online systems that incorporate changing 
and improved information.
 ▪ Integrate work of national and global research-
ers. 
As international development institutions move to 
support climate-smart agriculture, the lack of fund-
ing for this kind of technical planning presents a 
major obstacle. For example, countries typically use 
World Bank agricultural loans exclusively for direct 
agricultural investments and aid. Countries must 
themselves cover the costs of administering the 
loans and any technical planning efforts. The World 
Bank and other funding institutions should develop 
systems to ensure that at least a small percentage 
of agricultural project costs support the planning 
and analytical work necessary to make agricul-
tural plans truly climate-smart. Such systems 
could include dedicated grant funds or project/
loan requirements to apportion, for example, 2–3 
percent of funding for this kind of work. 
Funding Needed for Breakthrough 
Technologies 
The steady, incremental growth of crop and live-
stock yields, and recent improvements in input 
efficiency in developed countries, reflect the con-
tinuous development by researchers of a wide range 
of new seeds, new breeds, and new management 
techniques. As discussed previously, we assume 
continued incremental improvement in our 2050 
baseline projections. We also call attention to many 
breeding opportunities to reduce environmental 
impacts. 
In order to achieve a sustainable food future, the 
world’s food system will need to develop and deploy 
a number of breakthrough technologies as well. 
Table 37-1 summarizes some of the innovations 
identified in this report.
These research efforts require dedicated and 
coordinated funding, directed with intelligence, just 
as funding institutions support multiyear efforts 
to cure specific diseases or to develop new energy 
technologies. Private sector research should be 
adequate in some areas; developing improved meat 
substitutes from plant-based ingredients is one 
such example. But the private sector is unlikely to 
devote serious funding to most of the items in Table 
37-1 and will likely ignore them unless GHG emis-
sions regulations, taxes, or strong financial incen-
tives are in place to assure a market for innovative 
new products or techniques.
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Additional, coordinated funding is therefore 
needed. In 2009, several governments agreed to 
form the Global Research Alliance for Agricultural 
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation precisely because of 
this need. New Zealand hosted the first meeting 
and provided much of the motivation, reflecting 
its commitment to reduce its emissions under the 
Kyoto Protocol and the fact that almost half of the 
country’s GHG emissions come from agriculture. 
By 2017, 46 countries had joined, and the alliance 
now comprises a series of scientific working groups. 
Although on the right track, the alliance has limited 
resources. In the absence of additional resources, 
only limited coordination and development is 
possible. Another challenge is that in many coun-
tries, agricultural agencies are the primary agri-
cultural researchers. Notwithstanding the strong 
motivations of the individuals involved, these 
Table 37-1  |    Critical research needs for breakthrough technologies 
SELECTED MENU ITEM RESEARCH NEED COMMENT
DEMAND-SIDE SOLUTIONS
Course 1: Reduce growth in demand for food and other agricultural products
Reduce food loss and 
waste
Development of inexpensive methods 
to prevent decomposition without 
refrigeration
Companies are investigating a variety of compounds, such as 
spray-on films that inhibit bacterial growth and hold water in. 
Shift to healthier and 
more sustainable diets
Development of inexpensive, plant-
based products that mimic the taste, 
texture, and experience of consuming 
beef or milk
The private sector is making significant investments in various 
plant-based substitutes including imitation beef containing heme, 
which appears to bleed like real meat.
agencies were historically established to promote 
agricultural production. It will take real effort to 
expand their missions to include GHG emissions 
mitigation.
The alliance provides a structure for international 
coordination but requires additional funds to effec-
tively support the development and deployment 
of the kinds of breakthrough technologies listed in 
Table 37-1. In addition, research agencies with a 
broader mandate than agricultural research should 
become involved along with climate-focused insti-
tutions such as the Green Climate Fund, the World 
Bank, and international development agencies. 
International efforts should adopt good research 
grant-making procedures, such as professional 
administration and panels of outside scientists to 
review and rank proposals. 
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SELECTED MENU ITEM RESEARCH NEED COMMENT
SUPPLY-SIDE SOLUTIONS
Course 2: Increase food production without expanding agricultural land
Increase livestock and 
pasture productivity
Breeding of better, high-yielding forage 
grasses that can grow in “niche” 
production areas
In much of Africa and Asia, with limited land available, quality 
forage for cattle depends on producing high-quality grasses and 
legumes in restricted land areas, such as underneath forest or 
banana plantations.
Improve crop breeding to 
boost yields
Breeding of cereals to withstand higher 
peak temperatures
Recent research has shown that high peak temperatures, 
particularly at critical growth periods, can greatly restrict cereal 
yields, and that climate change may push temperatures to exceed 
peak thresholds. 
Course 4: Increase fish supply
Improve productivity 
and environmental 
performance of 
aquaculture
Development of fish oil substitutes from 
microalgae, macroalgae (seaweeds), or 
oil seeds for aquaculture feeds
Research groups have developed initial breeds of rapeseed 
containing oils nutritionally equivalent to fish oils and promising 
seaweed varieties. Work is also proceeding on more economical 
production of algae. 
Course 5: Reduce GHG emissions from agricultural production
Reduce enteric 
fermentation through 
new technologies
Finding feed compounds, drugs, or 
breeds that lower methane emissions 
from cows, sheep, and goats
Several research groups are working on feed compounds to 
reduce methane emissions. After years without promising results, 
a private company has claimed 30 percent emissions reductions 
from a cheap compound that does not appear to have significant 
impacts on animal health or environmental side effects.
Reduce emissions 
through improved manure 
management
Development of lower-cost ways to 
dry and consolidate manure, stabilize 
nutrients to reduce methane and 
nitrous oxide emissions, and make 
them easier to use efficiently with crops 
Technologies exist to dry manure and turn it into energy, but costs 
and leakage rates reduce viability and GHG emissions reduction 
benefits.
Reduce emissions from 
manure left on pasture
Breeding of traits into pasture grasses 
to inhibit formation of nitrous oxide or 
developing safe, ingestible nitrification 
inhibitors for livestock
Researchers have discovered one variety of Brachiaria that 
significantly inhibits nitrification and thus nitrous oxide formation. 
Reduce emissions from 
fertilizers by increasing 
nitrogen use efficiency
Development of more effective, lower-
cost, and integrated compounds such 
as improved nitrification inhibitors to 
reduce nitrogen losses associated with 
fertilizer use and breeding nitrification 
inhibition into crops
Various compounds exist and appear to be effective but 
improvements should be possible, including more tailored 
understanding of which compounds are most effective under 
precisely which conditions. Researchers have now identified traits 
to inhibit nitrification biologically in some varieties of all major 
grain crops that can be built upon through breeding.
Adopt emissions-
reducing rice 
management and 
varieties
Development of rice varieties that emit 
less methane
Researchers have shown that some common rice varieties emit 
less methane than others and have bred one experimental rice 
variety that reduces methane emissions by 30 percent under 
scientifically controlled conditions, although its effects on yields 
are unknown.  
Note: This table is not intended to be exhaustive and does not include all courses or menu items. 
Source: Authors.
Table 37-1  |    Critical research needs for breakthrough technologies (continued)
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CONCLUSIONS
The challenges of creating a sustainable food future, to some 
extent, are reflected and addressed in the concept of “climate-
smart agriculture.” Our menu defines our understanding of that 
concept, which is less a specific set of practices and more a 
quality that emerges from highly efficient use of natural resources, 
innovation in technology and management, and protection of 
natural lands at a national or landscape level.
CHAPTER 38
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Creating a sustainable food future—simultaneously 
feeding a more populous world, fostering develop-
ment and poverty reduction, and mitigating climate 
change and other environmental damage—presents 
a set of deeply intertwined challenges. Our defini-
tion of a sustainable food future overlaps in large 
measure with the term “climate-smart agriculture” 
(CSA) but our report offers several insights that dif-
fer in direction or emphasis from much prior work 
(Box 38-1).
The challenge of sustainably feeding nearly 10 
billion people by 2050 is substantially greater 
than commonly presented in land-use or climate 
mitigation analyses 
 ▪ Global challenge: We believe that many 
studies to date have failed to take account of the 
full magnitude and interrelated nature of the 
challenges ahead. Climate estimates generally 
pay little attention to rising agricultural emis-
sions and often improperly assume that land-
use-change emissions will stop. Some agricul-
tural analyses have overestimated the trends of 
yield gains because, for example, they base their 
estimates on compound growth rates. Others 
have simply assumed that other human activi-
ties can convert large areas of pasture or woody 
savannas without food, carbon, or significant 
biodiversity effects. But the world is on a course 
(on existing trend lines) to require more than 
50 percent more food per year by 2050, which, 
in our baseline scenario, would be produced by 
converting hundreds of millions of hectares of 
land to agriculture and generating 33 percent 
more GHG emissions from agricultural produc-
tion relative to our base year of 2010. 
 ▪ Shifts in locations of agricultural land: 
Loss of carbon and biodiversity result not mere-
ly from net land expansion but also from shifts 
in agricultural land locations both between and 
within regions. This shifting adds greatly to the 
challenge and makes land-use restrictions or 
pricing of carbon consequences necessary.
BOX 38-1 | The Menu for a Sustainable Food Future and “Climate-Smart Agriculture” (CSA)
Since the term was coined around 2010, 
CSA has become an important goal of 
international institutions, such as the World 
Bank and FAO. FAO identifies three pillars 
of CSA: sustainably increasing agricultural 
productivity and incomes, adapting and 
building resilience to climate change, and 
reducing and/or removing GHG emissions. 
The overlap between this broad definition 
and the goals of this report is clear, which 
means that our report can help to define and 
identify priorities for CSA. 
One school of thought, which we consider 
too restrictive, treats CSA as a set of specific 
practices, with a particular focus on those 
that build soil carbon. The original hope 
was that sequestering carbon in soils 
would provide a cheap method of reducing 
concentrations of carbon in the air, which 
factories and utilities might fund for carbon 
offsets. Measures such as mulching, 
agroforestry, and no-till farming would 
simultaneously mitigate climate change 
by removing carbon dioxide, boost output 
through the greater productivity of carbon-
rich soils, and increase resilience to greater 
fluctuations in rainfall through the ability of 
carbon-rich soils to hold water longer. 
As we discussed in Chapter 30, soil carbon 
sequestration in agricultural soils turns 
out to be far more difficult than previously 
thought, and several measures were more 
about moving carbon storage around than 
increasing total storage. The potential of 
soil carbon sequestration to mitigate other 
agricultural emissions is limited and is 
probably needed just to offset emissions 
not counted today from soil carbon loss. 
We believe that measures to build carbon 
in soils should be thought of not as easy 
climate mitigation or adaptation measures 
but rather as challenging yet valuable 
measures primarily to build agricultural 
productivity, with relatively modest direct 
climate mitigation through the carbon 
dioxide removed—but more potential climate 
benefits through the potential to reduce land 
conversion. 
For these reasons, the menu items proposed 
in this report offer a broader set of strategies 
for climate-smart agriculture. They offer 
major synergies between productivity gains, 
greater resilience, and GHG mitigation. They 
support the goal of “produce, protect, and 
prosper.” The core synergy lies in boosting 
efficiency in the use of land, animals, 
and inputs, which can raise agricultural 
incomes while reducing emissions and the 
demand for land. Yet because productivity 
gains can exacerbate shifting in locations 
of agricultural land, the synergy requires 
strong measures to prevent agricultural land 
expansion into natural ecosystems.
Because of this synergy—and even though 
some specific agricultural practices are 
necessary to mitigate production emissions, 
such as feed additives for enteric methane—
low-emissions agriculture cannot just be 
one specific set of agricultural practices. 
Low-emissions agriculture can only emerge 
from a combination of strategies deployed at 
national or, at the least, landscape level. 
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 ▪ Sub-Saharan Africa: Sub-Saharan Africa 
presents a core challenge for a sustainable 
food future because of its low yields, high rates 
of malnutrition, rapid population growth, 
abundant opportunities to convert additional 
woody savannas and forests, and hundreds of 
millions of smallholder farmers. Improving the 
region’s crop yields, focusing land expansion 
on the lowest-environmental-cost lands 
(above all by controlling the locations of road 
improvements), and accelerating progress in 
education and public health are all critical to 
success. 
Productivity gains are critical
Under all scenarios, the growth in crop and pasture 
yields and other forms of agricultural productivity 
gains are the prime determinants of future emis-
sions and land-use demands (although this fact can 
be obscured by the large productivity gains already 
assumed in baselines).
Productivity gains in land, animal, and chemical 
inputs already in our 2050 baseline are responsible 
for closing two-thirds of the GHG mitigation gap 
and more than 80 percent of the land gap that exist 
if we assume no improvements in efficiency or 
output relative to 2010 levels (our “no productivity 
gains after 2010” scenario). When adding in the 
various additional productivity gains required to 
meet our 4 gigaton/year GHG emissions target by 
2050, the role of productivity gains must grow even 
larger. Productivity gains also provide the most 
important potential synergy between income, food 
security, and environmental goals. 
 ▪ Crops: Replicating the large increases in 
chemical inputs and irrigation water associated 
with the Green Revolution is no longer possible 
or consistent with environmental goals. Fortu-
nately, advances in molecular biology and re-
lated breeding technologies offer great potential 
for boosting productivity above trend lines—if 
research efforts receive sufficient financial sup-
port. 
 ▪ Pasture: Every hectare of global pasture that 
is capable of and appropriate for sustainable 
intensification must be fully exploited to realize 
its potential to increase milk or meat output 
several times over. 
Slowing the rate of growth in demand for food 
and other agricultural products is critical too  
 ▪ Food loss and waste: Abundant technical 
opportunities exist to reduce food loss and 
waste. The deliberate reduction of food loss and 
waste, through action by governments, consum-
ers, and food companies, is a newly emerging 
effort. At this time, it requires commitment, in-
novation, measurement, and then deployment 
of promising approaches. 
 ▪ Diets: When properly factoring in the effects 
of diets on land use, dietary choices have far 
greater consequence for ecosystems and GHG 
emissions than typically estimated.
 ▪ Bioenergy: To date, the primary effect of public 
policy has been to make the challenge harder 
by increasing demand for bioenergy, based on 
mistaken GHG accounting. Because even a small 
amount of bioenergy from crops or feedstocks 
that make use of dedicated land requires a large 
amount of land, plans for more bioenergy could, 
alone, derail a sustainable food future.
 ▪ Population: Major economically and socially 
advantageous opportunities exist to hold down 
the growth in demand for agricultural products in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Key strategies are to increase 
educational opportunities for girls, increase ac-
cess to reproductive health services, and reduce 
infant and child mortality. Realizing these op-
portunities will require major social and finan-
cial commitments.
Production of meat and milk from cattle, sheep, 
and goats needs to be a core focus of both 
demand-side strategies and productivity gains
 ▪ Forage-based agriculture: Demand for 
milk and meat from cattle, sheep, and goats is 
responsible for most projected future land-use 
expansion and roughly half of agricultural pro-
duction emissions. No viable strategy for a sus-
tainable food future exists that does not include 
huge increases in the efficiency of pasture- and 
forage-based agriculture and slower growth in 
demand for ruminant meat. 
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 ▪ Ruminant meat consumption: Analyses 
that have focused inappropriately on human-
edible feeds only and have not fully factored in 
land-use consequences have sometimes masked 
the enormous role that ruminant meat con-
sumption plays in agricultural land demand. A 
major effort to shift diets away from high levels 
of ruminant meat consumption is warranted by 
several factors. The environmental impacts of 
ruminant meat production are high, the num-
ber of people who consume large quantities of 
ruminant meats is relatively small, ruminant 
meats provide only 3 percent of calories and 12 
percent of dietary protein even in the United 
States, and there is a historical precedent for 
shifting away from beef consumption in the 
United States and Europe.
Productivity gains must be explicitly linked to 
protection of carbon-rich ecosystems 
 ▪ Link “produce” and “protect”: Productiv-
ity gains by themselves cannot stop emissions 
and ecosystem degradation caused by shifts in 
the locations of agricultural land. Productivity 
gains will only solve the land-use challenge if 
countries simultaneously enforce protection of 
forests and savannas and—when some agricul-
tural expansion is inevitable—use detailed, spa-
tial plans to locate expansion in the areas with 
the lowest environmental opportunity costs.
 ▪ Policy instruments: Governments and 
private parties should explicitly link efforts to 
boost yields with ecosystem protection through 
financing, lending conditions, supply chain 
commitments, and public policies. 
 ▪ Road building: New roads must be located 
in ways that minimize the incentives to convert 
natural areas to agriculture. The forest frontier 
should be closed to agriculture.
Reforestation of some lands, and restoration 
of peatlands, should proceed immediately, 
but larger-scale reforestation depends on 
technological innovation and changes in 
consumption patterns 
 ▪ Reforestation: Important but limited op-
portunities exist today to reforest unproduc-
tive or abandoned agricultural lands with little 
improvement potential. However, the scale of 
reforestation necessary to fully achieve climate 
goals requires that more land be liberated from 
agriculture. Freeing up hundreds of millions of 
hectares of land can only be achieved through 
highly successful implementation of the mea-
sures proposed in our demand-reducing and 
productivity-boosting menu items (Courses 1 
and 2).  
 ▪ Natural forests: Because agricultural land 
tends to shift locations, programs that reforest 
abandoned land only with plantation forests 
will lead to steady declines in biodiversity and 
carbon stocks. More reforestation programs 
therefore need to focus on diverse, native spe-
cies.
 ▪ Peatlands: Restoration of drained peatlands 
is a low-hanging fruit among climate mitigation 
options. Drained peatlands occupy perhaps 0.5 
percent of total agricultural land but produce 
2 percent of all human-generated GHG emis-
sions, not merely those from agriculture. 
Strategies should support rural livelihoods by 
helping farmers sell to markets, even as more 
farmers transition to urban jobs, but should not 
promote large land acquisitions. 
 ▪ Pushing large farms? Pushing the replace-
ment of small farms, particularly by supporting 
large acquisitions of communal land or land 
now farmed by small farmers, is not consistent 
with poverty reduction or environmental goals 
and is rarely helpful for productivity gains. 
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 ▪ Focusing assistance for small farms: 
Even so, subsistence agriculture offers poor 
prospects over the long term, and small farms 
in many parts of the world are dividing and be-
coming too small to allow households to avoid 
poverty without off-farm income. Policy should 
therefore encourage farming for markets, allow 
farms to consolidate “organically” through pur-
chases and leases of land, create social welfare 
systems that reduce the risk inherent in farm-
ing for markets or specializing in cash crops, 
and otherwise support the inevitable shift 
toward off-farm incomes. 
 ▪ Appropriately formalizing property rights: Formalizing property rights would 
probably be valuable in many parts of the 
world, and new geographic information systems 
make the effort less technically difficult. But the 
process can lead to greater inequity when con-
trolled by powerful interests. Formalizing rights 
can even codify inequities such as limitations 
on property rights for women. Formalization 
should therefore proceed in ways that respect 
the variety of traditional uses, carefully safe-
guard equity, and modify traditional property 
approaches when necessary to rectify historic 
inequities. 
Regulation and technological innovation will be 
essential to achieve the most ambitious levels of 
our menu items.
 ▪ Regulation: It is hard to reduce emissions 
and related environmental harms if efforts to 
reduce them are completely voluntary. Regula-
tions must be crafted to spur innovation while 
allowing flexibility to develop cost-effective 
solutions. Regulations should apply mostly to 
manufacturers of agricultural inputs and to 
managers of concentrated livestock facilities.
 ▪ Research and innovation: Several types 
of innovations are necessary to close the food, 
land, and GHG emissions gaps. Many already 
exist but, despite their promise, receive mini-
mal support today. Their further development 
requires large increases in public funding, 
which need to come from a variety of public 
agencies, not just traditional agricultural re-
search agencies. 
 ▪ The “D” in R&D: The actual deployment of 
low-emissions and productivity-enhancing 
technologies often requires the development 
of detailed plans, with regular monitoring and 
feedback. Today, most aspects of technological 
deployment receive only a fraction of the atten-
tion that is needed. Just as engineering costs 
are built into construction projects, develop-
ment plans should be incorporated into virtu-
ally all agricultural development funding.
To summarize our conclusions, we believe that 
the challenge of sustainably feeding nearly 10 
billion people by 2050 is greater than commonly 
appreciated. 
Despite the many obstacles to be overcome, we 
believe that a sustainable food future is achievable. 
Our menu proposed in this report can create a 
world with sufficient, nutritious food for everyone. 
It also offers the chance to generate the broader 
social, environmental, and economic benefits that 
are the foundation of sustainable development. But 
such a future will only be achieved if governments, 
the private sector, and civil society act upon the 
entire menu quickly and with conviction. 
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Overview of the Model
The GlobAgri-WRR model is a global agriculture and land-use account-
ing model. It estimates changes in agricultural production, greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions, and land-use demands over time, which result 
both from changes in demand for agricultural products and changes in 
production techniques, yields, and systems. Changes in demand may 
result from changes in population, diets, nonfood uses of crops such 
as biofuels, and levels of food loss and waste. Changes in production 
may result from changes in crop yields, livestock efficiencies or a 
broad range of changes in agricultural production methods. GlobAgri-
WRR’s primary use is to estimate levels of land-use demand and GHG 
emissions at various points in the future, particularly 2050, and how 
various changes in demand or production methods might reduce those 
land-use requirements and emissions. 
As an accounting model, the model estimates ultimate land-use 
requirements and emissions given a wide variety of parameters that 
are varied exogenously by the user or programmed into the model. 
For example, diets, populations, crop yields, nitrogen use efficiencies, 
and the intensity of livestock systems can all be varied, but the user 
must set exogenously to run the model for any particular scenario. The 
model is designed to answer questions such as what the changes will 
be in land-use requirements and total emissions, both from production 
methods and land use, if diets, populations, crop yields, and production 
systems in each country in 2050 follow certain estimates. It is therefore 
a means of estimating what set of demands and production systems 
would achieve environmental goals. In the course of doing so, the 
model also estimates many other parameters, such as nitrogen lost to 
the environment and changes in terrestrial carbon.
The initial drivers of the model are diets, population, and demand 
for nonfood agricultural products. The model is calibrated to match 
statistics from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions (FAO) for the reference year of 2010 using an average of 2009–11 
to avoid overreliance on the results of a single year. These statistics 
include diets at the country level (set forth in FAO food balance sheets),1 
production, harvested area, cropland, and pasture. Food loss and waste 
rates are based primarily on a 2011 FAO study,2 which GlobAgri-WRR 
adjusts to reflect estimates of processing and transformation losses in 
FAO food balance sheet data and thereby avoid any double-counting 
between the 2011 FAO study and the FAO food balance sheets.
The reference year inputs are disaggregated at the country level, 
including not just demands but the various coefficients that translate 
demand for agricultural products into production, inputs, and land use, 
such as levels of waste, calorie balances, and livestock production 
systems. When the model is “run,” which involves solving for trade and 
some other interactions among countries, these levels are aggregated 
APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTION OF THE GLOBAGRI-WRR MODEL
to a regional level both to avoid excess computation requirements 
and to smooth out possible data errors at the country level. When 
coefficients for parameters are missing at the country level, regional 
estimates are assigned to each country within the region.  
Overall, the model can estimate how changes in population, diets, 
other crop demands, rates of losses and wastes, and/or production 
techniques within any one country will change production, emissions, 
and land-use demands regionally and globally. Table A-1 shows how 
the world’s countries and territories are grouped into 11 regions in 
GlobAgri-WRR: Asia (except China and India), Brazil, China, European 
Union, Former Soviet Union, India, Latin America (except Brazil), Middle 
East and North Africa, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, other countries), sub-Saharan Africa, and the 
United States and Canada. Because the regional disaggregation is fully 
flexible, it is also possible to use any individual country as a region, and 
in the standard operation of the model, Brazil, India, and China are both 
countries and regions.
At the country level, the model works with the 117 agricultural products 
that are a part of FAOSTAT commodity balance levels. For specific pur-
poses, in particular trade and nitrogen balances, some products may 
be further disaggregated into finer agricultural products, which FAO 
calls supply and utilization account (SUA) commodities. For example, 
pulses are divided into separate types of beans, and the category of 
vegetables is divided into separate vegetable products. This further 
disaggregation is used to analyze trade because FAO reports trade 
in these products at more detailed levels, and to determine nitrogen 
contents of crops in order to estimate nitrogen surpluses. By contrast, 
some derived products are merged with the product they are derived 
from using energy equivalent quantities and after accounting for 
processing losses. For example, demand for a certain quantity of beer 
results in demand for barley with equivalent energy content after ac-
counting for transformation losses. 
Although these country-level products are used to calculate land-use 
demands, GHG emissions, inputs, and other factors, all interactions 
among countries occur at the regional level both to reduce processing 
time and to smooth out errors in data that may occur at the country 
level for some products. In addition, to limit processing time, the more 
detailed agricultural products are aggregated to 33 product aggregates 
at this regional level. Some of these aggregates remain as unique 
products, as is the case for wheat, maize, rice, soybeans, soybean oil, 
soybean cakes, beef, dairy, and eggs. Feed products not in com-
modity balances are also included at both the country and regional 
levels, most prominently grass. For the most part, country-level and 
commodity-balances parameters can be individually varied, allowing 
the model to compute model inputs using whatever detail is available 
at the country and detailed products level.
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COUNTRY OR TERRITORY GLOBAGRI-WRR REGION
Afghanistan Asia (except China and India)
Albania OECD, other countries
Algeria Middle East and North Africa
American Samoa Asia (except China and India)
Andorra OECD, other countries
Angola Sub-Saharan Africa
Anguilla Latin America (except Brazil)
Antarctica Not classified
Antigua and Barbuda Latin America (except Brazil)
Argentina Latin America (except Brazil)
Armenia Former Soviet Union
Aruba Latin America (except Brazil)
Australia OECD, other countries
Austria European Union 
Azerbaijan Former Soviet Union
Bahamas Latin America (except Brazil)
Bahrain Middle East and North Africa
Bangladesh Asia (except China and India)
Barbados Latin America (except Brazil)
Belarus Former Soviet Union
Belgium European Union 
Belize Latin America (except Brazil)
Benin Sub-Saharan Africa
Bermuda OECD, other countries
Bhutan Asia (except China and India)
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Latin America (except Brazil)
Bosnia and Herzegovina OECD, other countries
Botswana Sub-Saharan Africa
Brazil Brazil
British Indian Ocean Territory Not classified
British Virgin Islands Latin America (except Brazil)
Brunei Darussalam Middle East and North Africa
Bulgaria European Union 
Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa
Burundi Sub-Saharan Africa
Cambodia Asia (except China and India)
Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa
Canada United States and Canada
Cape Verde Sub-Saharan Africa
Cayman Islands Latin America (except Brazil)
Central African Republic Sub-Saharan Africa
Chad Sub-Saharan Africa
Table A-1 |  Countries, territories, and regions in the GlobAgri-WRR model
COUNTRY OR TERRITORY GLOBAGRI-WRR REGION
Channel Islands European Union 
Chile Latin America (except Brazil)
China China
Christmas Island Not classified
Cocos (Keeling) Islands Not classified
Colombia Latin America (except Brazil)
Comoros Sub-Saharan Africa
Congo Sub-Saharan Africa
Cook Islands Asia (except China and India)
Costa Rica Latin America (except Brazil)
Côte d’Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa
Croatia OECD, other countries
Cuba Latin America (except Brazil)
Cyprus European Union 
Czech Republic European Union 
Democratic People’s  
Republic of Korea Asia (except China and India)
Democratic Republic  
of the Congo Sub-Saharan Africa
Denmark European Union
Djibouti Sub-Saharan Africa
Dominica Latin America (except Brazil)
Dominican Republic Latin America (except Brazil)
Ecuador Latin America (except Brazil)
Egypt Middle East and North Africa
El Salvador Latin America (except Brazil)
Equatorial Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa
Eritrea Sub-Saharan Africa
Estonia European Union
Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Latin America (except Brazil)
Faroe Islands OECD, other countries
Fiji Asia (except China and India)
Finland European Union
France European Union
French Guiana Latin America (except Brazil)
French Polynesia Asia (except China and India)
French Southern and Antarctic 
Territories Not classified
Gabon Sub-Saharan Africa
Gambia Sub-Saharan Africa
Georgia Former Soviet Union
Germany European Union
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COUNTRY OR TERRITORY GLOBAGRI-WRR REGION
Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa
Gibraltar OECD, other countries
Greece European Union
Greenland OECD, other countries
Grenada Latin America (except Brazil)
Guadeloupe Latin America (except Brazil)
Guam Asia (except China and India)
Guatemala Latin America (except Brazil)
Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa
Guinea-Bissau Sub-Saharan Africa
Guyana Latin America (except Brazil)
Haiti Latin America (except Brazil)
Holy See OECD, other countries
Honduras Latin America (except Brazil)
Hungary European Union
Iceland OECD, other countries
India India
Indonesia Asia (except China and India)
Iran (Islamic Republic of) Middle East and North Africa
Iraq Middle East and North Africa
Ireland European Union
Isle of Man European Union
Israel Middle East and North Africa
Italy European Union
Jamaica Latin America (except Brazil)
Japan OECD, other countries
Jordan Middle East and North Africa
Kazakhstan Former Soviet Union
Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa
Kiribati Asia (except China and India)
Kuwait Middle East and North Africa
Kyrgyzstan Former Soviet Union
Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic Asia (except China and India)
Latvia European Union
Lebanon Middle East and North Africa
Lesotho Sub-Saharan Africa
Liberia Sub-Saharan Africa
Libya Middle East and North Africa
Liechtenstein OECD, other countries
Lithuania European Union
Luxembourg European Union
COUNTRY OR TERRITORY GLOBAGRI-WRR REGION
Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa
Malawi Sub-Saharan Africa
Malaysia Asia (except China and India)
Maldives Asia (except China and India)
Mali Sub-Saharan Africa
Malta European Union
Marshall Islands Asia (except China and India)
Martinique Latin America (except Brazil)
Mauritania Sub-Saharan Africa
Mauritius Sub-Saharan Africa
Mayotte Sub-Saharan Africa
Mexico Latin America (except Brazil)
Micronesia (Federated States of) Asia (except China and India)
Monaco OECD, other countries
Mongolia Asia (except China and India)
Montenegro OECD, other countries
Montserrat Latin America (except Brazil)
Morocco Middle East and North Africa
Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa
Myanmar Asia (except China and India)
Namibia Sub-Saharan Africa
Nauru Asia (except China and India)
Nepal Asia (except China and India)
Netherlands European Union
Netherlands Antilles Latin America (except Brazil)
New Caledonia Asia (except China and India)
New Zealand OECD, other countries
Nicaragua Latin America (except Brazil)
Niger Sub-Saharan Africa
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa
Niue Asia (except China and India)
Norfolk Island Asia (except China and India)
Northern Mariana Islands Asia (except China and India)
Norway OECD, other countries
Occupied Palestinian Territory Middle East and North Africa
Oman Middle East and North Africa
Pacific Islands Trust Territory Not classified
Pakistan Asia (except China and India)
Palau Asia (except China and India)
Panama Latin America (except Brazil)
Papua New Guinea Asia (except China and India)
Paraguay Latin America (except Brazil)
Table A-1 |  Countries, territories, and regions in the GlobAgri-WRR model (continued)
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COUNTRY OR TERRITORY GLOBAGRI-WRR REGION
Peru Latin America (except Brazil)
Philippines Asia (except China and India)
Pitcairn Islands Not classified
Poland European Union
Portugal European Union
Puerto Rico Latin America (except Brazil)
Qatar Middle East and North Africa
Republic of Korea Asia (except China and India)
Republic of Moldova Former Soviet Union
Republic of North Macedonia OECD, other countries
Réunion Sub-Saharan Africa
Romania European Union
Russian Federation Former Soviet Union
Rwanda Sub-Saharan Africa
Saint Helena Sub-Saharan Africa
Saint Kitts and Nevis Latin America (except Brazil)
Saint Lucia Latin America (except Brazil)
Saint Pierre and Miquelon OECD, other countries
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines Latin America (except Brazil)
Samoa Asia (except China and India)
San Marino OECD, other countries
São Tomé and Príncipe Sub-Saharan Africa
Saudi Arabia Middle East and North Africa
Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa
Serbia OECD, other countries
Seychelles Sub-Saharan Africa
Sierra Leone Sub-Saharan Africa
Singapore Asia (except China and India)
Slovakia European Union
Slovenia European Union
Solomon Islands Asia (except China and India)
Somalia Sub-Saharan Africa
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
Spain European Union
Sri Lanka Asia (except China and India)
Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa
COUNTRY OR TERRITORY GLOBAGRI-WRR REGION
Suriname Latin America (except Brazil)
Svalbard and Jan Mayen 
Islands OECD, other countries
Swaziland Sub-Saharan Africa
Sweden European Union
Switzerland OECD, other countries
Syrian Arab Republic Middle East and North Africa
Tajikistan Former Soviet Union
Thailand Asia (except China and India)
Timor-Leste Asia (except China and India)
Togo Sub-Saharan Africa
Tokelau Asia (except China and India)
Tonga Asia (except China and India)
Trinidad and Tobago Latin America (except Brazil)
Tunisia Middle East and North Africa
Turkey Middle East and North Africa
Turkmenistan Former Soviet Union
Turks and Caicos Islands Latin America (except Brazil)
Tuvalu Asia (except China and India)
Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa
Ukraine Former Soviet Union
United Arab Emirates Middle East and North Africa
United Kingdom European Union
United Republic of Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa
United States of America United States and Canada
United States Virgin Islands Latin America (except Brazil)
Uruguay Latin America (except Brazil)
Uzbekistan Former Soviet Union
Vanuatu Asia (except China and India)
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Latin America (except Brazil)
Viet Nam Asia (except China and India)
Wake Island Not classified
Wallis and Futuna Islands Asia (except China and India)
Western Sahara Middle East and North Africa
Yemen Middle East and North Africa
Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa
Zimbabwe Sub-Saharan Africa
Table A-1 |  Countries, territories, and regions in the GlobAgri-WRR model (continued)
Note: The European Union comprised 27 member states in 2010, the base year used in the model.
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Although the core of the model is an elaborate accounting system, 
the model incorporates results from a variety of submodels that use a 
range of biophysical processes to estimate emissions or the relation-
ship of inputs to production. These models include the following, which 
are discussed in further detail below: 
 ▪ Land use: A model to estimate the source of new agricultural 
lands by region and resulting GHG emissions from land-use change 
developed primarily by researchers at the European Commission’s 
Joint Research Centre.
 ▪ Livestock: A model estimating representative production systems, 
feeds, and emissions at the regional level for beef, milk, sheep and 
goats, pork, chicken, and eggs developed primarily by researchers 
at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisa-
tion and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
 ▪ Aquaculture: A model to separate aquaculture production by rep-
resentative production systems within major producing countries or 
regions, and to estimate land-use demands, feed requirements, and 
emissions developed by WorldFish.
 ▪ Rice: A model to estimate GHG emissions from rice production 
developed primarily by a researcher at the Institute for Soil Science 
in Nanjing, China.
 ▪ Nitrogen: A model to estimate nitrogen demand and emissions by 
different crop types and country developed primarily by researchers 
at Princeton University.
 ▪ Energy use: Estimates of emissions from agricultural energy use 
developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and by FAO.
Categories of Agricultural Products 
The model manages three types of agricultural products: 
1. Primary vegetal products, such as wheat, soybeans, or grasses, are 
grown on land. Based on levels of demand, location or production, 
and yield, the demands for these products translate into demand 
for cropland and/or grazing land (and, based on production tech-
niques, into GHG emissions). Demand for these products may be 
direct, or it may result from demand for transformed products, such 
as meat. At the regional level, the model aggregates the primary 
vegetable products into 15 categories of primary vegetal products 
based on commodity-balances products and three grass products.
2. Transformed products provide a second type of product demand, 
including vegetable oil, oilseed cakes (sometimes called meals) 
used for livestock, biofuels, alcohol, and various meats, milk, and 
eggs. Some of these products are in direct demand, such as the 
demand for meat and milk or vegetable oil. The demand for some 
others, such as oilseed cakes, which are used as an animal feed, 
derives from demand for other products, such as meats and milk, 
and may depend not only on their levels of demand but also on 
production systems specified in the model. For example, the 
amount of soybean cake required will depend not only on the 
quantity of various livestock products but also on the production 
systems specified for those products. There are 17 such products at 
the regional level.
3. The third type of agricultural product does not require land, 
directly or indirectly. It corresponds to aquatic plant, honey, game, 
and other such products but also to some livestock by-products, 
such as offal. These products play a small role, and when diets or 
livestock production systems call for such products, the model 
generates them without emissions or land-use costs. 
The report refers to “animal-based foods” (and subcategories of such 
foods) extensively throughout Chapter 6—which are a combination of 
the second and third types of agricultural products noted above. See 
Figure A-1 for additional clarification about the different subcategories 
of animal-based foods modeled in this report.
In each case, the model also uses FAO data to relate calories available 
as food in each region and country to food quantities produced based 
on commodity-balance food products information included in food bal-
ance sheets. These coefficients vary by country because FAO estimates 
of the calorie content of final food products differ from country to coun-
try (mostly modestly but sometimes to a large degree) and because 
final products differ in quality and type (for example, the type of beef 
consumed). The calories-to-quantity coefficients must reflect these 
different calorie contents. For products that are the result of processing 
(e.g., alcohol), the relationship of production to consumption must also 
reflect losses during processing. We describe in more detail how those 
coefficients are calculated for processed products below.
Overall, one feature of this model that differs from most or all previous 
global agricultural models is the higher degree of disaggregation into 
both different food products and their transformed products. This 
makes it possible to analyze changes in more detailed diets. 
Model Computational Structure
For the most part, the model works like a series of interlocked spread-
sheets translating demand for all types of agricultural products into 
production in different countries and calculating the land use and other 
inputs required for that production and, from these inputs, the emissions 
generated during that production. In certain features, however, the model 
must resolve demand and supply through more complicated algorithms. 
Trade
In the base year, imports and exports are specified by FAO data at the 
country level and aggregated to the regional level using FAO bilateral 
trade information to remove intraregional trade. From these data, each 
region’s “dependence ratio” and “share in global gross exports” are cal-
culated for each agricultural product. The dependence ratio is the ratio 
of a region’s gross imports divided by the region’s demand for domestic 
consumption. If a region has gross imports of 10 units and consumes 
100 units of a product, its dependence ratio is therefore 10 percent. The 
“share in gross exports” is that country’s share of global gross exports. If 
a country contributes 20 units of total gross exports of a product among 
all exporting countries, and the world’s total trade of that product is 100 
units, that country’s share in gross exports is 20 percent. 
In future scenarios, the baseline assumption preserves both the 
“dependence ratio” and the “share in gross exports.” A region may 
both import some of the same product and export that product, in 
general because of different types or qualities of a crop or agricultural 
product. This system preserves both roles in global markets. To explore 
future scenarios, the model can be run with different trade shares and 
dependence ratios.
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Figure A-1 | Animal-based foods are split into eight categories in the GlobAgri-WRR model
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Land Use
In some scenarios that the model could analyze, there are possibilities 
for increasing agricultural land-use demands within a country to levels 
in excess of available land. To avoid this scenario, when a country runs 
out of agricultural land, the model is programmed to cap production 
and to meet rising demand by changes in net imports. This cap would 
only become relevant for extremely high growth scenarios.
 
We also have special rules regarding dry grazing land. In general, the 
model assumes that the full range of global production systems meet 
milk or meat demands in the base year. However, we believe that all or 
virtually all dry grazing land available in a country is used today, so that 
increases in grassland areas must come from wetter systems (humid 
or temperate). We also believe that because dry grazing lands have 
little alternative use, they would continue to be used even if demand 
for milk or ruminant meat declined. We therefore program the model 
so that changes in supply of milk or ruminant meat do not come from 
increases or decreases in arid grazing systems and instead result in 
changes in humid and temperate production systems. 
By-products, Processing Products, and Coproducts
We take diet consumption in the reference year from FAO commodity 
balances. FAO reports these data per country. These balance sheets 
cover a wide variety of products that are derived products, such as 
sugar and sweeteners, alcohol, vegetable oils and cakes, brans, milled 
rice, and milk and meats. In addition, some products may be joint prod-
ucts. For example, soybeans generate both soybean oil and cake, and 
producing milk will result in both milk and some meat production. 
It is possible to handle these transitions by translating all final products 
into primary product equivalents. For example, a kilogram of soy-
bean oil can be transformed into a fraction of a kilogram of soybean 
crop that might correspond to its weight or calorie percentage. An 
advantage of this approach is that it limits the number of products, 
and also implicitly accounts for changes in coproduct shares when 
Note: Offal refers to the entrails and internal organs of an animal used as food. Demersal fish refers to fish living near the floor of a body of water. Pelagic fish 
refers to fish that exist in the pelagic zone of a body of water, which is neither close to the shore nor close to the bottom. Cephalopods refers to sea life with 
prominent heads and tentacles, such as squid and octopi.
Source: GlobAgri-WRR model and FAO (2019a).
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demand changes. But a limitation of this approach is that the quantities 
of processed products may not be physically possible. For example, the 
percentages of soybean cake and soybean oil consumed may be differ-
ent from the physical quantities actually produced by a given quantity 
of soybeans. In part because of the growing dietary importance of 
vegetable oil, which may come from multiple sources, we wished to 
have a model that was physically possible for those products. We also 
wanted to have primary equivalents for other products—namely, sugar 
and sweeteners, alcohols, and brans. The model therefore establishes 
rules so that production of a primary product is driven by its largest 
coproduct by energy value—for example, soybean cake in the case of 
soybean products. The quantity of soybean oil production is therefore 
established by the demand for soybean cake for animal feed. 
Similarly, the FAO commodity balances show that many products (e.g., 
crops) are devoted to processing. The finished products that come out, 
such as alcohol, may derive from different combinations of primary 
products, such as different grains. During the processing, some product 
quantities are also lost or transformed into bran and some other 
products that are typically used for animal feed and that do not show 
up in food balance sheets. The commodity balances do not directly 
permit a mapping of processed products to primary products, and such 
a mapping is not straightforward. One challenge is that FAO estimates 
of calorie contents of food calories vary by region or country (e.g., a 
kilogram of beef will have different calories in one country compared 
to another because the types of beef products are considered to vary). 
Ultimately, consumed calories in the different product categories have 
to map consistently and plausibly to primary products, both produced 
domestically and imported.
Programming in GlobAgri-WRR is designed to address these challenges 
in a variety of ways. For derived products, such as raw sugar, sweeten-
ers, alcohols, and brans that can be derived from diverse products, 
we first determine the relative contributions of different processed 
inputs. There could be more than one solution for the determination 
of a derived product source. For example, wheat and maize processed 
in alcohol and sweeteners may be combined in different ways. As one 
example, all the sweeteners may come from maize and the remaining 
processed maize could be used as alcohol, then processed wheat 
would be used to produce the remaining alcohol. However, many other 
combinations are possible. We use a minimization to find a unique 
solution by trying to keep the share of input product in derived product 
similar to the share of processed use in total processed uses for cor-
responding products. In the example above, if processed maize is twice 
as high as processed wheat, then two-thirds of alcohol and sweetener 
will come from maize and one-third from wheat. This calculation is 
done only for the reference year to set coefficients for the model in 
general. 
Finally, for derived products set forth in use by FAO that are not explicit 
(brans, sugar, alcohols), we compute the transformation coefficients 
so that primary products and ultimate products are equivalent. For ex-
ample, if diets report consumption of alcohol, and some of that alcohol 
is imported, these demands and imports are transformed into primary 
products both for calculating diets and imports. 
All the computations described above concern commodity balances 
products and reference year balances and coefficients. Turning to the 
model resolution, for sugar, brans, and alcohols, all the demands for 
food and feed are translated into primary products demands, mostly 
cereals and sugar crops. The model resolution is therefore simple for 
those products. 
For oil and cakes that are joint products of oil crops and meat and milk 
that are joint products of the dairy sector, a different approach must 
be used to assure physical consistencies for the reasons discussed 
above. In the case of oil crops except for oil palm fruit, the quantity 
demanded is based on the quantity of oilseed cakes required. The oil is 
treated as a by-product and is the first source of vegetable oil. If more 
vegetable oil is required, the model estimates that this supply will come 
from palm oil production because it is the cheapest source of global 
vegetable oil production. For this assumption to function, palm kernel 
cake and palm oil are considered to be produced independently so that 
palm oil demand can be met by increased oil palm production without 
increasing production of palm kernel cake. Similarly, the quantity of 
meat produced by the dairy sector depends entirely on the quantity 
of milk demand, with the meat treated as a coproduct. The remaining 
meat demand is filled by production systems for beef or small ruminant 
meat that produce only meat. 
Aquaculture
In the case of aquaculture, the model determines feed available from 
fish (a composite of oil and meal) as a percentage of available wild fish 
consumption. Because the wild fish harvest has not grown for more 
than 20 years, we do not believe any additional wild fish consumption is 
possible and therefore cap the level of fish and fish feed at 2010 levels. 
We have rules to ensure that additional aquaculture production substi-
tutes oilseeds for wild fish. (For some years, diversion of fish feed from 
other livestock products may serve as the direct source of additional 
aquaculture production, but that would require additional consumption 
of oilseeds by other livestock sectors with the same net result.) 
Waste
FAO food balance sheet data provide a category of waste for uses of 
food, but the category is too small to account for all sources of waste. 
GlobAgri-WRR therefore incorporates estimates of waste for each 
product in each region from FAO (2011c). To avoid double-counting 
waste, we add “waste” in FAOSTAT back into the food available for con-
sumption and then use loss and waste coefficients from FAO (2011c). 
Because FAOSTAT food balance sheets already assume transformation 
losses in food that goes through processing, we also do not include 
“processing and packaging” wastes estimated in FAO (2011c). “Posthar-
vest handling and storage” losses going through local food systems 
are also accounted for. The result should be actual diets. 
One of the issues with FAOSTAT and FAO (2011c) estimates of waste is that 
resulting actual diets appear likely to remain substantially higher than the 
calories people probably eat. As reported in Del Gobbo et al. (2015),3 there 
is a large discrepancy between the calories FAO data imply that people 
actually consume even after adjusting for loss and waste estimates, and 
the calories that people claim to eat based on food surveys around the 
world. For example, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) food surveys 
claim that people in the United States on average consumed 2,081 calories 
per day in 2009–10. By contrast, FAO food balance sheets, which are also 
based on USDA data, estimate food availability of 3,711 calories per person 
per day, which according to our calculations translates into 2,922 calories 
per person per day after adjusting for estimates of waste in the retail and 
consumer sectors. This difference is part of a broader set of discrepan-
cies. For example, Del Gobbo et al. (2015) found that while the FAO balance 
sheets estimated much higher food availability than consumption for most 
foods, they typically underestimated reported consumption of beans and 
legumes and nuts and seeds. 
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These discrepancies lack a full explanation. They may represent 
overestimates of food available by FAO, but they may also reveal under-
estimates of food consumption by people responding to surveys. One 
possible explanation for the underestimate of nuts and beans is that 
FAO may be failing to count some home production or wild-gathered 
nuts and seeds. Another possibility is that the FAO (2011c) estimates of 
food losses and waste, as high as they are, underestimate actual food 
waste, particularly if they fail to count portions of products that many 
people don’t ultimately consume but may not consider waste (such 
as the interior parts of vegetables, or the fattier parts of meat, that 
the affluent throw away). For purposes of GlobAgri-WRR, what is most 
important is that the land (and chemicals) used for agricultural produc-
tion ultimately correspond properly to diets. If losses and wastes are 
higher than otherwise estimated in FAO (2011c) and consumption is 
lower, this relationship between land and inputs and diets will remain 
accurate. At this time, there is no alternative to using FAO data for this 
type of analysis.
Land-Use Requirements 
The model specifies a production level for each crop and for livestock 
in each country based on demand and trade. Land area require-
ments for each crop are then based on specified yields and cropping 
intensities, which reflects the ratio of total cropland area to harvest. 
The model uses an average cropping intensity for all crops within a 
country. These figures are based on FAO data in the reference year. 
In future years, yields and cropping intensities can be specified as a 
model input. 
For grazing area, the model computes a demand for grazing area 
forage from the livestock module and in the reference year, an average 
yield of forage per hectare of grazing land in each of several climate 
zones. Forage quantities from grazing land are based on the model 
used for Herrero et al. (2013), discussed below. Grazing areas per 
climate zone were based on an overlay of the zones as specified by 
FAOSTAT and maps of grazing area from Bouwman et al. (2006). The 
climate zones are arid, humid, and temperate within each country. 
For reasons discussed above, all growth and reductions in livestock 
grazing areas in future years are estimated to come from humid and 
temperate zones. Grass yields are therefore specific to those zones. For 
future years, the model permits specification of percentage changes 
in grassland yields. Increases in tons of grass consumed per hectare 
could result either from improved grass growth or more efficient graz-
ing, and the model does not differentiate. (The livestock model also 
permits specification of improved livestock yields due to more efficient 
conversion of feed to meat and milk, but that improvement is made 
through the livestock module.)
Emissions
The model focuses on emissions up to the farm gate, including 
emissions involved in the production of farm inputs. Emissions from 
land-use change are also calculated separately and can be combined 
with production emissions.
Emissions are based on carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and meth-
ane (and do not include other pollutants such as black carbon and 
aerosols, or impacts on climate through tropospheric ozone or changes 
in albedo). In all cases, emissions are counted both in their actual 
gasses and using global warming potential (GWP) for 100 years. To 
calculate the GWP of 1 kg of methane, the model uses 34 kg of carbon 
dioxide equivalent based on the recommendations of the most recent 
comprehensive assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). These figures contrast with a GWP 100 of methane of 
25 under the IPCC’s 2006 national reporting guidelines, which most 
countries and international institutions still use. The GWP 100 of nitrous 
oxide is 298. 
The model computes the following categories of GHG emissions in 
ways that incorporate several other models as follows:
Livestock emissions (enteric, manure management, 
and paddocks, range and pasture)
The model estimates both emissions from livestock and types and 
quantities of feed required using a representation of livestock systems 
used in Herrero et al. (2013). As part of that exercise, the authors sepa-
rated the world’s ruminant livestock systems into 27 regions, and in 
each region, into up to eight representative systems based on the Sere-
Steinfeld livestock categorization system. Those systems are based 
on grazing-only systems, mixed systems (combining some grazing 
and some confined feeding), and “urban,” which are entirely confined 
systems. Grazing and mixed systems were also grouped into arid, hu-
mid, and temperate zones, which include tropical highlands. Ruminant 
systems were also categorized as bovine dairy, bovine meat, small 
ruminant dairy (sheep and goats), or small ruminant meat. For each 
system, the team estimated average feed diets and dominant breeds 
used, and basic herd characteristics (such as fertility and mortality 
rates). The team then estimated production using the “ruminant model,” 
which is a biophysical model developed by Herrero that simulates 
ruminant digestion, energy and protein uptake, and their translation 
through different cow breeds into live weight gain and milk produc-
tion. The model is sensitive to the precise qualities of animal feeds. 
Using a number of convergence algorithms, the modelers adjusted the 
estimates to fit FAO data for livestock numbers, production, and animal 
feeds tracked by FAO. 
The model calculates feed requirements in the following categories: 
crops, forage from grazing land, forage characterized as “occasional” 
(forage gathered by cut and carry systems or wastes from agricultural 
processing), and “stover” (crop residues). (The underlying model also 
uses types of stover and wastes.) Crops in turn are segregated into 
barley, corn, pulses, rice, sorghum and millet, soybeans, wheat, other 
cereals, other oil seeds, canola, and feed from animal products. 
Running GlobAgri-WRR does not require running ruminant or the 
underlying herd model but instead incorporates these results based on 
the regions and production systems. For each production system, the 
model incorporates the estimates of feed requirements per kilogram of 
production and emissions generated per kilogram of production. For 
the reference year, the model allocates ruminant production in a coun-
try to the different systems in proportion to the regional distribution 
of livestock systems’ grass demand estimated by Herrero et al. (2013) 
for the year 2000, using system-specific grassland areas in countries 
and regional system grassland yields. For monogastrics, the regional 
system production shares are used to split country production in the 
different systems. The quantity of production otherwise calculated by 
GlobAgri-WRR in a region or country, multiplied by share of a produc-
tion system, and multiplied by either the feed requirements or GHG 
emissions per unit of production for that system generates the total 
feed requirements and emissions in total for that system. GlobAgri-WRR 
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then sums these feed requirements to the national or regional level, 
where they determine the production of feeds and trade. GlobAgri-WRR 
also sums the emissions to the global level. 
The ruminant model embedded in this livestock system estimates 
both methane emissions and the nitrogen content of wastes. Based on 
system, the overall model estimates the portion of this nitrogen that is 
deposited on paddocks, range, and pasture (PRP) and the portion that 
is subject to a form of concentrated manure management. The model 
then uses Tier 1 coefficients from the IPCC 2006 national GHG reporting 
guidelines to estimate emissions from nitrous oxide associated with 
these nitrogen excretions. The ruminant model also estimates quanti-
ties of waste. The overlay model determines the manure management 
system for those systems that involve concentrated production of 
manure and uses Tier 1 IPCC emissions factors for that management 
system to estimate methane emissions.
The same paper also generates analyses for pork and poultry systems, 
divided between egg production and meat. Within each region, pork 
and poultry production are divided between intensive (“urban”) and 
extensive (“other”). Only crop feeds are individually listed, as other 
feeds are considered to be wastes and residues of some unspecified 
type. The authors estimated waste management systems by region. 
Emissions are based on Tier 1 methods from the IPCC 2006 guidelines.
For future years, GlobAgri-WRR can be run through variations on these 
livestock systems by estimating changes in the mix of livestock systems 
within a region or by introducing improvements in livestock systems 
whose effects are separately estimated using the ruminant model and 
herd model to generate emissions and feed requirement estimates. 
More details about the livestock model components, including a de-
scription of the ruminant model, are presented in the published online 
supplement to Herrero et al. (2013).
Rice methane emissions 
Rice methane emissions are based on the model developed and pre-
sented in Yan et al. (2009) based on IPCC 2006 methods. According to 
these methods, rice production from irrigated fields is influenced by the 
length of period of flooding within the cultivation season, the flooding 
regime outside of the cultivation period, the types of soil amendments 
added (particularly crop residues), and whether the in-season flooding 
is continuous, interrupted once by a drawdown that allows oxygen to 
penetrate soils, or interrupted by multiple drawdowns. Yan et al. (2009) 
developed a spreadsheet model based on understanding of these 
conditions in the rice-growing countries, and which allows for changes 
in water management conditions and soil amendments. The model can 
produce average national estimated methane emissions for each hect-
are of rice production. GlobAgri-WRR incorporates these estimates for 
the baseline year based on the model per country. For future scenarios, 
the rice model can be run “off-line” to estimate changes in these aver-
age national emissions based on changes in management practices. 
Such changes can then be incorporated as part of mitigation scenarios.
For this process, we made one change to the version of the model 
used in Yan et al. (2009). The version for that model built in assump-
tions of very high levels of single and multiple drawdowns across the 
world’s irrigated rice production based on figures provided in an Asian 
Development Bank report. These estimates seemed too high to the 
authors of the World Resources Report rice installment in Adhya et al. 
(2014). We adjusted these estimates so that one midseason drawdown 
is assumed to be common only in Japan, China, and South Korea (90 
percent of irrigated production), and there is no meaningful rate of 
multiple drawdowns. In all other countries, only 10 percent of irrigated 
production is estimated to experience one midseason drawdown. 
Nitrogen fertilizer use and nitrous oxide emissions 
Nitrous oxide emissions from agricultural soils are a function of all 
nitrogen applied to soils whether from fertilizer, nitrogen applied in 
manure, nitrogen deposited on soils by grazing cows, nitrogen fixed or 
absorbed by crops and left in crop residues, or nitrogen deposition. For 
cropland and for the portion of nitrogen applied to pasture from fertil-
izer, the model is now programmed primarily to generate emissions 
using an IPCC Tier 1 emission factor for direct and indirect nitrous oxide 
emissions of 1.425 percent of applied nitrogen. An exception is that 
nitrogen for irrigated rice production is based on the IPCC emission 
factor of 0.3 percent, because of the extensive evidence that flooding 
reduces nitrous oxide emissions. The model can easily be run using 
alternative emissions coefficients. The model can also estimate nitrous 
oxide emissions based on nitrogen surplus (the excess of applied nitro-
gen over nitrogen removed in crops, according to a formula estimated 
by van Groenigen et al. 2010).
Total nitrogen application rates, including nitrogen from synthetic fertil-
izer, manure, biological nitrogen fixation, and nitrogen deposition, are 
based on a database presented in Zhang et al. (2015b) and described 
in its supplement. This database was developed using data from a 
variety of sources, with particular reliance on data sets established 
by the International Fertilizer Association (IFA) and FAO. The nitrogen 
database in Zhang et al. (2015b) provides estimates on nitrogen input 
rate from four different sources, namely fertilizer, manure, biological ni-
trogen fixation, and deposition, by country and crop type for the period 
1961–2011. The database covers 153 crop types and over 190 countries, 
which account for more than 99 percent of the global total nitrogen in-
put to cropland. The nitrogen fertilization rates are estimated based on 
reports by IFA and FAO on fertilization rates by country and crop types 
for recent years (namely, 2000, 2006, 2007, and 2010). Nitrogen deposi-
tion rates for each country and crop type are estimated based on maps 
of nitrogen deposition and crop distribution. The projected deposition 
rates in 2050 are estimated based on the projection in Bouwman et al. 
(2013) and the crop distribution map around year 2000. Nitrogen fixa-
tion rates by leguminous crops are estimated based on the crop type 
and yield following methodologies used in Van Grinsven et al. (2015).
In addition, this database provides information on nitrogen removed 
from cropland in the form of food product, and consequently the nitro-
gen use efficiency (NUE) by crop type and country (or region), which 
is defined as the ratio of nitrogen removed by harvested crops divided 
by total nitrogen inputs. Along with nitrogen inputs from other sources, 
fertilizer demand can be estimated over time as a function of NUE, crop 
production, and crop yields. By estimating changes in NUE, various 
potential mitigation options can be analyzed.
For nitrogen from manure, to ensure consistency with the livestock 
model and potential changes in livestock production, we replaced the 
manure estimates in Zhang et al. (2015b) with manure estimates from 
the livestock model adapted from Herrero et al. (2013). In addition, 
because nitrogen in crop residues is not explicitly accounted for, a coef-
ficient is used that links nitrous oxide emissions from residues to other 
sources of nitrous oxide emissions based on FAOSTAT emissions data.
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Energy Use 
Energy use emissions come from two categories: energy used on farms 
to run machinery, and energy used to produce fertilizer and pesticide 
inputs. Emissions for energy use on farms are taken from FAOSTAT and 
are assigned within a country by hectare of harvested area. Emissions 
for pesticides are based on quantities of pesticides used by hectare 
and country using the same methodology as the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) for a 2009 rulemaking for the Renewable 
Fuels Standard expressed in a worksheet included in the docket for a 
rulemaking published on March 26, 2010, titled EPA-HQ-OAR-2005-0161-
3175.17.4 The analysis also includes estimated emissions and quantities 
for the production of phosphorus, potash, and potassium, which are 
also estimated per hectare for each of 11 crop types using IFA data. 
For nitrogen use, the model uses the nitrogen model subcomponent 
to estimate quantities of synthetic nitrogen used and then estimated 
emissions factors associated with synthetic nitrogen synthesis from 
the EPA document. 
Land-Use Emissions 
Emissions from land-use change are based on a model developed 
by researchers at the European Commission Joint Research Centre 
(JRC), originally described in Hiederer et al. (2010). This land-use model 
estimates the quantity of GHG emissions that will be generated by 
land-use change for a specified quantity of hectares of a particular 
type of crop within a specific region. It does so by identifying existing 
croplands and areas devoted to specific crops (Ramankutty et al. 2008; 
Monfreda et al. 2008) and identifying potentially suitable land for each 
specific crop that is not in crop production from the GAEZ/FAO model, 
and then a variety of mapped products to identify different landscape 
types. After excluding land within a cell that is not suitable for produc-
tion of a particular crop, the model then selects lands within a cell that 
are not cropland. In each cell with crops of any particular type, the as-
sumption is that cropland expands into remaining ecosystem types in 
proportion to those types. This analysis is based on an assumption but 
grounded in extensive empirical evidence that agricultural expansion 
tends to work outward from existing agricultural areas. 
Expansion of cropland results in levels of vegetation and soil carbon 
stocks falling from those found under natural vegetation to those found 
under cropping systems. To estimate carbon stocks, the model uses 
vegetative carbon stocks based on the IPCC 2006 default values for 
different ecosystems as synthesized in the guideline for the European 
Commission Directive on Renewable Energy (European Commission 
2010). The IPCC provides values for a broader range of ecosystems 
than our five land-use categories.5 The JRC model uses these differ-
ent land-use categories to estimate carbon stocks and changes but 
groups changes into five broader land-use categories: open forest 
(less than 30 percent canopy cover), closed forest (30 percent to 100 
percent canopy cover), scrubland (woody plants lower than 5 meters 
not having clear aspects of trees), grassland, and sparse vegetation. 
Soil carbon stocks within the top meter were estimated based on the 
Harmonized Soil and Water Database (version 1.1).6 The GlobAgri-WRR 
model assumes that cropland conversion causes the loss of one quar-
ter of soil carbon from the top meter, while conversion to grazing land 
does not alter soil carbon stocks.
In GlobAgri-WRR, the quantity of grazing land is dictated by demand 
for livestock and livestock systems. If the JRC model estimates that 
cropland would expand into grassland used for grazing, the area of 
grazing land would have to expand further. The JRC model can also be 
run to estimate land-use types converted for grazing. When the model 
estimates that cropland would expand on to grazing land, we therefore 
substitute for that grazing land a mix of land-use types that would 
be converted for expanded grazing. Because little of the world’s true 
native grassland (as opposed to scrubland or woody savanna) is not 
already used for grazing, we assume that all grassland conversion for 
crops reduces grazing land and therefore triggers this second-order 
conversion to replace the grazing land. This second-order conversion 
comes from ecosystem types that the model estimates would supply 
new grazing land in proportions based on the cell-by-cell analysis, but 
those sources of potential grazing land are restricted by GlobAgri-WRR 
to scrublands, open forest, and closed forest on the grounds that exist-
ing native grazing land is already used.
These calculations result in average carbon emissions for each hectare 
of land expansion in each country for pasture or for each type of crop. 
The central features of GlobAgri-WRR use these estimated emissions 
rates per hectare if the model estimates a change in demand for a 
type of crop or pasture within a country. Although the precise rate of 
emissions per hectare varies for each run of the model, typical average 
conversion rates for global changes in diets are around 85 tons of car-
bon per hectare, including both vegetation and soil carbon. These aver-
age emission factors are slightly higher than the average emissions 
per hectare used by the U.S. EPA for biofuel regulations (for the 2017 
case) of roughly 76 tons of carbon per hectare.7 One likely reason is 
that the EPA analysis used an international model focused on cropland 
expansion, which did not require that all converted grazing land be 
replaced. As a result, substantial areas of relatively low-carbon grazing 
land could be converted to crops without any further conversion of 
higher-carbon forest and savanna. Under the accounting approach 
in GlobAgri-WRR, a reduction in grazing land due to crop conversion 
requires an increase in pasture area for the same level of production, 
and this pasture land requires a further conversion of savanna,  
scrubland, or open or closed forest. All net increases in agricultural 
land can therefore only come from these land covers. The EPA model 
also did not account for the high carbon losses associated with peat-
land conversion for palm oil production in Southeast Asia.
One challenge in calculating emissions from land-use change is that 
methods such as those employed by our model typically ignore the 
forgone carbon sequestration that would occur in forests, and some 
savannas and scrublands, if the land were not converted to agriculture. 
Carbon stock estimates are typically based on existing forests, not 
undisturbed forests. Many and probably most of the world’s forests and 
woodland/savannas have been subject to forest harvest, whether for 
commercial production or firewood, and have depleted carbon levels. 
In satellite mapping systems, many lands that appear as savannas 
and open forest are actually abandoned agricultural lands regenerat-
ing with wood, or mixed-use landscapes. If not converted to cropland, 
some of these lands would increase their carbon stocks, and others 
might continue to be used but would contribute wood or even agricul-
tural products that help meet human needs. If carbon stocks are taken 
as fixed, the model neither picks up this forgone sequestration or the 
loss of biomass for human uses that might be replaced elsewhere. Put 
another way, the full opportunity cost of converting this land is not cap-
tured. Data limitations frustrate attempts to estimate these costs more 
fully because regeneration and harvest rates are unknown. At this time, 
our model in this way underestimates the costs of land conversion. 
Many other assumptions are uncertain because of the uncertainties 
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about the precise lands that will be converted, soil carbon losses, and 
existing carbon stocks. However, GlobAgri-WRR can be easily run with 
adjustments to these carbon stocks to represent alternative scenarios.
Land-use conversion will also typically result in nitrous oxide emis-
sions during decomposition of soil carbon, as well as nitrous oxide and 
methane emissions if fire is used for clearing. Although the JRC model 
estimates nitrous oxide emissions from soils in this way,8 the estimated 
emissions are typically only around 2 percent of carbon losses, and we 
omit them here.
Aquaculture 
Levels of aquaculture production, feed demand, and emissions are 
based on a study and model developed by WorldFish and described in 
Hall et al. (2011b). This study first characterized aquaculture production 
in all of the world’s major aquaculture-producing countries (plus other 
regions where aquaculture rates are lower) by major fish type and 
into three levels of production systems: extensive, semi-intensive, and 
intensive. For each system, the modelers estimated direct land-use 
demands (ponds), chemical and feed inputs, production, and emissions 
from direct energy use. (WorldFish modelers also estimated indirect 
emissions and land-use requirements associated with feed produc-
tion, but for use in GlobAgri-WRR, these quantities were stripped from 
the model to avoid double-counting, as GlobAgri-WRR estimates these 
emissions and land-use requirements directly given type and quantity 
of feed demand.) We aggregated fish production by country into com-
modity balance products based on the present mix, with associated 
average feed, direct land-use demands, and direct energy emissions 
(including chemical inputs). Using the WorldFish spreadsheet model, 
we developed alternative scenarios for future aquaculture production 
both in type of fish produced (allowing us to vary such factors as herbi-
vores, omnivores, or carnivores), and changes in production methods. 
These scenarios, some of which are intended to explore mitigation 
techniques, are run “offline” and then fed into GlobAgri-WRR as alterna-
tive production and demand scenarios. 
Because aquaculture has provided all increases in global fish 
consumption for more than two decades, the model assumes that all 
future fish consumption will come from aquaculture. Presently, the 
model is also programmed to assume that uses of wild fish meals and 
oils are constant to the 2010 base year, so that increases in aquaculture 
production will require oilseeds to replace fish meal and oil.
Biomass burning
At this time, GlobAgri-WRR model does not estimate emissions from 
biomass burning. Biomass burning typically attributed to agriculture 
falls into two categories: burning of savannas and grasslands for 
improved grazing, and burning of crop residues. We do not include the 
former because the extent to which human burning of grasslands and 
savannas increases methane and nitrous oxide above natural condi-
tions of these fire-prone ecosystems remains unclear. Residue burning 
has not yet been incorporated into the model, but it is small. 
Diets
To analyze diets in the reference year, GlobAgri-WRR generally adjusts 
diets provided by FAO food balance sheets after adjustment for wastes 
as specified in the papers describing the diets. For vegetarian diets 
in developed countries, there is little information available about 
what vegetarians actually consume. One exception is a set of surveys 
from 1993 to 1999 of vegetarians and vegans in the United Kingdom 
conducted by EPIC-Oxford. These data were the basis for an analysis 
of differential GHG emissions in Scarborough et al. (2014), which com-
pared emissions from diets using analogous lifecycle calculations that 
included not just farmgate emissions, which are the focus of GlobAgri-
WRR, but also processing, retailing, and consumption emissions. For 
the vegetarian analysis in GlobAgri-WRR, the authors of that study 
provided access to the dataset showing the reported intakes of each 
of 289 different foods for all 55,504 EPIC-Oxford participants. Those 
food items included final, processed food categories. We extracted the 
reported dietary intakes of each item by the vegetarians and vegans for 
both men and women and, using other data provided by the authors of 
that study, transformed the final food diets into calories of the types of 
foods analyzed by FAOSTAT. The resulting reported calorie consumption 
per person was significantly lower than that implicit in the FAOSTAT 
food balance sheets. That imbalance may occur because balance sheet 
diets, as discussed above, tend to be substantially more calorie-rich 
than self-reported diets whether by vegetarians or omnivores, but 
vegetarian calorie consumption may also be lower because vegetar-
ians were likely a healthier subset of the UK population. To identify the 
benefits of vegetarian diets themselves rather than changes in calorie 
consumption, we rescaled vegetarian diets in each region in which we 
applied these diets (generally wealthier countries) to the average per 
capita calorie consumption. 
GlobAgri-WRR Model Authors 
Principal modeler: Patrice Dumas, Centre de coopération internatio-
nale en recherche agronomique pour le développement (CIRAD)
Principal comodeler: Tim Searchinger, Princeton University
Other contributors to core model: Stéphane Manceron, L’Institut 
national de la recherche agronomique (INRA); Richard Waite, World 
Resources Institute (WRI); Chantel Lemouel, INRA
Additional contributors: Craig Hanson, WRI; Élodie Marajo Petitzon, 
INRA
Contributors of model components:
Livestock: Mario Herrero, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Re-
search Organisation (CSIRO); Petr Havlík, International Institute for Ap-
plied Systems Analysis (IIASA); Stefan Wirsenius, Chalmers University
Rice: Xiaoyuan Yan, Institute for Soil Science (China)
Nitrogen: Xin Zhang, Princeton University
Aquaculture: Mike Phillips, WorldFish; Rattanawan Mungkung, Kaset-
sart University
Land use: Fabien Ramos, European Commission Joint Research Centre 
(JRC)
Vegetarian diets: Data on UK vegetarian diets were provided by Paul 
Appleby of Oxford University and reanalyzed by Brian Lipinski and 
Laura Malaguzzi Valeri of WRI.
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APPENDIX B. FINDINGS OF PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL  
CONSEQUENCES OF SHIFTING DIETS
Table B-1 summarizes papers that examine the implications of reducing 
meat and dairy consumption in diets. They have consistently found 
large reductions in land use and GHG emissions, although effects on 
water use can depend on the level of fruit, vegetable, and nut con-
sumption. Because each of the studies discussed in this list uses a dif-
ferent approach, and because some include GHG emissions from food 
processing and retail and not merely production-related emissions at 
the farm, their results are not directly comparable to each other or to 
GlobAgri results. 
The GlobAgri-WRR model builds on previous studies and addresses 
some of their limitations. Many other studies are based not on one 
consistent model but on average results from multiple lifecycle as-
sessments performed by different researchers of different foods. This 
approach can introduce inconsistencies due to the widely varying 
methods and assumptions of different lifecycle assessments. Moreover, 
some modeling analyses, such as Eshel et al. (2014), focus only on one 
country. GlobAgri-WRR applies a single modeling approach to produc-
tion of foods throughout the world. It is most similar in basic approach 
to Bajzelj et al. (2014) and Hedenus et al. (2014). A principal difference 
is that GlobAgri-WRR is substantially more disaggregated. It can 
therefore estimate, for example, not just broad global shifts in diets, but 
diet shifts only in regions where people consume large quantities of 
animal-based foods. It can also examine the regional consequences of 
these shifts and interactions with more possible changes in production 
methods. 
PREVIOUS STUDIES SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Eshel et al. (2009) Found that the average U.S. diet (which includes animal-based foods) required 3–4 times as much land and 2–4 
times as much nitrogen fertilizer as alternative vegan diets.
Stehfest et al. (2009) Modeled a “healthy diet” scenario, based on recommendations by the Harvard Medical School for Public Health, 
that included reducing consumption of beef, poultry/eggs, and pork to 52%, 44%, and 35% of global projected 
consumption levels (respectively) in 2050. The scenario freed up enough existing agricultural land to allow 
substantial reforestation and sequestering of carbon, and reduced GHG mitigation costs by more than 50% for 
the period 2005–50.
Eshel et al. (2014) Found that beef production requires 28 and 11 times more land and irrigation water, respectively, and produces 
5 and 6 times more GHG emissions and reactive nitrogen impacts, respectively, than the average of the other 
livestock categories (dairy, poultry, pork, and eggs). The paper also found that these other livestock categories, 
in turn, involved 2 to 6 times more land, GHG emissions, and nitrogen impacts than staple plant-based foods, 
although irrigation requirements were comparable.
Bajzelj et al. (2014) Examined the effects of shifting to “healthy diets” that reduce consumption of sugar, oil, meat, and dairy while 
increasing consumption of fruits and vegetables. Found that shifting to “healthy diets” reduced global cropland 
demand by 5%, pastureland demand by 25%, GHG emissions by 41%, and irrigation water demand by 3% relative 
to 2050 baseline projections.
Hedenus et al. (2014); 
Bryngelsson et al. (2016)
Found that reducing ruminant meat and dairy consumption—in addition to improving agricultural productivity 
and efficiency and reducing GHG emissions from fossil fuels and deforestation—is a necessary strategy to meet 
EU and global emissions targets to limit global warming to 2°C.
Scarborough et al. (2014) Analyzed the GHG impacts of UK diets and found that vegetarian diets produce only two-thirds of the GHGs and 
vegan diets only produce one-half of the GHGs relative to the average UK diet.
Tilman and Clark (2014) Predicted that global average per-capita dietary GHG emissions would increase by nearly one-third between 
2009 and 2050 as incomes rise. Estimated that, relative to the projected 2050 global-average diet, per-capita 
dietary GHG emissions would be 30%, 45%, and 55% lower under Mediterranean, pescatarian (vegetarian diet 
with fish), and vegetarian diets, respectively.
Table B-1 |  Summary of findings by previous studies examining the implications of shifting toward  
lower meat and dairy consumption
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PREVIOUS STUDIES SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Tyszler et al. (2014) Modeled a diet for the Netherlands that both met nutritional requirements and lowered environmental impacts 
by reducing consumption of meat, cheese, and milk to 30%, 40%, and 84% (respectively) of the average Dutch 
diet, while raising consumption of fruits, vegetables, nuts, and seeds. The modeled diet provided a 38% reduction 
in GHG emissions and a 40% reduction in land use relative to the average Dutch diet.
Westhoek et al. (2014, 
2015)
Predicted that halving consumption of meat, dairy, and eggs in the European Union would reduce nitrogen 
emissions by 40% and GHG emissions by 25–40%. Also predicted a 23% reduction in domestic cropland needed 
to feed each EU citizen.
Tom et al. (2015) Found that shifting from the current U.S. diet to one that reduced overall caloric intake and also followed U.S. 
dietary guidelines actually increased energy use by 38%, blue water footprint by 10%, and GHG emissions by 6%. 
However, the scenario modeled included not only a 25% decrease in meat consumption but also a 78% increase 
in dairy consumption—leading to an overall 13% increase in animal-based food consumption.
Springmann, Godfray,  
et al. (2016a)
Found that transitioning to more plant-based diets in line with standard dietary guidelines could reduce food-
related GHG emissions by 29–70%, relative to a reference scenario in 2050, along with health and economic 
benefits.
Erb et al. (2016) Found that many options exist to meet the global food supply in 2050 without further deforestation, even at low 
crop-yield levels—including all scenarios with a fully vegan world population, and 94% of scenarios with a fully 
vegetarian population.
Springmann et al. (2018); 
Willett et al. (2019)
Found that a “healthy reference” diet reduced GHG emissions from agricultural production by roughly half 
(relative to 2050 business as usual), although cropland use and blue water use remained similar to business as 
usual.
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ENDNOTES
1. FAO (2019a).
2. FAO (2011c).
3. Del Gobbo et al. (2015) provides a comparison of national 
estimates implied by FAOSTAT and a separate Global Dietary 
Database. Although this paper does a great service by compil-
ing data on food surveys and analyzing differences with FAO, 
the authors did not adjust FAO food availability for estimated 
losses and waste in households and at the retail level. As a 
result, the size of the discrepancies the paper discusses are 
higher than those implied by the FAO data and estimates of 
losses and waste, but our analysis indicates that the discrep-
ancies remain even after adjusting for estimates of retail and 
household losses and waste.
4. The guide to the rulemaking can be found at https://www.
epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/renewable-fuel-
standard-rfs2-program-amendments-2010.
5. We corrected one element of the directive carbon stock esti-
mates, which were those for open forest. As discussed in Carré 
et al. (2010), vegetative soil carbon estimates were based on 
an assumption that an open forest would have vegetative 
carbon stocks relative to closed forests in proportion to their 
canopy cover (e.g., that a forest with 20% canopy cover would 
hold 20% of the vegetation of a closed forest). This calcula-
tion incorrectly assumes that closed forests all have 100% 
canopy cover, while closed forest carbon stocks are estimated 
for forests with between 30% and 100% canopy cover. The 
result was open forest carbon estimates far lower than those 
estimated by others. To correct this figure, we increased the 
carbon content of closed forests by 50%, which is probably 
still conservative as it left our figures for open forests lower 
than those estimated in Gibbs et al. (2008) (supplement) for 
average open forests using IPCC methodology.
6. FAO/IIASA/ISRIC/ISSCAS/JRC Harmonized World Soil Database 
(version 1.1), http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/External-
World-soil-database/HTML. 
7. Plevin et al. (2010).
8. Carré et al. (2010). 
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